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SPHERES OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

BY

JOHN INGLIS



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Many doctrines examined in the history of philosophy
... were most often developed within theology and
this theological setting is ignored at peril of distortion.¹

¹ Walter H. Principe (1922-1996) in a handout for a survey course in patristic and medieval theology (MST 9002Y) taught at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in the spring of 1980.

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PREFACE

This book grew out of visits to the Ohio Book Store in Cincinnati, a four story Mid-West Mecca for lovers of used books. Xavier University selected and sold off hundreds of boxes of books that had not been checked out in recent years, so many in fact, that it took over a year to unpack and price them. My education in the German historiography of medieval philosophy began by spending Saturdays looking over volumes as they were being unpacked. Out came extremely rare philosophical and theological texts from the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. I picked up a copy of Albert Stöckl's huge three volume history of medieval philosophy and began to read. How similar it was to the histories of de Wulf and Gilson, where most accounts of the historiography of medieval philosophy began. I also noted copies of the second edition of Brucker's history of philosophy, Joanne Baptista Scarella's extremely rare 1769 treatment of whether to baptize aborted fetuses, the Bekker edition of the works of Plato, the Denifle-Ehrle *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, and Prümmer's edition of the lives of Aquinas. Surprised to hear about the latter, Mark D. Jordan related that he had been forced to settle for a xerox at the Medieval Institute at the University of Notre Dame. The ascension numbers and original book plates of the older volumes indicated that this was a substantial portion of a Neo-Scholastic Jesuit collection from the middle of the nineteenth century. Here was the nucleus of the library of St. Xavier College, carefully assembled to impart an education in the humanities. Yet, in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council, these works were no longer needed. No longer could one study the material evidence of the nineteenth-century intellectual culture of the Jesuits at Xavier in Cincinnati.

I am grateful to the following people: above all to Daniel H. Frank and Don Howard for helpful criticism of different versions of my manuscript, and also to Daniel J. Breazeale, James E. Force, Mark D. Jordan, James W. Manns, Xavier Monasterio, Kurt Mosser, and the anonymous reader at Brill; to Ulrike Schellhammer for all her help, especially with the translations from German; to Inge and Edi Schellhammer for finding and supplying rare books

from Germany; and most importantly, to David Barry for proof-reading the manuscript and editing the text.

I want to thank A. J. Bucher, the present holder of Stöckl's chair; Christina Hoffmann; and especially Simone Schellhammer at the University of Eichstätt; Matthias Buschkühl and Christian Büchele for guiding me through the vast holdings of the University of Eichstätt library and arranging for the use of duplicates in North America. The depository in Eichstätt of books secularized from local monasteries in the early nineteenth century and the truly marvelous Episcopal Neo-Scholastic library proved invaluable in uncovering the German historical context. An earlier version of chapter nine appeared in the *Journal of Neoplatonic Studies*. I thank James T.H. Martin for granting permission to use substantial portions of that text here. An earlier and shorter version of my argument appeared as an article in the *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*. I thank G. A. J. Rogers for granting permission to use sections in the present work. Still earlier versions of sections were read at the Ninth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy in 1992, the SSIPS/SAGP 12th Annual Conference in 1993, and the Eighteenth International Conference on Patristic, Mediaeval, and Renaissance Studies in 1993. Three research grants at the University of Dayton and a Haggin Fellowship and research grant at the University of Kentucky allowed me to devote more time to research. I also want to acknowledge A. J. Vanderjagt, the editor of this series, for his support, and Theo Joppe, editor at Brill, for witty encouragement.

Dayton, Ohio
June 1997

INTRODUCTION

A COMMON MODEL OF THE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In the world of medieval studies 1974 marked the seven-hundredth anniversary of the death of Thomas Aquinas. Throughout the year academics gathered to celebrate at different sites around the world. Thirty-five medievalists of international renown commemorated the occasion by writing papers that were published by the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto, founded by Etienne Gilson in 1929 as the first academic institute devoted solely to research into the European Middle Ages.

In 1974 Gilson was still Director of Studies at the Institute, even though he had departed for France in 1972 never to return. A number of his early students were on staff, including the following historians of medieval philosophy: Armand Maurer (1915-), Joseph Owens (1908-), Anton Pegis (1905-1978), John Quinn (1925-1996), and Edward Synan (1918-1997), all of whom contributed papers to the volumes commemorating the anniversary of Aquinas's death. The cumulative publications of these scholars represent a sizable share of the Pontifical Institute's extraordinary contribution to the historiography of medieval philosophy during the first forty-five years of its existence.¹ The 1974 commemoration was not just a tribute to a great medieval thinker, but also to an academic institution, its founder, and its role in the recovery of medieval philosophy. The scale of this celebration is also of interest for another reason: Aquinas was not the only great Latin medieval thinker to die in 1274. Bonaventure also died that year, yet the Pontifical Institute

¹ James Weisheipl was also on staff and contributed a paper to the commemoration of Aquinas, but he had studied at St. Thomas in Rome and at Oxford; thus not with Gilson. Other important historians of medieval philosophy at the Institute included Gerald Phelan (1892-1965), Ignatius Theodor Eschmann (1898-1968), Laurence K. Shook (1909-1993), and Reginald O'Donnell (1907-1988). There are also a number of historians who were trained at the Institute but went to work elsewhere, including William B. Dunphy (1926-) across the lawn at the University of St. Michael's College and Vernon Bourke (1907-), George P. Klubertanz (1912-1972), and Robert Henle (1909-), all of whom worked at the Jesuit University of St. Louis (McCool 1988, 742-743).

of Mediaeval Studies did not mark his death in any comparable manner.² Why would Gilson's institute, which had been the site of so much research into medieval philosophy, celebrate Aquinas on such a grand scale and not Bonaventure?

Gilson states in the foreword to the two volumes of papers published in 1974 why Aquinas is philosophically important. Even though Gilson is often remembered today for his claim that the distinction between essence and existence is central to Aquinas's philosophy, it is not that point on which he focuses. He contrasts Aquinas's view of scientific knowledge with that of Descartes, granting Aquinas philosophical praise for upholding a form of realism in which knowledge conforms to its object.³ Aquinas's realism, according to Gilson, allows each science to be grounded in the objects that it studies, rather than in any Cartesian universalizing features of rationality. Gilson's epistemological and metaphysical interest in Aquinas is one of the key philosophical reasons why he came to single out Aquinas, and not Bonaventure, as the significant medieval thinker. But, as we shall see, there are moral, political, and theological reasons as well. One of the claims I will make in this inquiry is that individuals and institutions have influenced the writing of the history of medieval philosophy for moral, political, and theological reasons. I begin with a brief account of the influence that Gilson's institute had on my view of the history of medieval philosophy in order to provide an example of the methodology I use to discuss the moral, political, and theological considerations behind our historiography of medieval philosophy.

In 1974 I was introduced to the world of medieval philosophy as an undergraduate at the University of St. Thomas in Houston. Medieval thinkers are notorious for their prodigious works. Even if a person were to concentrate on the works of just one prolific thinker he or she would be confronted with an overwhelming mass of material. Scholars can develop reputations for having read all the

² The Institute's John Quinn contributed to the seventh centenary of the death of Bonaventure by publishing his monumental study of the philosophy of Bonaventure in 1973, his *Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy* (Quinn 1973), an article in the Pontifical tribute to Aquinas: "Certitude of Reason and Faith in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas" (Quinn 1974a), and one in the Franciscan tribute to Bonaventure: "St. Bonaventure's fundamental conception of natural law" (Quinn 1974b).

³ (Maurer 1974, 1: 9-10) For a discussion of Gilson's metaphysical realism within the historical context, see Hankey 1985, 94-97, 126-127.

works of any such author. For example, Joseph Wey was renowned at the Pontifical Institute in Toronto for having read all of the published works of Augustine. With so many texts even by one author such as Augustine or Aquinas, how can a person begin to prepare for the study of medieval philosophy?

From 1974 to the present, I have sought out accounts of the history of medieval philosophy. At first, I only wanted to gain an overview of the philosophical problems of the medieval period in order to understand specific texts at hand. I asked my teachers at the University of St. Thomas for a good history of medieval philosophy and was told to read Gilson's *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* because this work was supposed to be the clearest, most reliable, and most comprehensive account of medieval philosophy. Gilson became my guide to medieval philosophy, clarifying a number of philosophical problems and helping me to make sense of many a medieval text. I continue to use his history for two reasons: he discusses a large number of medieval figures and issues; and he leads the reader to important primary and secondary material through his extensive notes.

Gilson's history has come to interest me for other reasons, however, one of which is related to the fact that the Pontifical Institute celebrated Aquinas in 1974 and not Bonaventure. Gilson interprets medieval philosophy according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry and the reconciliation of faith and reason, and presents Aquinas as the summit of medieval philosophy. For example, he praises Aquinas for having reconciled Greek thought and Christianity in a philosophically interesting manner, a philosophical achievement, he argues, that was foreshadowed by a number of medieval thinkers, but which Aquinas carried out most completely in his reconciliation of faith and reason (Gilson 1955, 364). In presenting this view, Gilson claims that Aquinas brought the philosophical work of his medieval predecessors to a point of perfection, the central theme of Gilson's history as a whole.

Gilson's presentation of Aquinas also illustrates his method of interpreting the medievals according to the branches of philosophy. He judges Aquinas's view of the harmony between reason and revelation as the philosophical high point of medieval thought on account of Aquinas's use of philosophy within theology. This is evident in Aquinas's views of the metaphysical foundation of creation, human understanding, and morality. For example, according to

Gilson, Aquinas holds that every material thing is a composite of matter and form, the form contributing what is universal and the matter contributing the principle of individualization (Gilson 1955, 377). This is Aquinas's metaphysical realism, the reason, as I noted above, why Gilson ranks Aquinas over Descartes.

Form is what human beings grasp in coming to knowledge. Aquinas argues that the human senses passively receive the particularized species of sensible objects. The human intellect works on these species in order to remove any trace of individuality and thereby yield the form, uncovering the virtually present universal in the species of an individual object (Gilson 1955, 377-378). According to Gilson, Aquinas's metaphysics of creation and epistemology are superior to the accounts of his predecessors, because he discusses the natural capacities and not Augustine's divine illumination (Gilson 1955, 361-365). Natural capacities are more philosophically respectable than divine assistance, which escapes the grasp of reason.

Gilson explains how Aquinas's view of forms and of human understanding allows him to offer an objective account of morality. Since all human beings have the same form we can inquire into what human beings need by nature in order to flourish (Gilson 1955, 379-381). Understanding what it is to be human permits us to know what actions might support human life. Actions that support human life are good, while those that inhibit human life are evil. Since the highest human function is reason, to be rational is good for human beings, whereas to live at odds with reason is bad. Therefore, as Gilson notes, Aquinas offers an account of human morality that rests on human nature and not individual preference. Despite the multiplicity of human preferences, understanding human nature provides a sound guide to the good life.

Aquinas's view of the human understanding of creation has ramifications for his reconciliation of reason and revelation. On one level he harmonized philosophy and theology by incorporating metaphysical, epistemological, and moral notions from Aristotle, Augustine, and Avicenna into his own theology (Gilson 1955, 382-3). Yet, in explaining how human beings can come to know certain truths that have been revealed, he presents another level of his reconciliation. For example, by means of both reason and revelation human beings are able to know that God exists, that God is one, and that he has created the world (Gilson 1955, 366-372). What

they know by reason harmonizes with what has been revealed to them. Aquinas uses philosophy within his theology so carefully, according to Gilson, that he reconciles the former with the mysteries of Christianity.

Gilson presents Aquinas's metaphysics, epistemology, morality, and reconciliation of Greek philosophy and Christianity as the measure against which to judge the philosophical merit of other medieval thinkers. He praises certain medieval thinkers for the degree to which they approach Aquinas, and criticizes others for the extent of their opposition to him. Gilson's history is a narrative that reaches its climax in Aquinas and then decline. Thus, he argues that William of Ockham marks the end of medieval thought with his epistemological and metaphysical claim that forms are fictions. If forms exist only in the mind, then, according to Ockham, Aquinas is wrong to have argued that people can come to know the world through forms. Gilson states that Ockham is an "apprentice sorcerer," an apprentice to all sorcerer empiricists of the modern period who will argue that human concepts cannot be grounded in a real world. Ockham's epistemology has implications for the reconciliation of reason and revelation. If people cannot know universals then they cannot demonstrate propositions about the God they believe on faith (Gilson 1955, 495-498). In denying that there is an overlap between reason and revelation, Ockham departs from the medieval reconciliation of reason and revelation and brings about the dissolution of medieval philosophy.

We can summarize the model of the history of medieval philosophy that Gilson offers in his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* as follows: 1. The medievals contribute to the standard areas of philosophy and the harmony between reason and revelation, 2. Aquinas represents the high point of medieval philosophy, and 3. Ockham's criticism of Aquinas's realism and harmony between reason and revelation brings about the dissolution of medieval philosophy.

We might think that this model was original to Gilson, that is to say, he arrived at it from his own extensive research into the philosophy of the Middle Ages. I will argue instead that this general model of the history of medieval philosophy is not original to Gilson, that he would have found it in the history of Maurice de Wulf. My claim is that the very real differences between the histo-

ries of Gilson and de Wulf have obscured the general agreement between the two.

As an undergraduate in search of a historical account of medieval philosophy, I read Frederick Copleston's praise of Maurice de Wulf's *History of Medieval Philosophy*, published in six editions between 1900 and 1946, and asked my teachers whether de Wulf's work was useful (Copleston 1946-1975, 2: 5). I was told that his history is fundamentally opposed to that of Gilson, that de Wulf, unlike Gilson, argues for a common philosophy among the Scholastic philosophers. I looked at the fifth edition of de Wulf's history published in 1926, the last edition to be completely translated into English and found that this was the case. De Wulf argues that there was a common philosophical patrimony among the Scholastics, the philosophical differences between thinkers being only accidental (de Wulf 1926, 1: 269-324). Gilson, my teachers told me, had demonstrated that this was false, that there was a plurality of fundamentally different philosophies in the Middle Ages, and that since de Wulf failed to recognize this plurality, his history was no longer tenable.⁴

For a number of years I followed my undergraduate teachers in viewing Gilson's history as being at odds with that of de Wulf. I read Gilson's "superior" work and ignored de Wulf's. There were institutional reasons behind my choice. I was at the University of St. Thomas when I was first "convinced" that Gilson's history was the superior. St. Thomas is part of a group of universities with a special relationship to Gilson's Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. The Congregation of St. Basil, a religious congregation, founded both institutions and continues to have a hand in the direction of both.⁵ Many graduates of St. Thomas went on

⁴ There are a number of accounts of the differences between de Wulf and Gilson on the history of medieval philosophy. Gilson's student Anton Pegis has written one of the clearest defenses of Gilson in his *Middle Ages and Philosophy* (Pegis 1963b, 33-51). Fernand van Steenberghen clearly and forcibly defends de Wulf's approach in his *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century* (Steenberghen 1955, 7-18). Patrick J. Fitzpatrick discusses the differences between Gilson and van Steenberghen's interpretations of the history of medieval philosophy in his article "Neoscholasticism" in the *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, without pointing out what these "opponents" hold in common (Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, 846-847). For an excellent account of the differences between de Wulf's and Gilson's interpretations of Bonaventure, see Quinn 1973, 17-99.

⁵ Other universities and colleges run by the Basilian Fathers that have had special relationships with the Pontifical Institute include the University of St. Michael's

to the Pontifical Institute in Toronto for graduate work, while many graduates from the Pontifical Institute obtained teaching positions at St. Thomas. Almost all of my undergraduate philosophy teachers had studied under Gilson in Toronto and accepted his interpretation of medieval philosophy. It is not strange, therefore, that Gilson's and not de Wulf's history of medieval philosophy was recommended to me.

In 1976-1977, the University of St. Thomas began to offer its first graduate courses in philosophy, two seminars on Aquinas led by Gilson's student Anton Pegis, recently retired from the Pontifical Institute.⁶ Pegis had been a supporter of Gilson for many years, having been chosen to edit the *Gilson Reader* in 1957 (Gilson 1957a). In Houston Pegis did more than simply lead two seminars on Aquinas. Both he and Victor Brezik (1913-), a Basilian and the head of the philosophy department at St. Thomas, planned the creation of a new philosophical institute, one that would devote all of its resources to the study of the philosophy of Aquinas.

By 1976, the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto no longer specialized in medieval philosophy. It had diversified its resources into medieval theology, history, paleography, law, literature, and liturgy. The Aquinas commemoration of 1974 had in many ways been a celebration of the historical importance of the Pontifical Institute under Gilson, rather than an indication of its future course. Within a few years Pegis and other older Institute professors would extend their support to what was later to be named the Center for Thomistic Studies in Houston, an institute conceived to continue the type of philosophical work long associated with Toronto. Anton Pegis, Armand Maurer, Joseph Owens,

College in Toronto; Assumption University in Windsor, Ontario (largely sold off to the University of Windsor); St. John Fisher College in Rochester, New York; St. Thomas More College within the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan; and St. Joseph's University College within the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Alberta (Basilian Directory 1983-1984, 2, 6, 8-10).

⁶ Pegis led two seminars, the first graduate course work in philosophy at the university. Before his death, Pegis came from the Pontifical Institute to St. Thomas for a number of weeks each semester in order to lead seminars and set up what would become the Center for Thomistic Studies. He was the first director of the Center. After his death in 1978, Vernon Bourke became the interim director (1978-1980). Leonard Kennedy (1922-), another Basilian was the director from 1982 until 1987. See McCool 1988, 745; *Center For Thomistic Studies: Graduate Catalog 1992-1994* 1992, 5.

Edward A. Synan, and Leonard Boyle, all of whom delivered papers on Aquinas at the 1974 commemoration, traveled from Toronto to Houston in order to teach graduate seminars and/or attend a conference marking the centenary of "Aeterni Patris," the nineteenth-century papal encyclical that promoted the study of Aquinas within the Catholic Church.⁷ By the 1980s, the Center for Thomistic Studies in Houston⁸ was replacing Toronto as the institution that continued Gilson's brand of inquiry into the philosophy of Aquinas.⁹

Within the Gilsonian environment at the University of St. Thomas I accepted the view that Gilson's history of medieval philosophy was preferable to the history of de Wulf. I did not yet know that contemporary historians continued to defend the approach of de Wulf. For example, Fernand van Steenberghen argued for the merit of de Wulf's view on the unity of medieval thought over and against Gilson's pluralism in his *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century* (Steenberghen 1955, 7-14). But, after all, did not Steenberghen study with de Wulf as well as teach at the University of Louvain? Could Steenberghen have accepted the views of his teacher without giving fair consideration to Gilson's point of view? On the other hand, I had been taught to use Gilson's history and

⁷ See Brezik 1981 and *Center For Thomistic Studies: Graduate Catalog 1992-1994* 1992, 6-7.

⁸ Having worked on developing the library collections at both institutions, Vernon Bourke notes how difficult this was becoming by the late 1970s (Shook 1984, 189).

⁹ Gilson had hoped to found a new type of institute that would keep alive his manner of studying the Middle Ages long after his own death. For example, when deciding whether or not to undertake this project in 1927, he wrote in a letter: "Certainly the project interests me very much because it is the first time that my concept of the Middle Ages has taken form on a foundation that will make possible its surviving me" (Shook 1984, 180). Yet, the Pontifical Institute has entered a financial and intellectual crisis in the 1980s and 1990s that threatens its very existence. For example, the contracts of the two younger senior fellows working on medieval philosophy, Deborah Black and Stephen Dumont, were transferred to the University of Toronto in 1995 in order to cut down on costs (President's Report 1995). No specialist in medieval theology has been hired to replace Walter H. Principe following his retirement. Furthermore, while the syllabus for 1996-1997 announced that the soon-to-retire Edward A. Synan would be teaching the bulk of the courses in both medieval philosophy and theology, this plan was changed when the Institute suspended its academic program for the year (Syllabus 1996-1997, Academic Programmes 1997). Hopefully, the recent appointment of James K. McConica as president represents a step towards the reconstruction of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, but the losses suffered so far do not bode well for the future.

ignore de Wulf's. Was it not possible that my teachers and I simply accepted Gilson's arguments without granting a fair hearing to those of de Wulf and van Steenberghen?

When I finally read de Wulf's history of medieval philosophy, I recognized that his stress on the common philosophical patrimony of medieval philosophy differed indeed from Gilson's pluralistic approach. But what struck me was that de Wulf's general model of the history of medieval philosophy bore a remarkable similarity to that of Gilson. De Wulf interprets the medievals according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry as well as the relation of faith and reason. Furthermore, he presents Aquinas as the most significant philosophical thinker of the Middle Ages. For example, he argues that Aquinas offers an objective account of knowledge, metaphysical realism, an objective account of morality, and a harmony between reason and revelation.¹⁰ Not only does de Wulf interpret Aquinas's view of knowledge as important for the harmony between reason and revelation, but he ranks Aquinas as an important thinker for any age, claiming that Aquinas's account of reason and revelation is a philosophical achievement that has never been surpassed (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 287).

Aquinas's epistemology, metaphysics, morality, and harmony between reason and revelation play a significant role in the overall structure of de Wulf's history. De Wulf ranks Aquinas as the high point of medieval philosophy and uses him as the measure against which to judge other medieval thinkers. He explains that, since Ockham denies Aquinas's view that human beings can know form, Ockham destroys Aquinas's epistemology, metaphysics, objective morality, and harmony between reason and revelation.¹¹ For example, if people do not know form, then reason no longer stands on an equal footing with revelation, Ockham thus, according to de Wulf, brings about the downfall of medieval philosophy.¹² De Wulf, like Gilson, constructs his history of medieval philosophy around the standard areas of philosophy and the relations between faith and reason. Both he and Gilson write narratives describing more than

¹⁰ (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 280-281, 277, 285, 287, respectively) References will be made by the section numbers, which apply to both the French and the English editions (de Wulf 1924-1925; 1926).

¹¹ de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 371, 372, 374, 375-376, respectively.

¹² de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 371, 373.

one thousand years of philosophical thought as reaching a climax in Aquinas and a decline in Ockham.

We might be led to think that de Wulf was the first to compose this model of the history of medieval philosophy. After all, there are historians who claim that de Wulf's history is the pioneering work in the field.¹³ For example, Jean Ladrière states in his contribution to the monumental three-volume *Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, published in 1988, that de Wulf was the first to demonstrate the coherence of medieval philosophy in a general history of medieval philosophy (Ladrière 1988, 552). Ladrière states that de Wulf's central thesis is that philosophy was autonomous from theology during the Middle Ages.¹⁴ Could de Wulf also have been the first to interpret the history of medieval philosophy according to the standard branches of philosophy?

I argue that this was not the case. Neither was de Wulf the first to construct a history of medieval philosophy around the philosophy of Aquinas. The reason why the histories of de Wulf and Gilson have for so long been incorrectly thought to oppose each other is that they are both written within a single model of the history of medieval philosophy. The model in which they both wrote so dominated the field that discussion over the nature of the history of medieval philosophy has concerned itself largely with points of interpretation within that model and not with the accuracy of the model itself. Until recently, the model of the history of medieval philosophy that isolates the epistemological, metaphysical, and moral philosophical views of medieval thinkers, clarifies where they stand on the relations of reason and revelation, and places Aquinas at the summit of medieval philosophy has not been regarded as particularly problematic. There were philosophical and institutional reasons for the success of this model, reasons that have been largely forgotten, that had to do with the nineteenth century interest in reconciling faith and philosophy. If brought to light, these can help to clarify the limitations of the dominant model of the history of

¹³ For instance, Armand Maurer notes that of the histories of medieval philosophy written at the turn of the century, ". . . none was more important or influential than that of Maurice De Wulf" (Maurer 1990b, 467).

¹⁴ Ladrière is a professor at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie at Louvain, the same institute in which de Wulf and van Steenberghen were trained and taught.

medieval philosophy and facilitate a search for a more accurate model.¹⁵

My thesis is that two mid-nineteenth-century Germans are responsible for constructing what became the most influential model of the history of medieval philosophy. If we can distinguish the philosophical and the institutional reasons behind the origin of this model, we will be in a position to evaluate its accuracy apart from its influence. Joseph Kleutgen (1811-1883) was the first to construct a model of the history of medieval philosophy according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry, the reconciliation of faith and reason, and around the philosophy of Aquinas. Albert Stöckl (1823-1895) was the first to implement this model in the first general history of medieval philosophy.¹⁶ I hope to make clear that in a real sense Kleutgen and Stöckl invented the history of medieval philosophy.

Kleutgen and Stöckl wrote their history of medieval philosophy as a contribution to a conservative political and ecclesiastical agenda. Paying attention to the philosophical and political rationale behind their writing of the history of medieval philosophy will help us to clarify the fact that their history was a particular attempt to do philosophy. The thesis I suggest is that Kleutgen and Stöckl were consciously "recovering" a philosophical tradition in order to provide an alternative to what they took to be the inherent skepticism and individualism of modern philosophy.

I will argue that Kleutgen and Stöckl reconstruct medieval philosophy according to the standard branches of philosophy and the reconciliation of faith and reason. They interpret the medievals as

¹⁵ Recent writers in the historiography of philosophy have placed into question the paradigms that structure our historical writing. For example, see Charles Taylor, "Philosophy and its history;" Richard Rorty, "The historiography of philosophy: four genres;" and Bruce Kuklick, "Seven thinkers and how they grew: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz; Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Kant" in Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner 1984, 17-30, 49-75, 125-139 respectively.

¹⁶ Professors at Louvain are not alone in failing to note the pioneering role that Kleutgen and Stöckl played in writing the history of medieval philosophy. Wolfgang Kluxen at the University of Bonn also fails to appreciate this role in his contribution to the history of research into medieval philosophy published in the *Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*. He does not mention Kleutgen, and gives no evidence of actually having read Stöckl, only quoting the medievalist Baeumker's judgment that Stöckl's work is not a history of medieval philosophy (Kluxen 1988, 365). While Stöckl's work is not crammed full of dates, it is a history of philosophy, if we mean by "history" a presentation of the philosophical arguments and historical context of medieval thinkers.

writing accounts of logic, epistemology, natural philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and political philosophy that did not conflict with religious faith. Within this general schema, Kleutgen and Stöckl present Aquinas's theory of knowledge and his harmony between reason and revelation as the high point of medieval philosophy, the measure against which they judge Scotus and Ockham as marking a philosophical decline. I will describe the institutional support that was given to this model of the history of medieval philosophy and the influence of this model to the present.

Chapters one through eight consist of an account of the historiography of medieval philosophy. Chapters nine and ten are a case study in judging the accuracy of interpreting the medievals according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry. I will question whether we should continue to interpret Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham as having a theory of knowledge and a moral philosophy. My suggestion is that if we read Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham carefully, we can see that they do not conduct an epistemological investigation, that is, they do not concern themselves with clarifying the nature of knowledge but instead discuss the human power of cognition in order to illuminate the moral theological pilgrimage of human beings on their way towards or away from God.

In understanding why the history of medieval philosophy has been written as it has, we can begin to reevaluate what is required for a more adequate model.¹⁷ Kleutgen and Stöckl constructed their history as part of an inquiry into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, an almost Lockian project of opposing skeptical doubt. With the certainty of human knowledge in one hand and the certainty of revelation in the other, they concluded that Aquinas had solved the problem of reason versus revelation. Aquinas, to them, was the great medieval thinker because he defended the scientific character of philosophy and theology, an interpretation with ramifications for the modern role for church and state. But, if Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham inquired into human

¹⁷ Armand Maurer acknowledges the need for this sort of reflection in the introduction to his collected articles: "While calling these papers studies in medieval philosophers, I am aware that, with the exception of Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun, they were not primarily philosophers but theologians who philosophized for the purpose of their theology. The final paper on 'Medieval Philosophy and its Historians,' suggests the historical circumstances that gave rise to this way of doing philosophy, which has been aptly called 'Christian Philosophy' "(Maurer 1990a, vii).

understanding in order to clarify the life of the wayfarer on earth, and not a theory of knowledge, then the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy, like all who follow it, misrepresents medieval thought.

If we are more accurately to understand medieval thought, we need to read the medievals against their own concerns, and not those of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I will argue that Gilson is correct when he offers his nuanced view of Aquinas as a theologian and not as a philosopher (Gilson 1955, 365, 543-545). But Gilson moves too quickly from this view to talk about Christian philosophy. For if we conceive of philosophy as reasoning about the natural world, then we need to reevaluate whether Aquinas, Scotus, or Ockham have a philosophy. While they carefully studied, commented on, and utilized a large number of Aristotle's views, they did not identify philosophy as their project. Only when we understand the sacred character of their inquiry will we be in a position to situate their project within the medieval context and to construct a more adequate model with which to approach the intellectual endeavors of the age.

PART ONE

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHY
OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER ONE

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In order to clarify what Joseph Kleutgen and Albert Stöckl achieved in their model of the history of medieval philosophy we need to be clear about the historiography of medieval philosophy in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, since the Kleutgen-Stöckl model would be framed around the philosophy of Aquinas, it is worth considering the reception of his philosophy during this period. I will discuss two Dominican texts on the thought of Aquinas that were widely circulated in the eighteenth century, one on theology and one on philosophy. Understanding how Aquinas was thought by many to have both provides a contrast to the interpretation found in Jacob Brucker's monumental history of philosophy, namely that neither Aquinas nor the Latin medievals wrote philosophy. This reading of medieval philosophy and the contemporary reaction against medieval ecclesiastical institutions will be reviewed as a prelude to the resurgence of interest in things medieval that would occur in the nineteenth century.

From the fourteenth century, members of the Dominican Order had identified with the thought of Aquinas and members of the Franciscan Order with Duns Scotus.¹ The Franciscan Francisci

¹ There were those who had an interest in the thought of Aquinas at the time of his death in 1274. For example, his friend, secretary, and fellow Dominican Reginald of Piperno organized the completion of his unfinished *Summa theologiae*. Early catalogs of the works of Aquinas state that Reginald led a group of people who assembled the unfinished section of part three of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, largely from his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* of Peter the Lombard (Grabmann 1949, 296-301). But the governing bodies of the Dominican order did not begin to legitimize and mandate the study of his work until after the condemnation of Paris on March 7, 1277. This condemnation of 219 propositions occurred three years to the day after Aquinas's death (Weisheipl 1974, 334). Many of the views of Aquinas were condemned, along with those of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. Within this climate Franciscans wrote "Correctories" of Aquinas's works. For example, William of la Mare criticizes 119 propositions selected out of the works of Aquinas in his correctory. His goal was to inform potential and actual readers of the "errors" present in Aquinas. This correctory received institutional approval when the Franciscan general chapter of 1282 ordered that it be read by anyone who was to study Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*. Weisheipl points out that

Henno is unusual in that he represents an “ecumenical” effort to find a common ground between the two in his *Theologia Dogmatica ac Scholastica: Opus Principiis Thomisticis & Scotisticis, quantum licuit, accommodatum*, published from 1706 to 1713. Henno argues that if we are to create a future where opposition does not exist between the Dominicans and the Franciscans, we must work out a harmony between the views of Duns Scotus and Aquinas.² And like a precursor to de Wulf’s view of the common patrimony of Scholastic thought, Henno claims that Aquinas and Scotus are in agreement on many points. Yet, as a good Franciscan, he sides with Scotus when the occasion arises.

Charles-René Billuart and Aquinas

The over seven hundred commentaries that the German historian Karl Werner notes were written on Aquinas’s *Summa theologiae* by the beginning of the eighteenth century indicate the interest in his work up to this date (Werner 1889, 1: 885). Some commentaries were written in order to earn academic degrees, much as Aquinas himself had commented on the *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* of Peter the Lombard. Others were written to aid the study of Aquinas. Charles-René Billuart, at the command of the master general of the

Dominicans referred to la Mare’s “Correctory” as the “Corruption” (Weisheipl 1974, 340).

The Dominican general chapter of 1279 reacted against the opposition to Aquinas’s thought by stipulating the punishment of anyone attacking his writings. The Dominican capitular fathers of Paris took this a step further in 1286 by commanding that the Dominicans at the University of Paris were to support Aquinas’s thought or at least accept that his views were reasonable. A number of younger Dominicans wrote defenses of the works of Aquinas, including the Englishman Richard Knapwell who, in 1286, was excommunicated for doing so by John Pecham, the Franciscan Archbishop of Canterbury (Knowles 1948-1959, 1: 232). This sentence was upheld by the Franciscan Pope Nicholas IV who ordered that Richard remain perpetually silent until death. The Franciscan John Duns Scotus (1265-1308) wrote theological works during this period in which he differed on many points from Aquinas. It would become common in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries for members of the Dominican Order to follow Aquinas and for members of the Franciscan Order to follow Duns Scotus, setting a pattern that would last for hundreds of years.

For a list of Thomists from the late Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, see Kennedy 1989. For a list of Scotists beginning with the fourteenth century, see Mingès 1912.

² See the preface to volume one, titled *De Deo Uno et Trino* (Henno 1719, 1: 1).

Dominican order, published one of the last lengthy commentaries before the French Revolution, between 1746-1751. He wrote his nineteen-volume *Summa Sancti Thomae, hodiernis academiarum moribus accommodata* in order to help his contemporaries interpret Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.³ For example, the intellectual world had changed since the time of Aquinas with Dominicans, Jesuits, and Lutherans disagreeing over issues concerning the nature of grace, ones that Aquinas does not directly address. Billuart explains to his contemporaries how they can use Aquinas to achieve solutions.

Billuart's commentary is important for another reason. It demonstrates that a separation had occurred between philosophy and theology since the time of Aquinas. This separation is indicated by Billuart's interest in theological topics and his neglect of philosophy. For example, Aquinas had devoted an entire treatise to the powers of the human soul and another to creation.⁴ Yet, Billuart offers only a brief discussion of human nature in his treatment of Aquinas's treatise on divine creation, neglecting any extended study of human nature.⁵ Another example is Aquinas's discussion of the moral virtues in the first part of the second part of his *Summa theologiae*. Billuart retains a brief general account of virtue, but omits discussion of the cardinal virtues from this treatment.⁶ He does not state why he chose to neglect the powers of the human soul and human virtue.

In 1754 Billuart produced a summa of his commentary on Aquinas's *Summa*, his six-volume *Summa Summae S. Thomae*, which neglects philosophy to an even greater degree.⁷ This work begins with an etymological account of the word "*theologia*," which sets the tone for the work as a whole. In these volumes Billuart omits all discussion of human nature along with the entire treatise on creation.

³ I used the the Lyon and Paris edition published in 1852. A. F. Deodato Labye notes the circumstances surrounding Billuart's commentary on the *Summa theologiae* in his life of Billuart (Billuart 1763, 1: xi-xiii).

⁴ Aquinas discusses general issues having to do with creation in questions 44 through 49 of the first part of his *Summa theologiae*, angelic nature in questions 50 through 64, the different types of created beings in questions 65 through 74, and the powers of the human soul in questions 75 through 89.

⁵ Billuart's discussion of human nature appears in Billuart 1852, vol. 2: 268-274.

⁶ He provides only a brief discussion of each of the cardinal virtues within his treatment of the moral life (Billuart 1852, 4: 259-273).

⁷ I used the second edition published in 1763.

Furthermore, he removes his account of Aquinas's treatise on virtue in general, while retaining the theological treatises on God, angels, grace, theological virtues, sin, Christ, and the sacraments.⁸ Why does Billuart focus on theology at the expense of philosophy in what are purported to be commentaries on Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*?

Antonio Goudin and Aquinas

By looking at the text on the philosophy of Aquinas that was widely used at Dominican institutions when Billuart was active in the eighteenth century, we can see why he could stress theological issues and neglect philosophy in his commentaries on Aquinas's *Summa*. The Dominican Antonio Goudin (1639-1685) published his *Philosophia iuxta inconcussa tutissimaque Divi Thomae Dogmata* in 1670. He has written a philosophical textbook according to the mind of Thomas Aquinas. Interestingly enough, in accordance with the order of teaching preferred by Aquinas himself, Goudin discusses the philosophical themes that Billuart later neglects. This order moves from logic to physics, the soul, metaphysics, and ethics. The study of each discipline builds upon the preceding one.⁹ For example, Goudin argues that we need logic in order to reflect on the physical world, and knowledge of the physical world in order to reflect on the functions of the soul and metaphysics. With knowledge of all four of these parts of philosophy we are prepared to study the ethical life. Goudin considers human nature alongside human understanding in his treatment of the soul and human virtue within his

⁸ Billuart notes in this work that he will focus on moral theology, which makes it all the more significant that he does not retain his discussion of virtue in general (Billuart 1763, 1: 6). Within the treatment of the moral life, he provides only what needs to be said about justice and temperance in order to prepare the reader for discussions of a host of different classes of sin (Billuart 1763, 3: 314-317; 4: 384-388). Discussion of prudence and courage are omitted. Virtue theory has been reduced to the bare minimum needed in order to train confessors. The *Summa Alexandrina*, a moral compendium of the *Theologia dogmatica et moralis* of Alexander Natalis, is another example of a Dominican moral work that no longer covers both the virtues and vices. Omitting treatments of virtue in general and of the moral virtues, moral theology only concerns different types of moral sin (Alexander 1751, 5: 190-374; 6: 3-243).

⁹ Aquinas states the order of teaching in his commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE). He places math between logic and physics (NE VI.7.1211). For Goudin's list, see Goudin 1869, 1: 2.

discussion of morality, the two areas neglected by Billuart.¹⁰ What was considered philosophical has been extracted from Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* and placed in a textbook on philosophy.

In order to identify the complementary nature of the projects of Goudin and Billuart, we need to clarify their distinctions between philosophy and theology. After all, they separate the philosophical from the theological in a way that Aquinas did not. Goudin argues that wisdom consists of knowledge of principles, of which there are two types: the knowledge of the principles of natural things, which is philosophy; and the knowledge of the principles of things above nature, which is theology (Goudin 1869, 1: 1-2; 2: 5). Goudin sums up the distinction between these two disciplines as the distinction between the natural order and the order of grace (Goudin 1869, 4: 28-29). Philosophy concerns itself with the natural order of things while theology concerns itself with the divine influence that lies above nature. Since philosophy is concerned with the principles of natural things, to talk about a human being as human being belongs to philosophical wisdom, the topic of Goudin's work. To discuss grace or the sacraments requires more than what can be accounted for on natural principles alone, which belongs to the area of theological wisdom, the topic of Billuart's work. Therefore Goudin offers a view of the principles of the natural world in his *Philosophia iuxta inconcussa tutissimaeque Divi Thomae Dogmata*, a work written for students in a program of philosophy. In Dominican schools in the eighteenth century, students who were to study theology would first study philosophy. After studying philosophy, those who were suitably predisposed would enter a program in theology where they would study a work such as Billuart's *Summa Summae*.

In his *Summa Summae* Billuart gives us a reason to understand why he would separate Aquinas's theology from his philosophy in a way that Aquinas did not. At the beginning of his study of grace, he offers a theological theory of the five different states in which human beings have existed since the beginning of time. This theory helps to explain the importance the philosophical conception of human nature had come to play in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pure human nature, the first state, consists in what it

¹⁰ For Goudin on the vegetative and animal powers, on the human intellect, on the passions, and on the virtues in common and in particular, see Goudin 1869, 3: 59-166, 3: 166-177, 4: 87-113, 4: 125-165 respectively.

means to be human apart from sin and grace (Billuart 1763, 2: 284-285). The second and third states concern the first human beings before sin. The second state is integral human nature as the perfect subjection of the body to the soul and of the sensitive appetites to reason (Billuart 1763, 2: 286). There is no physical or moral defect for a human being in this state. The third state is that of original justice according to which human beings were constituted in perfect subjection to God (Billuart 1763, 2: 287-8). Not only were the first human beings in harmony within themselves, they were also in harmony with God. But when Adam and Eve entered a state of corruption on account of sin, they entered the fourth state in which they lost both their state of natural harmony and of original justice (Billuart 1763, 2: 288). Corruption wrought by sin prepares for the fifth state which consists in the elevation of human beings from the fallen state to redemption through the gift of divine grace (Billuart 1763, 2: 288-289).

What is philosophically interesting about Billuart's five states is the central role that human nature plays in each. He claims that the will, the appetites, and the intellect are the essential properties of human beings that remain through every state (Billuart 1763, 2: 297). Original sin, the sin which all people incurred in Adam's fall, does not actually damage human nature itself. While fallen human beings more easily err than before, they continue to desire, think and choose according to their nature. What is important about this continuity of nature for Billuart, as well as for many of his contemporaries, is that it provides the intelligible touchstone for theological discourse. The only reason why Billuart can discuss the states of human nature both before and after God's offer of grace is that human beings remain essentially the same.

Billuart's foil on the continuity of human nature is Martin Luther, who argues that human nature itself has become depraved in the fall of Adam and Eve. Luther opposes the use of an essentialist theology, arguing that there is a discontinuity between the order of nature and the order of the cross (Congar 1968, 151-152). For example, Luther expresses his opposition to an essentialist philosophy in proposition number 45 of his *Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam*, written in 1517, where he states that to say "the non-logical theologian is a monstrous heretic" is "a monstrous and heretical use of language" (Luther 1517, 226). The non-logical theologian is not a monstrous heretic because adherence to logic can lead the

Christian away from Christ. In proposition number 50, Luther criticizes Scholasticism in particular for the use of Aristotle in theology: "Briefly, all the works of Aristotle are to theology as darkness is to light" (Luther 1517, 226). He can praise illogical theology and criticize the use of Aristotle because intelligibility, for him, stands at odds with the grace of God.

Luther's attack on essentialist theology threatened one of the styles of theological discourse practiced by the Roman Catholics of his day. Catholic bishops united with their Pope and opposed Luther's critique by defending the continuity of human nature at the fifth session of the general Council of Trent in 1547. For example, they condemned the view that free will was lost after the fall:

If anyone says that after Adam's sin the free will of man is lost and extinct, or that it is an empty concept, a term without real foundation, indeed a fiction introduced by Satan into the Church, *anathema sit*.¹¹

In opposition to views such as these, both Goudin and Billuart argue that free will exists even after the fall. Goudin places his arguments for human freedom at the conclusion of his discussion of the human soul (Goudin 1869, 3: 177-181). Billuart offers his arguments on behalf of free will, in preparation for his discussion of grace. He quotes the fifth session of the general Council of Trent as evidence of the correctness of the Catholic position over the views of the Lutherans and the Calvinists (Billuart 1763, 2: 28).

The Reformation provided an impetus for Catholics to study essentialist philosophy in order to defend the centrality of the order of nature.¹² While commentaries on Aristotle's works had been produced by the Latins from the late Middle Ages, Thomistic philosophical textbooks did not appear in any numbers before the sixteenth century (Schmitt 1988, 796-797). The Council of Trent created the institutional demand for such works when the bishops called in 1563 for the creation of diocesan seminaries that would educate candidates for the clergy in both the liberal arts and theology.¹³ The Jesuits supported the study of the works of Aristotle in

¹¹ (Neuner and Dupuis 1982, 567) The Latin can be found in Denzinger-Schönmetzer 1965, 378, par. 1555.

¹² Philosophical essentialism was important to Catholics in order to offer accounts of how human beings could cooperate with God's grace in gaining merit.

¹³ Session 23, chapter 18; Smets 1851, 134-137.

their colleges (Schmitt 1988, 798-799). Pope Pius V, a former Dominican, encouraged the study of Aquinas in 1567 by declaring him a Doctor of the universal church. Pope Clement VIII informed the Jesuits in 1593 that, since the Bishops at the Council of Trent had placed such a great value on the works of St. Thomas, the Jesuits should take him as their intellectual model.¹⁴ The study of Aquinas would offer Roman Catholics a philosophical basis to fend off the Protestants. As schools were established, the demand grew for professors of philosophy as well as for manuals of Thomistic philosophy, a demand that increased in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Knebel 1971-).

There was yet another influence on the teaching of the philosophy of Aquinas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With the popularity of the philosophy of Descartes, Scholastic philosophy took on an apologetic character in defense of the Aristotelian principles of Catholic theology. Goudin's *Philosophia iuxta inconcussa tutissimaque Divi Thomae Dogmata* is an example of an early work in which the philosophy of Aquinas is used to oppose the work of Descartes and "his school." The confrontational character of Goudin's text is evident in his argument that it is better to study one sound philosopher than the many conflicting philosophical opinions of the contemporary age. Like a ship in the sea that cannot make progress when fighting winds, but only encounters danger; and like a stomach that is not helped but only weighed down by food that is contrary to itself; Goudin argues that the turbulence of opposing contemporary philosophical opinions can only hinder the perfect attainment of philosophical doctrine (Goudin 1869, 1: 16).

Goudin's conclusion is that nations are better off having one master of philosophy and that this indeed has been the case throughout history; the Egyptians had Mercurius Trismegistus, Italy had Pythagoras, the Greeks had seven masters of the individual sciences, and the East had Confucius (Goudin 1869, 1: 17). But these masters were not suitable for the present age because they had not encountered Christianity. According to Goudin, contemporary Europeans stand in need of a Christian master of philosophy. Since

¹⁴ (Mandonnet 1911, 12: 368f) Clement was likely concerned with the battle between the Jesuits and the Dominicans over the human and divine roles in attaining grace, but in proposing the study of Aquinas, he was recommending Christian essentialism (Jedin 1980, 5: 542-545).

Christians use faith as well as reason, God should provide a master of both in order to permit Europeans to attain a state of happiness. Goudin argues that such masters were provided in the Middle Ages, including a number of Scholastics who took into account both reason and revelation. Since Aquinas surpasses all other medieval masters in working out accounts of both philosophy and theology, he should be the single master for the Christian world.

The difficulties inherent in Cartesian philosophy provide Goudin with an opportunity to state what Aquinas has to offer for the contemporary age. He argues that the Cartesians, in criticizing the Scholastic principles of matter, form, and privation, present a philosophical threat to Scholastic natural philosophy. For example, Descartes, in his preface to *Les principes de la philosophie*, published in 1647, argues against the Scholastic view that there are a number of principles of natural things. Specifically, he argues that the principles of heat and cold, dryness and dampness are not evident, and since anything derived from something that is not evident is also not evident, anything derived from these principles does not amount to knowledge that is certain (Descartes 1897-1910, 9B: 8). If such principles are uncertain, then we should seek other principles that are certain in order to provide a solid foundation for philosophy. Claiming that we cannot imagine physical things apart from extension, Descartes argues, in the body of his *Les principes de la philosophie*, that extension itself must be the principal attribute of all physical things.¹⁵ If there is only one principle of physical bodies then the Scholastics are wrong to embrace a plurality of natural principles.

Goudin opposes the Cartesian view that natural philosophy can be reduced to the single principle of extension.¹⁶ He offers a moral-psychological argument in order to demonstrate the undesirable consequences of this account. Descartes had already argued that irrational animals are quite simply machines that we can explain through extension and motion. And Pierre Gassendi had responded to Descartes by noting that irrational animals do in fact have sensation, memory, hearing, that they can love, suffer, hate and

¹⁵ Descartes 1897-1910, 8A: 25; part 1, principle 53.

¹⁶ Goudin opposes Descartes at the beginning of his volumes on logic and physics, yet the Franciscan, Duns Scotus, remains a chief philosophical foil. For example, see Goudin's comments on haecceity, on metaphysical distinctions, on virtual distinctions, and on being as univocal (Goudin 1869, 4: 192, 193-195, 195-199, 172).

have a certain understanding of sense objects.¹⁷ Gassendi's claim is that all these activities cannot be accounted for by the principle of extension alone, even with the addition of motion.

Goudin adds a twist to Gassendi's argument, by taking into account the Cartesian response that irrational animals are in fact insensible and therefore do not perceive, suffer, love, hate, or understand. Goudin argues that if we are convinced that animals are not living and sensible, why not conclude that all people, other than ourselves, are in fact imitations and not real human beings (Goudin 1869, 2: 21)? His point is that if we focus on extension and motion alone, we might as well conclude that all "human beings" but ourselves are insensible. After all, because people, like irrational animals, only appear to be alive; we have no way of ascertaining whether this is indeed the case. Goudin assumes that his readers will opt for the view that all human beings and animals are living and not simply simulacra, a conclusion that supports the Thomistic view that all animals and plants have souls and cannot be accounted for through extension and motion alone. If we cannot fully explain human beings and animals by the principle of extension, then extension is not an adequate principle for physical beings.

Goudin claims that the philosopher who is interested in conducting an inquiry into truth will see that the actual extension of objects stands under specific forms. We should not forsake the concept of form, he argues, since the form of every individual substance governs its extension (Goudin 1869, 2: 19-20). Furthermore, the true principles of actual things are the principles of the generation and corruption of each individual. Therefore, in order to discuss natural things, we must take into account the matter, form, and privation involved in generation and corruption. In order to understand the principles of natural beings, Goudin argues that we should investigate matter, form, and privation, and only then will we understand the so-called Scholastic principles of hot, cold, wet, and dry that Descartes decries.¹⁸

In criticizing what he takes to be the Scholastic principles, Descartes overlooks the principles of actual things because he fails to penetrate the "interior" intelligibility of natural beings. According

¹⁷ Descartes 1897-1910, 7: 268-271; fifth set of objections, on Meditation II.

¹⁸ (Goudin 1869, 2: 23-25) Contrary qualities like hot and cold exist only within a subject that is common to both (Goudin 1869, 2: 7-8).

to Goudin, the human intellect functions to disclose the intimate properties of beings by offering universal concepts that map onto the natures of actual beings. We have here an interior penetration of truth that cuts through external extension to the innermost being of the actual things themselves (Goudin 1869, 3: 172-173). Goudin has an interest in epistemology to solve a question in the philosophy of nature. According to him we must look beyond extension to form if we are to begin to offer an adequate account of physical beings. In discussing only the external extension of physical bodies, Descartes failed to grasp the intelligibility of form.

Even though Goudin is careful to separate Aquinas's philosophy from his theology when arguing with the Cartesians, he is not adverse to using theology to support a philosophical point, for example, in his argument that extension cannot be the sole principle of natural beings. He grants that if extension is the sole principle, then an object becomes another thing when its extension changes, that is, when its size or shape undergoes change. This view becomes problematic, Goudin explains, when we consider the change that takes place in the sacrament of the Eucharist. According to Catholics, bread becomes the body of Christ in this sacrament but continues to look like bread (Goudin 1869, 2: 18-19). Goudin argues that if such change does occur in the Eucharist, then we cannot account for this change through the principle of extension. His reason is that if what was bread continues to look like bread, yet becomes something else, we have a change in substance while the extension remains the same.¹⁹ Therefore in this instance, the principle of extension is not sufficient to account for change in physical bodies. We should not posit the principle of extension as the sole principle of physical beings. Rather, Goudin claims that the extension of a physical object is an accidental quality of an object and not a substantial property. Descartes's error was to elevate an accidental quality of physical bodies into a central philosophical principle.

Goudin argues that while it might appear unphilosophical to base a philosophical view upon a religious belief, this is not the case.

¹⁹ This argument is similar to one of Antoine Arnauld's objections to the *Meditations* of Descartes. Arnauld notes that, according to Descartes, if the extension of a body remains unaltered, then one substance cannot change to another, bread cannot change into the body of Jesus. See Descartes 1897-1910, 7: 217-218; fourth set of objections.

Since faith provides a certainty that is greater than what can be attained in philosophy, it is permissible to use the tenets of faith to test a philosophical argument.²⁰

In maintaining that faith can be a legitimate guide in making philosophical commitments, Goudin does not cleanly separate theology from philosophy. And his discussion of the Eucharist is only one example of the use of theology in support of philosophical conclusions. Another is when he argues for the “metaphysical” claim that God aids the activity of creatures. Goudin cites Scripture, church councils, the consent of Christians, and church fathers in order to demonstrate the truthfulness of this philosophical conclusion (Goudin 1869, 4: 239-247). In the nineteenth century, Kleutgen and Stöckl will separate philosophy more decisively from theology.

The widespread yet diminishing nature of the influence of Aquinas and of medieval thought during the eighteenth century can be gauged from publishing records. Goudin’s *Philosophia iuxta inconcussa tutissimaque Divi Thomae Dogmata* was printed in Lyon, Paris, Bologna, Cologne, Treviso, Naples, and Venice, reaching its fourteenth edition by 1744 and appearing in print as late as 1796 in Madrid.²¹ Billuart’s *Summa S. Thomae hodiernis Academicarum moribus accommodata* appeared at least five times before 1787.²² The complete works of Aquinas were reprinted at least six times during the eighteenth century, the last apparently at Venice in 1787.²³ But

²⁰ Descartes had argued in the preface to his *Principia philosophiae*, written in 1647, that he would philosophize using natural reason apart from the light of faith (Descartes 1897-1910, 9B: 4).

²¹ I used the *National Union Catalog* and the “World Catalog” as the basis for the publishing histories in the present work [“WorldCat (OCLC)” 1997]. The National Union Catalog lists the fourteenth edition in 1744. I have found seventeen printings listed before 1800: Goudin’s *Philosophia iuxta inconcussa tutissimaque Divi Thomae Dogmata* Lyon, 1670; Lyon, 1671; Paris, 1674; Bologna, 1680; Cologne, 1681; Cologne, 1685; Bologna, 1686; Paris, 1692; Treviso, 1706; Cologne, 1723; Cologne, 1724; Cologne, 1726; Naples, 1732; Venice, 1744; Cologne, 1764; Madrid, 1767; Madrid, 1796. The Quétif-Échard bibliography of the works of members of the Dominican order notes that Goudin’s work had reached its tenth edition at Paris in 1692 (Quétif and Échard 1719-1721, bk. 2, Pt. 2: 739-740). I also used Thomas Hartley’s *Thomistic Revival and the Modernist Era* to compile this list (Hartley 1971, 18).

²² Billuart’s *Summa S. Thomae hodiernis Academicarum moribus accommodata*, Leodii: E. Kints, 1746-1751; Würzburg: I. I. Stahel, 1758; Würzburg: I. I. Stahel, 1767; Venice: P. Savioni, 1777-1778; Venice: P. Savioni, 1787.

²³ The complete works of Aquinas were published in Venice in 1712, 1745, 1755, and in 1787; Antwerp, 1745-1775; Madrid, 1765-1771 (De Wulf 1926, 2: 33; Mandonnet and Destrez 1921).

after 1787 editions of Aquinas's complete works were not reprinted for another fifty-nine years, the first volume appearing at Naples in 1846. Goudin's *Philosophia iuxta inconcussa tutissimaque Divi Thomae Dogmata* and Billuart's *Summa S. Thomae hodiernis Academicarum moribus accommodata* were not reprinted until the middle of the century.

One reason for the slackening of interest in the thought of Aquinas at the end of the eighteenth century was the intellectual shift towards modern philosophy, a shift represented by the influential *Institutiones logicae et metaphysicae* written by the Austrian Jesuit Sigismund Storchenau and published from 1769 to 1771.²⁴ The thirteen printings of this work between 1769 and 1833 coincide with a general decline of interest in Aquinas and in medieval philosophy in general.²⁵ Storchenau's work epitomizes this lack of interest in the brief forty-nine page history of philosophy with which it begins, where a little more than two pages are devoted to the philosophy of the Middle Ages. He presents this period as a time when dialectical skill was used to inquire into the most abstract philosophical questions and not into the natural world.²⁶ According to Storchenau, if we conceive of philosophy as reflection on the natural world *qua* natural world, there was no philosophy during the Middle Ages.

Storchenau's heart is with a number of modern thinkers who have restored philosophy through investigations into the natural world. He conceives philosophy after the model of the natural sciences and argues that it must return to human experience if it is to

²⁴ The Jesuits had turned away from medieval thought at the middle of the eighteenth century (Stasiewski 1981, 6: 540-541).

²⁵ Storchenau's *Institutiones logicae et metaphysicae* were often published separately.

Printing history of the logic: Vienna: Typis Joannis Thomae Nob. de Trattner Caes., 1769; Vienna: Typis Joannis Thomae Nob. de Trattner Caes., 1770; Vienna: Typis Joannis Thomae Nob. de Trattner Caes., 1772; Venice: Franciscum Pitteri, 1783; Venice: Josephum Rossi fil. Barthol., 1791; Venice: Josephum Rossi fil. Barthol., 1794; Buda: Typis reg. universitatis, 1795; Venice: Josephum Rossi fil. Barthol., 1798; Venice: Pasquati et Curti, 1816; Buda: Typis reg. universitatis, 1816; Venice: Antonium Rosa, 1817; Venice: Josephi Molinari, 1825; Bassani: Remondini, 1833.

Printing history of the metaphysics: Vienna: Typis Joannis Thomae Nob. de Trattner Caes., 1771; Venice: Franciscum Pitteri, 1775; Venice: Franciscum Pitteri, 1784; Venice: Josephum Rossi fil. Barthol., 1791; Venice: Josephum Rossi fil. Barthol., 1794; Buda: Typis reg. universitatis, 1795; Venice: Josephum Rossi fil. Barthol., 1798; Venice: Pasquati et Curti, 1816; Venice: Josephum Molinari, 1819-1820; Venice: Josephi Molinari, 1825; Bassani: Remondini, 1833.

²⁶ I will refer to the *Logicae* as volume five (Storchenau 1833, 5: 41-43).

make progress.²⁷ Throughout this work Storchenau refers to Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, and Wolff as presenting adequate accounts of the natural world. He argues that a renovation in philosophy has occurred from one side of Europe to the other, represented by Blaise Pascal in France, Galileo Galilei in Italy, Otto von Guericke in Germany, and Robert Boyle in England (Storchenau 1833, 5: 44-45). And, since it takes time and money to support a renovation, Storchenau praises numerous members of royalty for their aid to this cause, mentioning Peter the Great in Russia, Louis XIII and XIV in France, and Charles II in England.

Jacob Brucker's General History of Philosophy

The negative picture of medieval philosophy in Storchenau is presented at greater length in Jacob Brucker's *Historia Critica Philosophiae* published from 1742 to 1767. Brucker's history was important because, as Victor Cousin says, it established the modern genre of the general history of philosophy. Cousin calls Brucker "the father of the history of philosophy," just as Descartes had been the father of modern philosophy (Cousin 1847, 1: 265). Brucker devotes over nine hundred pages to medieval philosophy, presenting critical appraisals from a number of sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century historians of the church, historians of the university of Paris, historians of philosophy, historians of the world, and writers on Scholastic theology.²⁸ His achievement consists in his hav-

²⁷ Storchenau states that the mind is nothing without experience in the prolegomenon to his *Logicae* (Storchenau 1833, 5: 51). He also discusses human experience in an extended section of his metaphysical volume on psychology titled "*Empirica*" (Storchenau 1833, 3: 5-186).

²⁸ For example, Brucker cites: Juan Luis Vives, *De Causis Corruptarum Artium*, Basel, 1555; Lambertus Danaeus, *In primum librum Sententiarum cum commentario*, prologue to book one, Geneva, 1580; Christophorus Binder, *De Scholastica theologia*, Tübingen, 1624; J. Launoy, *De varia Aristotelis fortuna in acad. Parisiensi*, Paris, 1653; Georgius Hornius, *Historiae philosophicae libri VII, quibus de origine, successione, sectis et vita philosophorum ab orbe condito ad nostram aetatem agitur*, Lugduni Batavorum, 1655; C. D. Bulaeus, *Hist. uniuersitatis Parisiensis*, Paris, 1665-1673; Adam Tribbechovius, *De doctoribus scholasticis et corrupta per eos diuinarum humanarumque rerum et scientia liber singularis*, Giessen, 1665 and Jena, 1719; J. Launoy, *De scholis celebr. a Carolo Magno et post ipsum instauratis*, Paris, 1672; Jacob Thomasius, *Hist. Sapientiae et stultitiae*, Jacob Thomasius, *De doctoribus scholasticis*, Leipzig, 1676; Daniel Georg Morhofius, *Polyhistor, sive de auctorum notitia et rerum commentarii*, Lübeck, 1688-1707; Pierre Bayle *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, Rotterdam 1695-1697; Jacob Thomasius, *Origines his-*

ing presented a cross-section of the critiques of medieval philosophy from the preceding centuries. Kleutgen will criticize this project as having little philosophical value. As we shall see, he will claim that Brucker, a Lutheran minister, has a Protestant bias against medieval philosophy and argue that Brucker's error was to offer a reading of the medievals that was decidedly antipathetic to traditional Roman Catholic philosophy.

In the first part of his volume on the philosophy of the medieval period, Brucker states that he will account for and judge the truth of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. With enlightened zeal he claims that even though he will honor the names of the medieval ecclesiastical doctors, he will not overlook the errors of these thinkers.²⁹ Brucker quotes and refers to Renaissance and modern texts in order to argue that the Scholastics did achieve a certain level of dialectical skill during the Middle Ages, but that this strength was also a weakness.³⁰ His conclusion is that Scholastic "philosophy" was essentially unphilosophical. Labeling this philosophy "quarrelsome," "sophistic," "contentious," "vague," "jeering," "obscure," and an "immense logomachy sea," Brucker makes his case that there was no philosophy for the Latins during the late Middle Ages but only a pseudo-philosophy, a discourse with only the appearance of philosophy.³¹

Real philosophy, for Brucker, is an inquiry into natural things, and since the Scholastics imprisoned philosophy within theology, their philosophy can enjoy only the appearance of philosophy (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 873-874). Human reason was neglected by the Scholastics when they placed philosophy within the limits of theology, confounding rationality with revelation, instead of allowing reason to attain its own perfection. The medieval Latin thinkers subordinated reason to revelation and confused the principles of

toriae philosophicae et ecclesiasticae, Leipzig, 1699; Samuel Pufendorf *intro. ad. Hist.*; Johann Franciscus Buddeus, *Compendium historiae philosophicae*, Hall, 1712; C. A. Heumani, preface to the second edition of Tribbechovius, 1719, listed above; Johann Lorenz von Mosheim, *Institutionum historiae ecclesiasticae libri IV*, 1726.

For Brucker's general bibliography on Scholasticism, see Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 709-710.

²⁹ Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 2-4, preface.

³⁰ (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 871-872, 892-894) For Brucker, Scholastic philosophy began with Peter Abelard in the twelfth century (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 675, 731, 734-735).

³¹ (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 714, 871-874) He is not so critical of the philosophy of Augustine of Hippo or of other early medievals (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 502-507).

philosophical knowledge with the principles of theology (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 712). For this reason, Latin medieval philosophy is only a pseudo-science.

Brucker argues that the influence of theology is most visible in the "philosophical" creation of imaginary beings. The school of the realists, for example, spoke of universals as real entities, when in fact they are not (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 879-880). It took a thinker like William of Ockham to break philosophy out of this subservient mode. One of Brucker's themes is that only those intellectuals who break the chain of pontifical power are able to be philosophers and exercise reason freely. For example, in fighting against the authority of the Pope, Ockham rid himself of the limitations placed on philosophy by Rome (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 847-849). He was therefore able to dispel illusions about the reality of universals and focus attention on the real natural world.

According to Brucker, theology and ecclesiastical politics corrupted philosophy during the Middle Ages and transformed Scholastic dialectic into sophistry. Synods and councils consisting of ecclesiastical leaders reduced philosophy to a marketing tool for religious dogma. Brucker offers an almost Nietzschean critique when he claims that the Scholastics did philosophy merely to fulfill their ambitions within an ecclesiastical world order.³² Human ambition placed human understanding in a captive mode whereby reason was used with great cleverness and subtlety to gain high office and fame (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 876-877). Within such a non-philosophical world it is perfectly understandable that a number of pseudo-philosophical thinkers attained high ecclesiastical office, a point Brucker underlines by listing the professional ecclesiastical advancement of William Champeaux, Gilbert of Poitiers, Peter Lombard, Stephen Langton, Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Aegidius Column, Peter of Spain, Peter of Tarantasia, William Durandus, Peter of Words, Durand of St. Pourçain, and

³² Two papers given at the 1981 and 1982 conferences of the Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche Geschichte represent the renewed interest in viewing late medieval thinkers from the perspective of their relationship to the institutional church. Jürgen Miethke continues to consider the advantages that a university education allowed for attaining high church office in his "Die Kirche und die Universitäten im 13. Jahrhundert" (Miethke 1986). And Arno Seifert breaks with the tradition of viewing the medievals as wise human beings in his "Studium als soziales System." He argues that if we take the social privileges enjoyed by the medieval masters of theology into account we will get a clearer idea of their "intellectual" achievements (Seifert 1986, 604-605). See also Baldwin 1982.

Peter of Ailly (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 888). On this reading, Scholastic thinkers were not free to think during the Middle Ages. They simply stated what church officials wanted to hear in order to obtain high office, a type of ambition evidenced by the love of titles. How else are we to view the medieval practice of gathering disciples together to consecrate their master as: seraphim, angelic, doctor of doctors, most eloquent, the source of life, glorious, illuminated, profound, resolute, singular, subtle, sublime, venerable, universal (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 889)? The Middle Ages were a period when philosophy was bound up with the ambitions of academics in search of power and high standing linked, via vassal bishops and cardinals, to the Pope himself in Rome (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 713).

Brucker singles Aquinas out as having many supporters and as having written a number of works with a certain "ethical glory." But he adds that those who praise Aquinas's erudition fail to note that he did not know history, languages, or the critical arts (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 804). Aquinas's study of philosophy is fraudulent in that he knew no Greek and had only poor versions of Aristotle's works. Brucker even disparages Aquinas's ethical achievement as a possible case of plagiarism, when he suggests that Aquinas might have plagiarized the ethical views of Vincent of Beauvais that appear in his *Speculum Morale* (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 807). Since there are striking similarities between passages of the *Speculum Morale* and texts in Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* on the moral life, and since Vincent wrote before Aquinas, Aquinas appears to have plagiarized Vincent.

In presenting this interpretation of Aquinas as a plagiarist Brucker fails to mention the research into the textual history of the *Speculum Morale* carried out by the Dominican Jacob Échard and published as *Sancti Thomae Summa suo auctori vindicata, Sive de V. F. Vincentii Bellovacensis scriptis dissertatio* in 1708 and summarized in his *Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum* in 1719.³³ Échard compared the manuscripts and early published editions of the *Speculum Morale* and concluded that this work was composed early in the fourteenth century by someone other than Vincent (Quétif and Échard 1719-1721, 1: 215-232). Since Aquinas was no longer among the living at the time when this part of the *Speculum* was composed, he could not have plagiarized "Vincent." In fact, the textual evidence supports

³³ Furthermore, Brucker does not mention Échard's view in the supplement to his history that was published in 1767 (Brucker 1766-1767, 6: 594-595).

the conclusion that the author of the *Speculum Morale* compiled part of his work from Aquinas. Even though Brucker published his volume on the history of medieval philosophy more than 30 years later than Échard's original study, he makes no mention of this defense of the authorship of Aquinas.³⁴

One interesting aspect of Brucker's history is the attention he devotes to Aquinas when criticizing the view that philosophy existed in the late Middle Ages. He considers the philosophical achievements according to the philosophical disciplines of logic, physics, metaphysics, natural theology, ethics, and politics only to conclude that there was no real philosophy practiced during this period. When explaining this lack of philosophy, he discusses Aquinas under each discipline, except logic. In fact, the views of Aquinas are discussed more than those of any other medieval thinker in this treatment (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 895-901). But Brucker does not consider Aquinas with a view to praising him; in order to indicate the nonsense that has passed for philosophy, he chides him for his use of obscure language when discussing magnets in physics, for including the imaginary specter of prime matter in metaphysics, for his inane distinctions within natural theology, and for confusing the philosophical virtues with the theological virtues of faith, hope and love in ethics. Kleutgen and Stöckl will offer counter examples to these claims when they argue that Aquinas and the medievals made interesting philosophical contributions to each of the spheres of philosophical inquiry.

Brucker ends his account of medieval philosophy with a discussion of the realist versus nominalist controversy over the nature of universals (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 904-912). He notes that Aquinas clings to the old view encouraged by theology, that universals are real. The new view of Ockham is that universals are words and not things. This view, as Brucker says, will triumph in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as philosophers begin to free themselves from theology and its empty abstractions and use untainted reason to inquire once again into natural things.³⁵ Therefore medieval philosophy ends for Brucker not as the death of one type of philosophy and the birth of another, as it will for Kleutgen and Stöckl, but

³⁴ This is odd since in writing on Albert and Aquinas Brucker depends on Échard's *Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum* (Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 788, 790, 798, 806).

³⁵ Brucker 1766-1767, 3: 910-911; 4: 3-5, 106-107.

as the overcoming of a pseudo-philosophy through the free exercise of human reason.

The Secularization and the French Revolution

Enlightenment ideals were not the only threat to the promotion of medieval philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth century. A pattern had been set at the end of the Thirty Years War that legitimized the destruction of the academies and schools in which the works of Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Scotus were still studied. For centuries, the collection of kingdoms, principalities, free cities of the empire, and ecclesiastical territories that formed what is today Germany had been the site of warfare between Protestants and Catholics. In the Peace of Westphalia, the Holy Roman Emperor negotiated a pair of treaties, one with Catholic France, and another with Sweden and the Protestant estates of the empire, which allowed for territorial compensation. This treaty authorized on a grand scale the acquisition by secular sovereigns of free cities of the empire and of ecclesiastical territories governed by prince-bishops. The principle was established that a state could dispose of either church property or imperial territory in order to serve the common good — and the well-being of many a prince as well.

Sweden, for example, was compensated for its contribution to the war effort by being ceded the Hanse city of Wismar and the archbishopric of Bremen, and the bishopric of Verden (Gough 1911). In this transfer of imperial and ecclesiastical property, medieval political structures were fundamentally altered. While the ecclesiastical territory of Bremen had been occupied by the Swedish military for a number of years, “legal” recognition was now granted to a transfer of government and the closure of a number of monasteries and a Jesuit college (Lins 1907). The suppression of ecclesiastical educational institutions and the accompanying dispersal of various religious orders terminated the very educational centers that had traditionally promoted Scholastic learning.

Another movement to suppress religious orders and acquire ecclesiastical territory occurred during the last half of the eighteenth century. A number of states took over the land and buildings, including the schools, of different religious orders under pretexts of improved fiscal management and church reform. For example,

Joseph II suppressed a number of Dominican convents in Austria in 1765 and more than seven hundred religious communities in 1781.³⁶ The local communities of many religious orders were closed in France in 1770. Furthermore, Pope Clement XIV suppressed the entire Jesuit order across Europe in 1773, interpreted by many as a blow struck in the spirit of the Enlightenment.³⁷ One result of these suppressions was the further loss of institutions that had supported the study of Scholastic philosophy and theology.

The French Civil Constitution of 1790 dealt the death blow to Scholastic education in France, as well as to fifty bishoprics and all the religious orders. The Dominicans, the main propagators of the thought of Aquinas, lost their legal existence and suffered the secularization of their property. This act was not, strictly speaking, revolutionary, since both Catholic and Protestant royalists had been secularizing monasteries and convents for years, but the extent of the republican secularization was radical (Raab 1981, 498). Few, if any, centers of Scholastic learning would remain (Aubert 1981b, 29-38). Over 800,000 volumes were taken from the libraries of 162 religious houses in Paris during 1791 and over 6,000,000 from outside Paris (Tedder and Brown 1911, 567). Some were deposited in central state libraries. Yet as a decree had been issued to destroy or modify books that represented feudalism, thousands upon thousands of books on medieval philosophy and theology were destroyed. Within a few years virtually all the religious houses and centers for the study of medieval thought across Catholic Europe would be closed and their libraries seized, often at the insistence of French troops: Belgium (1796), Germany (1802-1807), Italy (1807-1811), Spain (1809), and Switzerland (1848) (Aubert 1981e, 206).

Understanding the secularization of Germany helps one appreciate the extent of the turn to the Middle Ages that occurs early in the nineteenth century. This secularization was prompted when France took the left bank of the Rhine from the German principalities and the Empire in 1792. All church property was to be seized and the ecclesiastical territories of Cologne, Trier, Speyer, Luttich, and Mainz, were to be secularized. Prussia and the Empire

³⁶ 758 religious communities were suppressed in Germany during these years (Gamble 1927, 160).

³⁷ On the suppressions under Joseph II, see Raab 1981, 496-497. On the suppressions in France during 1770, see Mandonnet, 1911, 368f. On Clement XIV's suppression of the Jesuits in 1773, see Schneider 1981, 579-582.

recaptured a number of the ecclesiastical territories on the left bank of the middle Rhine in 1794 (Raab 1981, 500). For Prussia's support in action against France, it was compensated with ecclesiastical territories on the right bank of the Rhine, including the prince-bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg, which were secularized in 1795. The "Protestant" states of Hesse-Kassel and Württemberg, and the "Catholic" states of Baden and Bavaria climbed aboard the secularization band wagon and took control of a number of ecclesiastical territories on the right bank in 1795 and 1796.

Napoleon marched to Austria and forced the emperor to accept the Peace of Campoformio in 1797, which ceded to France all of the ecclesiastical states on the left bank of the Rhine between Basel and Andernach (Raab 1981, 501). France secularized these states, and the prince-bishops, now devoid of territory, were promised compensation on the right bank of the Rhine.

Joseph Görres, the celebrated German Catholic intellectual, would later react against the excesses of revolution and use medieval imagery to defend the traditional institutions of church and state. Yet in the late eighteenth century he identified with the republicans and offers us some sense of the liberating quality of the secularization. Görres was raised in the city of Koblenz on the left bank of the Rhine, which had belonged to the archbishop of Trier since 1018. Clement Wenzeslaus, then the archbishop-elect of Trier, had moved his court to Koblenz in 1786. Up to 1803 he conducted an open-door policy towards French aristocrats and ecclesiastics, establishing Koblenz as a center for émigrés (Coblenz 1910, 613). It was during this chaotic period that Görres began to publish his republican newspaper *Das rote Blatt*. The first issue appeared at Koblenz in 1798. In one rather biting article, Görres takes issue with the imperial office of prince-bishop and with the aristocracy in general by offering for sale

three electors' caps of tanned buffalo-hide together with lead-filled crosiers, furnished with daggers and encircled by artificial snakes. The eye of God mounted on top is blind. —Two bishop's mitres, richly trimmed with tinsel, somewhat stained by cold sweat, but otherwise in good condition; hence very useful as red caps on trees of liberty. —A ducal hare skin hat, embellished with cocks' feathers, trimmed with a precious stone distilled by a clever alchemist from the tears of ten thousand widows and orphans A barn-full of patents of nobility, written on asses' skin, but badly moth-eaten in parts and giving out a strange smell of decay. (Mann 1968, 24)

The electors' hats would have belonged to the prince-bishop electors of Trier, Mainz, and Cologne, each of whom previously had the right to cast a vote in electing the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire. With the secularization of ecclesiastical territory there were no longer any prince-bishops in these three cities, so their hats could be offered for sale.

The Peace of Lunéville, which was concluded between France and the empire in 1801, granted the entire left bank of the Rhine to France, adding all non-ecclesiastical states to what France already possessed. Acceptance of this situation by Rome was effected in the Concordat of 1801 in which Pope Pius VII accepted the secularizations that had taken place in France and on the left bank of the Rhine.³⁸ Ecclesiastical property in the non-ecclesiastical territories on the left bank had not yet been secularized. All the religious orders and ecclesiastical property, including the schools in these territories, would be secularized in 1802.

France and Russia, in line with the Peace of Lunéville, and forgetting promises of compensation to the prince-bishops of the left bank, worked out a compensation program whereby imperial and ecclesiastical territory on the right bank of the Rhine would be granted to those princes who had lost territory on the left (Oer 1970, 21-22). Two ecclesiastical electoral states, one prince-archbishopric, nineteen prince-bishoprics, and more than two hundred monasteries were secularized.³⁹ The increase in territory often did not reflect the losses. For example, Prussia was over-compensated five times for its losses, increasing its territory by two hundred thirty-five square miles and 600,000 inhabitants; Baden grew by eight times its losses, gaining fifty-nine square miles and 237,000 people (Weis 1974, 13; Raab 1981, 505). For Kleutgen and Stöckl, this compensation would appear as an assault on the integrity of the Catholic Church and not as an act of justice.

The secularization drastically altered the political and ecclesiastical map of Germany and resulted in the closure of Catholic libraries, universities and schools, the repositories of medieval learn-

³⁸ Schmid 1874, 129-132; Raab 1981, 502-503.

³⁹ For example, Baden secularized the prince-bishoprics of Constance, Wesel, Strasbourg, and Speyer, plus 10 monasteries. Bavaria secularized the ecclesiastical principalities of Würzburg, Augsburg, Bamberg, the bishopric of Freising, part of Eichstätt and Passau, and the city of Passau (Schmid 1874, 132).

ing. The royal-, state-, and university-libraries were able to benefit from the losses of the church. Christoph Freiherr von Aretin, a distinguished member of the "Landesdirektionsrat" of Bavaria notes the importance for the Bavarian people of the transfer of the thousand-year-old cultural heritage to the state:

There was a break of a thousand years between yesterday and today. Today the giant stride over this vast chasm has been undertaken. From today's date begins an epoch of Bavarian history so important, as none till now has been found the same. From today on, moral, mental, and physical culture of the land will take on a completely different form. After a thousand years, one will still feel the results of this stride. The philosophical historians will begin a new chronology, starting with the dissolving of the cloisters, like they did after the lifting of the law by brute force, and one will approach the ruins of the abbeys with roughly the same mixed feelings with which we observe the old castles of robber barons. Do not believe, dear friend, that I get carried away with enthusiasm here. When you will come to know better the former influence of our cloisters that possessed a third of the land I am convinced that you will appreciate with me the importance of the changes, which can never or rarely appear in their true light to contemporaries.⁴⁰

Of course, since the choice manuscripts and books taken from the monasteries in Bavaria went into the private collection of the king, a number of years would pass before the people could gain access to "their" heritage.

The library of the Benedictine abbey at Tegernsee provided 4000 incunabula and 2000 manuscripts dating from the eighth through the tenth centuries. More than 700 cases of books, comprising 7231 volumes, were taken from the Benedictine abbey of Beuern, which included 148 manuscripts, 300 incunabula, 690 folios, 1198 quartos, 1518 octavos, 94 facsimiles, and 19 music books. The removal of books from this monastery was hindered by a debate with the suppliers of wood for the cases who were afraid they would not have enough wood for the royal court (Schneider 1970, 212). University libraries, many obtained from the Catholic Church through the secularization, also benefited. For example, the university library at Landshut was enriched with volumes taken

⁴⁰ (Schneider 1970, 207) Translations without reference to a published translation are my own.

from the monasteries at Steingaden, Ettal, Dießen, Metten, Rott, Attel, and Niederaltaich (Schneider 1970, 211-216).

The free German cities of the empire were also divided up as part of the spoil. There had been fifty-one free cities of the empire at the time of the French Revolution. By decree of the imperial deputation in 1803, only six free cities of the empire were left, including Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, Augsburg, Frankfurt on the Main, and Nuremberg (Chadwick 1980, 503-504). At the dissolution of the empire in 1806, Augsburg and Nuremberg were given to Bavaria, leaving four remaining free cities. Frankfurt was established as a duchy for the primate of the *Rheinbund*, the single prince-bishop retained in order to crown future emperors.⁴¹

With the secularizations at the turn of the nineteenth century the medieval political and ecclesiastical order was to a large extent laid to rest. Most centers of Scholastic learning had been closed, the monks and members of religious orders pensioned off or turned out into the streets, and the libraries dispersed. Both Catholics and Protestants looked on medieval thought as a relic of an earlier age. Storchenau represents those Catholics who found a common cause with Protestant intellectuals in what they took to be the modern world (Grabmann 1933, 206-210). An ecumenical age began, in which Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant were becoming the common masters of the schools.⁴² Little wonder that Neo-Scholastics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would describe this period as a time of philosophical and theological decline and what Yves Congar has called the “miasma of philosophism.”⁴³

⁴¹ Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, and Frankfurt were recognized as free cities of the German Confederation in 1815 after Napoleon's fall (Holland 1910).

⁴² The first book on Catholic dogmatic theology that the Protestants August Niemeyer and Heinrich Wagnitz single out from the period 1796-1810 in their *Neueste Bibliothek für Prediger und Freunde der theologischen Literatur* is the *Systema theologiae catholicae* by Marian Dobmayer, who, they note, uses the most recent philosophy with measured judgment. They also refer to *Das Handbuch der Religionswissenschaft für Kandidaten der Philosophie* by Van Jakob Feint, who, they state, is both familiar with the new philosophical systems and a loyal Catholic (Niemeyer and Wagnitz 1812, 256).

⁴³ Scheeben 1873-1887, 1: 457-459; Congar 1968, 181.

CHAPTER TWO

THE RESTORATION OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

Medieval philosophy and theology continued to receive little attention in the early nineteenth century, buried, as it were, under the foundation of the edifice of modern philosophy. Yet, a reaction to Napoleon's domination of Europe led to attempts to restore the traditional institutions of church and state. As this restoration progressed, various individuals began to look back to the Middle Ages in search of a model for contemporary society. In this chapter we shall take into account this turn to a pre-Enlightenment political and ecclesiastical order and the motivation that this provided for the writing of the history of medieval philosophy.

The Turn from the Enlightenment to the Middle Ages

In the German states and principalities, Napoleon had reached the high point of his powers by 1812. He had annexed all of Germany along the North Sea and had bound together Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria, Saxony, Westphalia, Mecklenburg, and a number of smaller states into a dependency known as the *Rheinbund* (Holborn 1964, 386-393). In alliance with Prussia and Austria, he assembled his Grande Armée for the Russian campaign in 1812. Retreating from Moscow with terrible losses by the end of year, however, Napoleon had little means to continue his hold over Germany.

On a wave of anti-French sentiment, Prussia mobilized its military forces against the French in a coalition with Austria and Russia. The Prussian, Austrian, and Russian armies were victorious at Leipzig in 1813. During this war, named the War of Liberation, Joseph Görres became engrossed in German nationalism and proceeded to fight against the republicanism to which he had earlier given his support in *Das rote Blatt*. He came to see the Enlightenment as directly linked to revolution and destruction, founding a second newspaper, *Der rheinische Merkur*, as an organ with

which to oppose these dangerous consequences.¹ In this newspaper Görres put out a call for a united Germany under one emperor, couching anti-revolutionary rhetoric in medieval terms reminiscent of the Holy Roman Empire.

In an article of 1814 praising the Cathedral of Cologne, Görres took a stand against the plan to build a giant column in honor of the War of Liberation. He argued instead that the Cathedral of Cologne should be completed as a monument to the German past and as a symbol of German unity (Eichholz 1980, 2: 21). In this article Görres discusses the master architect's conception of the as-yet-uncompleted cathedral in order to present a picture of the need for German unity:

Sadly hangs the master's idea over this cathedral, he has conjured her down from the heavens, but all the generations of the past have not been able to bestow her with a body, and thus she stands half spirit and half embodied, like the dying or the unborn, hovering around the mighty mass, unable to separate herself and return incarnated nor to be born, in order to live many thousand years on earth. (Görres 1854-1860, 2: 194)

The first section of the original master's plans of the Cologne cathedral were discovered the same year, leading to a 66 year rebuilding of the *Dom*, a reconstruction that mirrored the battle for political unity of the German lands.² Since Germany, like the cathedral, was in an incomplete state, the latter was to be rebuilt as a symbol of the completion of Germany itself. This image of Germany as an medieval ecclesiastical building would be used throughout the nineteenth century as an image of the old order that stood as a viable alternative to the sectarianism, violence, and destruction of political revolution (Parent 1980).

Görres underlines the importance of the Middle Ages for modern Germany when he states in his "Teutschland und die

¹ The French marched through Görres's native Koblenz in 1812 on their way to Russia and built a fountain in front of the church of St. Castor on which they inscribed a testament to Napoleon's invasion of Russia. After their retreat, the Russian commander St. Priest inscribed on the fountain the words: "Vu et approuvé par nous, Commandant Russe de la Ville de Coblenz" (Coblentz 1910).

² In 1814 Georg Moller discovered the medieval front elevation of the north tower in Darmstadt and in 1816 Sulpiz Boisserée acquired the medieval front elevation of the south tower and ground-plan from an art dealer in Paris (Trier 1980, 2: 38-39).

Revolution," published in 1819, that modern Germany is strong only because of the glory of the German past:

Well have you [i. e. our times] built a strong house to God and to the kingdom, but even the mountains themselves, which nature has erected on the everlasting stronghold of the earth, are destroyed and broken up in ruins, when the inner sustaining life dies: and you, too, have had to establish your new work on the ruins of a blooming past in earlier antiquity. (Görres 1854-1860, 4: 180)

Görres is speaking of the buildings of medieval antiquity as a metaphor for contemporary society, of the buildings and society constructed by the Germans themselves, for Germans who stand in need of an inner spirit. He identifies the German people with the stones that their forefathers used in constructing the medieval churches. His point is that just as the medieval stones fit into the whole structure, so too must individual people resign their own particular will in order to be part of the whole nation:

Well has the vaulting of your churches loomed heavenward, but the stones out of which you have ordained the work are not dead masses, rather are they free independent natures, which have faithfully resigned their own will to the whole; can I help it when they now regain their pawned freedom and the foundations move, and the elements hasten to bind themselves in new forms. (Görres 1854-1860, 4: 181)

After the chaos of the Napoleonic era, if Germany was to keep its foundation firm and make progress as a nation, the German people needed to accept their place in society and not to struggle for a false revolutionary freedom that would lead only to disaster.

Görres would put another medieval twist into his anti-revolutionary project in his *Die heilige Allianz und die Völker auf dem Congress von Verona*, published in 1822. He now claims that individuals cannot obtain what is in their best interests from the aristocracy alone. His reason for this claim is that the princes themselves are, and often have been, divided. Görres argues that the people's interests have been protected in the past by princes united with the Pope in Rome.³ In claiming that today we need someone who can represent the people in disputes with princes, Görres argues that we

³ Görres 1854-1860, 5: 5-6, 105, 123-124.

should return to the social harmony of the medieval world. His implication is that the Pope could again be a source of unity for the disparate aristocracy and watch out for the interests of the people of Europe.

In 1826, the same year that the university of Landshut was moved to Munich, King Ludwig of Bavaria offered Görres a chair in history at the new university. Görres gathered around himself a group of scholars and politicians who identified with his project of conserving both the church and the aristocracy.⁴ Twelve years later, members of this circle would begin to publish the *Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland*, a bi-weekly on national and international affairs written from a Catholic perspective. The prospectus for the *Historisch-politische Blätter* published in 1838 provides an indication of the anti-modern stance and respect for the pre-Enlightenment past that we will meet in Kleutgen and Stöckl.⁵

Georg Phillips and Guido Görres argue that Catholic Germany stands in need of a voice to oppose the abuse of freedom carried out by the periodical press in the service of destruction. The *Historisch-politische Blätter* is proposed as a project to defend the political and religious order rooted in pre-Revolutionary Europe and to oppose the revolutionary spirit of the contemporary world (Phillips and Görres 1838). This journal will look to the past for principles of true freedom and rights in order to single out false modern revolutionary political theory and expose this to criticism.

One of the clearest statements of the Görresian anti-modern stance appears in an anonymous article printed in the *Historisch-politische Blätter* in 1841 titled: "Ueber den Geist der Zerstörung und Erhaltung in unserer Zeit." This article appropriates medieval

⁴ Görres's circle included his son Guido, his niece Marie, and the following members of the faculty at the University of Munich: the philosopher Franz von Baader, the historian Ignaz von Döllinger, the political scientist Karl Ernst von Moy de Sons, the historian Georg Phillips, the professor of church law and New Testament exegesis Friedrich Windischmann, the jurist and professor of law Carl Ludwig Arndts, the historians Martin Deutinger and Constantin Höfler, the philosopher Peter Ernst von Lassaulx, the professor of medicine Johann Nepomuk Ringseis, and the theologian Johann Adam Möhler (Spindler 1974, 196-197).

⁵ The *Historisch-politische Blätter* was kept formally within the Görres' family through the co-editorship of Joseph's son Guido Görres and his friend Georg Phillips. The prospectus for this journal that prefaces the first issue lists Görres and Döllinger among its supporters and contributors, along with Freyberg, Möhler, and Moy, all of whom, we are told, will serve the political and religious truth without hate or fear (Phillips and Görres 1838).

imagery for use against the modern world; it begins with the statement that the French Revolution has played a central role in distancing the nineteenth century from the traditional institutions of church and state. The argument is made that modernism was not victorious, that the past is not dead but continues to stand like a medieval church in the midst of the desolation brought forth by revolution: "A general revolution was the mother of our time, it lies like a huge landslide between our century and the past, hardly appears the tip of the old towers with the cross peering out of the covered ground" (Ueber den Geist 1843, 1). This article puts out a call for the conservation of traditional society, the type of society that had been almost completely destroyed by revolution. We are told that churches and cloisters were burned along with castles and villages, and the cadavers of the murdered were found in the ruins (Ueber den Geist 1843, 3). Revolutionary ideals led to the starvation and death of priests and nuns along with the unlawful acquisition of the possessions of the church and the poor.

"Ueber den Geist" turns away from the view presented in Diderot's *Encyclopédie* that modern culture is grounded in the culture of Greece and Rome. The "Romantic" view sees the people of Germany as a Germanic-Christian people who have historically been united through the very medieval institutions that the revolutionaries criticize. Aristocrats and the people have been linked as brothers by land and blood in both good days and bad for eighteen centuries (Ueber den Geist 1843, 131). This historical bonding has been almost completely destroyed by revolution.

Yet, in spite of the violence wrought by revolution, aristocrats continue to look after the needs of the people. For example, the Queen of Bavaria gives 10,000 gulden to the poor on her religious feast day each year and the King of Bavaria supports the unifying element of the Octoberfest (Ueber den Geist 1843, 14). Another example, not mentioned in this article, is the establishment of a number of Benedictine monasteries across Bavaria by Ludwig I. He claimed that he wanted to unite the people with the land as they had been united in former times (Spindler 1974, 130). German society should be rooted in the German people who live on German soil with the traditional German institutions of church and state.

The author of this article states that the modern "foreign" Germany will not provide a model for the future of German society. Modern foreign Germany, here, does not refer to Christian

Germans who have been influenced by French Enlightenment thought. The foreignness refers to the Jewish leaders of modern Germany. We are told that Jewish leaders have restored the devil in this Christian land, promoting revolution and the emancipation of the flesh.⁶ They are responsible for the secularization and destruction of the property of the Catholic Church.

This judgment conveniently overlooks the role that Christian aristocrats played in the secularization. For it was here that the Christian leaders of the German principalities and kingdoms acquired enormous tracts of land and numbers of subjects. This fact is forgotten in order to defend the importance of the Christian character of the German state. Christians, and in this case an anonymous author (perhaps Görres himself) and the Catholic editors of the *Historisch-politische Blätter* blame the Jews and label them as foreign in order to promote a picture of Germany as a Christian land united by blood. German society is again presented through a Görresian-Gothic-architectural metaphor as an historical Christian organism:

This is what even a little strength can do, if it continues to build on one edifice through centuries, strengthened through unity and perseverance, putting one stone on another: we can see exactly that on many a great "church" even in the relatively small towns. The first ones who laid the cornerstone of the great edifice deep into the womb of the earth, they would hardly hope to see the walls even above ground, and whether their great-grandchildren would see the cross on the top, they did not know. However, with eternally admirable and selfless patience they joined hands and persisted until death appeared and called them to lay down their labour, then they passed on the hammer to their successors, putting their weary heads to rest, and their successors continued the edifice in the same way and thus the hammer was passed down through generations; stone fit on stone, vaulting above vaulting; the tender stalk grew from the bud and turned into the crown, and out of the crown lightly shot the fragile tip, and thus the minster grew invisibly like an oak-tree through the centuries, and its towers climbed higher and higher towards heaven, and we stand at their feet like weak dwarfs, and when we look up into the dazzling height — then we lack courage and strength to complete what the fathers, called away from their mission in the storms of the time, have left behind for us to complete. (Ueber den Geist 1843, 129-130)

⁶ "Ueber den Geist" 1843, 1, 5, 131.

The construction of a medieval church symbolizes German society as a living organism that stands united over time. Social cohesion will ensue only if generation after generation works at this common project.

Catholics were not alone in appropriating medieval imagery for political ends. Frederick William IV of Prussia did so in a speech he gave at the laying of the foundation stone for the completion of the Cologne cathedral in 1842, a speech that utilizes medieval imagery to promote pre-Enlightenment order (Parent 1980, 2: 118). Note the subtext in Frederick's talk, namely that nationalism can provide the unity religious denominations and republicanism have failed to achieve:

Gentlemen of Cologne, a great event is taking place among you. This is, as you are aware, no ordinary undertaking. It represents a common effort of all Germans and of all creeds. When I think of that fact, my eyes are filled with tears of joy and I thank God that I have lived to see this day . . . The spirit which builds these portals is the same which broke our fetters twenty-nine years ago, which brought to an end the humiliation of the Fatherland and the alien occupation of this province. It is the spirit of German unity and strength . . . I pray to God that the Cathedral of Cologne may soar over this city, may soar over Germany, over ages rich in peace until the end of time. (Robson-Scott 1965, 300)

Görres and Frederick William IV look back to medieval institutions in order to prepare for the future conservation of pre-Enlightenment society. But while they promote the Middle Ages as a period of social harmony, they do not actively support the study of medieval thought.⁷

The Rediscovery of Medieval Philosophy

Yet, philosophers and theologians were beginning to find the Middle Ages to be intellectually important. Romantics with an interest in pantheism, nature philosophy, and mysticism found much that was worthy of study. For example, with an almost

⁷ For example, when Görres notes that Aquinas most fully expresses the entire knowledge of the Middle Ages in his five-volume work on the good life, he does not raise up Aquinas as a model for current thought, but looks instead to the contemporary science of physiology (Görres 1836-1842, 1: 266-267).

Schellingian interest in nature, works were written on John Scotus Erigena whose view that creation is an emanation from God bears similarities to Romantic notions of natural religion. F. Hjort was one of the first to present the philosophy of Erigena in his *Johannes Scotus Erigena oder vom Ursprunge einer christlichen Philosophie*, published in 1823. Christoph Bernhard Schlüter, an early mentor of Kleutgen's, edited the first edition of Erigena's *De divisione naturae* to appear in over one hundred and fifty years in 1838 (Erigena 1838). The prolific Catholic theologian Franz A. Staudenmaier published the first volume of his uncompleted work on Erigena's scientific outlook, *Johannes Scotus Erigena und die Wissenschaft seiner Zeit* in 1834; and Renée G. E. Saint-René-Taillandier published a work on the relation of Erigena to Scholastic philosophy, *Scot Érigène et la philosophie scolastique* in 1843.

The mystical element in the twelfth-century school of the Victorines was mined by Albert Liebner in his *Hugo von St. Victor und die theologischen Richtungen seiner Zeit*, published in 1832, and by Johann Georg Veit Engelhardt in his *Richard von St. Victor und Johannes Ruysbrock*, published in 1838. Others wrote on the German mystics of the fourteenth century. Carl Schmidt wrote a monograph on Meister Eckhart in 1839, the title of which indicates his interest in the historiography of medieval thought: "Meister Eckhart. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie und Philosophie des Mittelalters" and Hans Martensen published his biography *Meister Eckhart* in 1842, while F. Pfeiffer produced a new edition of the works of the German mystics in 1845 and 1857.

In France Victor Cousin and his followers defended the dialectical skill of the medievals. Cousin edited a number of Abelard's previously unpublished works in 1836 and again in 1849 and 1850 in order to further the study of medieval thought (Abelard 1836 and Abelard 1849-1850). Rather than just stating that the medievals were good logicians, Cousin argued that Abelard played an important role in freeing human reason from subservience to religious faith. Charles Rémusat depended on Cousin's edition for his two-volume work on the philosophy and theology of Abelard, published in 1845. He follows Cousin in arguing for Abelard's strikingly rational sensibility in a work that remained the standard into the twentieth century.⁸

⁸ The Columbia historian James Thomson Shotwell and the University College, London philosopher G. C. Robertson note the authority of Rémusat's work in

In England Samuel Roffey Maitland, the librarian at Lambeth, began publishing articles on medieval thought and culture for the *British Magazine* in 1835, twenty-seven of these were published in 1845 as *The Dark Ages: A Series of Essays, Intended to Illustrate the State of Religion and Literature in the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Centuries*. While this title might indicate a lack of respect for the thought and culture of the Middle Ages, in fact, Maitland offers much praise for the intellectual life of the period (Maitland 1845, iv-v, 423-455). Members of the Oxford movement in the Anglican church also acquired an interest in medieval thought. For example, Benjamin Webb, a religious philosopher, and John Neale, a minister in the Anglican church (Chadwick 1971, 212-213), argued against the privilege of private pews in their translation of William Durandus's *Rationale divinatorum officiorum, The Symbolism of Churches and Church Ornaments*, published in 1843 (Durandus 1843, cxx-cxxiv). In this text Neale and Webb published a translation of a medieval work in order to argue for a more communitarian type of liturgy and society in which the bishop comes to play a significant role.

G. W. F. Hegel

Yet, this renewed interest in medieval thought was slow in changing the presentations of medieval philosophy in the general histories of philosophy. For example, G. W. F. Hegel continued to echo Brucker's interpretation of medieval philosophy in the more than seventy pages that he devotes to Latin medieval philosophy in his *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, published after his death, from 1833 to 1836. So relatively little space devoted to the philosophy of the Middle Ages suggests that Hegel had limited interest in this period. He views the Middle Ages as a time when people were interested in theology rather than philosophy. If we judge medieval philosophy by its content alone, then, according to Hegel as well as Brucker and Storchenau, there was no medieval philosophy, only the faith of the church (Hegel 1833-1836, 19: 132).

On the other hand, Hegel is interesting for the historiography of medieval philosophy because he represents a variation on Brucker's

their article on Abelard in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, published in 1910 (Shotwell and Robertson 1910).

view that medieval philosophy was an intellectual exercise carried out in order to acquire ecclesiastical power. Hegel agrees that ecclesiastical property and material goods hindered clear thought, but he interprets the medievals in a more positive light. He sees in this period an awakening of the religious spirit. Hegel's point is that philosophy and theology were the same in the Middle Ages, a period when Christian dogma, the views of Aristotle, and Neoplatonism were bound up in a single truth (Hegel 1833-1836, 19: 133-134). In the awakening of religious consciousness in the West, Christians reflected on revelation rather than on the natural world. At the close of this period, philosophy would again spring up as reason freed itself from revelation, marking the end of medieval thought.

Hegel explains that since medieval Christians concerned themselves with revelation and doctrine they neglected the natural world. They wrote intellectual defenses of the dogmas of the Christian church, on God, his attributes, his works, and on the relation of human beings to God (Hegel 1833-1836, 19: 162). Yet, because the matter of Latin medieval philosophy was ecclesiastical dogma and not the natural world, it lacked philosophical content: "It [medieval thought] is not interesting by reason of its matter, for we cannot remain at the consideration of this; it is not a philosophy."⁹ In writing and thinking about theological objects, the medievals lived in an intellectual world strikingly different from that of the nineteenth century.

Just as for Brucker, Scholastic thought does retain something of philosophy for Hegel, yet here he is more explicit than his predecessor. Hegel argues that when writing theology, the Scholastics retained the logical form of philosophy in their use of arguments, objections, responses, and replies. Even though philosophical content was lost over time, theological discourse continued to follow the rules of logic. For example, the theologians continued to obey the principle of non-contradiction even when treating the most abstract topics:

It is just as if one were to arbitrarily form and connect propositions, words and tones—without making the presupposition that they should by themselves express a concrete sense—which need be only capable of being uttered, without having any restriction except possibility, that is, that they must not contradict each other.¹⁰

⁹ Hegel 1833-1836, Michelet ed., 19: 132; Haldane and Simson trans., 3: 38.

¹⁰ Hegel 1833-1836, Michelet ed., 19: 203; Haldane and Simson trans., 3: 97.

On this reading, the Latins developed a language with minimal sense, just enough to avoid contradiction, but not enough to provide clear meaning. Yet, even though they obtained some success in clarifying religious belief, Hegel explains that they removed themselves so completely from the natural world that they became difficult to comprehend:

Though the subjects which they investigated were lofty, and though there were noble, earnest and learned individuals in their ranks, yet this Scholasticism on the whole is a barbarous philosophy of the finite understanding, without real content, which awakens no true interest in us, and to which we cannot return. For although religion is its subject matter, thought here reached such an excessive point of subtlety that, as a form of the mere empty understanding, it does nothing but wander amongst baseless combinations of categories. Scholastic philosophy is this utter confusion of the barren understanding in the rugged North German nature.¹¹

While Hegel does not view the medievals as interested only in professional advancement, he continues to think that medieval thought retains no real intellectual interest. The medievals have multiplied categories beyond comprehension, through hair-splitting technicalities that hinder our access to their works.

Hegel explains that the medieval realists were lost in one such conceptual quagmire, which the nominalists would dispel by turning attention to the human subject. The realists, he explains, did not pay sufficient attention to human subjectivity. They held that what is real stands apart from subjectivity. And since what is real is other than subjectivity, then subjectivity itself is not real (Hegel 1833-1836, 19: 181). Such an argument would not please Hegel who presents William of Ockham as one of the first to reflect on the importance of human subjectivity.¹² Ockham criticizes the

¹¹ Hegel 1833-1836, Michelet ed., 19: 198-199; Haldane and Simson trans., 3: 94-95.

¹² Here Hegel picks up a point made by Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann in his *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie für den akademischen Unterricht*, published in 1816, namely that Ockham was the first to investigate the human subject in the late Middle Ages. According to Tennemann, Ockham ends the dogmatic captivity of reason by distinguishing what can be known from what is real. Universals are not real, but only rational, that is, signs of external objects within a subject. Tennemann argues that Ockham's consideration of the subjectivity of human knowledge would weaken Scholasticism through a separation of philosophical issues from the theological (Tennemann 1816, 223-224). Otto Willmann would note in the late nineteenth century that Tennemann saw Ockham as a forerunner of Kant (Willmann 1896, 589-590).

philosophical realists for separating individual people from the essence of humanity (Hegel 1833-1836, 19: 185-186). In ignoring subjectivity the realists seem to assume that humanity could exist outside of individual human beings. But since humanity cannot exist outside individuals, serious attention needs to be devoted to human subjectivity. Otherwise, one could not give an adequate account of human life.

According to Hegel, the majority of the Scholastics had no place for the human spirit. In placing stress on things apart from subjects, they had denigrated the human spirit, and while the parts remained, no spirit was left (Hegel 1833-1836, 19: 207). Like Brucker, he believes that the medievals became more interested in material goods. A neglect of the human spirit occurred because the church, which should have been concerned with the divine, concerned itself with the possession of goods and land. Hegel explains that the entire ebb and flow of medieval thought became a struggle for external reality that led to the degradation of the supernatural: "The finite heaven, the content which had lost its religious character, drove it to the finite present. With this revolution the Scholastic philosophy sinks and is lost, as its thoughts are outside of reality."¹³ For Hegel, reality cannot be found in the finite, since reality is infinite. The medievals had neglected human subjectivity. Ockham had recognized the limitations of viewing universals as the foundation of reality and argued instead that they are mental images formed in the subject. In noting the role the human subject plays in knowledge, Ockham represents an awakening of the philosophical importance of human subjectivity and heralds the restoration of philosophy as an inquiry into the human world and the end of medieval thought.¹⁴

Hegel's contribution to the historiography of medieval philosophy was to explain Brucker's model in light of a move from realism to subjectivity. He presents a more positive identification of medieval philosophy with theology as a genre in which intellectual thought remained largely in the realm of Christian belief. While

¹³ Hegel 1833-1836, Michelet ed., 19: 210-211; Haldane and Simson trans., 3: 105-106.

¹⁴ For Hegel's criticism that the medievals neglected to explore the physical and human worlds, see Hegel 1833-1836, 19: 212-213. For his view that the awakening of interest in the physical world and in subjectivity marks the resumption of the ancient Greek philosophical project, see Hegel 1833-1836, 19: 267-268.

reflection on God and human redemption led people outside of themselves, such activity prevented scholars from inquiring into the human subject. Self-examination and the rebirth of philosophy would not occur until the patterns of medieval speculation were broken, something that would occur only at the close of the Middle Ages.

Heinrich Ritter

In the *Geschichte der Philosophie* by Heinrich Ritter published between 1829 and 1853 we have an even more positive appreciation of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. Kleutgen will refer more often to this history than to any other history. There are a number of reasons why he relies on Ritter rather than on Brucker or Hegel. For example, Kleutgen points out that Ritter put more labor into his presentation of medieval philosophy than did Brucker and, I might add, Hegel (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 329). While Brucker and Hegel rarely cite medieval texts and give little indication that they actually read the medievals, Ritter frequently quotes the medievals themselves.¹⁵ His hundreds of citations along with his comment about the difficulties incurred in obtaining the necessary medieval works at the Göttingen University library, give every indication that he had taken the trouble to read the primary sources.¹⁶ Ritter is one of the first writers of a general history of philosophy to base his treatment of the Middle Ages on a study of these sources. This is one of the reasons why he states that his volumes on the Middle Ages were the most difficult of his general history to write.

Ritter's reading of the medievals gave him reason to qualify Brucker and Hegel's view that science was a slave to theology in the Middle Ages (Ritter 1829-1853, 7: 76). He argues that the medieval thinkers did in fact carry out scientific investigations and acquired new positive knowledge. For example, Albert the Great conducted investigations into the natural world that, according to Ritter, rank

¹⁵ Ritter questions in one footnote whether Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann had read either Aquinas or Scotus, because his presentation is so wrongheaded that it would be hard to believe that he had (Ritter 1829-1853, 7: 92).

¹⁶ Ritter 1829-1853, 7: vi-vii. Ritter notes that only one who lives in Paris would have a sufficient number of texts available in order to do justice to the history of medieval philosophy.

as important in the history of science (Ritter 1829-1853, 8: 189-190). But, he argues, the medievals ultimately had theological reasons for concerning themselves with philosophy. For example, Albert did not simply write on the natural world, but used his knowledge of philosophy to construct a philosophical-theological system.¹⁷

Another example of the use of philosophy within theology is Aquinas's discussion of human understanding. Ritter explains that for Aquinas human beings only find peace in obtaining knowledge of God, this in turn, becomes Ritter's framework for his own presentation of Aquinas (Ritter 1829-1853, 8: 261-262). On this reading, Aquinas uses philosophy to explain the imperfect character of human understanding and virtue (Ritter 1829-1853, 8: 327-328). Human understanding is so weak that it limits human beings from understanding God and obtaining the desired peace. Therefore, in order to come to an understanding of God, human beings stand in need of God's supernatural help. Natural knowledge and virtue are insufficient for human happiness.¹⁸ The theological virtues are distinct from the natural order and the source of human perfection (Ritter 1829-1853, 8: 338). Therefore, while natural knowledge and virtue are important in human life on earth, only supernatural knowledge, obtained with the aid of theological virtue, will bring true peace. Ritter concludes his discussion of Aquinas by noting that he praises the supernatural order at the expense of the natural (Ritter 1829-1853, 8: 354). If philosophy and theology are to flourish, they need to be removed from the same playing field.

According to Ritter, William of Ockham solves this problem by separating philosophy and theology. We are told that Ockham views philosophy as having to do with human experience and thereby reduces the sciences to the tangible. Theology concerns itself with what is not tangible and is therefore not a science (Ritter 1829-1853, 8: 598-600). While philosophy rests on experience, the supernatural knowledge of theology rests only on authority. Thus, philosophy is liberated from religious dogma (Ritter 1829-1853, 8: 684-685). Since human experience of the tangible is separate from the authority of revelation, there can be no tension between the two.

¹⁷ Ritter does not think that Albert always recognized the theological implications of specific points made by Aristotle (Ritter 1829-1853, 8: 190-191).

¹⁸ Ritter 1829-1853, 8: 331-2, 339.

Ockham has disconnected philosophy from theology, and in doing so, leads to the modern intellectual world.

Ritter is important for the historiography of medieval philosophy precisely because he argues that philosophy existed in the Middle Ages. Yet, he continues to hold that philosophy was put to theological uses during the medieval period. Intellectuals studied philosophy in order to construct philosophical-theological systems. Because of the preeminence of theology, the accent was placed on theology rather than philosophy. The tension between the two would be dispelled in the fourteenth century with the separation of philosophy from theology, an event that marked the end of the Middle Ages.

Barthélemy Hauréau

The French Academy of Moral Science and Politics advertised a prize in 1845 for a work on the Scholastic philosophy of medieval France. The advertisement stipulated that this work should both clarify the views of the realists, conceptualists, and nominalists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and compare Scholastic philosophy to contemporary philosophy (Hauréau 1850, 1: i-iii). Barthélemy Hauréau, who was elected as a member of the French revolutionary national assembly in 1848 and appointed director of the manuscript department of the Bibliothèque Nationale the same year, won the contract. He published his two-volume *De la philosophie scolastique* in 1850 ("Hauréau" 1910). The Academy of Moral Science and Politics, the same group that had arranged for its publication, "crowned" Hauréau's work as an intellectual achievement. This honor was granted so quickly that the printers were able to note the "crowning" on the title page.

Hauréau presents the Scholastic thinkers of the Middle Ages as reflecting French thought, a nationalistic tone not evident in Brucker, Hegel, or Ritter. Even though many of the thinkers that Hauréau discusses were not French (Bonaventure, Albert, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham), he views Scholasticism as representing the same force that would unify the French nation, just one more example of French genius at work (Hauréau 1850, 1: 22-28). Yet, since

this interpretation was requested by the Academy of Moral Science and Politics, we need not credit it solely to Hauréau.¹⁹

Hauréau's concern is largely metaphysical. He offers a chronological narrative of the medieval problem of universals, discussing Aquinas as a realist, Scotus as a conceptualist, and Ockham as a nominalist. In presenting these three main schools of medieval philosophy, Hauréau presents the epistemological views of a number of medieval figures, something Brucker, Hegel, and Ritter had not done. He treats different medieval accounts of the origin of ideas and elaborates in some detail upon the theories of Aquinas and Ockham.²⁰ Unlike Kleutgen and Stöckl, however, he does not present the epistemology of individual medievals as having philosophical ramifications for that person's metaphysics, natural philosophy, morality, politics, and natural theology. Hauréau has given us an account of the medieval problem of universals. He has not written a comprehensive history of medieval philosophy.

Like Ritter, Hauréau breaks with Brucker's view that philosophy was materially dead in the Middle Ages. Hauréau claims that the human spirit worked throughout the Middle Ages to liberate itself from ecclesiastical dogma, noting that the Scholastic period from the ninth century onwards was an active time of independent philosophical labor. Anselm of Canterbury, Bernard of Chartres, William of Champeaux, and Gilbert of Poitiers all demonstrate their individual genius through dialectical arguments, arguments that reflect the emancipation of human thought from religious dogma. And Hauréau even suggests that the medieval use of reason was part and parcel of a revolution against ecclesiastical subservience that prepared the way for the French Revolution itself (Hauréau 1850, 1: 98-99). In arguing that the great medieval thinkers did not simply genuflect to dogma, but rationally thought through a number of philosophical problems, Hauréau pushes Brucker's fourteenth-century rebirth of philosophy back deep into the Middle Ages (Hauréau 1850, 1: 1-7). Philosophy thrived, as reason freed itself from the bonds of ecclesiastical dogma and mysticism during the medieval period. Furthermore, the opposition of philosophy to theology dur-

¹⁹ Hauréau also differs from Brucker, Hegel, and Ritter in that he cites many of the manuscripts of medieval texts, discussing many texts that had yet to be printed in modern editions. Ritter had consulted only printed texts.

²⁰ Hauréau 1850, 2: 174-206, 424-447.

ing the Middle Ages was necessary if human beings were to throw off the yoke of ecclesiastical control and develop the free use of reason.

Joseph Kleutgen and Albert Stöckl will oppose Hauréau's interpretation of medieval philosophy. They will agree that the medievals did philosophy as well as theology during the Middle Ages, but they will claim that Hauréau misunderstood medieval accounts of the relation between reason and revelation. Kleutgen and Stöckl will argue that, in fact, the Latin writers demonstrated superior philosophical ingenuity in reconciling philosophy to theology. They will also offer a rigorous interpretation of medieval philosophy according to the standard areas of philosophy. As members of a Neo-Scholastic movement whose emergence is closely tied to the restoration of the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century, Kleutgen and Stöckl will write from the perspective of another philosophical tradition. In order to clarify their accomplishment, it is helpful to be clear about this restoration.

The Restoration of Scholasticism in the Nineteenth Century

The religious orders of the Catholic Church experienced a rebirth in the nineteenth century. The Jesuits, for example, had been suppressed since 1773, but a number had survived by teaching at schools in Russia and at Georgetown College in the United States. Pius VII formally restored the order in 1814. New communities could now officially be established in those countries that would receive them. Within a year, the Jesuits numbered around 800 priests, after which they entered a period of growth, their numbers reaching 2,000 by 1820.²¹ Growing in influence, they regained control of the prestigious Roman and German Colleges in Rome during 1824. The Jesuits were once again the preeminent intellectual religious order in the Catholic Church, able to attract new recruits and expand their numbers to 4,757 on the eve of the revolutions of 1848 (Aubert 1981c, 9).

Success in Italy did not mean that the Jesuits would be able to regain their former influence in Germany. They were kept out of

²¹ This was no mean feat given the years of training necessary for final vows and ordination (Aubert 1981e, 208).

Germany by law during the first half of the nineteenth century. Ludwig I of Bavaria claimed that when he was questioned in Rome about his exclusion of the Jesuits, he replied that this religious order was a militia and that he was content to have an army without a militia (Doeberl 1931, 20). Since there was no law against Germans leaving the German states to join the Jesuits, institutions were set up to educate them as Jesuits in Switzerland, at Brig in 1814 and at Fribourg in 1818, where Kleutgen would be trained. The German and Swiss Jesuits thrived in Switzerland until they lent support to the breakaway *Sonderbund* of Catholic cantons.

The traditionally Protestant cantons had banned male religious communities from Switzerland in 1843. The traditionally Catholic cantons of Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Lucerne, Zug, Fribourg, and Valais formed a political union in the same year, in which a number of Jesuits held office. The Swiss diet chose to fight this union and restore “unity” to Switzerland, which they achieved in 1848, the victors expelling the Jesuits from the country. In light of the difficulties that the German and Swiss Jesuits encountered in Switzerland, Prussia agreed to receive them.²² The Jesuits would be allowed once again to return to German territory under Prussian control.

There was a large degree of philosophical pluralism among the types of philosophy taught by members of the religious orders in the first half of the nineteenth century. There were empiricists who embraced the Enlightenment, following the practice of the Jesuit Storchenau; traditionalists like Félicité de Lamennais, who argued that philosophy should be based on traditional Christian doctrine because no other ethical philosophy is capable of uniting Europe; rationalists like the Jesuit Franz Rothenflue, who argued that God was the guarantee of human ideas, and various groups of individuals who looked back to Aquinas for philosophical inspiration.

More is known about the Italian early nineteenth-century philosophers and theologians who drew upon Aquinas than about those in any other country. One figure who was important in promoting the study of the philosophy of Aquinas was Vincenzo Buzzetti (1777-1824). Buzzetti had studied empiricism under former Jesuits at the former Jesuit college of St. Peter’s in Piacenza. After graduating from St. Peter’s he studied the philosophy and theology

²² Pollen 1912, 101; and Lill 1981c, 7: 343.

of Aquinas at the Alberoni College in Piacenza, a college run by the Lazarist Order (Rossi 1988, 85). There he received an eighteenth-century style Scholastic education in Thomistic philosophy and theology, the sort that had been commanded in the seventeenth century by the founder of the Lazarist Order, Vincent de Paul.

Buzzetti later taught Thomistic philosophy from 1806 to 1808 and Thomistic theology from 1808 to 1824 at the Episcopal seminary at Piacenza. He was able to introduce many students to the philosophical importance of Aquinas (Schmidinger 1988b, 110). Two of his students were the Jesuit brothers Serafino (1793-1865) and Domenico (1790-1880) Sordi. Serafino would teach Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio, Matteo Liberatore, Carlo Maria Curci, and Giuseppe Pecci, the brother of the future Pope Leo XIII, all of whom would play leading roles in promoting the study of Aquinas throughout the nineteenth century.

Serafino would introduce Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio (1793-1862) to the philosophy of Aquinas while they were both in the Jesuit novitiate at Genoa. Taparelli had become a Jesuit at the age of twenty-one when the order was reactivated in 1814. His philosophical allegiances represent the pluralism in the Catholic Church of the day. Taparelli had studied the work of Storchenau and of Lamennais at the universities of Siena and Turin. He then joined the Jesuits and chose Aquinas's philosophy as his own (Schmidinger 1988b, 111-113). Taparelli was appointed the first rector of the Roman College after it was given back to the Jesuits in 1824. He then lobbied within the Jesuit order to reestablish the philosophy of Aquinas as the model for Jesuit philosophical studies. But Joseph Dmowski (1799-1879) and Agostino Ferrarini (1808-1860) opposed this project. Taparelli was moved to Naples in 1829 and appointed the superior of the local Jesuits. This transfer, however, did not remove Neo-Scholasticism from Rome. Gioacchino Pecci (1810-1903), the brother of Giuseppe, began to teach philosophy at the Jesuit German College in Rome the very same year. He would later become Pope Leo XIII and establish the study of Scholastic philosophy for the Catholic Church as a whole.

While in Naples, Taparelli carried out his Thomistic reform at the Massimo College, and at the college at Benebant (Schmidinger 1988b, 113). He brought in Domenico Sordi along with a number of his own former students in order to have instructors qualified to teach Aquinas. In time, Naples became a center of Thomistic stud-

ies. The diocesan priest and seminary teacher, Gaetano Sanseverino (1811-1865), began to publish the journal *La Scienza e la Fede* in 1840, which would serve the cause of Aquinas's philosophy. He would also found the Academy of Thomistic Philosophy in 1846, an association to promote the study of the philosophy of Aquinas (Schmidinger 1988b, 115). And Naples was the home of the Virgili press which began to reprint the complete works of Aquinas in 1846, the first such reprinting since the eighteenth century. Aquinas's works would be reprinted in Italy and France at least six times during the second half of the nineteenth century.²³

Publishing records are helpful in giving an indication of the activity of the emerging centers of Scholastic thought in the nineteenth century. The reprinting of Billuart's commentary on Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* indicates that the institutional study of Aquinas had begun again in France as early as 1827.²⁴ The demand for this work during the remaining decades of the nineteenth century called forth at least fourteen more printings.²⁵ Furthermore, Billuart's *Summa Summae S. Thomae* was reprinted first at Rome in 1834 and twice later at Paris.²⁶ Goudin's *Philosophia iuxta inconcussa tutissimaque Divi Thomae Dogmata* was reprinted in Paris in 1851 and appeared seven more times during that century.²⁷

²³ Parma: Petri Fiaccadori, 1852-1873; Paris: Vivés, 1871-1880; Paris: Dupont, 1876; Vatican: Leonine, 1882-present; Paris: Vivés, 1882; Paris: Vivés, 1895.

²⁴ Schmidinger argues that the interest in Aquinas during the nineteenth century in France was rekindled in 1834. He argues that the Roman condemnation of the French traditionalist views of Lamennais in 1834 led the way for Henri Dominique Lacordaire's reconsideration of the church fathers and the Scholastics (Schmidinger 1988d, 197). But the 1827 reprinting in Paris of Billuart's commentary on the *Summa theologiae* predates this date by seven years. More study is needed in order to determine the origins of the restoration of Scholasticism in France.

²⁵ Paris: Mequignon Juniores, 1827; Paris: Albanel et Martin, 1839; Lyon and Paris: Guyot Frères, 1852; Paris: Bibliopolas, 1852-1853; Lyon: Perisse Frères, 1853; Lyon: Perisse Frères, 1855; Lyon: Perisse Frères, 1857; Lyon: Perisse Frères, 1861; Lyon: Perisse Frères, 1864; Atrebat: V. Brunet, 1867; Paris: Palme, 1872-1877; Paris: Lecoffre, 1874; Paris: Lecoffre, 1878; Paris: Letovzey et Ané, 1880; Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1886; Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1904. These lists are based on the National Union Catalog and the World Catalog (WorldCat 1997).

²⁶ Rome: Crispinus press, 1834; Paris: Vivés Pussinelli, 1888; Paris: P. F. Ecalles, 1899.

²⁷ Paris, 1851; Paris: Editores Bibliothecae Novae, 1855; Urbeuteri: Speraindeo, 1859-1860; the French translation by Thomas Bourar, Paris: Poussielgue-Rusand, 1864; Paris: Scarlit, 1867; Paris: Scarlit, 1869; Paris: Scarlit & Soc., 1886; Atrebat: Sueur-Charreuy, 1886-1890.

The editor of the new edition of Goudin's work was the Dominican Abbé Pierre-Célestin Roux-Lavergne.²⁸ In the introduction to his edition he explains that Aquinas was becoming influential again because he gives a sound account of human knowledge and avoids the confusing modern philosophical accounts of the origin of ideas (Goudin 1869, 1: vii-viii). Epistemology is, therefore, one reason why philosophers were returning to Aquinas in the nineteenth century.

What we find by the middle of the nineteenth century are signs of a recovery of things medieval, including medieval philosophy.²⁹ A small number of historians and philosophers marching to different philosophies busied themselves in uncovering medieval philosophical texts and themes. The Romantics made a study of John Scotus Erigena in Germany, Victor Cousin and his followers worked on Abelard in France, and a number of clerics promoted Aquinas in Italy and France. However, there was as yet no large scale movement to use the philosophical thought of the Middle Ages as a counter to the philosophy of the modern period. The revolution of 1848 would change this situation, tipping the scales of the study of medieval philosophy against the Enlightenment. The promotion of the study of medieval philosophy would begin in earnest as an alternative to revolutionary politics.

²⁸ Grabmann notes that Roux-Lavergne was a member of the Dominican order (Grabmann 1933, 222). He was one of the earlier followers of Dominique Lacordaire who reestablished the first Dominican province in France in 1850 (Aubert 1981e, 210; Aubert 1981c, 11-12). Thibault lists Roux-Lavergne as teaching at the College of the Assomptionistes of Nîmes, where he published an edition of Aquinas's *Summa contra Gentiles* in 1853 (Thibault 1972, 40).

²⁹ Franz Ehrle, the assistant to the director of the library of the Jesuit community at Maria Laach in 1866 and future head of the Vatican library, will argue persuasively that the rise in prices of Scholastic works at used book stores indicates the revival of interest in medieval thought (Ehrle 1885; 1933, 37-38).

CHAPTER THREE

JOSEPH KLEUTGEN AND THE SPHERES OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY AS A MODEL FOR THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

During the latter half of the nineteenth century Joseph Kleutgen would offer a new model of the history of medieval philosophy. He would furnish the broad framework which Stöckl would follow in writing his history of medieval philosophy, the first general history of medieval philosophy written according to the spheres of philosophical inquiry. An understanding of the background and education of Kleutgen helps to explain the philosophical, theological, and political reasons that lie behind the construction of this history. He was no armchair philosopher, but wrote his interpretation of medieval philosophy in order to restore stability to the traditional institutions of church and state. I will discuss the political and ecclesiastical context of Kleutgen in order to indicate why this university-educated German would, after the revolution of 1848, turn to the philosophy of the Middle Ages to discover a philosophical foundation for rebuilding Europe. We will then be in a position to appreciate his role in interpreting the history of medieval philosophy through the lenses of the standard areas of philosophy.

Joseph Kleutgen was born in Dortmund in 1811 during the political and ecclesiastical upheavals of the revolutionary period. Dortmund had been a free city of the Holy Roman Empire until the imperial decree of 1803, which ceded it to Nassau (Dortmund 1910). The French took over in 1806 and gave it to the grand-duke of Berg two years later, after which the king of the Netherlands ceded it to Prussia in 1815 as part of the land of Westphalia.

Kleutgen was baptized at the "Dominican" church in Dortmund, a church that had been a Dominican cloister for centuries before its secularization in 1803.¹ The state authorities decided in 1818 to

¹ Kleutgen was baptized on Good Friday, the day that Catholics celebrate the death of Jesus, two days before Easter. He would later consider this a sign that he was intended to suffer in laboring for the Catholic Church (Langhorst 1883, 106). There were three cloisters in Dortmund secularized in 1803, Franciscan, Dominican, and Katharine.

grant the former Dominican property to the Catholic community of Dortmund, which transformed the friary into a parish church the following year. In 1819, when Joseph was eight years old, a new pastor arrived, by the name of Laurentius Stratmann (Deufel 1976, 25). The first non-Dominican posted to the church, he could find no suitable rooms at the deteriorating cloister and moved in with the Kleutgen family.

Father Stratmann and religion were important to the Kleutgens.² For instance, the number of Kleutgen children who became priests or nuns was high, an example for what has become a stereotype of the nineteenth-century revival of the Catholic Church. After the death of Joseph's father and the remarriage of his mother, more children were born who would choose an ecclesiastical career. Two of Joseph's full sisters and one half sister became nuns. One full brother and one half brother followed Kleutgen to study for the priesthood.³ Another full sister who wanted to become a nun, remained at home to take care of her aging mother and went about these duties dressed in the habit of a member of a religious order.

After completing his *Abitur* and spending a year devoted to the private study of classical Greek texts, Kleutgen chose to study philology at Munich (Deufel 1976, 28-29). At the beginning of the summer semester of 1830, he traveled to the university at Munich, "the Athens on the Isar," where he attended lectures on Plato, Pindar, Demosthenes, Horace, philosophy, aesthetics, and art history (Langhorst 1883, 118-119). During his first semester Kleutgen joined a student association known as "Germania." Ludwig I of Bavaria had legalized such associations in 1825 (Langhorst 1883, 121). The Munich branch of Germania numbered around 105 members out of a student population of 1,945 (Spindler 1974, 151). Kleutgen's membership in this student association would have negative consequences for his studies and his relations with the Prussian government for years to come. This was after all the Summer of the

² Kleutgen would also spend time with a Father Rustemeier. When he was fifteen, he lived and studied for a year (1826-1827) with Father Rustemeier in Lippstadt. Beginning with the Eucharist each morning, he would study all day and read poetry along the Lipp river in the evening (Langhorst 1883, 113-114).

³ One brother was released from his studies and did not continue towards the priesthood and the other was ordained for the diocese of Paderborn, but left, was married, and became a Lutheran pastor (Langhorst 1883, 108-111; Deufel 1976, 24-25).

July Revolution in Paris, when workers and students carried out a *coup d' état* against the repressive measures of Charles X.

Ludwig I of Bavaria, who preferred the sovereignty of the monarchy to that of the people, prided himself on taking good care of his *Volk*. After the July revolution, he took measures against the freedom of the press. He installed censors in September and banished three respected journalists in November.⁴ On the night before Christmas 1830 disturbances occurred on the streets of Munich in which the student association Germania played a central role. While it is thought today that Germania was reacting to the installation of a new corporate rector, the response of the authorities at the time suggests that they feared a revolution was in the making.⁵ The police were unable to restore order throughout successive nights of unrest. The civil authorities activated the militia which also proved fruitless in quelling the protests, with the result that the Bavarian army was finally called into action.

On 29 December Friedrich Schelling spelled out the impending danger in a speech to the students of the university and the faculty senate. Schelling asked the students to listen to his fatherly call to order and to discontinue the disturbances. He argued that any barbarian can enjoy physical fearlessness, but only a human being who is human in the full sense of the word can listen to the voice of reason. Reason should attain the highest victory and demonstrate the spirit of the German university (Schelling 1830, 5: 68-69). Schelling warned that a number of people who stood opposed to science could use the continuing violations of public order in order to ban the university altogether. He stated that even one more night of fighting would lead the authorities to close down the university, require all students from outside Munich to leave Bavaria, and all students native to Munich to leave the city. Arguing that public order is one of the greatest and inestimable goods, Schelling asked the Bavarian youth to avert this catastrophe in the name of the fatherland, of science, and of the university.

⁴ Journalists were expelled from the *Bayerischen Blätter*, the *Nürnberger Blätter für Politik*, and the *Bazar* (Spindler 1974, 150-151).

⁵ Earlier accounts of the December "uprising" concluded that the members of Germania were protesting against restrictions placed on the press by the king and following the example of the July Revolution in Paris (Spindler 1974, 151). For an example of the earlier view, see Huber, 1967-1969, 2: 32.

No further disturbances are reported to have occurred after Schelling's speech (Doeberl 1931, 3: 101). Yet, that very evening, a cabinet order was given to close down the university and require all students from outside of Munich to leave the city. But before this order could be implemented Ludwig I revoked it at the request of a number of citizens. The university was permitted to remain open and foreign students were allowed to continue to reside in the city.

Blame for the disturbances was leveled at the members of Germania. In order to protect the common good of the city, an order was signed on 6 January to expel all members of this association (Spindler 1974, 151-152). The police had placed fifty-nine of the approximately 105 members under arrest. Still a member, Kleutgen withdrew from the university on 8 January, 1831 and left for Dortmund (Deufel 1976, 31-32). Meanwhile, through negotiations and the posting of bail, the ban on the association was lifted on 16 January. After this date, the members of Germania were free to resume their studies.

The level of Kleutgen's involvement with the "December unrest" is unclear. When later asked by his Jesuit superiors, Kleutgen would deny that he had been involved in any political activities (Deufel 1976, 30, note 58). But it is hard to believe that Kleutgen had remained a member of Germania throughout the disturbances without participating in the association's activities. The Prussian authorities in Berlin would have sufficient interest in his whereabouts during this period to request later that he come to Berlin in order to explain his actions (Deufel 1976, 40-41). Kleutgen did not comply and ultimately resorted to a change of name and citizenship in order to escape the reach of the Prussian state. Whatever the level of Kleutgen's involvement, he was a member of Germania in Munich during the disturbances of 1830. This in itself is of interest because he would later argue, with revolutionary zeal, against the terrible violence wrought by revolution.

After a short time in Dortmund, following his Munich period, Kleutgen went to live with his uncle, Heinrich Kleutgen, a Catholic priest, in the village of Wiesdorf on the Rhine, near Cologne (Deufel 1976, 32-33). He was apparently confronted by his uncle during this time with arguments for the superiority of religious belief over philosophy (Langhorst 1883, 393). Two years later he would write in a letter that this was the time he began to recover his faith

which he had almost lost at Munich.⁶ In struggling with his own faith Kleutgen began to worry about the relationship between faith and reason. This would become the central issue of his scholarship.

In 1868 Kleutgen published a dialogue “Die Ideale und ihre wahre Verwirklichung. Ein Wort zum Verständniß der deutschen Classiker,” which reads like an account, with political overtones, of his youthful dilemma between reason and revelation. The dialogue takes place between an uncle named Christian, who argues for the merits of religious belief, and his twenty-three-year-old nephew Leopold, who has become infatuated with German philosophy. The text opens with a “Romantic” description of Leopold standing on a hill over the Rhine engrossed in thought, holding a scroll in his hand and his hair falling on his chest (Kleutgen 1868a, 3). The uncle explains the first stage of an anti-revolutionary argument to his nephew. He states that the modern ideals of freedom mislead both individuals and nations to place undue value on the physical world and to fail to appreciate the kingdom of God. Christian points out that German rulers, statesmen, educated persons — he mentions Kant by name — and artists have veered away from Christ and his holy religion and accepted a false view of freedom based on human rights, the type of view, in fact, that led to the French Revolution (Kleutgen 1868a, 24-26). The nephew is informed that freedom based on the view that people have a right to it is no freedom at all; such an interpretation leads to wickedness and destruction, filling people not with rights but with horror and dread. The problem is that if stress is placed on the freedom of individuals, then people will only work for their self-interest and fail to extend aid to others.

Kleutgen concludes his dialogue with a narrative account of a type of freedom, which, unlike that based on human rights and individual determination, can be found in a communitarian society of an ecclesiastical nature. A bell is heard from across the Rhine as Christian and his nephew finish talking. They see a church bearing a large cross in a tiny village on the side of a mountain. In front of the church marches a long row of school children dressed in white and carrying high fluttering banners along a blossom-strewn path. Choir boys, a priest, and a smoking censer take the lead, followed by the local community, whose song is carried by the evening wind.

⁶ Kleutgen to Schlüter, dated April 28, 1833 (Deufel 1976, 203-204).

Christian expresses how deep this church and its holy rites are, for they indicate the triumph of the Church on earth, where can be found freedom without chains and pure harmony that stands in contrast to the violation of public order through revolution (Kleutgen 1868a, 26-28). While this dialogue is not presented as an exact history of the year Kleutgen spent on the Rhine, it does offer an Görresian image of a harmonious society founded on the communitarian principles of the pre-Enlightenment.

After a year Kleutgen moved from his uncle's residence back to his native Dortmund. His renewed interest in faith led him to begin studies for the Catholic priesthood at the Academy at Münster in 1832. This was all that remained of the eighteenth-century University of Münster after the Prussian government had established the university at Bonn in 1818 (Langhorst 1883, 489-490). Kleutgen studied philosophy and began a life-long friendship with the Catholic philosopher Christoph Bernhard Schlüter (1801-1884), whose edition of the *Periphyseon* of John Scotus Erigena would appear in 1838. While studying with Schlüter, Kleutgen would read the Catholic philosopher Anton Günther, whose works he would later be instrumental in having placed on the Index of Prohibited Books (Deufel 1976, 34).

Kleutgen also studied at Münster with the church historian Johann Theodor Katerkamp (1764-1834), a specialist on patristics.⁷ Katerkamp had been educated in a *Gymnasium* run by the Franciscan order before the secularization and had been a member of the anti-modern circle gathered around Amalie von Gallitzin, that elevated the importance of feeling over reason.⁸ He held that older Christian thought was superior to the philosophy and theology of his contemporaries. For example, he argued for the moral superiority of pre-Enlightenment thought in his *Geschichte der Religion bis zur Stiftung einer allgemeinen Kirche* published in 1819:

For the sympathy with great deeds and sublime views of the older times [*Vorzeit*] raises the soul above the limitations of its time and bestows views of virtue and greatness on her, for which there may

⁷ Lakner 1933, 185-186; Deufel 1976, 35.

⁸ Gallitzin had been close to Goethe and Hamann, the latter was buried in her yard. Katerkamp lived in her house from 1797 to her death in 1806. He published a biography of Gallitzin in 1828 ("Katerkamp, Theodor Herm" 1883, 2: 558; Lill 1981b, 218).

have been a lack of material in her own time. (Katerkamp 1819, 6; quoted in Deufel 1976, 35)

This appreciation of the thought of the *Vorzeit* [the pre-Enlightenment period] appears to be why Kleutgen would refer to Katerkamp two years later as his “spiritual father” and “savior,” the one who gave him the “deepest” and “most fruitful view of Christianity.”⁹ He seems to be the one who introduced Kleutgen to the importance of pre-Enlightenment theology and philosophy.

While at Münster, Kleutgen wrote an essay in which he praised the philosophy of the *Vorzeit* at the expense of that of the moderns, the same general approach that he would later employ in his two extended defenses of the thought of the *Vorzeit*.¹⁰ ‘Modern’ here refers not so much to writers of a specific century as to those who constructed philosophies that no longer supported the traditional institutions of church and state. Kleutgen argues that disaster has befallen philosophy in the present age, noting that both Kant and Schelling have divorced philosophy from the church and in doing so have severed the traditional harmonious relation between the aristocrats and the people under the Pope.¹¹

A modern philosophical turn has led to the destruction of the religious orders and the loss of Catholic schools, the very institutions that had nurtured the sciences of the *Vorzeit* for centuries. Kleutgen makes reference to this situation when he notes that the old texts currently lie unused in modern libraries (Kleutgen 1868b, 7). If we substitute ‘state’ or ‘university’ for “modern,” we can see that Kleutgen is referring to the new libraries that benefited from the secularization. For example, the Staatsbibliothek in Munich had been founded in 1827. Construction on the new building was begun in 1832, the same year Kleutgen went to study at Münster (Spindler 1974, 126). The “old texts” are the editions of the church fathers and the medievals that had been studied at the ecclesiastical edu-

⁹ Kleutgen to Schlüter, dated April, 28, 1833 (Deufel 1976, 205). Deufel suggests that Katerkamp introduced Kleutgen to the study of pre-Enlightenment thought (Deufel 1976, 35).

¹⁰ Kleutgen would publish part of this youthful essay in 1868 in order to counter the charge that he was merely a “Roman” intellectual touting the Jesuit party line and not a “German” (Kleutgen 1868b, 4-11).

¹¹ Kleutgen criticizes Georg Hermes and Anton Günther for following Kant (Kleutgen 1868b, 8-10). He will oppose Kant, the German Idealists, Hermes, and Günther throughout his career.

cational institutions before the secularization, texts which in Kleutgen's day stood abandoned on the shelves of state institutions.

Kleutgen's proposal is that we return to the study of the church fathers and medievals. He argues that even though pre-Enlightenment authors might not handle all contemporary problems they offer an adequate framework for philosophy. For example, while these authors do not offer direct answers to contemporary questions in the theory of knowledge, they do offer a foundation for Catholic science that will help it withstand the inroads of modern philosophy (Kleutgen 1868b, 6-7, 10-11). Kleutgen claims that we can construct a sound philosophy by using the philosophical principles of the *Vorzeit*. Furthermore, he argues that pre-modern writers have provided solutions to what is becoming his central issue, the problem of reason versus revelation. He claims that the authors of the *Vorzeit* have explained the relation of rational science to Catholic belief through a reconciliation of the two.

In 1833 Kleutgen left Münster and went to study at the local seminary of his home diocese in Paderborn. After having read the works of a number of Jesuits, he decided to become a member of the Society of Jesus. He thought that as a Jesuit he would have more time for study and prayer than as a diocesan priest (Landhorst 1883, 499, 501). Since the Jesuits were not yet permitted to work in any of the German lands, Kleutgen traveled to Switzerland to undergo training. He spent two years at the novitiate of the German province of the Jesuits in Brig from 1834 to 1836. During this time he changed his last name to Peters and his citizenship to Swiss in order to escape the long arm of the Prussian authorities who still wished to question him about the Munich disturbance of 1830.¹²

Kleutgen received his Jesuit academic training in philosophy and theology in Fribourg from 1836 to 1840.¹³ He came into contact there with the Jesuit philosopher, Franz Rothenflue (1805-1869), whose lectures prepared him for the exams at the end of the year. Four examiners were needed for each exam. Franz Rothenflue, Simmen, Caspar Rothenflue, and Lückemeyer examined Kleutgen

¹² Kleutgen would publish books under the name P. Joseph Peters, and under the pseudonym J. W. Karl (Deufel 1976, 40-43, 489).

¹³ Lakner 1933, 189-191; Deufel 1976, 46.

at the end of his first year of philosophy.¹⁴ Rothenflue's lectures were published, and they demonstrate that the Cartesian philosophical tradition flourished in the Jesuit order in the middle of the nineteenth century. Rothenflue argues that God plays an important epistemological role insofar as he presents ideas to the human soul.¹⁵ All ideas that human beings claim to know are guaranteed by the idea and reality of the most real being of the first order, which is God.¹⁶ Since God is the source, he is a first-order reality, while both ideas and the reality to which they correspond are second-order realities. Kleutgen will later argue against Rothenflue's view, claiming that human knowledge is philosophically grounded in physical objects and not in God.

While in Fribourg, Kleutgen stated in a letter to his former teacher Schlüter that his goal was to recapitulate all of his former philosophical studies.¹⁷ He also claimed that the problem of reason and revelation could be solved if we would avoid modern philosophy and return to the philosophy of earlier ages:

For you know that I most definitely think that one should be familiar with the philosophy of former centuries in order to oppose the bad direction of the philosophy in our century, and that one has to investigate very well the relation between contemporary philosophy, which has brought disbelief into almost all science and art as well as into life, and the older philosophy, which for so long has happily defended the faith.¹⁸

Pre-Enlightenment thinkers are of interest to Kleutgen because they alone provide the key to the reconciliation of philosophy and revelation. In another letter, he states that one who has caught his interest is Thomas Aquinas.¹⁹

¹⁴ Franz Rothenflue, Simmen, Caspar Rothenflue, and P. Gotteland examined him at the end of his second year (Deufel 1976, 45, note 134).

¹⁵ Rothenflue's lectures were published in 1842. I refer to the edition of 1852 (Rothenflue 1852, 2: 211-212, 216-219).

¹⁶ On the point that God grounds human ideas, Rothenflue remains within the rationalist tradition of the *Institutionum Philosophicarum*, the work instituted by the Lyon diocese in 1782 that includes the proposition that God alone is the efficient cause of human ideas (*Institutionum*, 1819, 2: 162).

¹⁷ Kleutgen was ordained while in Fribourg. His biographers give a vivid picture of this period when they tell us that shortly after Kleutgen's ordination he exorcised a demon from an 18 year-old (Deufel 1976, p. 46).

¹⁸ Kleutgen to Schlüter, dated October 13, 1836 (Deufel 1976, p. 222).

¹⁹ Kleutgen to Schlüter, dated July 30, 1838 (Deufel 1976, p. 227). Kleutgen notes that he has studied Aquinas's *Summa contra Gentiles*.

Kleutgen moved to Rome in 1843 in order to become an official correspondent for the Jesuit community. Here he came into contact with Jesuits of different philosophical persuasions. For example, Joseph-Aloysius Dmowski continued to represent Jesuit empiricism in the tradition of Storchenau in his teaching at the Roman College.²⁰ Dmowski states in his lectures, published in 1840 that he, like Storchenau, follows a number of Greek thinkers, as well as Descartes, Bacon, Locke, Wolff, and Leibniz; but he makes no mention of the church fathers or the medievals (Dmowski 1840, 1: 3). While he refers to Augustine and Aquinas when discussing the existence of God, their views do not play a major role in his work (Dmowski 1840, 2: 71).

Dmowski argues that God does not impress ideas on the human soul, thus countering Rothenflue's view that God plays the key role in human knowledge (Dmowski 1840, 2: 215). He offers an account of human knowledge that begins with human experience. The human body has organs of sensation that mediate the impressions of external objects as either perceptions or ideas.²¹ Since words, on this account, correspond naturally to the perceptions of things, Dmowski argues that there is no place for skeptical doubt.²² As long as there is sufficient light for observation and human beings are in correct operating order, words will accurately correspond to what is perceived. Kleutgen will argue that we need to look to the Middle Ages for an empirical theory of knowledge that is suitable for the nineteenth century.

Kleutgen also got to know the Jesuit Giovanni Perrone in Rome. Perrone was a dogmatic theologian at the Roman College who would work with Kleutgen in the 1850s on the Index of Prohibited Books. Perrone had just completed the publication of his immensely popular lectures on theology, his *Praelectiones Theologiae*, in 1842, which would reach their twenty-first edition in 1854 (Perrone 1854). He is one of the first nineteenth-century Catholic theologians to use Aquinas in order to solve the problem of reason versus revelation.

²⁰ Dmowski joined the Jesuits in Russia in 1818 before coming to Rome. For information on his life and works, see the listing for Dmowski in Sommervogel 1890-1900.

²¹ For Dmowski's view on perceptions and ideas, see Dmowski 1840, 1: 5-6. For his view on sensation, see Dmowski 1840, 2: 230-233.

²² For Dmowski's view that words are signs of ideas and perceptions, see Dmowski 1840, 1: 10-11. On the conditions for trusting perception, see Dmowski 1840, 1: 82-84.

Perrone devotes the bulk of the first of his nine volumes of lectures to the necessity and existence of supernatural revelation.²³ He is concerned to offer an intellectually respectable account of revelation in an age of rationalism.

The argument for reason and *against* faith, to which Perrone responds, is that human beings ought to admit nothing that they cannot demonstrate as true through an examination of the evidence (Perrone 1854, 1: 16). Since human beings are only to admit what they can demonstrate from evidence, and since they are not able to locate evidence in support of religious faith, it goes against reason to hold something on faith. If people are going to be rational, they ought to forsake all religious faith.

Perrone responds to this “rationalist” argument by distinguishing what is in accordance with reason from what goes against reason. If faith is above reason, we can view faith as neither in accordance with, nor opposed to reason. There need be no conflict between what we hold on reason and what we accept on revelation. It is here that Perrone quotes Aquinas’s seventh chapter of the first book of his *Summa contra Gentiles* (Perrone 1854, 1: 17). He quotes Aquinas to argue that arguments brought against faith have not been properly derived from first principles. And if arguments against faith have not been properly derived from first principles, then they do not contradict revelation. For Perrone, we can be rational and continue to believe in what has been revealed. Kleutgen will follow this interpretation of Aquinas in order to reconcile faith and reason.

While in Rome, Kleutgen published his *Über die alten und die neuen Schulen* in 1846, his first published work against the Enlightenment. Kleutgen’s aim here is to praise the pre-Enlightenment schools run by the religious orders and criticize the new schools funded by the state. He notes that the old ecclesiastical schools were valuable because they promoted a reconciliation between reason and revelation, a reconciliation that can be effected through the study of the Christian authors of the *Vorzeit*.

In the preface to his *Über die alten und die neuen Schulen* Kleutgen laments the loss of the traditional schools through the secularization

²³ Another author of the nineteenth century who would explain the concord between faith and reason with reference to Aquinas was Antoine Martinet (Martinet 1835, 262, 270). For him, however, Augustine plays a more central role (Martinet 1835, 251, 261-2, 285, 288, 293, 309, 312, 313).

and the modern instruction that have effected a rupture between philosophy and theology:

One begins to lament bitterly the destruction of the state conditions [*Staatsverhältnisse*] and even more the destruction of so many ecclesiastical institutions, and turns away with horror from the godless philosophy and half-Catholic theology to the pure teaching of the church; yet the conviction continues to stand firm even among the most able in our days that we have surpassed the past centuries through higher education and true science. (Kleutgen 1846, 2)

The godlessness of modern philosophers, like Kant and his Catholic imitators, has placed knowledge and religious belief in doubt, and led the world to skepticism, as well as to the destruction of the old order (Kleutgen 1846, 92-95). Kleutgen argues that what is needed today is a philosophy that will ground both knowledge and religious belief, and not the rationalism to which some think the Jesuits have succumbed — Rothenflue, for example, would fit the bill (Kleutgen 1846, 97).

The type of philosophy to which, Kleutgen argues, we should return is the type taught for centuries by Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, and other religious orders in the institutions that had been lost through secularization. His point is that, if we are going to make any true progress, we must rebuild these institutions, as well as promote the work of Aquinas. Kleutgen argues that Aquinas is the greatest of the Scholastics because he offers a correct account of the relation between reason and revelation.²⁴ But Kleutgen does not provide the justification for his claim that Aquinas solves the problem of reason and revelation. He does not explain Aquinas's solution. Rather, he puts out a call for research into the study of medieval thought in order to oppose the influence of modern Protestant philosophy:

If, after research, works appeared in which the old Catholic science in some changed form opposed the new Protestants on the battle field, and the school books of the earlier times were not rejected, but improved and accommodated to the needs and not to the spirit of our century — then science and teaching would truly win the fight with false doctrine. (Kleutgen 1846, 108)

²⁴ Kleutgen 1846, 97-98, 104-105.

The modern Protestant thinkers who represent the opposition are Kant and the German Idealists (Kleutgen 1846, 92). Kleutgen will answer his own call for a philosophy and theology based on pre-Enlightenment thought, but he will do so only after the revolution of 1848.

The Revolution of 1848

In March of 1848 public protests aimed at the Jesuits for being a reactionary force prompted Pius IX to ask that the Jesuit order leave the Papal States (Aubert 1981d, 62). Many Jesuits, including Kleutgen, departed from Rome. Giovanni Perrone traveled to England, Matteo Liberatore (1810-1892) to Malta, and Kleutgen discovered a hiding place outside Rome.²⁵ Wishing to serve the order and forsaking the security of his hideaway, Kleutgen secretly returned to Rome in August of 1848 to work as an instructor at the clandestine German College.

In trying to please both liberals and conservatives, Pius the IX introduced freedom of the press and of assembly, some lay government and a constitution (Aubert 1981d, 59-60). Yet, these measures proved inadequate. Advocates of a constituent assembly stormed the Quirinal palace, where Pius IX was living, in November of 1848. The Pope dissolved the Vatican government and fled to Gaeta in the kingdom of Naples. In a speech on 20 April 1849 Pius took a decided stand against the republican value of freedom, arguing that the philosophy upon which the French Revolution was based led only to the destruction of the traditional institutions of church and state (Aubert 1981d, 65). French republican troops came to his aid and forced the troops of the Italian republic out of Rome in July of 1849. After having concluded that France would not impose an elective consultative council or a constitution, Pius returned to Rome on 12 April 1850.

During the revolution Pius, who had not particularly favored the Jesuits in the past, began to support the order, a move that would

²⁵ Recalling these events twenty years later, Kleutgen implies that he lived outside of Rome for almost two years. Deufel's research into Kleutgen's correspondence indicates that this is incorrect. Kleutgen actually went into hiding with a family outside Rome from the middle of May until the beginning of August 1848 (Kleutgen 1868b, 13; Deufel 1976, 50; Lakner 1933, 193).

have significant philosophical consequences. While still in exile, he aided a number of Jesuits, including Carlo Maria Curci, the moral philosopher Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio, and later the theoretical philosopher Matteo Liberatore, in the founding of the bimonthly *Civiltà Cattolica*, a semi-official organ supporting the Pope as head of the church and Papal States (Schmidinger 1988b, 116-117). The *Civiltà Cattolica* was founded in Naples while Pius IX was still in the area waiting to return to Rome, but its first issue did not appear until April 1850. State censorship was instituted at Naples and the production of *Civiltà Cattolica* moved to Rome.

The pre-Revolutionary philosophical works of Taparelli and Liberatore give reason to believe why they were chosen as editors for the *Civiltà Cattolica*. Taparelli had published his *Saggio Teretico di Dritto Naturale Appoggiato sul Fatto* in five volumes from 1840 to 1843.²⁶ Here he depends on Aquinas for his account of the divine origin of the moral order (Taparelli 1855 1: 114). Aquinas's view allows him to argue for a natural order in society that is the basis of individual and social law.²⁷ Taparelli argues against ivory-tower accounts of human rights, accounts which he associates with the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Taparelli's view is that we need to look to authority as it has actually existed in the concrete if we are to get a true sense of the nature of society. By looking at society as it has actually existed, we can recognize those institutions that are most suitable for the welfare of human beings (Taparelli 1855, 1: 309). Taparelli argues that it is evident from history that all authority has been fundamentally paternal (Taparelli 1855, 2: 482-483). We find it extended from the male leaders of families and groups of families to the monarchy. And since patriarchy and monarchy have been the norm in society through the ages, he concludes that these must be the most natural type of government for human beings.

²⁶ I will refer to the second edition of this work which is a reprinting of the first edition with additional notes. It would reach its eleventh edition during another period of reconstruction in 1949.

²⁷ Taparelli was finally able to get the Jesuits to institute the study of Aquinas in 1854. Yet Salvatore Tongiorgi (1829-1865) would teach at the Roman College until his death in 1865 and argue against the Neo-Scholastic notion of matter and form. A controversy ensued between Tongiorgi and the Neo-Scholastic Jesuits at the Roman College and in the pages of the *Civiltà Cattolica* which Peter Beckx (1795-1887), the superior general of the Jesuits, silenced in 1861 (Hartley 1971, 31-32; McCool 1989, 237).

After the revolution, Taparelli would use his view of patriarchy to defend the political structures of the Catholic Church. When he was called to Rome to work with the *Civiltà Cattolica*, he argued that we can construct the best of all possible societies if we continue to rely on patriarchy and the traditional institutions of church and state. In order to achieve broader distribution of Taparelli's plan for a truly up-to-date society, the *Civiltà Cattolica* press republished his articles in 1854 under the title *Esame Critico degli Ordini Rappresentativi nella Società Moderna*. Taparelli argues in the introduction that it is absurd to separate the church from the state (Taparelli 1854, 1: xxv-xxxiv). A distinction should exist between the two, but not separation. Furthermore, such a separation would mean one thing for largely Protestant states like the United States and Germany, and something else for the Papal States, namely, the removal of the Pope from his secular throne. Since the traditional structures of church and state have provided order in the past, we need to preserve these institutions for the future of society. The implication is that since the Pope was the traditional secular ruler of central Italy, he should remain the secular leader of the Papal States.

Matteo Liberatore became one of the editors of the *Civiltà Cattolica* in 1850. Like many other early nineteenth-century Jesuits, he had found solace in modern philosophy. Historians normally date Liberatore's turn to the philosophy of Aquinas after the revolution of 1848. The usual picture is that editors Curci and Taparelli obtained Liberatore's services to work on their journal in 1850 and converted him to the philosophical principles of Aquinas.²⁸ Yet this view overlooks one of Liberatore's works of the 1840s, namely, the first edition of his account of natural law, his *Ethicae et Juris Naturae Elementa* published in 1846. Liberatore frequently refers in this work to Aquinas and to Taparelli's *Saggio Teoretico di Dritto Naturale Appoggiato sul Fatto* and thus produces a Neo-Scholastic account of natural law.²⁹ For example, Liberatore quotes Aquinas in order to make the point that the rightness or wrongness of human actions depends on whether such actions are right or wrong for the entire

²⁸ For instance, Gerald McCool claims that Liberatore became a Thomist only in 1850 (McCool 1989, 145-146). Also see Schmidinger 1988b, 116.

²⁹ For Liberatore's citations of Aquinas in support of his view of natural law, see Liberatore 1846, 32, 66, 69, 76, 85, 141, 202, 313. For Liberatore's citations of Taparelli, see Liberatore 1846, 32, 65, 89, 117, 171, 206, 219, 251, 258, 265, 269, 333, 341, 343, 345.

society, and he uses Aquinas to present his view that natural law takes into account the common good of society as a whole (Liberatore 1846, 66). Liberatore begins by quoting and discussing Aquinas's definition of law as the ordering of reason to the common good (Liberatore 1846, 76). He was, therefore, already a Thomist and follower of Taparelli before the revolution of 1848. In choosing him as a fellow editor of the *Civiltà Cattolica*, Curci and Taparelli knew that they had found a budding Jesuit Thomist.

Furthermore, Liberatore makes a claim in his account of natural law that would have pleased Pius IX. Against the view that the church should submit to political authority, Liberatore argues that since the church is a divine and unchanging institution while the state is earthly and changing, the church should not be subject to the state (Liberatore 1846, 306-307). How can we submit what is eternal to the temporal? Since the eternal cannot submit to the temporal, the church should never submit to the state. Any other view, we are told, is Protestant and therefore wrong.

One implication of this strong contrast between the temporal and the eternal is that the Pope has every right to be the head of the Vatican States. If the Pope, as the head of the church, is to be free from the domination of earthly state power, then he needs to live somewhere that is free from all such power. This requires that the Pope live in a place where he retains the temporal authority (Liberatore 1846, 309). Both Liberatore and Taparelli argued in support of the temporal power of the Pope before the revolution of 1848. Therefore, when Curci gathered these Jesuits to publish the *Civiltà Cattolica*, he obtained scholars who had publicly supported papal temporal and ecclesiastical power.

All three editors looked back to Aquinas to work out a blueprint for contemporary society, and in promoting the production of the *Civiltà Cattolica*, Pius indirectly furthered the study of Aquinas and medieval philosophy. When Curci, Taparelli, and Liberatore began to spearhead a philosophical return to the study of Aquinas in 1853 through a series of programmatic articles, their project carried the implicit support of the bishop of Rome.³⁰ Kleutgen, therefore, after

³⁰ (Schmidinger 1988b, 116-117) This project did not gain the recognition it deserved in wider intellectual circles. For example, Karl Werner, a specialist on medieval philosophy, makes no mention of this project in his five volume history of the Italian philosophy of the nineteenth century. He does refer to the work of Taparelli. Yet, in referring to Taparelli as a representative of an intellectualistic

the revolution of 1848, would have found highly placed allies in Rome with a serious interest in recovering pre-modern philosophy and theology, and especially the thought of Aquinas.

During the period of reconstruction, Kleutgen was made an expert consultant at the Sacred Congregation of the Index of Prohibited Books.³¹ The theologian and canon lawyer Johannes Heinrich Bangen (1823-1865), who worked in the Vatican Congregation of the Council, published an account of the administration of the Catholic Church in 1854, *Die Römische Curie, ihre gegenwärtige Zusammensetzung und ihr Geschäftsgang*. He argued that God had authorized His church to defend the purity of morals and beliefs of the faithful by searching out and condemning works which present a danger to the faith (Bangen 1854, 125). Consultants on the index were to be well educated in a discipline that would aid the investigation of works awaiting the judgment of the church of Rome.

Learning was thought necessary in order that judgments could be fair (Bangen 1854, 137). In Kleutgen the Index received a Jesuit who had a German philosophical and theological education and thus the skills needed for examining the philosophical and theological works of German Catholics. He was put to use examining the works of Anton Günther in the early 1850s (Deufel 1976, 51-52, 437-487). Günther represented Hegel and pantheism to conservative Catholics. To liberals, however, here was a Catholic in touch with the intellectual currents of the age, one whom the German historian of philosophy Johann Eduard Erdmann would describe as the only philosopher to have founded a school of philosophy in the 1830s (Erdmann 1896, 2: 660). In preparing a list of passages drawn from the works of Günther that would lead to his condemnation, Kleutgen sided with the conservative faction of the church of Rome.

The Index serves an apologetic purpose, that is, to protect the faithful by condemning what is false. Kleutgen has a similar aim in his major works, *Die Theologie der Vorzeit*, published from 1853 to 1860, and *Die Philosophie der Vorzeit*, published from 1860 to 1863. In these works he defends what he takes to be true theology and

brand of psychologism, he shifts the focus from Thomism to the philosophical use to which Aquinas is put (Werner 1884-1886, 5: 251).

³¹ The earliest list of consultants found by Kleutgen's biographer Deufel dates from 1859. Kleutgen is listed among fifty-four consultants (Deufel 1976, 51, note 170).

philosophy in opposition to the errors of Descartes, Kant, Hegel and their Catholic imitators Rothenflue, Dmowski, and Günther.³²

Kleutgen would later claim that he first conceived and began to write *Die Theologie der Vorzeit* while in hiding during the revolution of 1848.³³ He planned a study of pre-Enlightenment theology in which he would offer an alternative to the stress that modern theology placed on the individual. The history of this work betrays Kleutgen's struggle to solve the problem of reason versus revelation. He argues in the first volume that, if knowledge is distinct from religious belief, religious dogmas can be defended only after one has first understood the relation between knowledge and revelation (Kleutgen 1853-1860, 1: 27). Kleutgen's claim is that since we can expect knowledge of truth to lead to progress in goodness, science that spreads erroneous, arbitrary, and pernicious teachings is not good science. Divine revelation and teaching offer a measure that allows us to distinguish good science from bad (Kleutgen 1853-1860, 1: 28-29). Kleutgen's point is that the revolutionary destruction brought on by modern philosophy and theology demonstrates the evil nature of modern thought.

In the first two volumes of *Theologie der Vorzeit* Kleutgen presents medieval views on particular points of religious belief in order to offer a view of theological science that does not lead to moral inequity. In carrying out this project, he distinguishes between natural knowledge and supernatural knowledge:

Natural knowledge is the knowledge that we obtain through the power of knowing that is particular to our spirit and through the revelation of God in creation, and supernatural knowledge is that which we obtain through the inner light of grace and through positive revelation, the expressed word of God. (Kleutgen 1853-1860, 1: 64)

Reflection on natural knowledge is no longer simply concerned with knowledge of the principles of the natural order, as it had been for Goudin. This type of reflection concerns what a human being can know through his or her power of cognition. In clarifying what

³² According to Kleutgen, the Catholic followers of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel would include Georg Hermes, Günther, and ontologists like Rothenflue and empiricists like Dmowski.

³³ (Kleutgen 1868b, 13) For the argument that Kleutgen fashioned a unitary method for theology that was influential for the nineteenth century, see McCool 1989, 167-215.

human beings can know, Kleutgen has an epistemological focus. He discusses many theological issues in order to clarify the relation between what human beings can know through reason and what they can know according to revelation.

Kleutgen did not complete this project before becoming embroiled in a controversy in 1859 surrounding the cultic legislation of the Catholic Church that would cast a cloud over his orthodoxy throughout the first half of the 1860s. He was responsible for hearing confessions at the convent of San Ambrogio in Rome where one of the young sisters, a mother Vicaria, was thought to be a saint (Deufel 1976, 56-59). Vicaria, in her late twenties, was placed in charge of the novices of the order, that is, of those new members who would spend a year and a day living a cloistered life in order to reflect on whether God was calling them to the religious life. One of the novices was the Hohenlohe princess Katherine of Hohenzollern. Katherine became close enough to her novice mistress for mother Vicaria to ask her to translate a letter from an American male. The letter indicated that Vicaria and the American had been in love. Katherine could not reconcile the conditions required for sanctity in a religious order with Vicaria's continuing a heterosexual relationship by mail. She told Kleutgen what she had discovered and Kleutgen said she must be mistaken. With stories circulating that impinged on her sanctity, Vicaria attempted to murder the princess by poisoning her. When the princess survived this attack on her life, her criticism of Vicaria and Kleutgen eventually caused them to be removed from their offices.

Katherine of Hohenzollern was a cousin of Gustavus Adolphus Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (1823-1896), the archbishop of Edessa, a friend of liberal academics, an opponent of the Jesuits, and a protector of the liberal philosopher Anton Günther. Kleutgen had been instrumental in having Günther's works condemned in 1857. The archbishop was reported to have been angry over the condemnation of Günther and convinced that Kleutgen had played a role in the poisoning of his cousin. For these reasons, Deufel concludes that Archbishop Hohenlohe was the instigator behind the investigation of the Holy Office into Kleutgen's cultic activities at the Ambrogio convent (Deufel 1976, 60). If this is true, then the prosecution of Kleutgen by the Holy Office was as much a response to his role in the condemnation of Günther as to a violation of ecclesiastical legislation.

Kleutgen was charged with heresy for permitting the nuns to venerate mother Vicaria as a saint and establish an altar in her honor, both violations of the cultic laws of the Catholic Church. The investigation resulted in Kleutgen's dismissal from his Jesuit administrative post and his position with the Index of Prohibited Books (Deufel 1976, 59-60). A. Steinhuber, who was later Kleutgen's rector at the German College, reported after Kleutgen's death, that the Holy Office had sentenced Kleutgen to five years in the cells of the Inquisition, a term that was reduced to living in a Jesuit house at Galloro, located south of Rome, and being denied permission to celebrate the Eucharist. The prioress of the convent of San Ambrogio was not so lucky; she was imprisoned for life. Apparently, Kleutgen's confinement was not unduly severe. He found the leisure and the materials to write the third volume of his *Theologie der Vorzeit* and both volumes of his *Philosophie der Vorzeit*.

In the third and "last" volume of his *Theologie der Vorzeit*, which he published in 1860, Kleutgen departs from the doctrinal project of the earlier volumes.³⁴ Time has elapsed and he no longer discusses the various theological doctrines that he had originally set out to treat. Having already considered God, creation, and grace, if he were to remain faithful to the order of Aquinas, he should have discussed Christ, the sacraments, and the last things. Instead, Kleutgen begins his investigation anew and states that he must now clarify the relation of philosophy to revelation.³⁵

In order to work out the relation between reason and revelation, Kleutgen poses a guiding question: was the medieval use of Greek philosophy fatal to theology (Kleutgen 1853-1860, 3: 9)? In response, he argues that the use of philosophy was not detrimental to theology, that religious belief actually requires the use of reason (Kleutgen 1853-1860, 3: 215-544). At the very least, human beings must use their rational faculties to judge whether or not belief is irrational (Kleutgen 1853-1860, 3: 332-333). His conclusion is that if we should use reason to judge belief, then reason is not fatal to theology. If reason and faith are both important then we need to work out accounts of each and of the relation between the two.

³⁴ The first edition of the third volume of Kleutgen's *Die Theologie der Vorzeit* has "Letzter Band" printed on the title page. Kleutgen would write a fourth volume in 1873 and a fifth in 1874.

³⁵ On the change in order, see Kleutgen 1853-1860, 3: iii-iv. He begins his third volume with a 129 page account of medieval theology, a treatment that would normally appear in the first volume of such a work (Kleutgen 1853-1860, 3: 11-139).

According to Kleutgen, Aquinas and the other Scholastics offer a view of reason and of revelation that is superior to the views worked out by the moderns. The medieval views are superior because they account for the attainment of certainty in the areas of knowledge and religious belief, without the possibility of a contradiction between the two.³⁶ However, before he can demonstrate that reason and revelation do not conflict, Kleutgen feels the need to explain how human beings can obtain certainty in philosophy and theology.

This gives Kleutgen cause to alter the order of his *Theologie der Vorzeit*. He announces in the preface to the first installment of the third volume that he will conclude the second installment with an account of the philosophy of the *Vorzeit* (Kleutgen 1853-1860, 3: iv). But this defense does not appear in the completed text. By the time Kleutgen finished volume three, he had changed his mind again. This task of presenting the philosophy of the *Vorzeit* had grown too large.

The closing sentences of the second installment of Kleutgen's *Theologie der Vorzeit* announce the publication of a second work (Kleutgen 1853-1860, 3: 214). He decided to write a separate work on philosophy to complement his work on theology. He would use the philosophy of the *Vorzeit* to present a theory of knowledge that would serve as a foundation to the study both of theology and the relations between reason and revelation. Kleutgen did this in the first volume of his *Philosophie der Vorzeit* published in 1860. A second volume appeared three years later filling out the philosophical picture of the first with a treatment of metaphysics according to the Wolffian categories of being, nature, psychology, and God. We can clarify Kleutgen's solution to the problem of reason and revelation only by taking into account his *Philosophie der Vorzeit*. If philosophical certainty can be attained through reason, and theological certainty through revelation, and truth does not contradict truth, then there can be no contradiction between reason and revelation. In order to work out this solution Kleutgen constructs an epistemology and a model of the history of medieval philosophy.

A number of studies appeared on the philosophy of Aquinas shortly before the publication of Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit*. The Italian Matteo Liberatore published articles on Aquinas's view

³⁶ Kleutgen 1853-1860, 3: 331-332, 387-388.

of human understanding in his *Della conoscenza intellettuale* from 1857 to 1858. The Frenchman Charles Jourdain published an account of the philosophy of Aquinas, *La Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, in 1858. The Austrian Karl Werner published a weighty three-volume account of Aquinas's life and thought, *Der heilige Thomas von Aquino* from 1858 to 1859. The German Franz Jakob Clemens published his Thomistic defense of the auxiliary relationship between philosophy and theology, his *De scholasticorum sententia, philosophiam esse theologiae ancillam*, in 1856. And his fellow countryman Hermann Ernst Plassmann published his massive five-volume textbook, his *Die Schule des h. Thomas von Aquino* from 1857 to 1862, modeled on the textbook of Goudin.³⁷

Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* differs from these texts in that it offers a sharply focused account of Aquinas's theory of knowledge in order to defend medieval realism against modern philosophy. In providing a theory of knowledge Kleutgen supplies the epistemological component of his reconciliation between reason and revelation. He does not take pains to explain the usual textbook distinctions; for example, he does not offer a systematic account of the five senses. Rather, his purpose is to defend Aquinas's theory of knowledge in opposition to the philosophical views of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and their Catholic followers. In making this defense of Aquinas, Kleutgen offers his model for the history of medieval philosophy. However, in order to understand why Kleutgen constructed this model, it is necessary to consider why he maintains the superiority of medieval realism over modern philosophy.

Kleutgen's claim is that Descartes founded modern philosophy by grounding knowledge of objects in the human subject (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 6). He explains that the modern epistemological problem is how to bridge the gap between subjects and objects. As we shall see, this problem is treated through a critique of a text representative of the modern philosophical turn to the subject, the "Transzendente Ästhetik" of Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Kleutgen argues that by locating the forms of space and time in the subject, Kant locks individuals up within themselves and fails to

³⁷ After a general volume on the philosophy of Aquinas, Plassmann treats logic in volume two, psychology and the foundation of physics in volume three, moral philosophy in volume four, and metaphysics in volume five. For Goudin's influence on Plassmann, see Walter 1988, 141; and Höfer 1965, 114.

offer an adequate account of objective knowledge. Kleutgen claims instead that if we, like the medievals, begin to philosophize by discussing objects, we will avoid falling into subjectivity and skeptical doubt. His thesis is that medieval thinkers, and especially Aquinas, offer a theory of knowledge that does not endanger objectivity and will allow for a reconciliation between reason and revelation. The argument, for rolling back the Enlightenment and rediscovering the glories of pre-modern thought is, therefore, that we have no other way to retain objective science and to safeguard religious belief.

Kleutgen argues in the introduction to his *Philosophie der Vorzeit* that the stress many philosophers place on the human subject has led necessarily, as premises lead to a conclusion, to subjectivity, skepticism, disbelief, and the violent revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 4-8). Again he claims that thought has consequences, in this case that a philosophical theory of knowledge has moral consequences. For example, according to Kleutgen, the French Enlightenment philosophers seduced both the princes and the people into destroying the religious orders and the traditional educational establishments of France. This was the type of philosophy that led to the suppression of the German religious orders, the very orders that had supported the study of Scholastic science through the centuries (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 12). Modern philosophy had infiltrated the Catholic religious orders in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to such an extent that the philosophy of the *Vorzeit* was no longer taught by the very orders that had given birth to it.

Kleutgen uses the criterion that the only sound philosophy is a philosophy that leads logically to the moral good. Modern philosophy is bad philosophy because it leads to immorality. He assumes that if we consider the destruction wrought by revolution, we will conclude that the modern philosophical attempt to begin with the human subject is an untenable option; for such thinking leads only to revolution and destruction.³⁸ The immoral activity in question would include the killing of princes and priests, the suppression of religious orders, and the theft of ecclesiastical property. Implicit here is a view that equates goodness with the stability provided by the altar and the throne. What supports the altar and the throne supports the people, and since modern philosophy supports indi-

³⁸ Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 5, 12, 17-18.

vidual subjectivity and opposes aristocratic and ecclesiastical institutions, it must be in fundamental error. Kleutgen refers to Hobbes, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel as the modern philosophers whose philosophy leads to destruction (Kleutgen 1860-1863 1: 4-11). These philosophers represent a single move, one which strives for the fundamental importance of the human individual. Kleutgen opposes to this group an alternative philosophical tradition that stresses epistemological objectivity, represented by a tradition of philosophy that he traces back to Socrates (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 3).

Kleutgen's epistemological aim is to safeguard perceptual and intellectual knowledge against the dangers of skepticism and subjectivism, which lead to revolution (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 906-909). While he will argue that the Kantian view of the origin of concepts is wrong, he nevertheless uses Kant as a stalking horse to criticize British empiricism, represented by John Locke (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 569). Kleutgen refers to Kant's critique of Locke's view of abstraction, that is, the view that human concepts are mere generalizations of sense experience (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 602). For Kleutgen, as well as for Kant, there is an essential and necessary aspect to human concepts on which rests the possibility of certain knowledge, and this cannot be reduced to the flux of perceptual experience.

Kleutgen offers a philosophical solution to the problem of knowledge which avoids grounding knowledge in sensation or rationality alone. He rethinks the philosophical relation between reason and experience by going behind the veil of modernism to a tradition that, he argues, stretches from the Greeks to the eighteenth century. In order to clarify Kleutgen's epistemological achievement, I will first discuss the problem he sees with Kant's theory of knowledge. If Kleutgen can demonstrate that Kant's philosophy is weak on epistemological grounds, he thinks, the same will be true of those who follow him: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and their Catholic imitators.

Kleutgen attacks Kant's view of sensibility. He notes that, for Kant, any possible experience is subject, at the very least, to the form of time; and the experience of physical objects is subject to the forms of time and space (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 567-568). Kleutgen locates Kant's chief epistemological error in his view that all human knowledge involves these forms of sensibility. He argues

that if space and time are *a priori* structures of all possible experience, then we cannot say that we know things in themselves, but instead only appearances (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 569). Kant would have no difficulty with this reading. But Kleutgen's philosophical problem is that Kant ends up having no real objects in the ordinary sense: "The pure intentions of space and of time are given in the imagination before all sense knowledge; they have as such no object in reality, but are the subjective conditions of all sense knowledge" (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 569). If space and time are only the subjective conditions that precede sense experience, then there are no real objects in space and time. On this reading Kant places limits on saying that we know physical objects: "Since we do not know whether the thing itself is extended, but only that it appears so in our perception, we can only assert that it has (for us) the appearance and not that it has the being of a body" (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 569). Kleutgen questions whether human beings actually understand appearances only through *a priori* concepts or rather perceive actual beings (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 570).

His argument is that in speaking of the origin of the forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding as *a priori*, Kant fails to locate them in human experience. He constructs two spheres that do not intersect. Kleutgen argues that we can avoid this mistake if we recognize that human experience is spatial-temporal. If human experience is spatial-temporal, then space and time are not something apart from it.³⁹ The difficulty with Kant's view of the subject, for Kleutgen, is that, if we separate the subject from objects, we cannot account for objective knowledge. Kleutgen accuses Kant, along with Descartes, of cutting away the possibility of a rational foundation for objective knowledge. If we begin with subjects apart from objects, we have no way of knowing whether my object and yours are one and the same: we do not attain an epistemological foundation.

Kleutgen's aversion to subjectivity appears to have affected one of the quotations he has taken from Kant. Kleutgen misrepresents

³⁹ Kleutgen argues that just as Kantians have criticized Aristotle for missing the nature of space and time by focusing only on external conditions, Kant also fails to locate the origin of space and time in the spatial-temporal nature of human experience: "Thus Kant came to his subjectivism, because he, too, referred the original ideas of space and time to something external, and did not recognize that we know ourselves as spatial-temporal beings rather than knowing space and time outside ourselves" (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 614).

Kant's view of the subjective reality of time by rewriting one of Kant's texts and placing it in quotation marks, without informing the reader of the changes.⁴⁰ For example, Kant uses the first person singular personal pronouns: "*ich*," "*mich*," and "*mein*" when discussing time as the form of inner intuition in his "Transzendente Ästhetik:"

Die Zeit ist allerdings etwas Wirkliches, nämlich die wirkliche Form der inneren Anschauung. Sie hat also subjektive Realität in Ansehung der inneren Erfahrung, d. i. ich habe wirklich die Vorstellung von der Zeit und meinen Bestimmungen in ihr. Sie ist also wirklich nicht als Objekt, sondern als die Vorstellungsart meiner selbst als Objekts anzusehen. Wenn aber ich selbst, oder ein ander Wesen mich, ohne diese Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit, anschauen könnte, so würden eben dieselben Bestimmungen, die wir uns jetzt als Veränderungen vorstellen, eine Erkenntnis geben, in welcher die Vorstellung der Zeit, mithin auch der Veränderung, gar nicht vorkäme. (Kant 1787, B 53-54)

Kleutgen drops a clause on inner experience: "Sie hat also subjektive Realität in Ansehung der inneren Erfahrung," as well as a reference to self-representation: "die Vorstellungsart meiner selbst als Objekts." He removes one use of the first person singular pronoun "*mich*," two uses each of the words "*ich*" and "*mein*," and two singular uses of the word "*selbst*." Kleutgen substitutes the first person plural personal pronouns: "*wir*," "*uns*," and "*unsere*," and "quotes" Kant as follows:

Die Zeit sei allerdings etwas Wirkliches, nämlich die wirkliche Form der innern Anschauung: wir haben wirklich die Vorstellung von der Zeit und unsern Bestimmungen in ihr. Sie sei also wirklich, aber nicht als Object, sondern als unsere (subjective) Vorstellungsweise. Wenn wir uns aber ohne diese Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit anschauen könnten, so würden eben dieselben Bestimmungen, die wir uns jetzt als Veränderungen vorstellen, eine Erkenntniß geben, in welcher die Vorstellung der Zeit, mithin auch der Veränderungen gar nicht vorkommen würden. (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 606)

What is significant is that Kleutgen shifts Kant's first person singular discussion of the subjective reality of time, the voice of a single

⁴⁰ While it is common in German to rephrase a statement using the subjective, the rephrasing would not appear in quotation marks. Even if Kleutgen were only

person, to the intersubjective level of two or more people. If the reader thinks he or she is with others, then perhaps the reader will not be tempted to think that he or she is an individual subject, with all the attendant philosophical problems. Whether or not Kleutgen consciously altered Kant's text in order to protect his readers from the temptation of Kant's seductive language, his revisions (which appear unchanged in the second edition eighteen years later) represent, if nothing else, a curious example of the fallacy of omission (Kleutgen 1878, 1: 573).

Kleutgen avoids the use of the first person singular in carrying out his philosophical project.⁴¹ By speaking about "we" instead of "I," Kleutgen betrays his presupposition that people are, philosophically speaking, a kind of being with others rather than individual subjects. His talk about knowers and the known and about people's mind ("*unser Geist*"), rather than about "I's" or "me's," demonstrates a Görresian objectification of the *Volk* (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 614). By arguing that philosophy should begin with the known, Kleutgen attempts to keep off the slippery slope into subjectivity, avoiding the type of subjective language that might on his account lead to skepticism and revolution.

Kleutgen's claim for the nineteenth century is that by working out of the Scholastic tradition we can best avoid the problems associated with subjectivity (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 905-906). He states that when science loses its contact with things, it loses its content and purpose. For example, how are we to know that what we claim to be true, is in fact true? How are we to know that it is not simply what appears to us and that it might appear differently to others (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 910)? We should call a judgment true when it corresponds to the way things are. Unless we begin with common objects we abandon the possibility of any truth or real knowledge. Without common objects there is no objective way to distinguish true judgments from false ones (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 271).

What if Kleutgen is wrong about Kant? What if Kant does not grant a constitutive epistemological role to the individual subject?

rephrasing here without using quotation marks, my interest is in the changes he has made.

⁴¹ For his relegation of subjectivity to the area of grace, see Kleutgen 1853-1860, 3: 409.

Kant's view, then, would not lead to skepticism and we would not need to go back with Kleutgen to the pre-Enlightenment in search of a philosophical defense of scientific knowledge. I suggest that there is more similarity between Kleutgen and Kant than Kleutgen was willing to maintain. Kant does not simply ground knowledge in the individual subject, and neither does he disregard the fact that people experience objects.

I take Kant's statements seriously when he claims that we can know what we experience. He states unambiguously in his *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik* that actual bodies appear outside of us. He does this when he notes that bodies are the "appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual." He is not denying actual things. Kant distances himself from the subjective idealism of Bishop Berkeley when he criticizes genuine idealism: "The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but it is only shown that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself."⁴² There are appearances of actual things. Admittedly using words like "bodies" and "thing" to discuss what cannot be experienced, might sound odd. But Kant is not denying that we experience actual things.

In fact, Kant's project is to offer an account of what is required for the everyday experience of things within the forms of time and space. It is appropriate to say with Kant that we experience real objects and not simply ideas, so long as we do not think that speaking like this means that we can know whether or not our experience of ordinary things is grounded in the rocks and gold fish around us. Therefore, in a very different way from Kleutgen, we can say that Kant is a realist, in the sense that he accounts for talk about ordinary objects. His concern is with those structures that allow human beings to talk about the experience of objects in everyday life. Human experience is not an illusion for Kant.

If the universal and necessary features of rational cognition are constitutive of knowledge and not simply regularities of a physical world, then intelligibility for Kant is in no sense lost as Kleutgen has charged. Kant offers a view of objective knowledge that accounts for the possibility of knowledge for all rational beings. Even though he writes about the subjective conditions of knowl-

⁴² Kant 1783, second remark to the first part; 36-37, Beck trans.

edge, and this is the important point in regard to Kleutgen's critique, Kant is not using the word "*subjektiv*" or "*Subjekt*" to ground knowledge in individual human beings. Kleutgen thinks that, for Kant, we each have our own personal structures with which to interpret experience. This would imply a lack of objectivity, since each individual might redefine knowledge according to how she or he is "constituted." There would be no reason to expect that rational beings are all constituted alike. Knowledge would no longer be objective. But this is not what Kant is saying. For Kant, "*Subjekt*," like the regulative ideal of soul, refers to what is required for any experience, and not to an individual subject as the source of experience. Only that which is presented through the forms of sensibility and the categories can be an object of experience; the "*Subjekt*" is neither.

When Kant talks about "*Subjekt*" he is not referring to an individual. He is claiming that knowledge or experience presupposes universal rational conditions. For example, when Kant discusses the subjective basis for appearances, he states that he is discussing sensibility itself, implying that he is speaking of the conditions for any possible experience of any individual and not just for the particular experience of Immanuel Kant.⁴³ His terms "*Subjekt*" and "*subjektiv*" refer to conditions for the possibility of any experience and not to individual beings. Therefore Kleutgen's concern that Kant is opening the door to a type of philosophical individualism and skepticism is unfounded. Both Kant and Kleutgen had the same philosophical purpose, namely, to account for objective knowledge.⁴⁴

⁴³ Kant 1783, at the end of part one, remark 2 after sect. 13.

⁴⁴ There is an epistemological parallel between Kleutgen and his Neo-Kantian contemporaries. Both argued for the central philosophical importance of the theory of knowledge. This interest in epistemology demonstrates that Kleutgen's concerns were more generally held. For example, Hermann Helmholtz, when speaking at the dedication of a memorial to Kant, praised Kant for explaining how knowledge is derived from experience. Helmholtz notes the perennial importance of Kant's epistemological project for philosophy (Schnädelbach 1984, 104). Another example is Eduard Zeller's argument, in his "Über Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie" from 1862, that due to advances in the sciences since the days of Kant, philosophers should be able to work out a theory of knowledge that is more precise than that of Kant. Zeller puts out a call for new work on the theory of knowledge (Schnädelbach 1984, 105).

Kleutgen's Theory of Knowledge

Kleutgen admits that the thinkers of the *Vorzeit* do not offer a theory of knowledge that will satisfy all the needs of philosophers in the nineteenth century (Kleutgen 1860, 1: 23-24). But he argues that we can find a common theory of knowledge in the *Vorzeit* that can serve as a basis for contemporary epistemological concerns. Kleutgen claims that a common theory, which he characterizes in three principles, was current among a number of significant pre-modern thinkers including Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Suarez, and Silvester Maurus (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 26-53). The first principle grants a constitutive role in knowledge both to the object known as well as to the knower: "Knowledge arises through an image of the known's being produced in the knower by the knower and the known" (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 26). If both the object and the knower play a constitutive role in knowledge, then Kleutgen has avoided a subject-object distinction. Because knowledge involves a union of the knower and the known, there is no reason to focus on the subject to the detriment of the object in a discussion of epistemology.

Kleutgen speaks of the constitutive role that the knower plays in knowledge in his second principle: "The known is in the knower according to the manner of the knower" (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 34). In order to obtain an accurate account of human knowledge we must have consideration for the functional manner in which human beings come to know actual physical objects. We are to treat types of knowers like any other object and clarify the manner in which they know. In focusing on how a specific type of being understands, Kleutgen avoids founding his theory of knowledge on the activity of individual subjects.

Kleutgen distances himself from the materialists in his third principle, where he separates intellectual knowledge from sense knowledge: "Knowledge is all the more perfect the further the knowing principle is removed in its being from materiality" (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 41). He points out that sense knowledge is an imperfect type of knowledge on account of the fact that it is connected with materiality. As material beings change, sense perceptions will no longer correspond to the objects that were perceived. Therefore, in order to avoid the difficulties that materialists encounter when try-

ing to account for knowledge that is necessary and true, Kleutgen distinguishes intellectual knowledge from material sense perception.

In expounding these three principles, Kleutgen claims to sum up pre-Enlightenment epistemology and to present an account that can be of use in the nineteenth century. He states that the origin of knowledge in material things is the deepest epistemological question. What he suggests is that the Scholastic conception of "abstraction" can protect us from the dangers of epistemological subjectivity and preserve objective knowledge (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 33). In other words, abstraction is the key to understanding why the knower need not be separated from the known and how universal knowledge that is certain can be attained.

To abstract here does not mean "to isolate," as it did for Locke, but rather an activity by which people come to understand essential forms. According to Kleutgen, human beings can understand the physical objects around them only because they understand essential forms. He argues that they understand essential forms through the sensible presentation of objects. Kleutgen's problem is to explain the relation between sensation and human understanding. For, if human understanding is more perfect the more it is removed from materiality, what role does the sensation of physical objects play in human understanding? Kleutgen uses the medieval notion of abstraction to explain this relation:

It follows that there has to be some cause through which it happens that in the presence of the sensual image — which always represents the object according to its individual and external appearances — there is produced in the reason the intelligible image that expresses the general, the necessary, and the essential. This, however, is what happens through the *intellectus agens* according to the scholastics, and, therefore, they usually say that its characteristic effect consists in making the material things, or rather the sensual presentation of the material things, recognizable and intelligible for reason: *facere phantasmata actu intelligibilia*. (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 120)

The argument is that through the power of the human intellect people can abstract unchanging forms from sensible presentations. The human intellect operates in such a way that human beings can acquire knowledge of universals from the sensible images they have of physical things. For example, through having sensible images of a tree, human beings can abstract and come to know the form

"treeness." They can then come to state the necessary properties of treeness, which they can know with certainty and use in order to judge whether some physical object is or is not a tree.

Like the empiricists Kleutgen retains the centrality of sense experience in his theory of knowledge, and like Kant he offers an account that yields necessary and objective truths. And since Kleutgen claims that people can identify physical things by judging with the help of universals, he manages to retain the elusive thing-in-itself as one of the grounds of human knowledge, something Locke hoped to do, but Hume and Kant agreed could not be done. In retaining a constitutive role for subject and object in an account of objective and necessary knowledge, Kleutgen avoids the subjectivity of modern philosophy, which, he claims, has led to an undue stress being placed on the individual and to the revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Violence can be avoided if we turn back to the theory of knowledge of the Middle Ages. In order to introduce the reader to this philosophy, Kleutgen offers a one-hundred-and-ten-page account of medieval philosophy.⁴⁵ In this account he provides the model that will dominate the historiography of medieval philosophy up to the present day.

Kleutgen's Model of the History of Medieval Philosophy

Kleutgen argues (with Hauréau) that the view that philosophy was subservient to religious dogma during the Middle Ages is false, and that philosophy did in fact exist during this period. The general histories of philosophy from Brucker to Hegel perpetuate a wrong-headed account of medieval philosophy that originated in a failure to understand the medieval answer to the problem of reason versus revelation (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 329-335). However, Kleutgen argues against Hauréau that Anselm and Aquinas achieved a reconciliation between reason and revelation allowing them to practice philosophy independent of, yet allied to, theology. Hauréau was wrong to think that philosophy was opposed to theology for the major thinkers in the Middle Ages.

⁴⁵ (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 250-360) This is the second installment of the first volume of Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit*.

Drawing on interpretations worked out before the Enlightenment, Kleutgen offers a critical account of three philosophical schools of the Middle Ages in order to clarify the importance of medieval philosophical realism. These schools are that of philosophical realism, formalism, and nominalism. In support of this characterization, he cites passages from the Jesuit Conimbricense college commentaries on Aristotle written in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁴⁶ He is often in agreement with the Conimbricensians even when not providing citations. For example, Kleutgen agrees that the nominalists and Heraclitus have similar views on the origin of ideas.⁴⁷ Likewise, that the realists followed Aristotle in their concern for universals and offered a view that is philosophically superior to that of the nominalists.⁴⁸ Such agreement with the Conimbricensians suggests a careful and sympathetic reading of their works.

On this account, Aquinas, William of Ockham, and Duns Scotus are the leading representatives of the realists, nominalists, and formalists, respectively.⁴⁹ This paradigm differs from the one worked out by Brucker, Hegel, Ritter, and Hauréau in that Kleutgen argues that Ockham did not mark the rebirth of philosophy, but its decline. For him, philosophical realism and the reconciliation of reason and revelation are the achievements of medieval philosophy. Both Scotus and Ockham represent decline because they criticize realism and the harmony between reason and revelation, leading inexorably to the dissolution of medieval philosophy.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ For example, see Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 252, 256, 262, 265, 273. Kleutgen also cites Fonseca, the Jesuit commentator on Aristotle. For example, see Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 252, 256, 262, 263, 265). In the second volume of his history of idealism published in 1896, Otto Willmann presents Kleutgen as in agreement with the Conimbricensians and Fonseca concerning the differences between the realists and the nominalists (Willmann 1896, 586-588).

⁴⁷ Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 252, 254; and Collegium Conimbricense 1607, 80.

⁴⁸ Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 253-254; and Collegium Conimbricense 1607, 83, 87. Kleutgen continues and develops the Conimbricensian presentation of the philosophical relations between Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle as part of the intellectual background to nominalism.

⁴⁹ For Kleutgen's view of Aquinas as representative of realism, see Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 272-278. For his reading of Scotus as representative of formalism, see Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 278-282. For his interpretation of Ockham as representative of nominalism, see Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 256-261.

⁵⁰ For Kleutgen's view of the negative direction of Ockham's thought, see Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 263-266. For his interpretation of the decline of philosophy in Scotus, see Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 290-29. On Kleutgen's understanding of the havoc Scotus and Ockham wreak on the medieval harmony between reason and revelation, see Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 318-328.

Importantly for the historiography of medieval philosophy, Kleutgen constructs the history of medieval philosophy according to the spheres of philosophical inquiry. Brucker, Hegel, Ritter, and Hauréau had already worked out the views of a number of medieval thinkers on the problem of universals. But they did not present the medievals as having offered accounts of the standard branches of philosophy. Ritter took a step in this direction by arguing that the medievals wrote philosophy, and Hauréau discussed medieval views of universals and human understanding, but they did not organize presentations of medieval philosophy according to the areas of philosophy. Goudin represents those Scholastics of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries who argued that Aquinas and Scotus had logical, physical, moral, and metaphysical views. What Kleutgen does is to apply this interpretation to the major medieval thinkers, arguing that they made contributions to logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, psychology, metaphysics, morals, and natural theology. He discusses logic and morals in his treatment of epistemology in the first volume of his *Philosophie der Vorzeit*, and the philosophy of science, psychology, metaphysics, and natural theology in his second volume.

Kleutgen also argues that the different branches of medieval philosophy are related philosophically. For example, a person's epistemology and metaphysics do not stand apart from each other like windowless monads. Rather, the epistemology of an individual has metaphysical consequences. In fact, Kleutgen judges epistemology to play the central role in philosophy, the trunk of the philosophical tree, as it were, with implications for every other area of philosophy; hence his belief that we must have a correct epistemology if we are to live a moral life. He defines the three types of epistemology that have flourished during the medieval period in order to characterize the schools of medieval philosophy (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 251-252). He clarifies each to explain the moral, metaphysical, and theological implications for each philosophical tradition and to argue for the philosophical superiority of medieval realism.

On Kleutgen's reading, nominalism is especially dangerous for philosophy because it threatens the view that human beings can have objective knowledge of physical things. He explains that words are, for the nominalists, singular natural signs and not carriers of universal meaning. Even general words are singular, the application

of particular words to more than one thing (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 258-260). Kleutgen judges this approach to be absurd because, without coming to know the order and laws of the world, we would see the world only as a mass of particulars and not as individual beings. Therefore, according to Kleutgen, Ockham makes a false move when he places stress on particular things and not on universals. He fails to offer an adequate account of how human beings can obtain a scientific understanding of the physical world around them.

If there are only particulars, and there is nothing in general we can know about the world, then all science is impossible. Science would become a game with representations and not unchanging objective knowledge. Given such a view, we slide into subjectivity, into a world of what appears to each individual, and end up as philosophical skeptics (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 271). This view triumphs in Kant with the claim that we do not know things in themselves, which is for Kleutgen a world without philosophy. If philosophy is an inquiry into universal and necessary truths, and we cannot attain such knowledge, then we have arrived at the death of philosophy.

Ockham's view of knowledge has consequences for his view of God. For, if we can have no universal concepts that we can apply to things, we are unable to speak with accuracy about anything, even about God. We lose the meaning of our names and concepts of God (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 327-328). This has ramifications for Kleutgen's project of reconciling reason and revelation. For, if there are no universal truths of faith or of reason, there are no truths that need to be reconciled. Therefore, from Kleutgen's standpoint, Ockham brings about the downfall of the medieval reconciliation of reason and revelation. And since, for Kleutgen, this reconciliation is the crowning achievement of medieval thought, in bringing about this ruin, Ockham represents the decline of medieval thought.

In preparing to explain the virtue of realism over nominalism, Kleutgen reconsiders the view that nominalism defeated realism during the late Middle Ages and represents a general rebirth of philosophy. Kleutgen claims that this is simply inaccurate and that, in fact, it was the followers of Aquinas who would be in the ascendancy during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and who, by the sixteenth, would almost completely dominate the philosophical

scene.⁵¹ His point is that the medieval realists did not represent philosophical decline in relation to Greek philosophy, and that the historians who have argued that they did were simply siding with a misreading of the history of philosophy.⁵² Kleutgen implies that since Protestants are members of many churches and not united in one church they have a predilection to agree with Ockham's view of the importance of multiplicity. There are only particulars in the universe and no forms shared by individuals. In general, Protestants are unable to evaluate correctly the philosophy of Aquinas, in which the oneness of the forms, like the oneness of the Catholic Church, reigns supreme. And since Kleutgen believes that nominalism has borne fruit in the many flavors of modern philosophy, the implication is that his crusade against modern philosophy will result in another victory for philosophical realism over nominalism.

Duns Scotus and his followers are termed "formalists" by Kleutgen because they fail to appreciate that physical things are more than mere forms. Kleutgen argues that since, for Scotus, the individualizing principle of any particular thing is yet another form, he does away with actual individual subjects, and in doing so abolishes the philosophical foundation that is necessary in order to distinguish between individuals. What we have in Scotus is, according to Kleutgen, an endless number of predicates with no subject to which they could adhere. Since the Scotists offer a view of forms without subjects, they must conclude that the entire world is a single subject.⁵³ Even though Scotus and his followers do not claim to be pantheists, the logic of their view leads inevitably to the conclusion that all is one.

In focusing on form to the exclusion of individuals, the Scotists represent one philosophical extreme. They lead to the view that all is God and in so doing blur the distinction between reason and revelation. The nominalists represent another philosophical extreme by taking into account individuals, with no regard for form. In denying that we can know anything in general about the world, they destroy the foundation for all objective science. If there is no knowledge, then there can be no rational account of the relation of reason to revelation.

⁵¹ Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 251-252, 344-347, 350.

⁵² Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 252, 330-333.

⁵³ Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 297, 306.

According to Kleutgen, the truly great philosophers of the ancient and medieval periods provide a common philosophical theory of knowledge that takes into account both what is individual and what is universal. Aquinas most successfully continues the work of ancient philosophy by giving a detailed philosophical account of how we can talk with certainty about physical objects. According to Aquinas, everything that exists is singular, but since singular things have natures, they can be the grounds for universal truths. All natures are natures of particular beings and these natures ground universal concepts, concepts which come to exist only in the minds of knowers (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 275). Truth resides formally in the soul that recognizes things in the world for what they are, but foundationally in the nature of each individual thing for being the kind of thing that it is. In so doing, Aquinas steers a middle course between particularity and universality. Goudin had already argued that the nominalists were wrong to deny universal natures, and that the formalists were wrong to argue only for forms (Goudin 1869, 1: 107, 109-110). What Kleutgen does is to offer a model of the history of medieval philosophy that promotes Aquinas's theory of knowledge as the virtuous mean between the epistemological extremes of Scotus and Ockham. In steering a middle course, Aquinas provides a basis for a sound philosophy.

Aquinas most clearly represents the summit of medieval philosophy for Kleutgen, because he has attained the epistemological mean between the formalism of the Scotists, which leads through Spinoza to the German Absolute Idealism of the nineteenth century, and the anti-scientific and ultimately anti-philosophical skepticism of Ockham, which leads through Montaigne, Descartes, and the British empiricists to Kant's denial that we can know things in themselves. Kleutgen argues that these are the two philosophical schools that have met with great success since the time of Descartes, and that neither school offers a sound theory of knowledge or a correct account of the relation of reason to religious belief (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 348-353). Rather, his view is that we should turn to the realists of the *Vorzeit* if we are to steer a course between both horns of this philosophical dilemma and avoid the philosophical subjectivity associated with pantheism and the skepticism that leads to revolutionary destruction.

Furthermore, Kleutgen argues that Ockham's concern for particularity leads to an undue stress on the individual human subject

in morality. Morality becomes the preserve of the individual with no universal criterion for human action.⁵⁴ When the values of two persons conflict with one another, there is no philosophical method to distinguish right from wrong. The result is that individuals feel free to resort to warfare or revolution in order to obtain what they desire. Kleutgen thinks that if we are rational, we will choose a philosophy that leads to the preservation of society and not its destruction. Since nominalism leads to conflict, it would not be rational to choose this philosophy. Kleutgen's implication is that Aquinas offers an epistemology that allows for a conception of human nature that can serve as a basis for moral objectivity. A universal concept of human nature provides a universal and necessary guide to moral activity. Therefore, one reason why Aquinas's theory of knowledge is superior to that of Ockham is the implications it has for the moral life. Kleutgen opposes Aquinas's epistemological and moral objectivity to the modern philosophical turn towards the subject. In Aquinas, we have a basis for a philosophy that avoids the skepticism and moral subjectivity of modern philosophy.

Epistemological realism permits Kleutgen to make progress in his long standing project of clarifying reason and revelation. In his *Philosophie der Vorzeit* he constructs a theory of natural knowledge that complements the account of supernatural knowledge based on revelation offered in the third volume of his *Theologie der Vorzeit*. On the one hand, he defends revelation against the nineteenth century "rationalists," who deny that anyone should trust revelation; on the other, he defends philosophical knowledge against the religious traditionalists, who deny the validity of human reason. Moreover, Kleutgen clarifies the relations between reason and revelation. For example, he argues that, according to Aquinas, people can apply analogously to God the concepts and terms they use in regard to natural things (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 325-327). This allows them to explain how human beings can use the same language to talk about God and created things. Religious language is therefore not separate from but analogous to philosophical language. In describing how we can talk about God as good and as truth itself in a different way from how we talk about other beings, Kleutgen clarifies the relation between religious and philosophical language.

⁵⁴ (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 4-5, 266, 271) In order to reconstruct Kleutgen's moral argument, one needs to read his evaluation of the philosophy of Ockham together with his introduction.

He also argues that God is responsible for the nature of each thing and therefore provides the foundation for all scientific knowledge (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 276). This argument is that God has created a universe of particular things, each of which has its own nature, and these natures provide the basis for intellectual abstraction which is necessary for human understanding and reason. As the creator, God is the ultimate foundation for human knowledge as well as of revelation. Since both reason and revelation have their source in God, reason is not cut off from revelation as the moderns would have us believe. Because there is a theory that encompasses the truth of both philosophy and theology, philosophy need not be in conflict with theology. Kleutgen has arrived at an understanding of the relations between faith and reason from the study of medieval thought.

There are political and ecclesiastical implications in Kleutgen's view. If philosophy is not at odds with theology then we need not continue the Enlightenment project of dislodging theology as the queen of the sciences. Theology properly understood does not present a threat to the use of reason. Furthermore, the church does not present a threat to the state. The revolutionary destruction of ecclesiastical property and persons was unjust and detrimental to society as a whole. Respecting the relations between philosophy and theology as well as between church and state will promote the common good. A return to the philosophy and theology of the *Vorzeit* will restore stability to society and prevent the violence of revolution.

Kleutgen and Michelis

Upon the publication of the first volume of Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* a controversy arose over the proper method of writing the history of medieval philosophy. The *Historisch-politische Blätter* entered this controversy in 1861 with an anonymous article titled "Neueste Stimmen über die Nothwendigkeit einer positiven Philosophie für unsere Zeit" ("Most recent voices concerning the necessity of a positive philosophy for our time"). "Positive philosophy," in this case, does not refer to hard-nosed empirical inquiry. Theological writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had used the word "positive" to refer to argumentation that rests on

principles accepted as true. For example, Billuart notes in the preface to his *Summa Summae S. Thomae* that theology is positive when it rests on texts taken from Scripture or from church tradition (Billuart 1763, 1: 2). By using "positive" data, along with dialectic, Billuart fashions a foundational theology that can withstand the inroads of skeptical doubt. Assuming that the data is true and the argumentation sound, we have no reason to doubt the theological conclusions.

In the *Historisch-politische Blätter* "positive philosophy" is discussed as a type of philosophy that avoids the subjective foundations of modern philosophy. We are told that a number of recent philosophers use the texts, and the philosophical principles, of ancient and medieval philosophy in order to ground philosophy on a more positive and eternal foundation (Neueste Stimmen 1861, 865-869). Kleutgen is singled out as representative of those philosophers who use Aquinas to construct a positive foundation for philosophy and look for intellectual guidance to the Pope in Rome (Neueste Stimmen 1861, 872). Since Kleutgen grants the Pope an authoritative role in intellectual spheres he is called a "Roman" philosopher. The philosopher Friedrich Michelis (1815-1886) is singled out as an example of a "positive" philosopher who holds that we need to understand the Greeks if we are to arrive at a sound philosophy. He points out that there is a similarity between the philosophy of the ancient Greeks and the new scientific method of the German universities (Neueste Stimmen 1861, 877, 882). Both stress the role of human reason. But Michelis offers a very different "positive" philosophy from that of Kleutgen. He sees no reason to grant the Pope a role in determining scientific questions. Michelis is a "German" and not a "Roman" because he holds that the modern German university, with its reliance on reason, should be the locus of philosophical research, and not the ecclesiastical seminaries that are tied to the religious dogmas of Rome.

Michelis represents those Catholic "Germans" who grant a dominant role to reason in philosophy and science and a negligible one to the Pope. Kleutgen represents the "Romans" who place the church hierarchy above reason. This polarization had not existed in the 1830s when Kleutgen and Michelis both studied under Schüller at the Episcopal Academy of Münster. Kleutgen was instructed in the importance of pre-Enlightenment philosophy and Michelis in the scientific value of Plato's precise use of dialectic at the same

institution.⁵⁵ The conclusion of the article in the *Historisch-politische Blätter* is that both sides have something to contribute.⁵⁶ But, as we shall see, these two schools of thought will become polarized; and by the late 1860s the stakes between the two will have been raised to a critical point. In 1870 the “Romans” would score a lasting victory on the issue of intellectual freedom.

Michelis later notes his debt to Plato in a manner that helps to clarify his disagreement with the “Romans.” He states that Plato had helped him to defend the importance of reason against the Jesuits who, as members of the “Roman” camp, clung to religious dogma:

My life is determined by the one thought that in Plato, the Greek and the student of Socrates, the very point on the large scale of human development on earth is designated, where poetry turned into philosophy. And just like this thought, which was planted in my soul early, has been the driving force in the first half of my life and in my choice for the priesthood, it has also kept me upright in the struggle for the truth and dignity of my Catholic priesthood in the face of the mutilation of the church by the Jesuits.⁵⁷

Michelis’s view is that when the Jesuits and the other “Romans” place ecclesiastical dogma over reason, they sap the intellectual rigor of philosophy. By looking back to the birth of Western philosophy he argues that we can construct a methodology that allows us to be rational and talk about God, without becoming the mindless puppets of Rome.

Michelis criticizes Kleutgen in his monograph *Bemerkungen zu der durch J. Kleutgen S.J. verteidigten Philosophie der Vorzeit* published in 1861. He accuses Kleutgen of subverting Aquinas’s theory of knowledge in order to serve the interests of Rome. Michelis’s aim is to point out what is wrong with Kleutgen’s interpretation and to indicate the political and ecclesiastical ramifications of Kleutgen’s philosophical position. For example, Michelis accuses Kleutgen of offering an inaccurate reading of Aquinas in order to grant religious dogma a role in the sciences over human cognition:

⁵⁵ On Michelis’s studies at Münster with Schülter, see Belz 1978, 8. Schülter introduced Michelis to the contemporary importance of the serious study of Plato. On Kleutgen’s studies with Schülter at Münster, see Deufel 1976, 35.

⁵⁶ *Neueste Stimmen* 1861, 884-885.

⁵⁷ Quoted in Belz 1978, 8. Original appears in Michelis 1885, iii-iv.

Herewith I have arrived at the purpose of these pages, I wanted to take a clear and firm stand in the face of the present strife for the repristinization of scholasticism, as it has undoubtedly appeared most conclusively and respectably in Kleutgen's works, and I do not have to hide behind the mountains concealing what it is that I want to represent. (Michelis 1861: 64-65)

The phrase "hide behind the mountains" ("*hinter dem Berge halten*") is an allusion to the liberal slogan "beyond the mountains" ("*jenseits der Berge*" or "*ultramontane*") which refers to Catholics north of the Alps who stand united to the Pope, who lies "beyond the mountains." Michelis is north of the Alps and points out that he has no need to draw on Rome in the area of science. When presenting his philosophical views, he needs neither mountains nor a Pope behind which to hide.

According to Michelis, Kleutgen's philosophical and political interests lead him to read an epistemology into Aquinas that is not in the texts. When Kleutgen cites the medievals in order to promote his non-subjective-philosophical objectivity, he misrepresents medieval philosophy. He reads a defense of philosophical objectivity into the texts of Aquinas and neglects Aquinas's discussion of the subjective activity of the active and passive intellects (Michelis 1861, 3-4). Aquinas does not present human cognition as the generic abstracting machine that Kleutgen intimates. Aquinas writes at length about the subjective activity of each individual person in understanding.⁵⁸ Kleutgen misreads Aquinas in order to lend "objective" philosophical support to the absolutist institutions of church and state (Michelis 1861, 65, 68). His interpretation of medieval realism is a reactionary reading and not good history. In contrast, Michelis's project is to ground philosophy in the rationality of the individual human subject, as well as to argue that philosophy and politics are the concern of every human being, and not the special preserve of those who have received the oils of ordination.

Michelis's conclusion is that the budding historians of medieval thought ought to avoid modern polemics when they write the history of medieval philosophy. Rather, they should begin by reading

⁵⁸ Aloys Schmid in his *Wissenschaftliche Richtungen auf dem Gebiete des Katholicismus*, published in 1862, notes Michelis's contribution to seeing the Platonic elements in medieval thought (Schmid 1862, 73-74).

those philosophical works that the medievals themselves read, namely, those of Plato and Aristotle (Michelis 1861, 67, 76). Only after coming to grips with the ancient Greek use of reason can they understand the medieval use of ancient philosophy.

Michelis's point about the nature of Kleutgen's interest in medieval philosophy is accurate. Kleutgen admits that he is constructing a philosophy in order to restore a traditional ecclesiastical and secular order. But Michelis does not take into account that Kleutgen is interpreting the history of medieval philosophy in order to arrive at an understanding of the relations of faith and reason. Furthermore, he neglects to note that Kleutgen approaches medieval philosophy according to the spheres of philosophical inquiry and grants the central role to epistemology. For example, Aquinas's view of universals allows him to talk meaningfully about God and to offer an account of the relations between faith and reason, whereas Ockham's reduction of reference to particulars would seem to render such talk nonsensical. In arguing that the medievals wrote accounts of different areas of philosophy that relate philosophically, Kleutgen constructs an influential model for the historiography of medieval philosophy. Yet, Kleutgen did not write a chronological history of medieval philosophy. This would be supplied by Albert Stöckl, who would use Kleutgen's model in writing the first comprehensive general history of medieval philosophy.

CHAPTER FOUR

ALBERT STÖCKL'S *GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE DES MITTELALTERS*

A controversy between the liberal Catholic "Germans" and conservative Catholic "Romans" over the relation between church authority and academic freedom arose in the late 1850s. With references to medieval thought, Franz Jakob Clemens argued in 1859 that philosophy is subservient to theology. He had argued the same position in his *De scholasticorum sententia, philosophiam esse theologiae ancillam*, published in 1856, but it was the anonymous publication of his programmatic piece "Unser Standpunkt in der Philosophie" by the new editors of the *Katholik* that set off the controversy (Clemens 1859). Johannes Kuhn, the important dogmatic theologian at the University of Tübingen, defended a broader view of academic freedom in his *Philosophie und Theologie*, published in 1860, and in his two-part article "Das Verhältniss der Philosophie zur Theologie nach modern-scholastischer Lehre," published in the *Theologische Quartalschrift* in 1862 and 1863 (Kuhn 1860; 1862-1863).

In order to achieve some consensus between the two camps that were forming, Ignaz Döllinger, a member of the Görres circle and an eminent church historian, organized a congress of German-speaking Catholic philosophers and theologians at Munich in September of 1863 to discuss the ecclesiastical limits of academic freedom (Acton 1864, 209-210). Members of both the "German" and "Roman" schools were present. Many speeches were given, including one by Kleutgen's foe Michelis, who spoke on the role that historical research can play in the exercise of free thought (Versammlung 1863, 83-85; Betz 1978, 31). Through dialogue, a compromise was reached between the two camps, both agreeing that academics should be able to think without restraint as long as they do not endanger the faith.¹

In 1864 Pius IX issued his *Syllabus of Errors*, a collection of eighty condemned propositions, including some aimed at the Munich

¹ While many thought that a conciliation had occurred, the polemics between the two sides would soon increase (Aubert 1981a, 245-246).

meeting. One of the errors he condemned was the view that philosophers should forgo religious authority and use reason alone as their guide:

10. As there is a distinction between the philosopher and his philosophy, he has the right and duty to submit himself to the authority which he acknowledges as legitimate; but philosophy neither can nor must submit to any authority.

11. The Church must not only abstain from any interference with philosophy; she must also tolerate the errors of philosophy, and leave it to philosophy to correct itself.²

In these propositions Pius takes the liberal demand for free thought, pushes it to an extreme denial of all religious authority, and condemns a straw man of his own construction. The view that philosophers should never submit to religious authority was not the view adopted at the Congress of Munich. But, it is Pius's vocation to look out for possible errors since he is not only concerned with the Catholic Church in Germany.

Pius's condemnation of proposition number thirteen lends respectability to the study of Neo-Scholastic philosophy. The proposition he condemns is: "The method and principles by which the old scholastic doctors cultivated theology are no longer suitable to the demands of our times and to the progress of the sciences."³ This proposition sums up one paragraph of Pius's "Tuas libenter," a letter he sent to the Archbishop of Munich in December 1863 criticizing the proclamation of academic freedom agreed upon at the Munich Congress.⁴ By condemning a proposition that denied the contemporary usefulness of Scholastic thought, Pius provided an indirect defense of the study of medieval thought, the history of which Stöckl would begin to publish the following year.

Some of the philosophical and political reasons for writing his history of medieval philosophy may be sought in Stöckl's background and education. Unlike Kleutgen, who moved across international borders as a member of a religious order, Albert Stöckl

² Denzinger-Schönmetzer 1965, 578, sec. 2910-2911; Trans., Neuner and Dupuis 1982, 40.

³ Denzinger-Schönmetzer 1965, 578, sec. 2913; Trans., Kaufmann 1961, 163.

⁴ Denzinger-Schönmetzer 1965, 572, sec. 2876.

(1823-1895) became a diocesan priest, attached to the institutions of a specific diocese. Born into a Catholic family in the village of Möhren to the west of Eichstätt, Stöckl was ordained a priest of the diocese of Eichstätt while his brother Julius was ordained for the diocese of Munich (Pernsel 1896, 3). His life in Eichstätt began when he arrived in 1835 to attend grammar school. A priest of the diocese of Eichstätt, he would remain for most of his life at the seminary at Eichstätt.

Eichstätt is situated in the kingdom of Bavaria, within the valley of the Altmühl. The Baroque ecclesiastical architecture of this city stands as a tribute to its importance in the history of Christian Germany. It was founded in 745 as a bishopric by St. Boniface, the missionary of Germany. The bishops of Eichstätt became prince bishops in 1220, acquiring secular jurisdiction. They ruled over territory stretching along the Altmühl, north almost to Nuremberg and south to Ingolstadt on the Danube. In the secularization of 1803 ecclesiastical rule was separated from secular rule (Hollweck 1909, 5: 364-365). The bishops of Eichstätt lost their secular but retained their ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The secular territory of Eichstätt was placed under the intermediary governorship of the son-in-law of the king of Bavaria, Eugène de Beauharnais, in 1817 and returned to the direct rule of the Bavarian Crown in 1855.

Karl August von Reisach (1800-1869) became the bishop of Eichstätt in 1836. Reisach had received a Ph.D. in law at Landshut before turning to the study of theology at the German College in Rome. He began there in 1824, the same year that the Jesuits resumed control of the college, and was awarded a doctorate in theology in 1829 (Schlager 1911, 730-731). He was appointed rector of studies at the College of the Propaganda by Pope Pius VII and asked to continue to take an interest in the affairs of the German church by Pope Gregory XVI. Remaining in Rome, Reisach published his *Was haben wir von den Reformatoren und Stimmführern des katholischen Deutschland unserer Tage zu halten?* in 1835 under the pseudonym Athanasius Sincerus Philaethes. In this work he opposed a number of the current criticisms of the Catholic Church in Germany. He was installed by Gregory as the Bishop of Eichstätt the following year. Reisach later became a consultant to the Index of Prohibited Books in Rome and translated into Italian, along with the Jesuit Curci, Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit*.

Eichstätt had a long history of higher education. A cathedral school flourished during the Middle Ages and a university was established at Ingolstadt in 1472. The first German seminary to be founded after the Council of Trent had called for the establishment of a seminary in each diocese was opened at Eichstätt in 1564, and a lyceum was founded by the Jesuits (Suttner 1886, 4: 250-251, 253). The seminary and the lyceum were closed during the secularization, but Bishop Reisach reopened the seminary in 1838, and reopened the lyceum in 1843 for the study of philosophy and theology.⁵ The rector was Joseph Ernst (1804-1869), who encouraged the study of the fathers of the early church (Walter 1988, 176).

In 1838, while Stöckl was still in grammar school, he was offered the twenty-first free place to study at the seminary. He entered the first class of the Willibald Seminary in Eichstätt, completed the *Gymnasium*, and was the first candidate to be accepted at the lyceum at its inception in 1843.⁶ Stöckl studied philosophy for two years and theology for three years (Pemsel 1896, 13). He studied philosophy under Ernst and Ignaz Senestrey, who later became the bishop of Regensburg. Towards the end of his studies, in the year 1848, Stöckl's first publication appeared, a prize-winning study on sacrifice in the Old and New Testaments, which he dedicated to Ernst, *Liturgie und dogmatische Bedeutung der alttestamentlichen Opfer insbesondere in ihrem Verhältniß zur neutestamentlichen Opfertheorie*.⁷

Stöckl was ordained a Catholic priest and given Ernst's teaching position in theoretical philosophy at the lyceum in 1850, and appointed a professor of philosophy there in 1852.⁸ He submitted a dissertation titled "Nominalismus und Realismus in der Geschichte der Philosophie" for his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University at Würzburg in 1855 and was promoted to doctor for his thesis "Die Sakramente des Alten Testaments" (Pemsel 1896, 28). His methodological perseverance is evidenced in the word-books and daily meditations he wrote in Latin, Hebrew, and English, which remain among his papers at the archives of the Episcopal Seminary Library at Eichstätt. He taught exegesis and Hebrew in the theological department of the Lyceum, beginning in

⁵ Pruner 1896, 1; Pemsel 1896, 4 and 12.

⁶ Pruner 1896, 4; Pemsel 1896, 12.

⁷ Stöckl notes that Ernst was his supervisor and teacher in the dedication (Stöckl 1848, i).

⁸ Walter 1988, 176; Pemsel 1896, 23; Morgott 1899, 827.

1857. And when Franz Jakob Clemens died in 1862, Stöckl was offered and accepted his position in philosophy at the Academy at Münster.

Stöckl decided in the 1850s to become an historian of philosophy because there were so few Catholics in the field (Pruner 1896, 5). While Catholics had published numerous textbooks and monographs on philosophy, no one had written a substantial history of philosophy from a Catholic perspective. Many of the older works on philosophy written by Catholics like Storchenau, Rothenflue, and Dmowski, had placed medieval philosophy in an unfavorable light. In order to address this situation, Stöckl wrote his first historical works on patristic and medieval philosophy. He discusses the epistemological and metaphysical battles of the Middle Ages in his dissertation on nominalism and realism, published in 1854, offers a rather substantial history of patristic philosophy in his two-volume *Die spekulative Lehre vom Menschen*, published in 1858 and 1859, and considers the ontological argument for the existence of God in his *De argumento ut vocant ontologico quo existentia Dei demonstrari solet*, published in 1862. But most importantly for the historiography of medieval philosophy, Stöckl would publish his vast, three-volume history of medieval philosophy between 1864 and 1866, his *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*.

Wilhelm Kaulich's *Geschichte der scholastischen Philosophie*, an unfinished history of medieval philosophy, published in 1863, offers an interesting point of contrast with Stöckl's work. Kaulich covers the history of European philosophy from Isidore of Seville to Gilbert of Poitiers in the twelfth century. Like Hauréau, he argues that philosophy existed in the Middle Ages. For Kaulich, philosophy is the complete systematic history of the human spirit (Kaulich 1863, 4). Therefore a specific philosophy reflects the personality and world view of its advocate. He argues that John Scotus Erigena was one of the first medievals to offer a systematic account of the medieval world view and the first Scholastic thinker (Kaulich 1863, 64). In fact, this history consists largely of an extended 161-page monograph on Erigena and a 71-page monograph on Peter Abelard, with brief treatments of others in between (Kaulich 1863, 65-226, 376-447). Like earlier nineteenth-century medievalists, Kaulich is interested in the nature philosophy of Erigena and the dialectics of Abelard. In discussing both, he comes close to interpreting the medievals according to the standard branches of philos-

ophy. For example, he discusses the dialectics, physics, anthropology, and ethics of Erigena and the dialectics and ethics of Abelard.⁹ In considering Erigena on dialectics, physics, anthropology, and ethics, he interprets him according to four areas of philosophy. But he does not offer a straightforward account of the metaphysics of Erigena. Instead he discusses being and the knowledge of being through theophanies (Kaulich 1863, 120-141). Neither does he offer any extended account of Erigena's or Abelard's theory of knowledge.¹⁰ And when presenting Abelard's views on dialectics and ethics, he explains specific texts without clearly reconstructing his thought according to the branches of philosophy. In writing a history of philosophy conceived as the history of the human spirit, Kaulich remains faithful to the texts, without engaging in the important philosophical task of clarifying issues according to each of the standard areas of philosophy. Stöckl would offer a careful interpretation of the medievals according to the spheres of philosophical inquiry configured according to the problem of reason versus revelation.

Stöckl states in the preface to his history that no one has yet written a complete history of the entire development of the philosophy of the Middle Ages in the detail required by the period (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: iii-iv). He is aware of those who think the Middle Ages to be a thousand-year period of philosophical darkness (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 6). Stöckl, like Ritter, Hauréau, Kleutgen, and Kaulich, opposes the view that philosophy did not exist during the medieval period :

The "chaos magnum," which has been placed for a long time between the church fathers and the modern times, and which has been invested with the thickest darkness, proves to be pure ridiculousness that only someone partial or ignorant could take seriously.¹¹

He claims that philosophy was independent from church dogma during the Middle Ages, in the sense that medieval thinkers were

⁹ Kaulich 1863, 99-120, 163-216, 387-404, 439-447.

¹⁰ For example, while Kaulich discusses Abelard's view of knowledge in relation to his views on logic, physics, and metaphysics, he does not clearly delineate each sphere of inquiry. To do so in Kaulich's opinion would misrepresent the hierarchy of levels of knowledge involved in Abelard's conception of wisdom (Kaulich 1863, 388-390).

¹¹ (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 3-4) This statement appears in the introduction to the second volume, published in 1865.

free to work out their own philosophical positions. He acknowledges that theological concerns were of paramount importance. And Stöckl is familiar with the standard historical accounts of his day, those by Ritter, Hauréau, and Kaulich, citing each in his text.¹² But he does not consider any of these to have written a comprehensive history of medieval philosophy.

The detail of Stöckl's history is apparent: an enormous 2,278-page work, based on the texts of the medievals themselves, a work that contains thousands of quotations and citations.¹³ One reason why this work continues to be useful today is that the lengthy quotations in Latin provide the reader with a storehouse of medieval arguments in the original language.¹⁴ Many texts are included that do not appear in other standard histories of medieval philosophy, texts that are often well chosen and which would otherwise be inaccessible without a library strong in medieval holdings.

Stöckl's history is comprehensive. He reconstructs the arguments of individual medieval thinkers, devoting anywhere from a half a page to a figure like Antonius Andreas, the "Doctor dulciffuus," to more than three hundred pages to Aquinas.¹⁵ Extended accounts are given of the philosophical positions of John Scotus Erigena, Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Raymond Lullus, William of Ockham, and Suarez. Stöckl also offers a rather lengthy reconstruction of Moslem and Jewish medieval philosophy. And he discusses in some detail figures often neglected in histories of medieval philosophy, including Peter Lombard, Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh of St. Victor, Richard of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and the German mystics Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler, Heinrich Suso, and Johannes Ruysbroek. These are just a selection of the many authors whose texts Stöckl treats.

But Ritter, too, had offered a tremendous amount of detail in his treatment of medieval philosophy within his general history of philosophy. He had also discussed many medieval authors, basing his

¹² Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 22, 129, 24, respectively.

¹³ 2711 pages if we include Stöckl's history of patristic philosophy, an area Gilson will also cover in his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Stöckl 1891). I am adding the numbers on the last page of printed text.

¹⁴ Ernst Commer will hold Stöckl up in 1886 as a model of how not to write, arguing that lengthy texts in the footnotes both scare readers and disturb the unity of the text (Buschkühl 1992, 27).

¹⁵ Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 875, 421-734.

discussions largely on the medieval texts. Taking into consideration Ritter's history, how can Stöckl claim that there existed no complete presentation of the historical development of medieval philosophy, unless he means something else by medieval philosophy?

The First Volume

Stöckl begins his consideration of medieval philosophy in the first volume with an account of the Christian character of medieval science. He notes that the Christian idea is the thread that leads through the labyrinth of medieval thought (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 5). After pointing out that the church did not threaten the use of reason but supported the study of the sciences, Stöckl clarifies the medieval Christian view of the relation between reason and revelation through an explanation of the medieval maxim "*Philosophia Theologiae ancilla*," that is, "Philosophy, the Handmaiden of theology" (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 9). According to Stöckl, this means that both reason and revelation come from a single source and must, therefore, reconcile or harmonize ("*Uebereinstimmung*") with each other (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 9-10). Once this is the case, then what is known to be true by reason cannot contradict what is known through revelation. Philosophy can be used to support theology because, rightly used, neither will contradict the other. This, Stöckl explains, was the manner in which the medievals interpreted the relation between reason and revelation as the foundation of their intellectual systems.

Neither Ritter, Hauréau, or Kaulich had included accounts of the medieval reconciliation of reason and revelation in their histories. As far as Stöckl was concerned, unless one correctly grasps the central character of this issue, one fails to understand medieval philosophy. In not explaining the medieval understanding of the relation between faith and reason, earlier historians were not faithful to the medieval use of philosophy. Beginning his history with a discussion of reason and revelation, the thread that will run through his entire text, Stöckl hopes to provide a more accurate account.

What Stöckl wishes to clarify is that philosophy was used by the medievals in support of theology. While Ritter presents Aquinas's view of natural knowledge as a defective type of human knowledge that will be rectified when human beings gaze on God in the next

life, Stöckl presents Aquinas and the Scholastics as offering a philosophically sound epistemological account of objective scientific knowledge independent of religious dogma.¹⁶ Stöckl discusses the Scholastic theory of knowledge as a discipline that is foundational to theology. However, even though philosophy was used in the service of theology, the autonomy of philosophy was never endangered (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 9-10). There was, therefore, no opposition between reason and revelation for the important Latin medieval thinkers. From this perspective Ritter, and the earlier historians, had written muddled treatments of the history of medieval philosophy. Stöckl would be the first to offer a clear comprehensive history of the autonomous discipline of philosophy during the Middle Ages.

In his first volume, Stöckl covers medieval philosophy from Isidore of Seville in the sixth and seventh centuries to John of Salisbury in the twelfth century. He devotes the largest number of pages to John Scotus Erigena with 97, Anselm of Canterbury with 57, Peter Abelard with 54 pages, and Hugh of St. Victor with 51. Even though Erigena receives the most detailed treatment in the text, Stöckl, unlike Kaulich, does not view him as the father of Scholastic philosophy. Stöckl interprets medieval thought according to a different framework from Kaulich. For Stöckl, following Kleutgen, Christian medieval thought is based on the reconciliation of reason and revelation. Erigena does not harmonize the two so much as explain contradictions away through the use of allegory in interpreting Scripture. Through allegorical interpretation, he identifies true philosophy to be identical with true religion. Stöckl's claim is that Erigena relies too heavily on allegory and loses the factual truth contained in Holy Writ (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 40-41). In explaining away the historical content of revealed truth, he fails to do justice to both reason and revelation. In fact, one reason that Stöckl devotes significant attention to Erigena is to clarify his inability to reconcile Christianity and Greek philosophy. One could extend what Stöckl has to say in his first sentence about our knowledge of Erigena's life to his view of Erigena's orthodoxy: "The history of the life of this man is shrouded in darkness from beginning to end (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 31)." Erigena has buried Christianity

¹⁶ Ritter 1829-1853, 8: 268-269, 327-330.

so deeply within Neoplatonic pantheism that, for Stöckl, it can no longer be recognized (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 127-128).

Stöckl considers Anselm of Canterbury to be the father of Scholastic philosophy on account of his clarification of the relation between faith and reason (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 151-152). Stating that we first have faith and then reason, Anselm explains the relation between the two (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 154). Reason without faith can reach many truths, but faith can provide a corrective to reason (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 155-156). Anselm respects both faith and reason but gives a priority to faith. Reason cooperates with faith and can be used to understand what is believed on faith. He is the first great medieval thinker because he gives due respect to reason as well as to faith.

Holding that the relation between faith and reason is foundational to medieval thought, Stöckl follows Kleutgen in arguing that the different branches of a person's philosophy result logically from his theory of knowledge. He applies an epistemological reading of philosophy to a number of medieval thinkers, presenting each person's metaphysical, psychological, moral, and natural theological views as the result of that person's theory of knowledge. For example, Stöckl comments in the first volume of his history on Anselm's treatment of reason versus revelation and states that Anselm's philosophy is "grounded" in his theory of knowledge. His epistemology has implications for his metaphysics and ethical philosophy (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 157-159). On this account, Anselm is philosophically important because he has made contributions to the standard branches of philosophy that depend on his epistemology.

Throughout the first volume, Stöckl's general practice is to begin discussing the philosophy of an individual through a consideration of that person's view on the relation of faith to reason. He does this in his extended discussions of the philosophy of Peter Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers, Hugh of St. Victor, Richard of St. Victor, and Peter the Lombard. In some instances, he will follow up with an examination of the author's views on epistemology, metaphysics, psychology, ethics, and theology, through not always in the same order. For these individuals Stöckl clarifies many issues dealing with the standard areas of philosophy. For example, after discussing the mystical tendency of Hugh of St. Victor, a reason why he is neglected by many philosophers, Stöckl explains a number of Hugh's philosophical positions. His understanding of faith, human reason,

and the relation between the two is followed by a comparison of Hugh's views on divine being, creaturely being, human psychology, human freedom, good, evil, virtue, and law (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 304-352).

For some idea of his method and the types of specific issues that he discusses one might look at Stöckl's consideration of Hugh's views concerning on the human soul. The topics include the degree to which the human soul is an intelligible substance, the unity of the soul, the classification of higher levels of the soul, the relation between reason and will, human nature, the place of body and soul in the constitutions of human beings, and identification of human beings with the soul (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 334-337). He includes quotations for many of the points he explains, an unusual practice in a general history of medieval philosophy. One example is his quotation of Hugh's *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, to explain that one does not become a person once the soul is united to a body. His point is that the soul already has the character of personality through itself before it is united to a body.¹⁷ From a study of the ten-line Latin quotation, the reader can check Stöckl's interpretation against Hugh. This is certainly preferable to reading a simple bald statement of philosophical doctrine.

When Stöckl claims to be writing the first complete history of medieval philosophy, he acknowledges that he has done so according to the relation between reason and revelation and the spheres of philosophical inquiry. He was also the first to explain the philosophical relations between the different areas of each individual's philosophy. Older historians like Brucker and Hegel argued that there was no philosophy in the Middle Ages. Ritter continued to hold that theology impinged on the territory of philosophy in the Middle Ages. Hauréau had treated only a single theme of medieval philosophy. And Kaulich's history was incomplete. Most importantly, however, for an appreciation of the advance represented by Stöckl, none of these historians presented medieval philosophy according to the problem of reason versus revelation or all the standard branches of philosophy.

¹⁷ Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 337, note 1.

Stöckl and Johannes Huber

A controversy arose in 1865 between Johannes Huber and Albert Stöckl that indicates the growing polarization between conservative “Roman” seminary academics and liberal “German” university academics. The occasion was the publication of the first volume of Stöckl’s history of medieval philosophy. Franz Heinrich Reusch of Bonn, the editor of the liberal “German” *Theologisches Literaturblatt*, gives an indication of the importance of this controversy in outlining the positions of Huber and Stöckl for his readers (Reusch 1866, 20-22). He appends this outline to Karl Werner’s review of the first volume, and first installment of the second volume, of Stöckl’s history.¹⁸ This polemic is of special interest for the historiography of medieval philosophy because the participants fail to note what is new about Stöckl’s history of medieval philosophy.

Huber was a professor of philosophy at the university of Munich. In his review of the first volume of Stöckl’s history, published in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*,¹⁹ he accused Stöckl of plagiarism. Stöckl answered this charge in two articles in the Augsburg *Postzeitung*.²⁰ Huber responded in 1865 with his pamphlet *Professor Stöckl in Münster. Ein Beitrag zur Charakteristik neuscholastischer Wissenschaftlichkeit*. Here Huber criticizes Stöckl for not writing his history of medieval philosophy from the primary sources and accuses him of plagiarizing Kaulich’s history, Heinrich Hayd’s *Abälard und seine Lehre im Verhältniß zu Kirche und Dogma*, and Huber’s *Johannes Scotus Erigena. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie im Mittelalter*.²¹

Stöckl responded with his pamphlet *Professor Huber in München. Sendschreiben an einen Freund. Ein Beitrag zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Münchener Philosophie und philosophischen Polemik*, published in 1865. He begins by settling an old score. Stöckl notes that Huber had already criticized him for working too quickly from the primary

¹⁸ Reusch founded the journal as an organ for the Munich circle of academics who had gathered around Döllinger. On Reusch and the *Theologisches Literaturblatt*, see Aubert 1981a, 246.

¹⁹ (13 May, insert no. 133) I take this publication information from Stöckl 1865, 1.

²⁰ (Stöckl 1865, 1) Huber notes that Stöckl’s articles were insert numbers 41 and 42 (Huber 1865a, 1).

²¹ (Huber 1865a, 4-8, 20-21; Hayd 1863; Huber 1861) I will focus my comments on Huber’s second pamphlet where he more clearly lays out his charges by printing Stöckl’s texts alongside the texts he is accused of plagiarizing.

sources and failing to grasp the philosophical issues in his *Die spekulative Lehre vom Menschen*, published in 1858 and 1859 (Stöckl 1865, 5). Stöckl argues that this is not the case, that in fact, he worked from the primary texts and discussed the philosophical issues.

Huber, according to Stöckl, has a history of publishing hasty criticisms of his work. While Stöckl agrees that he did not always have the original sources at hand when writing the first volume of his history of medieval philosophy, he disagrees with the charge that he did not generally work from primary texts (Stöckl 1865, 29-30). Stöckl admits that he used the histories of Kaulich and Ritter, which he acknowledged in his text, just as any historian relies on the work of his or her predecessors, but states that he wrote his accounts of Gerbert of Aurillac, Anselm, John of Salisbury, Abelard, Roscelin of Compiègne, and Gilbert of Poitiers from the primary sources themselves.

Stöckl also clears himself of the charge that he plagiarized the treatments of individual medieval figures. He cites his own previous publications and studies as evidence that he wrote his history from his own research. He notes that he had published two articles on Abelard by the summer of 1862 and had discussed Abelard in a book, before Hayd's work on Abelard was available in bookstores.²² He argues that if we look at his works to date, we can see that he substantially follows these interpretations word for word. Stöckl notes in particular that his earlier accounts of Abelard's view on the relation of reason to revelation and on the Trinity demonstrate the injustice of Huber's charges. He claims to have been influenced by Hayd only after completing two drafts of his treatment of Abelard, noting that while he developed a few points from Hayd this was no reason to malign his history as a whole. He insists that he did not plagiarize Hayd's book on Abelard.²³

Stöckl defends himself against the charge that he plagiarized Huber's work on John Scotus Erigena with reference to a large treatise on Erigena including more than thirty pages of quotations that he had completed in 1856 before reading Huber's work.²⁴ Stöckl

²² (Stöckl 1865, 31-32) The articles appeared in the July and August issues of the *Katholik* published in Mainz. The book is Stöckl 1861.

²³ (Stöckl 1865, 32) Stöckl notes that while he did borrow several translations from Hayd in order to avoid the trouble of making new translations, he gave full credit to Hayd (Stöckl 1865, 31).

²⁴ (Stöckl 1865, 34) He would publish *De Joannis Scoti Erigenae philosophia* in two volumes in 1867.

claims that he based his treatment of Erigena on his own work and not on the book of Huber. The reason Stöckl gives for not having credited Huber when citing the texts of Erigena is that he had already read, underlined, and written about their philosophical importance before the publication of Huber's book.

Stöckl's controversy with Huber was more than a controversy between two academics. This polemic was a battle between Huber, a liberal "German" philosopher at the University of Munich, and Stöckl, a conservative "Roman" philosopher trained at the Episcopal seminary at Eichstätt. "Germans" like Huber viewed ecclesiastical seminaries as educational institutions where intellectual inquiry was impossible due to the required subservience to Rome. "Romans" like Stöckl considered seminaries to be ideal places for teaching and research because professors were free from the liberal anti-monarchical and anti-ecclesiastical pressures that persisted at the state universities.²⁵ Stöckl indicates his view of German universities and the polarization between the two camps, when he flatly dismisses the scholarship of Huber and his university cronies at Munich. Stöckl states that his only mistake was to open Huber's book in the first place. In an allusion to Jesus's comment to Mary Magdalene after his resurrection that she not touch him — and obviously without intending to identify the professors at Munich with Christ — Stöckl claims that he will never again touch a book written by a professor at the University of Munich.²⁶

Huber responded to Stöckl's pamphlet with his *Offener Brief an Professor Stöckl in Münster. Ein weiterer Beitrag zur Charakteristik neuscholastischer Wissenschaftlichkeit*. He points out what he calls the "inquisitional technique" behind Stöckl's brand of scholarship. We are told that Stöckl has been denouncing Huber and other professors at Munich for years. Because of Stöckl's denunciations, Huber accuses him of supplying the type of criticisms needed by the Index

²⁵ Stöckl defends ecclesiastical institutions of higher education at the expense of public universities in his article "Die Seminare und ihre Gegner," published in 1869 (Stöckl 1869). For a similar discussion written near the beginning of the *Kulturkampf* where he compares the training of priests to military training, see Stöckl 1873, 185-188.

²⁶ (Stöckl 1865, 36) As noted above, the faculty of theology at Munich had awarded Stöckl an academic prize and sponsored the publication of his first major work in the 1840s, his *Liturgie und dogmatische Bedeutung der alttestamentlichen Opfer* (Stöckl 1848; Morgott 1899, 827). For Stöckl to dismiss the professors at Munich indicates the degree of polarization that had occurred since that time.

of Prohibited Books in Rome in order to open investigations.²⁷ Huber states that the church is not identical with the congregation of the Index and scholars do not need to stand in the shadow of the latter. If Stöckl is to act in a scholarly manner, Huber suggests, he ought to respect Aquinas's view that reason cannot contradict revelation and realize that the free use of reason will not endanger revelation, theology, or the church.

In his second pamphlet, Huber prints texts that he claims Stöckl had plagiarized alongside of the originals from his own work²⁸ and that of Hayd.²⁹ He includes eleven passages from Hayd and three of his own. No longer does he devote the same degree of attention to the claim that Stöckl has represented the work of Kaulich as his own. I have three points to make concerning Huber's charge of plagiarism. First, as Stöckl has already pointed out, he does cite the work of Huber, Hayd, and Kraulich.³⁰ Secondly, the charge of plagiarism should often be reduced to one of cribbing translations or paraphrases from primary sources. For most of the texts that Huber accuses Stöckl of plagiarizing are translations or philosophical paraphrases. Since he does not include the citations to the medieval works that appear in these historical texts in the passages that he has reproduced, let alone the Latin medieval quotations that are often included, the general reader is unable to appreciate the original context. Yet it is only by looking at these citations that we can draw a conclusion that is fair to Stöckl.

For example, the *second* text from Huber's own book that appears together with a text from Stöckl is a statement of Erigena's view of the authority of reason and revelation (Huber 1861, 130-131). Huber has a point here, Stöckl's text is very similar to his own. I will include Huber's text, followed by that of Stöckl, as they appear

²⁷ Huber 1865b, 6-7, 10, 17.

²⁸ (Huber 1865b, 48-51) The texts of Huber that Huber both reproduces and accuses Stöckl of plagiarizing occur in Huber 1861, 129-130, 130, 167-168. Huber accuses Stöckl of plagiarizing on the following pages: Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 37, 37-38, 74-75.

²⁹ (Huber 1865b, 40-48) The texts of Hayd that Huber both reproduces and accuses Stöckl of plagiarizing occur in Hayd 1863, 81, 146, 173, 181-183, 184, 191, 185, 273, 247, 310, 311-313. Huber accuses Stöckl of plagiarizing on the following pages: Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 224, 247-249, 254, 257, 258, 261, 261, 265, 268, 269, 270-271.

³⁰ The fourth citation that appears in Stöckl's history is to Huber's text on Erigena (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 15, for Huber; 24, for Kaulich; 228, for Hayd).

in Huber's second pamphlet, in order indicate the similarity (Huber 1865b, 49-50). Huber's text:

Auf zweifache Weise offenbart sich das ewige Licht der Welt, nämlich durch die Schrift und durch die Creatur. Nicht anders nämlich wird in uns die göttliche Erkenntniß erneuert, als durch die Züge der hl. Schrift und die Formen der Creatur. Lerne die göttlichen Aussprüche und erfasse in deinem Geiste ihren Sinn, in dem du das Wort erkennst. Mit dem körperlichen Sinne aber erfasse die Formen und Schönheiten der sinnlichen Dinge, und du wirst auch in ihnen das göttliche Wort erkennen und in allem wird dir die Wahrheit nichts anderes als sich selbst offenbaren . . . (Huber, 1861, 130-131)

Stöckl's text:

Auf zweifache Weise, sagt er (Erigena), offenbart sich das ewige Licht der Welt, nämlich durch die Schrift und durch die Creatur. Nicht anders nämlich wird in uns die göttliche Erkenntniß erneuert, als durch die Züge der hl. Schrift und durch die Formen der Creatur. Lerne die göttlichen Aussprüche und erfasse in deinem Geiste ihren Sinn, darin wirst du dann das Wort erkennen. Mit dem körperlichen Sinne dagegen erfasse die Formen und Schönheiten der sinnlichen Dinge und du wirst auch in ihnen das göttliche Wort erkennen; in Allem wird die Wahrheit nichts anderes als sich selbst offenbaren. (Stöckl, 1864-1866, 1: 37-38)

Since Stöckl frequently uses the same words, phrases, and sentence structure, he appears to have plagiarized the work of Huber. The interesting point about these two texts is what Huber does not reproduce. From his own work he fails to include the quotation marks that appear around the entire passage, the citation to the text of Erigena, and the original Latin text of Erigena. From Stöckl's history, he leaves out the citations to the original text and the original Latin text. Huber does not inform the reader that both Stöckl's passage and his own are translations from the same medieval texts.

Stöckl's translation is close to that of Huber, often including the same words and grammatical order, because they are translating the same Latin passage. In fact, the bulk of the passages that Huber accuses Stöckl of stealing are either translations or philosophical paraphrases of Latin medieval texts. This is why Stöckl's text is often similar to Huber and Hayd. Different people can translate from one language into another and arrive at similar texts without

copying from each other's work. If they did not arrive at similar texts we would begin to doubt the practice of translation.³¹ Stöckl might be telling the truth when he says that he did not plagiarize. On the other hand, in translating, a person can be guided by the translations of others. Stöckl may have been influenced by more translations than he remembers. After all, as noted above, he does admit to using translations from Hayd. But since Huber does not provide clear evidence for the charge that Stöckl has plagiarized interpretations, only for the possibility of borrowed translations, his general charge of plagiarism appears unfounded.³²

This being said, my third point is that Huber could have made the case that Stöckl was under someone's influence, but not necessarily his own, if he had reproduced the citations that accompany the texts he reprints. For example, both of the texts quoted above are based on two separate texts of Erigena. The first part of each text is a translation from a sermon on the Gospel according to St. John, while the second part is from a commentary on the same gospel. How did Stöckl come to use the very same quotations from two different sources that Huber includes together in a single footnote?

A comparison between the citations left out of the *first* selection quoted from Huber's work and the parallel text taken from Stöckl's history leads me to pose the same question. Stöckl bases this passage on four of the six quotations that Huber uses.³³ In each case, Stöckl uses the same texts as Huber, even down to three cases of ellipsis, two in the same four word Latin text: "Inconcussa . . . auctoritas divinae scripturae. . . ." ³⁴ The other ellipsis appears in a quotation eight lines in length.³⁵ It seems unlikely that Stöckl would include the exact same lengthy quotation with an ellipsis at the same place. He appears to be under the influence of Huber or someone else.

³¹ Huber admits in his first pamphlet that while it might seem odd to charge a person with plagiarism in regard to the translation of quotations, that in this case the number of quotations and framework of presentation leads him to make this charge (Huber 1865a, 7).

³² In order to support this claim one would need to compare all of the texts that Huber discusses together with the original texts.

³³ See Huber 1865b, 48-49; Huber 1861, 128-129; Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 37.

³⁴ See Huber 1861, 129, note 3; Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 37, note 1.

³⁵ See Huber 1861, 129, note 5; Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 37, note 2.

Yet this does not mean that we must assume that Stöckl has taken either his narrative or his citations from Huber. For example, he does not use all six of the quotations that Huber includes and the four that he does use appear in a different order and for a different purpose. Similar to Brucker, Hegel, and Hayd, Huber occupies himself with the relation between reason and authority, while, as one might expect, Stöckl's inquiry is epistemological, that reason and revelation are the two sources of knowledge. Furthermore, the texts quoted are not exactly the same in every respect. For example, some words are spelled differently. In the four word text quoted above, Stöckl has "*auctoritas*" while Huber leaves out the letter c and has "*autoritas*." These are two alternative spellings of the same word. In the eight line text mentioned above, Stöckl capitalizes the word "*Deo*" and Huber has it in lower case.

Greater dissimilarity exists between the citations that accompany the *third* pair of selections taken from the works of Huber and Stöckl. Again, both texts run the gamut between translations and paraphrases, which is the reason for the similarity. Yet, only two of Stöckl's four citations appear in Huber. In one of these, Stöckl includes many commas and the word "*esse*" at places that Huber does not.³⁶ Importantly, Stöckl includes fifteen words at one point within the quotation that Huber fails to either include or mark with an ellipsis. Clearly, Stöckl is not using Huber as his source for Erigena's text, but a different source for what are not, to be precise, the "same" quotations.

Stöckl states in his history that he is relying on Erigena's text as it appears in Migne's *Patrologia Latina* (PL) and this helps to explain many of the differences between his citations and those of Huber.³⁷ The word "*Deo*" is capitalized and almost all of the commas appear in the Migne text along with the fifteen words that Huber has left out (PL 122: 518A-B). While "*esse*" does not appear in Migne, this does not mean that Stöckl slipped up at this point in copying quotations. Sheldon-Williams notes in his critical edition of the text that some versions include the word at this point.³⁸ Stöckl must have relied on another source.

³⁶ Stöckl 1864-1866, 75, note 1; Huber 1861, 167, note 5.

³⁷ (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 31, note 1) Stöckl also notes in his pamphlet that he worked from the Migne (Stöckl 1865, 34).

³⁸ Erigena 1968-, 1: 208, line 23.

With differences such as these, there is no need to think that Stöckl is borrowing either Huber's narrative or citations. There is no reason to believe that he is simply following Huber. Clearly, Stöckl has other sources. The similarities between some passages do not establish that he stole from Huber without providing the proper acknowledgment.³⁹ A history of texts and interpretative traditions stands behind both Huber and Stöckl's accounts of the philosophy of Erigena. Short of better evidence, or a confession, only a careful study of Erigena's reception in the nineteenth century would prepare for a fair determination of the issue.⁴⁰

Huber's reaction to Stöckl is as significant for what he says about the first volume of Stöckl's history of medieval philosophy as for what he does not say. He does not note that this history differs substantially from earlier accounts of the history of medieval philosophy. He overlooks Stöckl's preoccupation with the relation of faith and reason and his manner of discussing medieval philosophy according to the spheres of philosophical inquiry. I have noted that Reusch printed his account of this controversy immediately after Karl Werner's review of Stöckl's history. Neither Reusch nor Werner note the originality of Stöckl's interpretation.⁴¹ Yet Stöckl wrote a history of medieval philosophy that differs substantially from the histories of Ritter and Kaulich. Huber, Reusch, and Werner fail to draw attention to what is new in Stöckl's work.

Stöckl himself would later state a difference between his project and that of the scholars he was accused of plagiarizing. When he names the "liberal" philosophical opposition, in the second edition of his *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* published in 1875, he lists Huber, Hayd, Kaulich, and Michelis — Kleutgen's foil — as liberal Germans who base philosophy on modern pantheism and subjectivity (Stöckl 1875, 913-914). He also states that he shares Kleutgen's philosophical project to base philosophy on older

³⁹ A study of the reception of Abelard would be needed in order to clarify Stöckl's use of the work of Hayd.

⁴⁰ A close analysis of the controversy between Huber and Stöckl would help to fill an important lacuna in the German intellectual history of the nineteenth century.

⁴¹ It is strange that Werner does not note the central role that Stöckl gives to epistemology in his history of medieval philosophy. After all, Werner begins his account of Aquinas's thought with a 171-page treatment of Aquinas's view of knowledge which he claims is the key to both Aquinas's philosophy and theology (Werner 1889, 2: 4).

Christian thought. In doing so, Stöckl distances himself from the "German" philosophers. To suggest, as Huber did, that Stöckl has based his account of the history of medieval philosophy on the works of the liberal university philosophers, whom he in fact opposes, is to misunderstand his interpretation of this history.

The Second and Third Volumes

The second volume of Stöckl's history, published in 1865, is the longest volume at 1,159 pages. He devotes it to the philosophy of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, which he calls "the golden period of medieval speculation" (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 3). In order to avoid speculation over his use of secondary sources, Stöckl lists in the preface those sections of his work where he depended on others, mentioning for example, Hauréau on Godfrey of Fontaines and Peter Auriol, and Kleutgen on Aquinas (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: v).

Stöckl continues to interpret the medievals according to the relation between faith and reason and the standard branches of philosophy. For example, he divides his treatment of Aquinas into lengthy sections on metaphysics, epistemology, theology, creation, psychology, ethics, soteriology, and politics. Stöckl presents Aquinas as the most remarkable philosopher of the Middle Ages, because he offers a theory of epistemological certainty that does not yield truths that contradict revelation.⁴² God is the author of the principles of human rational activity as he is the author of revelation, and since God is the truth itself, a contradiction between reason and revelation is impossible.⁴³ For Stöckl, Aquinas's reconciliation of reason and revelation is the foundation of his philosophical and theological system, the framework of his entire philosophy. And in order to grasp the role of reason in Aquinas's reconciliation, we need to understand his theory of knowledge.

For Stöckl, as for Kleutgen, epistemology plays a foundational role in philosophy. But there is a sense for Stöckl in which metaphysics is also foundational. Even Kleutgen, when offering a treatment of philosophical realism in his volume on epistemology, introduces a metaphysical discussion into epistemology. Stöckl devotes

⁴² Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 421-422, 427-435.

⁴³ Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 433-435, 447.

the first section on Aquinas to his reconciliation of faith and reason and the second, 43 pages, to his metaphysics and epistemology (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 448-491). In this section, he defines notions like substance, form, matter, nature, individual, essence, and universal, which will be useful for his presentation of Aquinas's epistemology (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 448-461). He calls this the metaphysical foundation on which Aquinas builds his theory of knowledge (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 462).

Stöckl bases his presentation of Aquinas's epistemology on Kleutgen's account, as he states in his preface (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: v). For example, he uses the three principles of the theory of knowledge that Kleutgen features in his *Philosophie der Vorzeit*. He follows Kleutgen in arguing that Aquinas offers an account of objective knowledge that has regard for both the knower and the known (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 462). The knowing subject must be receptive to the object. Stöckl states Kleutgen's second principle, namely, that the known is in the knower according to the manner of the knower (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 464-465). Human knowledge is structured by the intellectual activity of the human soul. And since human knowledge is based on the intellect, Stöckl introduces Kleutgen's third principle, which is that knowledge is all the more perfect, the further the knowing principle is removed from materiality (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 465-466). Sense knowledge, bound up as it is in material organs, is perfected to the degree that it leads to intellectual knowledge.

Stöckl explains the roles that the senses and the intellect play in human understanding. The human intellect comes to know universals through abstraction from what is received by the senses (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 474-475). Through the abstraction of universals, individuals are able to understand natural things. Therefore, they can gain certainty when the concept they have coincides with the nature of the thing they know. This is why human beings can utter judgments that are either true or false, true when the concept coincides with the nature of the physical thing and false when it does not. This is a second type of truth for Stöckl, one based on the truth of things.

The truth of things is a primary type of truth. Things are true to the degree that they conform to the ideas of God (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 477). For example a horse is true if it corresponds to God's idea of horse. One implication being that whenever a being falls

short of its divine ideal, it is less than fully true. One might say that a blind person is less true than another with sight. Stöckl points out that the truth disclosed by the concept is a secondary truth — that is, the essential conformity of a concept to the essence of the thing — is based on the primary truth — which is the conformity of the thing to the ideal of God. Human knowledge depends on the truth of things, because the concepts through which human beings understand, are expressions of the essences of things. According to this view, God's ideas are the metaphysical law of reality and the epistemological norm of the perfection of human knowledge.

Stöckl offers a detailed account of human reason that clarifies why, if rightly used, it cannot contradict divine revelation. He explains that human reason is the secondarily true comprehension of concepts, which express the primary true essences of things, essences which conform to the ideas of God. Therefore, if human understanding expresses what is in conformity with the divine ideas, it will not contradict what is revealed by God. If God is absolute understanding and truth, as Stöckl believes and argues (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 522-525), then what is in conformity with the divine ideals cannot contradict what is revealed by the divine. Therefore, true human understanding cannot contradict true revelation.

According to Stöckl, Aquinas's epistemology and metaphysics also have ramifications for morality. He argues that Aquinas offers a philosophical account of true knowledge that allows for the accurate discussion of the natures of things. Since we can know a thing's nature, we can speak about what is good for an individual thing. Through inquiry into what is good for a specific nature, we can clarify the moral good for an individual (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 676). Therefore there is a type of objective moral naturalism in which the knowledge of human nature leads to the objective knowledge of what ought to be done. One of the merits of Aquinas's epistemology and metaphysics, for Stöckl, is that a basis is provided for objectivity in morals.

Aquinas's epistemological and metaphysical realism represents the central philosophical school of the Middle Ages for Stöckl, the others being the formalists and the nominalists (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 952-953). Aquinas is the chief realist, the one who has most fully presented this philosophical position. He attains the philosophical mean between placing undue stress on either form or matter. Aquinas is able to achieve this mean through stating that general

concepts are materially in individual things and formally in the understanding (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 954-956). The epistemological result is that people can utter universally true judgments that apply to actual individual beings. In this way, Aquinas solves the Greek problem of whether reality is ultimately one or many. While there are only individual instances of any one kind in the world, the human intellect is able to predicate these through a single concept.

The medieval formalists follow Duns Scotus and argue for a theory of knowledge that pays undue attention to the "one" (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 956). According to the members of this philosophical tradition individualization occurs only through the possession of the form "*haecceity*." Therefore, any individual being is the combination of a general and of an individual essence. Hence, form is the only principle of individuation.⁴⁴ For Stöckl, as for Kleutgen, the logical conclusion of this epistemology is that, while Scotus accounts for forms, he fails to account for individuals. Without a material principle of individuation, Scotus cannot account for the individuality of any member of a species. He remains only at the level of form. The ultimate conclusion of this view is that all things are in fact one, a pantheism with no real distinction between individuals, the sort of account that Stöckl tells us is unacceptable to Christians.⁴⁵

William of Ockham's theory of knowledge represents for Stöckl another epistemological extreme, one that only takes into account the "many" (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 961). In accounting for the many and not for the oneness of form, Ockham's thought leads to the denial of all science. Stöckl notes that Ockham does not actually state that he has destroyed the foundation of objective science. Yet, this is the logical outcome of his argument that universals are unnecessary for human knowledge (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 962-964). For him, the only things that exist are individuals and the only clear concepts that people can have are particular concepts of individual things. Since, on this account, general concepts are the application of particular words to more than one individual, the fact that we

⁴⁴ Stöckl argues that Scotus's view of individuating form follows the exaggerated realism of earlier thinkers. I assume he is thinking of Anselm of Canterbury (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 957).

⁴⁵ For Stöckl's view that pantheism is the logical outcome of Scotus's philosophy, see Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 961. On his view of the incompatibility of pantheism and Christianity, see Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 127.

have general concepts does not mean that there is anything general in the world. If Ockham is right and there is no definite reference for general concepts, then there can be no objective universal knowledge. If we conceive science as the attainment of universal and necessary knowledge, then all science becomes impossible.

While the Scotist extreme of pantheism might bother a Christian, the denial that people can have objective scientific knowledge about the external world should bother everyone.⁴⁶ Without epistemological certainty we wallow in skepticism, unable to obtain objective knowledge or ground an objective morality (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 969-970). Since, on this account, God does not guarantee the natures of individual things and thereby ground knowledge, there is no reason why philosophy cannot contradict revelation. If philosophy can contradict revelation then Ockham signals the end of the medieval project to reconcile philosophy and theology.

Kleutgen and Stöckl

The parallels between Stöckl's history and Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* are not inconsequential.⁴⁷ As noted above, Stöckl bases his account of Aquinas's epistemology on Kleutgen's characterization of the three epistemological principles of the medieval realists. More importantly for my argument, however, Stöckl states that he has modeled his presentation of the realists, formalists, and nominalists on Kleutgen's 110-page treatment in *Philosophie der Vorzeit*.⁴⁸ He informs his readers that he depends on Kleutgen for the framework of his presentation of medieval philosophy. This is significant because it is in this text where Kleutgen explains that working within one medieval tradition of epistemology or metaphysics has impli-

⁴⁶ I do not mean to give the impression that Stöckl treats Scotus and Ockham only to dismiss them. While that is a major part of his project, he offers detailed accounts of the philosophy of these theologians that merit rereading (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 778-868, 986-1021).

⁴⁷ School traditions need to be taken with a grain of salt, but Stöckl's student and biographer Joseph Pemsel mentions Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* when explaining the solid path of research that Stöckl would continue (Pemsel 1896, 43).

⁴⁸ Stöckl refers to pages 250 through 360 of the first volume of Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 954, note 1). This is the section I discussed in the previous chapter when explaining Kleutgen's model of the history of medieval philosophy.

cations for the other branches of a philosophy. Since the different branches of a philosophy relate to each other and cohere, it makes sense to study philosophy according to each branch. This is Kleutgen's reason for adopting his methodology in writing on medieval philosophy and Stöckl follows suit.

Furthermore, Stöckl adopts Kleutgen's philosophical interpretation of the realists as representing the philosophical mean, and of the formalists and the nominalists as representing epistemological and philosophical extremes. The realists are the heroes of Stöckl's history. Anselm of Canterbury is the hero of volume one, the first Scholastic, the one who used a realistic theory of knowledge to reconcile reason and revelation. For this, Stöckl labels Anselm the "Augustine of the eleventh century." Just as Augustine determined the questions that Latin thinkers would debate for centuries, Anselm framed the questions that would haunt the Scholastics (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: 152, 208). Aquinas's realism and the resulting harmony between reason and revelation is the high point of the second volume, as well as of medieval philosophy. And the Jesuit Suarez is the philosophical hero of volume three for raising medieval epistemological realism to new heights in the face of a diverse group of modern philosophers riding on the coat-tails of the Protestant Reformation.⁴⁹

Stöckl presents Duns Scotus and William of Ockham as the philosophical opponents of Thomism, as figures whose views led logically to the destruction of Aquinas's philosophical achievement. On this reading, Ockham's criticisms of universals would have the more far-ranging effect. For these result in a subjectivist philosophy that heralds the dissolution of philosophical realism, of intelligibility in the area of morals, and of the reconciliation between reason and revelation (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 1040-1041). Ockham is responsible for working out a theory of knowledge that will lead to modern empiricism and bring down the entire edifice of medieval philosophy, as well as of philosophy itself, as it had been conceived by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

While Stöckl constructs his history around Kleutgen's model of the three schools of medieval philosophy, he adds many facts and figures to Kleutgen's picture. Stöckl gives more information about the historical circumstances of the three schools than does Kleutgen.

⁴⁹ Stöckl 1864-1866, 3: 628, 630, 634-644.

He presents a philosophically connected picture of a large number of thinkers from each school and discusses many figures that Kleutgen does not mention. However, importantly for the historiography of medieval philosophy, Stöckl follows Kleutgen in presenting the medievals according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry. Since Kleutgen was the first to view medieval philosophy according to the standard branches of philosophy and the relation of faith and reason, and since Stöckl filled out this reading in the first general history of medieval philosophy, I refer to this model as the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy.

There are, however, differences between Stöckl and Kleutgen's versions of the history of medieval philosophy that we need to note, especially as de Wulf will follow Kleutgen in one of these. Kleutgen argues that the majority of all Scholastics whose writings survive were realists, and that Aquinas's realism was the telos for the philosophy of the *Vorzeit*.⁵⁰ Stöckl does not state so boldly that Aquinas synthesized the work of his predecessors. For him, Aquinas used Aristotle's philosophy as a foundation for speculative investigation in order make it the property of Christian science (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 425). While Stöckl does argue that Aquinas stands on the shoulders of a number of his predecessors, he does not suggest that there is one essential Scholastic philosophy, or indeed that the philosophy of Aquinas was the actual telos of medieval philosophy.⁵¹

In fact, Stöckl argues that Aquinas and Scotus each represent high points of medieval speculation (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 952-953). Scholastic philosophy is therefore pluralistic for Stöckl in a way that it was not for Kleutgen. Aquinas does not represent the single high point. Yet, Stöckl is not far from Kleutgen. A careful reading of Stöckl's treatment on Aquinas leads the reader to conclude that Aquinas represents a high point of medieval philosophy that towers above that of Scotus.⁵² Aquinas's philosophy is the summit of medieval philosophy for Stöckl because Aquinas was victorious in the spiritual crusade of the Middle Ages. He is philosophically

⁵⁰ (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 272-278, 909) Kleutgen presents Aquinas's theory of knowledge as the end point and completion of such reflection since the time of Socrates (Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 3).

⁵¹ For example, he claims that Aquinas stood on the shoulders of Albert the Great (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 421).

⁵² Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 421-422, 424-425, 427, 733-734.

important because he understood Aristotle's philosophy, defended it against the false interpretations of the Moslems, and appropriated it as a foundation upon which to build Christian science, a science that is neither subjective nor unsound.

Moral and Political Uses

There is another difference between Stöckl's history and that of Kleutgen. Stöckl's history alone does not give a complete picture of the moral and political uses to which he puts medieval philosophy. While Kleutgen discusses both the contemporary uses of medieval philosophy and its history in his *Philosophie der Vorzeit*, Stöckl separates his philosophical position from his telling of the history of medieval philosophy. If we look at Stöckl's *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*, however, first published in 1868, we discover the full use to which he put medieval philosophy. In the preface to the sixth edition, published in 1887, three years after Kleutgen's death, he recognizes that he was following Kleutgen in carrying out this project and indicates the importance of his *Lehrbuch* for Germany, maintaining that it was the first Neo-Scholastic textbook in the German language.⁵³

Stöckl demonstrates in his *Lehrbuch* how we can use medieval political philosophy to offer a royalist alternative to the revolution, Socialism, and Capitalism of the nineteenth century. He argues that there are two great orders in the world, the order of the state and the order of the church. Revolutions occur when people think they can attain benefits by disturbing the traditional order.⁵⁴ But, in Stöckl's opinion, the result is always worse than the original problem. He was likely thinking of the suffering and destruction wrought by modern philosophy through the secularization of the ecclesiastical territories such as Eichstätt as well as of the revolutions of 1848.

⁵³ (Stöckl 1887, 1: v) Besides referring to Kleutgen in the preface to the sixth edition of his *Lehrbuch*, Stöckl in his *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* places Kleutgen and himself in the same philosophical school of empiricists. However, there is no record of any correspondence between the two in the Stöckl *Nachlass* at Eichstätt (Stöckl 1875, 913). Kleutgen associates Stöckl with his philosophical project of defending the old science in his *Zu meiner Rechtfertigung* (Kleutgen 1868b, 2: 134). Deufel 1976, lists no letters between Kleutgen and Stöckl and it would appear that they never met.

⁵⁴ Stöckl 1887, 3: 386-388, 408-409.

Stöckl argues that revolution is not the proper way to respond to injustices committed by rulers. Instead, we should resort to an international tribunal in order to redress any wrong that a sovereign has committed. Stöckl notes that in the Middle Ages the Popes worked together with the sovereigns in order to punish those who had wronged their people. Perhaps an alliance between the altar and the throne can again provide the best care for the people of Europe (Stöckl 1887, 3: 426, note 1). And since the authority of the state depends ultimately on the authority of God, whom the Pope in Rome represents, the Pope should work together with the sovereigns of Europe to bring about the peaceful coexistence of church and state (Stöckl 1887, 3: 389-390). According to Stöckl, a philosophy that fails to recognize the importance of the two orders of church and state will only disturb these twin poles of society (Stöckl 1887, 3: 454, 462-465). Modern rationalistic philosophy has ignored the truths of Christian belief and brought ill consequences to Europe. The solution to the disorder wrought by modern philosophy is to return to the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages, a philosophy that respects both the natural and the supernatural orders, the type of philosophy needed to preserve traditional society. Yet this return will take time, because, as Stöckl notes in his *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, published in 1883, the thought of the *Vorzeit* is not yet studied at the universities (Stöckl 1883, 2: 586). The state monopoly on university education in the hands of the Protestant and liberal parties has made it difficult even to discuss these issues at the universities. Stöckl notes that the so-called freedom of science exists only on paper in the German academy.

An awareness of Stöckl's own political philosophy helps in our reading of his history of medieval philosophy. The reason why he so painstakingly provides his reader with so many clear accounts of a vast number of medieval arguments is that he hopes to offer the world an escape from the dark cave of ignorance and destruction. Stöckl's cave is the modern philosophical world and his way out is the philosophy contained in numerous volumes of medieval texts: "I had to enter deeply into the content of those [great Scholastic systems of doctrine in the thirteenth century] in order to bring into the light, to the best of my abilities, the truly overwhelming wealth of ideas" (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: iii). When Stöckl praises the philosophy of the thirteenth century, he implies that this century holds light for the present:

The period that we are about to enter is the golden period of medieval speculation. The works that were created during this period are great to such an extent that they deserve our complete admiration. In the same measure as the Christian spirit was more and more strengthened among the western people and brought its fruits into deeds and life, the scientific efforts in the church's domain were also strengthened, and expanded into all areas of human knowledge. (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 3)

For Stöckl, the West gained its identity in the thirteenth century through the alliance between the Christian spirit and science, an identity that can perhaps be emulated in the nineteenth century. He uses the metaphor of a living tree to demonstrate the unity and spiritual strength of the Euro-Christian world of the Middle Ages, virtues that could again prove beneficial for society:

Thus it could not have been otherwise that the tree of Christian science grew upwards mightily and with its lordly crown shaded the peoples. The fruits of this tree lie before us in the works that this age produced. The powerful systems that we encounter in these works and in which the entire area of speculative science is covered, give evidence of the power and wealth of the spirit that lived in the authors of the same. They also give testimony of the greatness and power of the ideas through which the life of the European people then was moved and sustained. It was only due to the fact that the Christian belief along with the entire riches of its content was incorporated, so to speak, into the flesh and blood of these peoples and penetrated their whole spiritual and social life, that it was possible for such lordly fruits to sprout out of this life-giving foundation, as we have them before us in the Scholastic doctrinal systems of this time. (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 3)

Intellectuals produced "lordly fruits" within a church that supported the advancement of science in order to benefit the *Volk*. Stöckl offers a picture of the European people as a living intellectual body united as members of an organic Christian body. In arguing that the religious truth that flows through the veins of this people originated in a culture intimately connected with medieval Christianity, little if any room is left for members of other religions, let alone unbelievers.

Görres had used the medieval *Dom* of Cologne as a symbol of the restoration of the altar and the throne in Germany early in the nineteenth century. The Nazarenes and the Neo-Gothic architects

had borrowed medieval forms and images for frescoes and buildings that were often funded by either church or state. Stöckl takes it upon himself to contribute to this same project by providing a history of medieval philosophy. He argues that, if we are going to catch up with the progress made in the arts during the nineteenth century, then philosophers must turn back to the philosophy of the Middle Ages:

It is a fact that in recent times the philosophy of the Middle Ages has been given greater attention than has been the case even decades ago. According to my most ardent conviction, this fact can be viewed as nothing but very encouraging, and just as art has received a fresh impetus in going back to the medieval developments of art, the continuation of Christian science, most especially the discipline of philosophy, will be promoted to a high degree through a return to the old Scholastic masters and through the use that can be made for our time out of the rich treasures of knowledge reflected in their works. (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: iii)

If Europe is ever again to be strong it must return to its own origins in the Christian medieval world and find a philosophy that is respectful of both altar and throne. This interpretation becomes evident in Stöckl's presentation of individual medieval thinkers and especially of Aquinas.

At the beginning of his account of Aquinas, he uses the image of a medieval knight in order to characterize the Scholastic, a sort of gentle combatant as it were, and names Aquinas in particular as the true spiritual knight of the Middle Ages:

If the worldly knighthood of the Middle Ages won immortal praise on the battlefields, then there stands a spiritual knighthood at the side of this worldly knighthood that won laurels on the field of science, which were no less brilliant. The indestructible victorious power that proved itself in the first as martial bravery, has revealed itself here in the spiritual area. We admire in the representatives of the spiritual knighthood of this time an energy of intellectual power that penetrates the depths of the higher sciences and does not shrink back from any difficulty. And just as the courageousness of the worldly knights was used in the service of virtue, honor, and religion, so did the thinkers of this time bow their heads before religion and consecrate their scientific investigations to the service of religion. As the first and most distinguished authority of this spiritual knighthood we must name the man whose name stands at the top of this treatise. It is Thomas Aquinas. (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 421)

Aquinas is the great medieval thinker, a man for all Christian ages because he argues so clearly for the coexistence of science and faith. Aquinas solves the nineteenth-century problem of the relation between reason and revelation; he provides a philosophical foundation for a harmonious society. But in presenting him through a military metaphor of knighthood, the suggestion is made that combat is one goal in the search for truth.

Following his presentation of Islamic and Jewish philosophy, Stöckl argues that just as there was a crusade against the "unbelievers" of the Middle East in the Middle Ages, so there was also a spiritual crusade ("*geistiger Kreuzzug*") to recapture Greek philosophy from unbelievers. Just as the Christians went on a crusade to conquer and defend the Holy Land against the "unbelievers," there was also a spiritual crusade to acquire the works of Aristotle (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 308-313). With the works of Aristotle, Christian intellectuals were equipped to refute the false interpretations of the Islamic commentators and to build a foundation for a speculative system of Christian science. According to Stöckl, this project was carried out in the theological *summæ* of the thirteenth century and most perfectly in the *Summa theologiae* of Aquinas. Just as Aquinas fought against the medieval enemies of the church in the thirteenth century, so Kleutgen and Stöckl would fight against the modern enemies of the church in the nineteenth century.

When Stöckl discusses social philosophy in his *Lehrbuch*, he suggests how we can draw on the Middle Ages in order to defend the Christian character of German society. The subtitle of his section on religious society is "*Die Kirche*" which indicates the place he leaves for synagogues and mosques, namely, no place at all (Stöckl 1887, 3: 451). While he does sound liberal when arguing that Christian states must tolerate different religions, his ideal of tolerance is that the state must only "bear with" ("*dulden*") religious pluralism.⁵⁵ He notes explicitly that he is against the type of liberal tolerance that requires the state to show no favor towards any particular religion.

Christian states should not treat all religions equally, according to Stöckl, because we need to take into account the historical nature

⁵⁵ (Stöckl 1887, 3: 474) Stöckl has many things to say about how to protect the traditional institutions. For example, he explains in a pamphlet on public opinion how the media-generated voice of the people needs to be kept in check if we are to protect the moral order (Stöckl 1878, 6-8).

of particular states. In the case of Germany, the implication is that the state should continue to support the Catholic and Lutheran religions because these churches have been the dominant religions for centuries. Stöckl's point is that we should tolerate all religions in the religious realm, but not in the realm of the state (Stöckl 1887, 3: 473-475). Indifference to religion on the level of the state is simply wrong. In Germany, the same rights that are granted to Catholics and Lutherans should not be granted to other Christians, or to non-Christians, because these groups are not historically part of Germany. Given this perspective, Stöckl's *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* is an aid in determining what is historically European and worthy of state legal protection.

The Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy is a careful philosophical construction according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry and the relation of faith to reason. And as we shall see, they fashioned an account that would come to dominate the historiography of medieval philosophy in the twentieth century. Kleutgen and Stöckl's purpose was to lend scientific respectability to the beliefs and authority structures of a conservative, nineteenth-century ecclesiastical and political order centered in Rome. In writing this history Kleutgen and Stöckl constructed a narrative around the claim that there is only one philosophy that surpasses all others in preserving both objective science and the traditional authorities of church and state. According to their account, modern philosophical views on individuality and self-determination are unsound because they lead inevitably to skepticism and to the subversion of traditional society. The best single chance to restore harmony to the chaos of contemporary society is to promote a philosophy that reconciles reason and revelation and, in doing so, supports the traditional institutions of church and state.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SUCCESS OF THE KLEUTGEN-STÖCKL MODEL IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

By the late 1860s, Kleutgen and Stöckl's interpretation of the history of medieval philosophy had not yet found its way into the standard German histories of philosophy. For example, the general histories of philosophy published by Friedrich Überweg and Johann Eduard Erdmann continued to present the Enlightenment interpretation of the history of medieval philosophy. Überweg's method is to provide a doctrinal outline of the positions of individual thinkers accompanied by a number of supporting quotations. In reference to medieval philosophy, he continues Brucker's interpretation that theology ensnared the freedom of philosophy in the Middle Ages:

Scholasticism was philosophy in the service of established and accepted theological doctrines, or, at least, in such subordination to them, that, where philosophy and theology trod on common ground, the latter was received as the absolute norm and criterion of truth.¹

Theological teaching placed limits on philosophical activity. For example, he explains that Aquinas is a significant medieval thinker because he was able to use Aristotle's philosophy within his theology to a greater degree than his predecessors: "He [Aquinas] brought the Scholastic philosophy to its highest stage of development, by effecting the most perfect accommodation that was possible of the Aristotelian philosophy to ecclesiastical orthodoxy" (Überweg 1871, 1: 440). While Aquinas would surpass the other medievals in his use of the philosophy of Aristotle, he could not use reason with absolute freedom because to do so would have led him outside orthodoxy.

Erdmann also follows Brucker's interpretation of medieval philosophy in his general history of philosophy, published first in 1866. He argues that the goal of the medieval Scholastics was to make religious dogma comprehensible:

¹ I quote from the Morris translation of the fourth and last edition prepared by Überweg himself, published in 1871 (Überweg 1871, 1: 355).

The Fathers have produced the dogmas, the Schoolmen have to systematize them and to make them comprehensible. When, therefore, the philosophizing of the Schoolmen always takes its departure from the propositions established by authority, this is not narrowness on their part, but their necessary confinement to their vocation.²

But Erdmann's account is more nuanced than Brucker. He does not argue that there was no philosophy during the Middle Ages. Like Ritter, Erdmann argues that Albert the Great studied the natural world when he was young and the divine when he was older. By studying nature first and then theology, Albert came to appreciate the natural world before the supernatural.

In appreciating first the natural then the supernatural, Albert set up a problem for Aquinas, the problem of how to reconcile reason and revelation. Erdmann notes that Aquinas would become a great medieval thinker in the eyes of the church on account of his solution to this problem:

The fact that Albert, although always filled with glowing piety, had devoted himself first to secular studies alone, and only afterwards to theology, is the reason why the stream of his knowledge, like many a stream into which a tributary flows, appears bi-colored. The fusion can be much more complete where the idea exists from the beginning that everything, and therefore also the teachings of the philosophers, is to be studied only in the interest of theology and for ecclesiastical ends. If it should happen in consequence that in many points the Aristotelians were interpreted less according to their own meaning, the transformation of their teaching will nevertheless not bring the one who undertakes that transformation into the difficult position of the *persona duplex*. This is the reason not only why the Church has placed St. Thomas above the blessed Albert, but also why an undeserved superiority over his master is often assigned to him by philosophical writers.³

Aquinas's solution is to use Aristotle to further theology, which for Erdmann is to fail to be fair to either Aristotle or to philosophy. In holding that the turn towards the natural world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was a turn towards freedom in philosophy, and

² (Erdmann 1866, 1: 246) Quotation is from the translation of the third edition, which remains unchanged from the first (Erdmann 1890 1: 288-289).

³ (Erdmann 1866, 1: 356-357) Quotation is from the translation of the third edition, which remains unchanged from the first (Erdmann 1890, 1: 422).

away from the supernatural, Erdmann subscribes to the view that philosophy did not exist in the Middle Ages. Even in the last edition of his history published in 1896, Erdmann argues that a rebirth of interest in philosophy would occur only in conjunction with Protestantism, as a reaction against the medieval project of clarifying ecclesiastical dogma (Erdmann 1896, 2: 1-6). In presenting the Middle Ages as a time of bondage for philosophy, neither Überweg nor Erdmann has accepted the Kleutgen-Stöckl interpretation of philosophy as autonomous in the Middle Ages. The Kleutgen-Stöckl model would not be generally accepted outside of Catholic circles before the first decades of the twentieth century.

Polarization and Rupture

By the late 1860s, the Catholic intellectual winds were beginning to blow more strongly from Rome. Kleutgen and Stöckl had set their sails in the right direction. The canonization of the inquisitor Arbues in 1867 sent out a signal of papal support for absolute service to Rome. Expectations for intellectual direction from the Pope were increased with Pius IX's announcement of a new ecumenical council, the first such council to occur since the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century (Aubert 1981f, 313). Pius declared the following year that this council would open at the Vatican in December 1869 (Aubert 1964, 47-48). In newspapers and in intellectual journals a rash of speculation occurred over the purpose of this council. Would the bishops be asked to define the infallibility of the Pope as a dogma of the Roman Catholic Church? After great secrecy it became clear, as accounts were appearing in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, that the definition of papal infallibility would indeed be on the agenda (Aubert 1964, 74-76). The reason given was that a majority of Catholics desired such a definition. Beginning in 1869, Döllinger responded in Germany in conjunction with Johannes Huber by publishing arguments against the definition of papal infallibility (Aubert 1964, 77). These arguments were published in the form of letters to the editor of newspapers, written under the pseudonym of Janus, letters that were republished and translated around the world. By the time the German bishops met for their annual conference at Fulda in September 1869, a majority agreed that the time was not yet right for the definition of papal

infallibility (Aubert 1964, 79-80). Their fear was that such a definition would intensify the polarization within the German church and possibly lead to destructive results. A secret letter was drafted by the bishops and sent to the Pope, cautioning him not to define papal infallibility.

In saying that the time was not yet right for the definition of papal infallibility, the German bishops were not opposing the Neo-Scholastic philosophy associated with the "Roman" philosophers and theologians. Eugenio Cecconi, the archbishop of Florence, notes in his history of the Vatican Council that the German bishops at Fulda warmly received Stöckl's *Lehrbuch der Philosophie* (Cecconi 1878, 2: pt. 2, 858). Praise would also come from Rome, namely from the Pope himself.

According to Stöckl's former student and biographer Joseph Pemsel, Stöckl traveled to St. Peter's in Rome in the summer of 1869 and placed copies of his philosophical works on the steps leading up to the papal throne. He is said to have dedicated all his scholarly efforts to the victories of the great Pius (Pemsel 1896, 32-33). It appears that Pius was not on his throne at the time, since he sent a letter to Stöckl in October 1869, thanking him for his gift and praising him for his philosophical work.⁴ Pius notes that on account of the labors required for his shepherding office, he has not had time to read Stöckl's works. Yet, in sending an official letter at a busy time, just before the beginning of the Vatican Council, the Pope chooses to honor a very "Roman" Neo-Scholastic philosopher. The message was clear, Scholasticism and communitarian loyalty to Rome were in favor and not the liberal subjectivity associated with modern philosophy.

⁴ Pius praised Stöckl for his philosophical works in service of the Catholic Church: "Bis enim, Dilecte Fili, declaras, ac luculenter profiteris, nihil Tibi gratius, nihilque potius esse, quam omni cura, studioque philosophicas disciplinas ad catholicae Ecclesiae doctrinae normam diligenter tradere, ac juvenes salutari doctrina imbuere, Nostrisque in hac re monitis sedulo obtemperare Gratissimum certe id Nobis accidit, ac dum meritas Tibi laudes tribuimus, animos Tibi addimus, ut majore usque alacritate in hoc proposito quotidie magis constanter permanes. Debitas autem Tibi agimus gratias pro philosophicis libris a Te conscriptis, quos tamen ob gravissimas supremi Nostri Pontificatus curas, et occupationes nondum legere potuimus." From an unpublished letter of Pope Pius IX to Stöckl dated 10-28-1869. The original is in the Stöckl *Nachlass* at the archive of the Episcopal library of the university of Eichstätt. For a German translation of the letter, see Pemsel 1896, 32-33.

After the opening of the Vatican Council in December 1869, Döllinger informed the world of the ecclesiastical battles waged behind the scenes through another set of letters, which he published under the pseudonym of Quirinus in newspapers. Döllinger wrote these letters while remaining in Germany. He was supplied with information by the historian and future Lord Acton as well as by the theologian and historian Johann Friedrich. They transported their reports out of the Papal States via the diplomatic pouches of the Prussian and Bavarian ambassadors (Aubert 1964, 164-166). Acton was the unofficial leader of the opposition to papal infallibility. Though not a member of the Council, he organized disparate forces at weekly meetings. During these sessions, he instructed council participants in the use and benefits of parliamentary procedure. Friedrich, secretary to Kleutgen's nemesis — the German Archbishop Gustav Adolf Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst — was able to participate at the council.

In early 1870, that is before the definition of papal infallibility in July, Döllinger published articles against the definition of papal infallibility under his own name.⁵ Professors at different universities and academies across Germany signed petitions agreeing with Döllinger. These were published at Breslau on 23 January, Braunsberg on 30 January, Bonn and Prague on 3 February, Münster on 9 February, Cologne on 10 February, and Freiburg on 26 February.⁶ Philosophers and theologians of the Roman persuasion took the opportunity to defend the legitimacy of a definition of papal infallibility.

Albert Stöckl published a response to the petition signed by fourteen of his colleagues at the Academy of Münster, his *Die Infallibilität des Oberhauptes der Kirche und die Zustimmungsadressen an Herrn v. Döllinger, namentlich die Münster'sche*. In stating that the Münster endorsement of Döllinger's position was written by a young lay professor, Stöckl betrays his disdain for the involvement of non-clerics in theological discussions. He indicates the limits of the faculty involvement, noting that two professors of theology and twelve members of the philosophy faculty signed the statement while six

⁵ He published these in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of Augsburg on 19 January and 9 March 1870. In order to make his point, Stöckl refers to this paper as the *protestantischen Allgemeinen Zeitung* (Stöckl 1870, 10). Döllinger's articles were reprinted in other newspapers (Neuprotestantismus 1883-1900, 272).

⁶ Neuprotestantismus 1883-1900, 272.

lecturers of theology and seven members of the philosophy faculty did not (Stöckl 1870, 7). He also questions the competency of those who did sign, claiming that his colleagues in zoology, chemistry, literature, mineralogy, history, and botany had little to contribute to discussions on papal infallibility because they were not prepared to discuss ecclesiastical matters (Stöckl 1870, 12). Stöckl's point is that there is no place in the Catholic Church for private authority in the area of belief and morals (Stöckl 1870, 33-34). Leave theological discussions to those who are educated and appointed for such discourse, that is, to the theologians and bishops in union with the Pope. The danger is that divisions engendered by protest can lead only to sectarianism and terrorism, none of which would bode well for the church.

Stöckl argues that since the bishops of the world have the responsibility to decide the issue of papal infallibility, scholars should keep their opinions to themselves and await the judgment of the church. The warning by the German bishops at Fulda was of little importance because they spoke only for themselves and not for the church as a whole. The bishops of the entire world, when sitting in an ecumenical council, have the authority to determine the doctrine of the church. Therefore, when Stöckl attacks Döllinger's position as heretical, he is not saying that Döllinger is wrong to deny the yet-to-be-defined infallibility of the Pope (Stöckl 1870, 10, 14-15). Döllinger takes an heretical position in denying the right of the church hierarchy as a whole to define dogma.

A response to Stöckl's pamphlet signed by fourteen supporters of Döllinger was published in *Westfälischer Merkur* on 23 February 1870, and reprinted in the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* on 2 March. They argue that Stöckl is unfair to the arguments of Döllinger, who has supplied evidence against defining papal infallibility (Münster, 28 1870, 2). In fact, they claim to be faithful to church tradition, adhering, as they do, to the theological views of Henri Louis Charles Maret and Alphonse Gratry. Rather than hurling personal invective against Döllinger, Stöckl should give his position a fair hearing and pay heed to the Augustinian maxim: "In necessity unity, in doubt liberty, and in all things charity."

Stöckl's reply of the following day in the *Münsterischer Anzeiger*, also reprinted in the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, notes that Döllinger's supporters have still not taken the trouble to answer his arguments (Münster, 28 1870, 2). Furthermore, he did not need to refute

Döllinger's arguments, as these had been borrowed from "Janus" and Hergenröther had already published a reply in his *Anti-Janus*. Anyone in need of sound arguments against Döllinger should consult Hergenröther's work. Stöckl also claims that the authority of Maret and Gratry is unworthy of consideration since they are in error for not giving due attention to the power of the Pope.

Seven responded to Stöckl in a pamphlet titled *A. Stöckl für die Infallibilisten*, including Johann Hittorf, professor of physics and chemistry and the discoverer of cathode rays, Bernhard Ten Brink, lecturer on philology and a pioneer in the study of the works of Chaucer, and Wilhelm Storck, professor of German literature.⁷ They argue that when Stöckl states that everyone should let the bishops of the world decide whether the Pope is infallible, he is not the disinterested party he suggests, but rather a supporter of papal infallibility and an opponent of German science.⁸ Papal infallibility will destroy science because once infallibility has been defined, science will no longer be free. Academics will no longer be able to inquire freely into the world, fearing condemnation from Rome. Stöckl responded to these charges in the second edition of his pamphlet, signed on 9 March 1870, and repeated much that had already been said. He attempts to bring the pamphlet-war back to the level of argument by pointing out the unscientific nature of the arguments directed against him. His suggestion is that we should stay within the realm of argument and refrain from reading motives between the lines (Stöckl 1870, 36-39). The polarization between Stöckl and other faculty members at Münster would increase to such a level that by the summer of 1870, around the time of the definition of infallibility, Stöckl would hand in his resignation and return to the diocese of Eichstätt in a pastoral capacity.

Kleutgen was in Rome as a member of the Vatican Council, from where he published works in support of papal infallibility in 1869 and 1870. He was acting as a theological consultant to P. Stein, the Jesuit Apostolic Vicar of Calcutta. His job was to supply

⁷ Stöckl notes that the pamphlet "A. Stöckl für die Infallibilisten" was published at Münster by Brunn and signed by Rospatt, Karsch, Storck, Langen, Hittorf, Hosius and Ten Brink (Stöckl 1870, 36). I assume that he is talking about Johann Hittorf, Wilhelm Storck, and Bernhard Ten Brink, who taught at Münster (Engelkemperin 1911, 640).

⁸ (Rospatt 1870) I note the arguments Stöckl refers to in his reply (Stöckl 1870, 36-40).

arguments as the need arose. Cardinal Steinhuber reports in a letter written at the time of Kleutgen's death in 1883 that Stein submitted Kleutgen's draft of a formula of the definition of papal infallibility to other bishops for their perusal. Interest was expressed in the authorship of Stein's formula and Kleutgen was chosen, along with Johann Baptist Franzelin (1816-1886), to draft sections of key documents for the council (Deufel 1976, 67).

Kleutgen and Franzelin drafted sections of "Pastor aeternus," the text that contains the definition of papal infallibility.⁹ They reworked a version of this definition in order to please a majority of the bishops. The definition arrived at was the assertion that the Pope can define teaching on faith or morals as infallible under certain precise conditions. In helping to compose the text of the definition of papal infallibility, Kleutgen was thus able to participate in grounding one pole of his long-standing project to establish the absolute certainty of faith and reason.

Kleutgen also reworked sections of the conciliar text "Dei Filius."¹² Interestingly enough, the first canon appended to the second chapter consists of a condemnation of the view that human beings cannot use natural reason to know God:

If anyone says that the One true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty with the natural light of human reason through the things that are created, *anathema sit*.¹¹

While many philosophers would argue that they can prove that God exists, a condemnation of the view that human beings cannot use natural reason to prove what they already believe supports Kleutgen and Stöckl's interpretation of Aquinas's reconciliation of reason and revelation. The existence of God can be both held on faith and known through reason.

Furthermore, in the fourth chapter of "Dei Filius," the council fathers are even more explicit with regard to the relationship between reason and revelation. They confirm that faith cannot contradict reason:

⁹ Aubert 1964, 225, 247, 303, 314.

¹⁰ On Kleutgen and Franzelin's roles in drafting "Dei Filius," see Aubert 1964, 182-183; McCool 1989, 218-224.

¹¹ (Neuner and Dupuis 1982, 41) The Latin can be found in Denzinger-Schönmetzner 1965, 593, par. 3026.

However, though faith is above reason, there can never be a real discrepancy between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has bestowed the light of reason on the human mind, and God cannot deny Himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth.¹²

This conciliar document therefore represents a victory for those "Roman" philosophers and theologians who had gone back to the Middle Ages in order to solve the problem of reason versus revelation. Human beings have the power to reason and this power will not contradict revelation. In promoting both reason and revelation, the council avoided the traditionalist denial of the trustworthiness of reason and the rationalist neglect of revelation. The reconciliation of reason and revelation, without any fear of a contradiction, receives the highest level of ecclesiastical support within the Roman Catholic Church. Not only was Brucker wrong to think that reason was subservient to religious dogma during the Middle Ages, but Kleutgen and Stöckl were right to turn to the Middle Ages in order to clarify anew the relationship between theology and philosophy.

The council fathers were almost united in voting for the definition of papal infallibility. There were two abstentions, one an apparently garbled assent. Yet this vote does not reflect the actual division among the bishops at the council. Since more than sixty bishops could not get agreement on the point that both the Pope and the church are infallible, they chose to depart before the vote was taken.¹³ These bishops left in order to avoid taking a public stand against the Pope and causing scandal to the faithful. Each would ultimately accept papal infallibility. Döllinger, Huber, Michelis, and Friedrich would not and, as a result, would incur excommunication from the Catholic Church.

What was considered the triumph of the medieval church (papal infallibility) occurred in the same month that the German lands mobilized for war with France, a conflict that would lead to the loss of the Papal States. France had protected the territory of Pius the IX since Louis Napoleon's troops occupied Civita Vecchia north of Rome in 1849. While the Italian War of 1859 led to the loss of the

¹² (Neuner and Dupuis 1982, 46) The Latin appears in Denzinger-Schönmetzger 1965, 591, par. 3017.

¹³ (Aubert 1964, 231-232; and Aubert 1981f, 329-330) Defining the church as infallible would place stress on the larger ecclesiastical community and lessen the dependence on Rome.

Papal States north of Rome (Romagna, Urbino, Ancona, and Spoleto), Napoleon III continued to protect Rome and its environs. Yet, soon after the start of the Franco-Prussian war, France withdrew from Civita Vecchia allowing the Italian General Cadorna to lead his troops into Rome and occupy the city on 20 September (Aubert 1964, 238). The area around Rome was annexed by early October. With the Vatican Council in recess since August, Pius conceded that it could no longer continue. He adjourned the council on 20 October 1870 and took on his role as the prisoner of the Vatican.

After the German victory, Wilhelm I, the king of Prussia, was proclaimed the emperor of Germany on 18 January 1871. While this occasion might have provided the perfect setting for a medieval marriage of altar and throne, the antagonism between liberal and conservative Catholics prevented such a union. Pius had succeeded in having papal infallibility defined, and in doing so was thought to have delivered a blow to the respect for the freedom and authority of the people. Vatican opposition to German liberal Catholics encouraged the view that the Pope stood opposed to the ideals of modern democratic states. Liberal Catholics in Germany continued to support the separation of church and state and did not draw on the Vatican for political inspiration. In 1871 there were sufficient numbers of liberal Catholics in the Catholic parts of Germany to elect a majority of the National Liberal Party, including twelve of the fourteen representatives from Baden, seventeen of the eighteen representatives from Württemberg, and a large majority of the representatives from Bavaria (Phillips 1910, 875-876). Thousands of liberal Catholics refused to accept papal infallibility and founded the Old Catholic Church. By the early 1870s, the differences between "Roman" and "German" Catholics had grown into schism.

The Center Party, which had sixty members elected to the *Reichstag* in 1871, represented those Catholics who looked to the Pope in Rome for guidance (Phillips 1910, 876). This party lobbied for German assistance to help Pius recover his secular power. Bismarck, the first Chancellor of Germany, came to view the dependency of conservative German Catholics on the Vatican as a danger to his young empire. Would conservative Catholics, who appeared to be gaining the ascendancy in their church, side with the German empire in a moment of crisis, or with the potential Catholic enemies of Austria or France? After all, German Catholics

had argued for years that Austria be included in the German Empire, an addition that would have raised the number of Catholics above the number of Protestants.

Members of the Catholic hierarchy punished Catholics who did not support the definition of papal infallibility. For example, Bishop Krementz of Ermland removed Friedrich Michelis from his professorship in philosophy at the Lyceum Hosianum in Braunsberg. Michelis had worked hard to attain this post. He had left the city of Munich, with its libraries and culture, and moved to what he referred to, in a letter to Döllinger written in 1868, as his "Siberia exile" (Betz 1978, 34). He was willing to leave Munich in order to fulfill what was for him a dream, a chair in philosophy.

Michelis was not a radical thinker. He continued to draw on ancient and medieval philosophy. During his last semester at Braunsberg he taught a seminar on the philosophy of Aquinas, Aristotle, and Kant. But the Catholic Church was no longer broad enough for a philosopher who would not accept the new dogma of papal infallibility. Michelis would lecture only once more at an institution of higher learning, at Heidelberg during the Winter semester of 1872-1873 (Belz 1978, 217). Removed from his post and excommunicated, he was assured that orthodox Catholics would no longer read his works. His manner of reading medieval philosophy in tandem with Greek and modern philosophy would now be out of bounds for those loyal to Rome. Michelis became a member of the Old Catholic Church.¹⁴

Bismarck and the National Liberal Party responded to the "Michelis affair" by eliminating the Catholic Department of the Prussian Ministry of Public Worship in 1871 (Lill 1981c, 31-32). Since this Catholic Department had not protected liberal Catholics from the "Roman" bishops, Bismarck placed the state administration of the Catholic Church within the Department of the Prussian Ministry of Public Worship, which administered the Prussian Evangelical church. Bismarck was both protecting those Catholics who dissented from the dogma of papal infallibility and trying to win control of the German Catholic Church from Pius IX, as the liberal governments of Baden and Bavaria had done in the 1860s

¹⁴ Döllinger was excommunicated as well, but did not join the Old Catholics (Lill 1981e, 330-332). He thought that history had demonstrated that such groups did not help to reform the church.

(Lill 1981d, 276-280). The struggle intensified between those who supported and those who opposed the influence of the Pope in Germany. Since the Jesuits had a reputation for doing the bidding of the Pope, Bismarck and the National Liberal Party passed a federal law on the 4 July 1872 that allowed the police to arrest members of the Jesuit order (Lill 1981c, 35). The German *Bundesrath* interpreted this law as excluding the Jesuits from working in German churches and schools. The Jesuits left Germany and moved their German house of studies first to Ditton Hall in England and later to Valkenburg in Holland.¹⁵

The government of Prussia attempted to distance the Catholic clergy from Rome in 1873 by placing all Catholic seminaries on Prussian territory under the control of the state. Laws were passed in Prussia requiring that ecclesiastical offices be filled only with priests educated at German universities (Lill 1981c, 36-37). The old battle between university and seminary was raised to a new level. Anyone who did not comply with the new legislation would be ineligible for church office. Bishops who did not obey were to lose state funds and risk imprisonment. On account of violations of these laws, six of the eleven Prussian bishops were dismissed from office. By 1878 only three bishops were able to function in Prussia at the helm of their dioceses (Lill 1981c, 40). All seminaries and 296 religious houses were closed, 1,000 parishes were without pastors, all reminiscent of the secularization at the turn of the century.¹⁶

What had begun as measures put forth by the National Liberal Party to protect liberal Catholics and to protest against the long reach of Rome had become a battle between the modern liberal culture that placed stress on the rights of the individual and the supporters of pre-modern conceptions of church and state. This battle between the cultures of the modern and the medieval worlds became known as the *Kulturkampf*. The *Preußische Jahrbücher* describes this battle in apocalyptic terms, as if the future of the civilized world hung in the balance:

¹⁵ For a description of the excellent philosophical and theological library at Valkenburg, see Hoensbroech 1926, 1: 165.

¹⁶ (Lill 1981c, 41-43; Spahn 1910, 8: 708) 1,125 priests, out of 4627, were prosecuted for various crimes including criticism of the Prussian state and sixteen million German marks were diverted away from the Catholic Church.

. . . the fight of modern freedom of thought against the last spiritual heritage of the Middle Ages, the papal subjugation of faith, and the fight of the modern state against the last judicial vestige of the Middle Ages, the immunity of the Roman Church.¹⁷

Germany was finally a single nation. If the power of the Vatican could be broken, then Germany would finally enter the modern world.

Conservative Catholics saw the definition of papal infallibility as a final triumph of the Catholic Church over the false philosophy of the modern period. Cardinal Manning, the archbishop of Westminster, would sum up this view in his 1890 preface to Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas Scannell's translation of Matthias Joseph Scheeben's great *Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik*:

But what the Council did eventually declare is, not the existence of God, but that the existence of God may be known with certitude by the reason of man through the works that He has created. This is the infallible light of the Natural Order, and the need of this definition is perceived by all who know the later Philosophies of Germany and France, and the rationalism, scepticism, and naturalism which pervades the literature, the public opinion, and the political action of the modern world. This was the first dominant error of these days, demanding the action of the Council. The second was the insidious undermining of the doctrinal authority of the Holy See, which for two hundred years had embarrassed the teaching of the Church, not only in controversy with adversaries without, but often in the guidance of some of its own members within the fold. The definition of the Infallible Magisterium of the Roman Pontiff has closed this period of contention. The Divine Certitude of the Supernatural Order completes the twofold infallibility of the knowledge of God in the natural and supernatural revelation of Himself. This was the work of the Vatican Council in its one memorable Session, in which the Councils of the Church, and especially the Councils of Florence and of Trent, culminated in defining the certitude of faith. (Wilhelm and Scannell 1890, 1: vii-viii)

The opposition between the pre-modern and the modern worlds that Kleutgen had so carefully drawn was becoming a reality. As a result of this polarization, the study of medieval philosophy would remain largely the province of seminaries until a rapprochement between the two was effected.

¹⁷ *Preußische Jahrbücher* 1873, II, 596; quoted in Lill 1981c, 38.

Eichstätt as a Center for Medieval Studies

With Stöckl's return to teaching there in 1872, Eichstätt became the leading center in Germany for the study of medieval philosophy and theology (Pemsel 1896, 34, 37). Stöckl joined the important Neo-Scholastics Franz von Paula Morgott and Mathias Schneid, who published a large number of works on the history of medieval thought.¹⁸ Stöckl had already published his *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* during the 1860s at Münster, a work that Karl Werner called the only recent complete presentation of the entire philosophy of the Middle Ages based on primary texts (Werner 1866b, 721). In fact, Stöckl was the first to complete a general history of medieval philosophy constructed around the view that philosophy had flourished in the Middle Ages. In the 1870s and 1880s he used medieval philosophical principles to argue against what he took to be the anti-Catholic climate of the day. For example, in the first edition of his *Lehrbuch der Pädagogik*, published in 1873, he supports the view that if Western culture is to survive, the church must retain a role in education. He argues that, if unchecked, the Rousseauian educational practice of leaving Christianity out of education will lead to the demise of Western civilization.¹⁹ If we are to preserve "our" culture, we must continue to support the influence of Christianity in education.

In response to the *Kulturkampf* Stöckl campaigned for and won the Eichstätt-Weissenburg seat in the German *Reichstag* in 1878. He also began publishing a newspaper called the *Eichstätter Volkszeitung* (Pemsel 1896, 52-53). Both his political career and this newspaper gave him a larger public forum in which to make use of medieval philosophy in arguing against liberal values. Stöckl gathered many of the talks and articles he gave during this period into the three volumes of his *Das Christenthum und die großen Fragen der Gegenwart* published in 1879 and 1880, and into the single volume of his *Das Christenthum und die modernen Irrthümer*, published in 1886.

We find evidence of the stature that Stöckl and the other Neo-Scholastics at Eichstätt had attained in the second edition of the

¹⁸ On the importance of Eichstätt, see Walter 1988, 175-179; Hirschberger 1964.

¹⁹ (Stöckl 1873, 31-33) As if to stress the implications that his view has for public education, Stöckl dedicates this work to a school teacher, his father. He notes that his father has been a school teacher in the village of Möhren for 53 years.

Wetzer and Welte *Kirchenlexikon*, edited by Cardinal Joseph Hergenröther and Franz Kaulen between 1877 and 1901. Cardinal Hergenröther wrote in his prologue to this *Kirchenlexikon* while at Eichstätt that he had suggested the necessity of preparing a second edition as early as 1877.²⁰ The first edition had been published from 1847 to 1856. Two reasons why a second edition was needed were the definition of papal infallibility and the triumph of Neo-Scholasticism. The first edition did not bear the stamp of either, and many of its contributors were now intellectually outside the Catholic Church.²¹

With Michelis and Huber and so many other Catholic philosophers now excommunicated, Stöckl was the leading Catholic philosopher in Germany if not the world.²² He was given the commission to write 58 articles for the second edition of the *Kirchenlexikon*, including the main 35-column entry on philosophy.²³ He was able to offer his interpretation of medieval philosophy in the major German-Catholic reference work written at the end of the nineteenth century, a work which Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas Scannell praise for having summed up the "labors of the German school" and which would remain the dominant work of its kind until the Herder press began publishing a new encyclopedia in the 1930s.²⁴

In his article on philosophy, Stöckl presents the view that reason cannot contradict revelation.²⁵ The implication is that the philosophy of nature, including the hard sciences, will not contradict revelation. Stöckl interprets philosophy in terms of its standard spheres

²⁰ (Hergenröther and Kaulen 1882-1901, 1: v) Hergenröther turned this project over to Kaulen after being raised to the cardinalate and appointed as the first archivist of the Vatican library.

²¹ But as Döllinger was so widely respected in academic circles, his articles "Bossuet," "Luther," "Regalienstreit," and "Scotus, Johannes Duns" were retained (Hergenröther and Kaulen 1882-1901, 12: 2048).

²² Cardinal Manning called him the leading contemporary Catholic philosopher period (Pensel 1896, 43).

²³ Stöckl's articles include "Alexander von Hales," "Alexandristen," "Algazel," "Alkendi," "Arabische Philosophie und Theologie," "Averroes," "Avicena," "Bernhard von Chartres," "Buriandus," "Cartesius," "Gassendi," "Gottfried von Fontaines," "Gunther," "Johannes von Salisbury," "Malebranche," "Mill," "Mysticismus," "Naturrecht," "Nominalism," "Ontologismus," "Optimismus," "Philosophie," "Plato," "Platonismus," and "Raimund von Sabunde" (Hergenröther and Kaulen 1882-1901, 12: 2097).

²⁴ Wilhelm and Scannell 1890, 1: xlix.

²⁵ Hergenröther and Kaulen 1882-1901, 9: 2047-2048.

of inquiry: logic and epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of law.²⁶ He then explains the philosophical relations between these spheres. In the historical section of his article, he claims that Aquinas represents the high point of Scholastic philosophy, the “Augustine of the Middle Ages,” who carries the banner of Christian philosophy for all times.²⁷ We are also told that William of Ockham opposes the philosophy of the thirteenth century, and leads Scholasticism away from the achievement of medieval thought, the synthesis of philosophy and theology.

Franz von Paula Morgott (1829-1900) had been Stöckl’s student at Eichstätt in the 1850s and was given Stöckl’s chair in exegetical studies when Stöckl departed for Münster in 1857 (Walter 1988, 178). Morgott also taught philosophy at Eichstätt and, after 1869, theology. By the 1870s he had published a number of influential works on Scholastic philosophy: *Geist und Natur im Menschen: Die Lehre des hl. Thomas über die Grundfragen der Psychologie in ihrer Beziehung zur Kirchenlehre und zur neueren Wissenschaft* in 1860, the fourth volume of Plassmann’s *Die Schule des hl. Thomas von Aquin* in 1861, and *Die Theorie der Gefühle im Systeme des hl. Thomas* in 1864. Morgott also wrote 22 articles for the Wetzter and Welte *Kirchenlexikon*, including essays on Peter the Lombard, Bañez, *Concursus divinus*, *Congregatio de auxiliis*, the relation of freedom to grace, and a biographical piece on Stöckl.²⁸

When Morgott began to teach theology in 1869, his chair in philosophy was given to Mathias Schneid (1840-1893), who also wrote a number of works on medieval thought. After Stöckl returned to Eichstätt in 1872, he shared the teaching of philosophy with Schneid (Walter 1988, 178). Schneid’s publications on Scholastic philosophy include his *Die scholastische Lehre von Materie und Form und ihre Harmonie mit den Tatsachen der Naturwissenschaft*, published in 1873, *Aristoteles in der Scholastik: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie im Mittelalter*, published in 1875, *Zur Körperlehre des Johannes Duns Scotus und ihr Verhältnis zum Thomismus und Atomismus*, published in 1879, and *Die Philosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin und ihre Bedeutung für die Gegenwart*, published in 1881. In line with his interest in the medieval use of Aristotle’s philosophy, Schneid wrote the articles on

²⁶ Hergenröther and Kaulen 1882-1901, 9: 2051-2052.

²⁷ Hergenröther and Kaulen 1882-1901, 9: 2068.

²⁸ Hergenröther and Kaulen 1882-1901, 12: 2079.

Aristotle and on the Aristotelian school of thought for the *Kirchenlexikon*.²⁹

With the *Kulturkampf* Eichstätt came to play a central role in the German Catholic intellectual scene in the 1870s and 1880s. The closure of seminaries under Prussian jurisdiction, including schools in Westfalen, Hessen-Nassau, Rhein province, Hannover, Sachsen, and Prussia, forced students to travel south to Eichstätt in search of a seminary education (Spahn 1910, 8: 708). In coming to Eichstätt, they were choosing Scholastic thought over the curriculum of the liberal universities. At Eichstätt, they received instruction in the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy. They were educated to use Scholastic philosophy and theology to oppose modern philosophy and theology. More than 300 of these students came to Eichstätt during the 1870s, students who would later return to their dioceses and further propagate the Kleutgen-Stöckl model (Walter 1988, 178). Legally, no one returning to territory under Prussian control could hold ecclesiastical office, unless they had studied at a university. All who attempted to do so would be liable for prosecution and imprisonment. Yet, the administrators of dioceses continued to send students to Eichstätt in order to prepare them to oppose the excesses of the modern state.

Pius IX died in 1878 and Leo XIII was elected Pope on February 20, 1878. He demonstrated his concern to end the tension between the papacy and various nation states on the day of his election. He wrote a letter to a number of sovereigns, including the emperor of Germany, suggesting that they improve their relations (Lill 1981a, 55-58). Actually, the papacy had much in common with the German monarchy. For example, both Leo XIII and Wilhelm I believed that the Middle Ages provided a symbolic and conceptual foundation for contemporary political and ecclesiastical life. The continuing construction of the cathedral of Cologne stood out as a symbol of Wilhelm's pro-monarchical positions. He would lead the celebration marking the completion of the cathedral in 1880, an occasion that brought the reigning German princes together in order to honor German unity under a single throne. The political magnitude of this event is evident in the fact that the largest bell in the cathedral was also the largest and heaviest bell hung anywhere in the world. It was named the *Kaiserglocke* in honor of the emperor.

²⁹ Hergenröther and Kaulen 1882-1901, 1: 1303-1312.

or. Along with its smaller mates, it was cast from French guns captured during the Franco-Prussian war.³⁰ Therefore, when rung, these bells sounded military prowess and the unity of altar and throne.

The German historian Franz Schnabel paints a romantic picture of the theologian Matthias Scheeben writing his Neo-Scholastic *Dogmatik* in Cologne in the 1870s as the construction on the cathedral was nearing completion. Schnabel notes a parallel between Aquinas writing his *Summa* in the thirteenth century when work on the Cologne cathedral was begun and Scheeben writing his *Dogmatik* in Cologne as the construction was coming to an end.³¹ But the priest seminary in Cologne had been closed in 1875 due to the *Kulturkampf*. Scheeben was writing under less than romantic circumstances. He could no longer teach at the Episcopal seminary and his archbishop was in exile, while the government responsible for both situations was preparing to lead the celebrations marking the completion of the Gothic Roman Catholic cathedral (Parent 1980, 2: 121-124).

The Catholic response to the celebrations in honor of the completion of Cologne cathedral was a mixture of delight in things medieval and anguish at the *Kulturkampf*. The joy and the sadness are evident in the description of the celebration published in Joseph Schäfler's *Handlexikon der katholischen Theologie für Geistliche und Laien* in 1883:

For some years large sums were procured especially through the cathedral-construction lottery, so that under the architect Voigtel the entire completion of the beautiful cathedral together with the extension of both towers took place. The festivities were celebrated in the

³⁰ The guns were taken from France by Hamm in 1874 and cast in 1875 (Cologne 1911, 6: 697; "Kölner Dom" 1883, 2: 659; Seidler 1980, 2: 381-385, with pictures).

³¹ (Schnabel 1955, 4: 261) Scheeben himself compared Aquinas's *Summa* with the Cologne cathedral to draw a parallel between the architecture and the Scholasticism of the thirteenth century. He argued that we should take into account the similarities between the transition from Romanesque to Gothic in architecture and the change from the patristic intellectual style to the Scholastic (Scheeben 1873-1887, 1: 429, note 1). Furthermore, he explains that the unfinished state of both the great cathedrals and theological summas gives evidence of the scientific striving of the era. Hauréau had already pointed out that there was a similarity between the Gothic architecture of the thirteenth century and the thought of Albert, Aquinas, and Scotus (Hauréau 1850, 1: 6). For more recent accounts of this parallel, see Panofsky 1976; Radding and Clark 1992.

presence of Emperor Wilhelm I, the princes of Prussia, numerous aristocrats, and the Jewish Liberals of Germany. Because of the sadly felt absence of the archbishop of Cologne Paul Melcher, who was residing abroad since 1875 due to the results of the *Kulturkampf*, the Catholic people applied themselves in dignified reservation. (Kölner Dom 1883, 2: 659)

The cathedral was completed, but the archbishop of Cologne was absent. The Jewish Liberals were the scapegoats of the *Kulturkampf*, so they figure in the celebration as well, with no mention of the liberal Catholics who had voted for the Liberal party and opposed the Pope. Nevertheless, there was something bizarre about the monarch of a state at odds with the Catholic Church celebrating national unity in a medieval cathedral whose archbishop was in exile (Hartmann 1980). What was needed was a union between those who supported the medieval institutions of church and state.

With so much in common, Leo XIII and Bismarck decided that there was nothing to gain from continuing the *Kulturkampf*. Negotiations were conducted between the two sides and the *Kulturkampf* was relaxed. By 1884 many bishoprics were functioning normally once again. The state permitted either exiled bishops to return or new bishops to be installed (Lill 1981a, 9: 65-73). State funds began to flow back into the Catholic Church. By 1887 seminaries independent of state control were allowed to reopen. Many religious orders were permitted to return to Prussia and given back their property. Yet, the Jesuits would not be able to return until 1917 and the state retained control of the elementary and secondary schools.³²

Leo XIII's Support for Medieval Philosophy

Leo XIII, near the beginning of his pontificate, encouraged the study of medieval philosophy and theology. He called Kleutgen back to Rome in 1878 in order to appoint him as the prefect of general studies at the Jesuit Gregoriana University. Moving Kleutgen to the Gregoriana signaled the importance of Neo-Scholasticism for the future of this most prestigious Jesuit universi-

³² In 1917 there were 1234 German Jesuits including priests, scholastics, and lay brothers (Hoensbroeck 1926, 1: 215).

ty (Deufel 1976, 74). Kleutgen is also thought to have been called to Rome for another reason, namely, to help write a programmatic piece for the restoration of medieval philosophy, Leo XIII's encyclical "Aeterni Patris."

There are many contenders for the person(s) who helped Leo write "Aeterni Patris." Leo might have turned to his brother Giuseppe Pecci, Matteo Liberatore, Salvatore Talamo, and/or Kleutgen. He had contact with his brother, who was a Neo-Scholastic. A draft of the encyclical has been found among the papers of Liberatore (Lakner 1933, 199). The historian Roger Aubert concluded in 1988 that Salvatore Talamo (1844-1932) played a central role, noting that when Leo made his brother a cardinal in the summer of 1878, he gave Giuseppe's chair in the philosophy of law to Talamo (Aubert 1988, 314-315). Aubert points out that Talamo had argued in his *Il rinnovamento del pensiero tomista e la scienza moderna*, articles that were published together as a book in 1877, that true philosophy does not stand in opposition either to modern science or religious belief. Therefore, according to Aubert, since Talamo had goals in common with Leo and was given Giuseppe's chair, we have every reason to believe that he was one of the main sources for "Aeterni Patris" (Aubert 1988, 315).

But how are we to know that Talamo drafted "Aeterni Patris" and not Kleutgen? After all, Kleutgen's solution to his life-long struggle to clarify the relation between faith and reason was that Scholastic philosophy provided a foundation for an objective account of science that cannot contradict revelation. Furthermore, there is a tradition in the Jesuit order that Kleutgen was a co-author of the encyclical and prepared a draft.³³ And Kleutgen did have his supporters in the 1860s and 1870s. His *Philosophie der Vorzeit* had already been translated into French and Italian (Kleutgen 1867; 1868-1870). The identity of the translators of the Italian edition, published by the Vatican Propaganda of the Faith Press, gives some indication of the reception of Kleutgen's work. Karl August Graf von Reisach (1800-1869) was one of the two translators. He had been the bishop of Eichstätt who opened the school where Stöckl was educated, became a cardinal in 1855, and worked with

³³ Lakner notes that Kleutgen worked on "Aeterni Patris." He refers to Hertkens 1910, 90, and to Sachs 1912, 2: 411 (Lakner 1933, 199; McCool 1989, 228). The only difficulty with accepting this judgment is that no one claims to have seen Kleutgen's draft.

Kleutgen on the Index.³⁴ The other translator was Kleutgen's fellow Jesuit, Carlo Maria Curci, the main editor of the *Civiltà Cattolica*. Since Leo had called Kleutgen to Rome in 1878 he was clearly also a supporter of his work. When Kleutgen died in 1883, Leo called him "the prince of the philosophers" (Toohey 1910, 8: 667). Perhaps he had been Leo's co-author.

Until recently the hope existed that we could find out who wrote "Aeterni Patris," once the archives of Leo XIII were opened to scholars. This hope consisted in the possibility that the original drafts of "Aeterni Patris" were in the archive. For example, Leonard Boyle, while still a professor at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto and before becoming prefect of the Vatican library, gave a paper at a conference commemorating the centenary of "Aeterni Patris" at the University of St. Thomas in Houston. Boyle concluded his talk by calling for a young scholar, perhaps a student from the University of St. Thomas, to search the newly opened archives of Leo XIII in order to determine the identity of the author(s) of "Aeterni Patris" (Boyle 1981a, 21). Since the time of Boyle's call, Monsignor Piolanti has revealed that, with the permission of Pope Paul VI, he did just that in 1974. He examined the archive and concluded that there are no documents that could lead us to the person who wrote "Aeterni Patris."³⁵

While we do not know whether Kleutgen composed a draft of "Aeterni Patris," there is no reason to doubt the tradition that he did; and, besides, we do know that Leo talked to him about the encyclical before its publication. Kleutgen states that this was the case in a letter he wrote to his former teacher Schlüter:

You know what goal it is for which I have worked all my life. Is it not that which has recently been promoted so strongly by the encyclical "Aeterni Patris?" The tendency and principle of all my writings have received a confirmation through the words of the representative of Jesus Christ on earth that I could not have hoped for. I had been in Rome for hardly a few weeks when the Holy Father had me called and elaborated for almost an hour about the encyclical, which he intended to issue. For me it seemed like a miracle to hear my own thoughts from such a source (this was before my illness during which the encyclical was published). God the Lord be praised, who did not

³⁴ Deufel 1976, 259-260, note 88.

³⁵ Aubert quotes Piolanti in Aubert 1988, 316, note 32. Piolanti's assertion appears originally in Piolanti 1985, 170, note 25.

allow for me to expend time, effort and energy on anything but the truth. Now however, Catholic research, or rather the research of the Catholics, will be directed back into the right and off the wrong tracks, where it was allowed to be driven by the heretics.³⁶

Kleutgen is delighted to have listened to Leo talk about the encyclical before its publication. Recognizing the secrecy expected if he was asked to write a draft, he could not admit that he had. And if he did write a draft of this encyclical, there is no miracle in his hearing his own words from the Pope. But whether or not Kleutgen did write a draft, what is important, however, is that he thought he was receiving from Leo the highest level of confirmation for his life-long project.

Leo's encyclical has three points in common with the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy. Leo labels Aquinas the chief of the Scholastic doctors who towers over the other Scholastics on account of his harmonization of reason and revelation. He states that Aquinas's achievement fulfills those of his predecessors: the philosophy of Aquinas is the fulfillment of medieval philosophy.³⁷ And Leo notes that modern philosophy has sprung up in opposition to Scholastic philosophy and led to philosophical doubt. His suggestion is that we can avoid the skepticism of modern philosophy if we return to the philosophy of the pre-Enlightenment era.

According to Leo, there are two problems with modern philosophy. One is that modern philosophy is founded on the subjective authority of individual professors.³⁸ If a particular philosophy depends on the authority of only one professor, there are only weak grounds for its acceptance. Leo's point is that a single author does not provide a firm foundation for philosophy. Since different professors can hold different philosophies, the authority of a single

³⁶ Kleutgen to Schlüter dated 10-19-1879 (Deufel 1976, 383-384).

³⁷ Paragraph numbers allow reference to either the Latin or the English editions of "Aeterni Patris." Page numbers refer to Gilson's English edition. For Leo's view of Aquinas as the chief of the Scholastic doctors, see Leo XIII 1879, par. 17, p. 43. For his view of Aquinas as establishing the rights of both reason and revelation, see Leo XIII 1879, par. 18, p. 44. For Leo's view that Aquinas works out a most perfect accord between reason and revelation based on the work of the fathers and doctors of the church, see Leo XIII 1879, par. 17, p. 43; par. 27, p. 48.

³⁸ Leo XIII 1879, par. 24, pp. 46-47.

philosopher is no reason to praise one philosophy over another. He argues further that just as a philosophy built on a shifting base does not stand for long, a society built on a shifting philosophical base lacks a proper foundation. If we are to have a suitable society, a firm philosophical foundation is required, one crafted by many philosophers over a number of years. Only then will the proper order for society be attained.

The other problem with modern philosophy is that it has moved away from theology. Leo fears that when we respect reason but not revelation, we live in a world where the state can claim to act rightly against the interests of the church. Since action against the church is action that is incorrectly ordered, it can only appear rational if we have false views of reason, law, and liberty. Aquinas is helpful because he offers an accurate picture of liberty in contrast to this false picture of the moderns:

For the teachings of Thomas on the true meaning of liberty, which at this time is running into license, on the divine origin of all authority, on laws and their force, on the paternal and just rule of princes, on obedience to the higher powers, on mutual charity one towards another—on all of these and kindred subjects—have very great and invincible force to overturn those principles of the new order [modern philosophy] which are well known to be dangerous to the peaceful order of things and to public safety. (Leo XIII 1879, par. 29, pp. 48-49)

When we use reason rightly, we will see that the modern ideals of freedom militate against the common good of society. Aquinas offers a true account of freedom and law based on the divine authority of altar and throne.

Leo's program for achieving stability in church and state included that Scholastic philosophy be taught in Catholic schools.³⁹ Although the Popes were no longer rulers of secular states, they could still set in motion an intellectual movement that would promote the traditional institutions. "Aeterni Patris" is Leo's clarion-call for a return to the study of medieval philosophy in order to oppose the contemporary philosophical errors that undermine the rightful authority of church and state.

In Paris, Hauréau heard Leo's call for the renewal of research into the history of medieval philosophy. He makes a note of the

³⁹ Leo XIII 1879, par. 31, p. 50.

futility of this type of research in the second volume of the second edition of his text on Scholastic philosophy published in 1880. Hauréau states on the very last page of his treatment of Aquinas that a new interest in the philosophy of Aquinas has emerged at the instigation of the Pope, an indirect reference to “Aeterni Patris” (Hauréau 1872-1880, 2: 462). He criticizes this particular use of medieval philosophy because it infringes on the very freedom of philosophy. Hauréau’s point is that by confining philosophy to the strictures of religious dogma, Leo heralds the death of philosophy. The sole work that Hauréau cites as an example of this reactive type of philosophy, a work he notes, that has met with some measure of success, is the 1867 French translation of Kleutgen’s *Philosophie der Vorzeit*. Interestingly enough, however, Hauréau fails to note the merit of an interpretation of medieval philosophy that will shortly overshadow his own Enlightenment-paradigm.

Leo’s labors on behalf of the study of medieval philosophy called forth great support for the propagation of the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy: critical editions of medieval works, academic associations, journals, and chairs in the history of medieval philosophy. Giovanni Cornoldi (1822-1892) was brought to Rome in 1880 to help establish the “Accademia Romana di San Tommaso” for the study of Aquinas, to teach at the Gregoriana university, and to be editor of the *Civiltà Cattolica*.⁴⁰ Leo appointed his brother Giuseppe Pecci and Tommaso Maria Zigliara (1833-1893) as the first presidents of the new academy. Salvatore Talamo was named the first secretary. Thirty consultants were chosen, including Kleutgen, Stöckl, and Morgott (Schmidinger 1988b, 123).

Leo directed Cardinals Antonino de Luca, Giovanni Simeoni (1816-1892), and Zigliara to prepare a critical edition of the works of Aquinas in 1880. A group of French Dominicans had begun a similar project in 1869, which they abandoned after disputes as to the nature of the project (Contenson 1974, 339-353). The Leonine Commission, named after Leo, carried on where the French Dominicans had left off, developing a methodology and preparing critical editions.⁴¹ The first volume of this edition was published in 1884, and the edition continues into the present.

⁴⁰ Köhler 1981c, 310; Schmidinger 1988b, 122-123.

⁴¹ The Leonine edition of the works of Aquinas continued the efforts of the French Dominicans P. A. Uccelli, and J. Dallet, begun in 1869 (Contenson 1974: 354-368).

One of the young Dominicans who worked on the edition in its early years was Henrich Denifle (1844-1905). Together with Franz Ehrle (1845-1934), a Jesuit whose first important work was a commentary on "Aeterni Patris," he published critical editions of medieval texts in the seven-volume *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, from 1885 to 1900 (Knowles 1969). Denifle and Ehrle also trained a young scholar from Eichsätt by the name of Martin Grabmann in their precise method of researching original manuscripts. Grabmann would become the most exacting scholar of medieval thought in the first half of the twentieth century (Ott 1949a; 1949b).

Interest in the philosophy and theology of Aquinas was becoming a key to academic success. Some faculty members at the Catholic universities in Rome who would not teach according to the mind of Aquinas were transferred elsewhere. For example, Domenico Palmieri, who taught dogmatics at the Gregoriana university, was critical of Aquinas's hylomorphic theory of matter and form (Köhler 1981c, 311). He was moved to Maastricht in 1879, where he taught scriptural exegesis, a field where interpretations of matter and form would have little consequence.

Scholars and admirers of Aquinas, by contrast, were awarded chairs in philosophy and theology: Camillo Mazzella (1833-1900) was given a chair at the Gregoriana in 1878 and raised to the cardinalate in 1886, S. Schiffini (1849-1906) obtained a post in philosophy at the Gregorian in 1881, and Louis Billot (1846-1931) began teaching theology at the Gregoriana in 1885.⁴² Valentino Casajoana (1828-1889), José Juan Urráburu (1844-1904), and Michele de Maria (1836-1913) obtained posts at the Gregoriana and Leo appointed his former student, Francesco Satolli, to a chair in dogmatics at the Pontifical Urban College.

The Jesuits of Maria Laach and German Neo-Scholasticism

The German Jesuits would answer Leo's call, and help advance the cause of Scholastic philosophy in Germany. They had established their training center in 1863 at the old Benedictine abbey of Maria Laach in the Rhineland and published tracts in defense of Pius's

⁴² Schmidinger 1988b, 122; Köhler 1981c, 310-311.

Syllabus of Errors under the title *Stimmen aus Maria Laach* (Herwegen 1910, 658). During the First Vatican Council they also published a series of pamphlets in support of papal infallibility. This series became a regular journal in 1871, bearing the title *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*.

Before the *Kulturkampf*, the Jesuit Tilmann Pesch (1836-1899) taught philosophy at Maria Laach. After the Jesuits were forced to leave Germany in 1872, Pesch moved to Holland, from where, on a number of occasions, he illegally entered Germany in order to promote Catholicism, trips that repeatedly led to his arrest (Drum 1911, 740). In 1875, fifteen years after the publication of the first volume of Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit*, and four years before the publication of "Aeterni Patris," Pesch published a favorable review of Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* in the *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*. It accompanies a two-part monograph in which Pesch argues afresh for the philosophical value of Kleutgen's project. In the first part of the monograph, which bears the title "Die Philosophie der Zukunft," Pesch claims that the philosophy of the future is the philosophy with a past. He maintains that the philosophy of the *Vorzeit* offers principles upon which we can construct a sound philosophy and society that will satisfy the needs of the future. In providing us with a theory of knowledge based on medieval realism, the medieval Scholastics point the way to solving a number of philosophical problems. They provide the epistemological key to opposing modern skeptical doubt with its origins in medieval nominalism, as well as to the errors of modern pantheism arising out of medieval formalism (Pesch 1975b, 155). In praising medieval realism over nominalism and formalism, Pesch of course propagates central tenets of the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy.

While there were no institutions in Germany where Jesuits could lecture legally after 1872, members of the Society of Jesus were able to disseminate their views through the profit-bearing courtesy of the Herder press. For example, Pesch and other Jesuits, circumvented the *Kulturkampf* laws through the pages of the *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*. Pesch also arranged with the Herder press to publish a new philosophical series written entirely by German Jesuits and based on the principles of Kleutgen's *Vorzeit*. This new series was given the name *Philosophia Lacensis*, in honor of the exiled Jesuit community

of Maria Laach.⁴³ The first volume was Pesch's *Institutiones Philosophiae Naturalis*, published in 1880. In the preface to this volume, Pesch notes the philosophical importance of Leo's "Aeterni Patris." He quotes sections of the encyclical, including Leo's praise for Aquinas as the chief of the Scholastic doctors, and highlights one work written in the nineteenth century that successfully clarifies the philosophy of Aquinas, namely, Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* (Pesch 1880, xii).

The ten volumes of the Maria Laach series (seven by Pesch himself), published between 1880 and 1900, offer one of the most exacting and detailed presentations of Neo-Scholastic philosophy written in the late nineteenth century.⁴⁴ Neo-Scholastic solutions are given to contemporary philosophical problems. Since the books were written in Latin, unlike the major works of Kleutgen and Stöckl, they could be used at the Jesuit Xavier College in Cincinnati, Ohio, as well as at institutions in Latin America, Asia, and Europe. The Latin language gave the German Jesuits a more international appeal, and there was, of course, a special delight in having an entire Herder philosophical series written by members of an order in exile.

Journals, Societies, and Universities

Neo-Scholastic journals founded in the wake of "Aeterni Patris" include *Divus Thomas*, published at Piacenza, Italy from 1880, the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie*, published at Freiburg from 1887, the *Revue thomiste*, edited in Fribourg and published in Paris from 1893, the *Revue néo-scholastique de Philosophie*, published at Louvain from 1894, *Etudes Franciscaines* at Paris from 1899, and *La Ciencia Tomista*, published in Madrid from 1908.⁴⁵

⁴³ Some critics viewed Pesch through the eyes of Hegel as involved in a Jesuit scholarly plot to root society in a stationary past as if human and social development does not occur. See Hoensbroech 1926, 1: 703-704.

⁴⁴ See Pesch 1880, 1888-1890, and 1896-1898; Meyer 1885-1900; Hohtheim 1893. In 1893 the Maria Laach Jesuits began publishing a less demanding series of philosophical textbooks for ordinary classroom use known as the *Cursus Philosophicus* (Walter 1988, 187).

⁴⁵ For a list of Neo-Scholastic journals published during the last part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth, see Grabmann 1933, 13-14. Ernst Commer (1847-1928), who had been educated at Eichstätt, was one of the

Catholic academic societies began to support the study of medieval philosophy. The Görres Society was formed as a scientific association in Germany during the *Kulturkampf* in 1876 by Johann Baptist Heinrich (1816-1891), Georg Freiherr von Hertling (1843-1919), and Paul Haffner (1829-1899).⁴⁶ The philosophical section of this Society began publication of a philosophical journal, *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, in 1888, under the editorship of Constantin Gutberlet (1837-1928) and the ubiquitous Josef Pohle (1852-1921). Gutberlet states the aim of this journal in the first paragraph of his programmatic piece entitled "Die Aufgabe der christlichen Philosophie in der Gegenwart." He echoes Kleutgen's view of the opposition between the medieval and modern world when he argues that Christians are in a life and death battle with those opposed to Christianity. Gutberlet resorts to the use of military metaphors in order to state that the philosophy of the Middle Ages is more than a match for modern philosophy. He claims that the ballistics of the Middle Ages are fully capable of matching the modern artillery of the anti-Christians (Gutberlet 1888, 1). Readers are informed that the expressed purpose of the *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* will be to take up and improve the range of medieval weapons in order to present an account of science that is empirical and does not conflict with Christian faith.

In his "Aeterni Patris," Leo called upon new universities to promote the study of Aquinas. By a special arrangement with the Master General of the Dominican order, he entrusted the theology faculty of the newly created University of Fribourg to the Dominican order in 1890. Leo expected the Dominicans to teach according to the principles of their brother Thomas (Kirsch 1909, 302). They began publishing a number of important medieval studies and texts in the pages of the *Revue thomiste*, including Dominicus

editors of the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie* (Walter 1988, 179). The letters he exchanged with the theologian Michael Glossner reveal the byzantine politics of German Neo-Scholasticism from 1886 to 1908. For example, note their differences with the Görres Society and the Herder Press (Buschkühl 1992, 9, 31, 44).

⁴⁶ Heinrich was an editor of the Mainz journal *Katholik*. Kleutgen and Stöckl had published articles in *Katholik* during the 1850s and 1860s. For a list of the articles Kleutgen wrote for the journal, see Deufel 1976, 489-491. I know of no list of Stöckl's articles. Haffner was the president of the philosophical section of the Görres Society until he became bishop of Mainz in 1886 (Walter 1988, 182-184).

Prümmer's edition of the early medieval biographies of Aquinas.⁴⁷ The authors of these works were often aware that they were responding in their scholarship to Leo XIII. For example, Prümmer notes in the introduction to his edition of the early biographies that this is the type of historical labor called for by the pope.⁴⁸

Another fledgling university to appear during the late nineteenth century under the shadow of Leo's encyclical was the Catholic University of America in Washington. The bishops of the United States chose to found a Catholic university under the rectorship of bishop John J. Keane. Leo XIII agreed that it would be a pontifical university, receiving degree-granting authority from Rome. The Vatican approved the constitution in 1889 (Pace 1908, 455). Josef Pohle, the co-founder of the *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, obtained a position in dogmatics at the Catholic University.⁴⁹ He fought to shape the university to oppose the errors of the modern world, but, unable to convince Keane of the importance of his cause, he returned to Germany in 1894 to teach at the Academy at Münster.⁵⁰ He did, however, achieve a victory of sorts. After the removal of Keane as rector by Leo XIII in 1896, Pohle would be held in such esteem by the faculty members of the Catholic University, that he was given the responsibility to write the central article on dogmatic theology for the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, of which they had been placed in charge.

Neo-Scholasticism in the late nineteenth century included more than the study of the work of Aquinas. The six-hundredth anniversary of Bonaventure's death in 1874 provided an impetus for a critical edition of his works. In preparation for this project, P. Bernhardin von Portogruaro (1822-1895), the General of the Franciscan order, appointed P. Fidelis a Fanna (1838-1881) to

⁴⁷ (Gilbert 1988, 420) Prümmer, a member of the Dominican order, was a professor in the theology faculty at Fribourg.

⁴⁸ Prümmer and Laurent 1912-1937, 7.

⁴⁹ Pohle's career gives an indication of the European and North American network of institutions that employed Neo-Scholastics. He studied at the German College in Rome, taught at Leeds in England, beginning in 1882, at Fulda in 1886, at Washington where he taught at the Catholic University in the early 1890s, at Münster in 1894, and at Breslau in 1897 (Hofer and Rahner 1957-1967, "Pohle, Josef").

⁵⁰ (Köhler 1981b, 160; 1981c, 313) Joseph Schroeder, also a German professor of dogmatic theology at Catholic University and Keane's chief opponent among the faculty, would follow Pohle to Münster in 1897 in the wake of Keane's dismissal as rector (Gleason 1995, 9-10).

search for copies of Bonaventure's works throughout the libraries of Europe. The first volume in the Quaracchi edition, named in honor of the location of the Franciscan center for medieval studies, appeared in 1882, one year after Fanna's death (Köck 1988, 390-394). Franciscans at the center would later publish critical editions of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, from 1924 to 1948, and of the *Glossa in Quatuor libros sententiarum* by Alexander of Hales, from 1951 to 1957, and preparations for critical editions of the works of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham would begin in 1927 and the 1930s, respectively.

One of the difficulties in working on Franciscan medieval thinkers was Leo XIII's view that Aquinas was the prince of philosophers. What role should the study of Bonaventure play within this context, let alone the philosophy of Scotus and Ockham? Should we view Bonaventure simply as a precursor to Aquinas? Leo XIII sent a letter to the Franciscan order in 1885, in which he supported the publication of the critical edition of the works of Bonaventure. Leo notes, in this letter, that the works of Bonaventure have a role to play in fighting the errors of the modern world, and suggests a similarity of doctrine between the thought of Bonaventure and that of Aquinas. He calls attention to their friendship as the basis for this and implies that there are no major philosophical differences between the two thinkers (Lampen 1930, 246-247). This letter was printed on the first page of the third volume of the Quaracchi edition of the works of Bonaventure in 1887. Kleutgen's view of a common central Scholastic philosophical tradition had thus found its way into the critical edition of the works of Bonaventure. A number of years would pass before it would be acceptable to note the philosophical differences between the two. Yet, unlike Scotus and Ockham, Bonaventure remained a suitable master in the study of philosophy.

Universities in Germany were not quick to hire Neo-Scholastics. When von Hertling was hired by the University of Munich in 1882, he became the first Neo-Scholastic to gain a post at a German university. Clemens Baeumker (1853-1924) was the second, obtaining a post at the University of Breslau in 1883 (Walter 1988, 175, note 147). Yet, with the deaths of Huber in 1879, Kleutgen in 1883, Michelis in 1886, Wilhelm I in 1888, Döllinger in 1890, Stöckl in 1896, and Bismarck in 1898, an era was ending. By the turn of the

century, the polarization between the Neo-Scholastics teaching at seminaries and those teaching at the universities had weakened.

The twentieth-century medievalist Martin Grabmann is an example of a shift that was occurring in the intellectual climate.⁵¹ At Eichstätt, he was trained by Stöckl, Schneid, and Morgott, began to teach, and wrote the first two volumes of his incomplete and important *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Ott 1949a, v; 1949b, 137). The success of this work brought him an offer of a chair in philosophy at the University of Vienna in 1913. He accepted and held this chair throughout the First World War. In 1918, he moved to the University of Munich to accept a chair in dogmatic theology. He spent the rest of his academic life there, writing on the history of medieval thought, while returning frequently to Eichstätt, his spiritual home.⁵² The product of a seminary, Grabmann is nevertheless reported to have been proud to receive a university chair (Ott 1949a, vi). That a German university would choose to hire a student and teacher of the Eichstätt seminary, and that Grabmann would accept the post indicates the changes that had occurred since the *Kulturkampf*. In moving from seminary to state university, Grabmann represents the general movement in the study of medieval philosophy from ecclesiastical to state institutions that would take place in the twentieth century.

⁵¹ One rough measure of the importance of Grabmann's work is Carlo Giacon's 1943 bibliography of medieval Scholasticism. Giacon devotes three lines in his index to the works of de Wulf, four lines to Gilson, and eight lines to Grabmann (Giacon 1943, 264, 249, 250). Another gauge is the last edition of de Wulf's history of medieval philosophy, published in the 1930s and 1940s. In the index to this work, de Wulf lists 24 references to his own work, 39 to Gilson, and 168 to Grabmann (de Wulf 1934-1947, 3: 274, 276, 277).

⁵² Grabmann demonstrated his regard for the seminary at Eichstätt by leaving to this institution all of his personal papers and materials. He left his scholarly works and correspondence to the theological faculty of the university at Munich which led in 1954 to the founding of the Grabmann Institut. And he left his materials on European manuscripts to the Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek in Munich (Ott and Köstler 1980, vii).

CHAPTER SIX

FROM MAURICE DE WULF TO GENERAL ACADEMIC ACCEPTANCE

In Belgium in the 1870s, conservative Catholics sought the return of the Papal States and criticized the actions taken against Catholics in the German *Kulturkampf*. In response to this agitation, the Belgian electorate voted the moderate Catholic government out of office and elected a liberal government in 1878. This newly elected government took primary education out of the control of the Catholic Church in 1879. In retaliation, the Catholic bishops of Belgium announced that the teachers and parents of students at the newly secularized schools were no longer to receive absolution in the sacrament of confession. The bishops established a private Catholic school system, a gambit that paid off. 580,680 students were attending the free Catholic schools by November of 1880, while only 333,401 were enrolled in the secular schools run “without God” (Köhler 1981a, 108). In response, the Belgium government broke off diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

Leo XIII sent a letter to the bishops of Belgium in 1880, in which he criticized the free-thinking and anti-clerical views prevalent in Belgium. He stated that while such views masqueraded as freedom of thought, they were actually a perversion of freedom that promoted godlessness (Van Riet 1988, 207). Leo argued that the University of Louvain should provide the weapons of a sound philosophy to the young in order to prepare them to oppose liberalism and preserve the traditional institutions of society.

The University of Louvain was no ordinary Catholic university; on the contrary, it was the most comprehensive of its kind in the world, one that included faculties of law, medicine, arts, and sciences. The bishops of Belgium agreed to establish a new center of philosophy at Louvain. As the Pope’s brand of philosophy was obvious from his recent “Aeterni Patris,” they authorized Cardinal Dechamps, the archbishop of Mecheln, to create a chair in Thomistic philosophy. Its first occupant was Désiré Mercier (1851-

1926) appointed in 1882.¹ The creation of this chair was part of an effort that led to a victory for the conservative Catholics at the general election in 1884. They would retain control of Belgium until 1919, when they entered a number of coalition governments with the Liberal and Socialist parties (Köhler 1981a, 108-109).

The conservative control of the Belgian church and state coincided with the flourishing of Mercier and Leo's Louvain project. The number of students who attended Mercier's lectures climbed from 89 in 1882 to 161 in 1887. He was able to institute a licentiate and a Ph.D. program in Thomistic philosophy in 1885 and founded the Philosophical Society of Louvain in 1888 (Van Riet 1988, 232). Mercier was raised by Leo to the ecclesiastical office of prelate in 1886, which took him, and his program, out of the control of the archbishop of Mecheln and placed him under the immediate control of Rome. In 1889, Leo called Mercier to Rome and informed him of his plan to create an institute devoted to the study of Scholastic philosophy. He directed the Vatican secretary of state to transfer 150,000 francs in order to establish two chairs in philosophy (Van Riet 1988, 233). The Belgian bishops supported the foundation of this Institut Supérieur de philosophie with Mercier as president.

Mercier hired four of his students as professors of philosophy for the new institute: Simon Deploige (1868-1927) in social and political philosophy, Désiré Nys (1859-1927) in the philosophy of science, Armand Thiéry (1868-1955) in philosophical psychology, and Maurice de Wulf (1867-1947) in the history of medieval philosophy (Van Riet 1988, 238-239). As Mercier and his fellow professors would need a research outlet, they founded the journal *Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie* in 1894. Classes would begin at the institute the same year.

Through the appointment of de Wulf to the first university chair in the history of medieval philosophy, Mercier professionalized this study. De Wulf began to publish major works, including both his dissertation on the Belgian thinker, Henry of Ghent, *Études sur Henri de Gand* in 1894, as well as a history of Belgian philosophy, his *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique dans les Pays-Bas* in 1895, and the series *Les Philosophes Belges* which commenced in 1901. What is inter-

¹ Mercier would himself become the archbishop of Mecheln in 1906 and a cardinal in 1907 (Van Riet 1988, 206-207).

esting about these works is that de Wulf was writing on the philosophy of his native Belgium. The people of Belgium were now able to study Belgian philosophy that happened to be medieval. In offering works on this philosophy, de Wulf was conforming to a Romantic nationalism.

De Wulf would also write a general history of medieval philosophy, a text that would become a standard work throughout the first half of the twentieth-century.² The first edition was published in 1900 in a single volume. By then, Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* was forty years old and Stöckl's history had been in print for thirty-five years. Yet de Wulf praises Stöckl for having written the only history of medieval philosophy in which the philosophical positions of medieval thinkers were correctly presented and cites Kleutgen at a critical point in his discussion of Aquinas's epistemology. My claim is that de Wulf substantially followed the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy and communicated this model to readers throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

The First Edition of de Wulf's History of Medieval Philosophy

De Wulf titled the first edition: *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale précédée d'un Aperçu sur la Philosophie Ancienne*. Along with medieval philosophy, he treats Greek, Roman, Veda, Brahman, Upanishad, Sanskrit, Chinese, and Jewish philosophy. A textbook in the "Cours de Philosophie" series published by Mercier, this history was originally intended to introduce students to the history of philosophy.³ It was not aimed at a scholarly audience.

De Wulf adopts Mercier's textbook style by offering a precis of the philosophical doctrines of individual thinkers and by framing questions, to which he responds. He states the essential doctrine of each author, using the question-and-response style as a teaching device to spur student discussion of the critical problems. De Wulf does not continue Stöckl's practice of clearly laying out the medieval arguments based on specific medieval texts, or of providing a large number of quotations. Claiming that this history is writ-

² Carlo Giacon in his bibliographical guide to medieval philosophy cites de Wulf's work as the best history of medieval philosophy (Giacon 1943, 47).

³ (de Wulf 1900, title page) De Wulf's history was volume six in the series.

ten to serve as a springboard for the discussion of philosophical problems, he supplies detailed bibliographies to guide further study (de Wulf 1900, viii). These features will be retained in each of the following editions as this work is shaped into a standard academic history of medieval philosophy.

The preface to the first edition of de Wulf's history contains a discussion of the previous work in the field. He notes that the history of medieval philosophy is a relatively recent science that has been poorly treated in the eighteenth-century general histories of philosophy. For example, he points out that Brucker devotes little attention to the philosophy of the Middle Ages in his general history of philosophy (de Wulf 1900, v-vi). Yet, Brucker, in fact, devotes 910 quarto pages to medieval philosophy, almost twice as many pages as de Wulf's octavos.⁴ According to de Wulf, Brucker does not give sufficient attention to the medievals because he offers only superficial judgments and jeering epithets. Brucker has failed to understand the issues that de Wulf argues are central to medieval philosophy, including the autonomy of philosophy in the Middle Ages.

De Wulf credits Cousin and his disciples with good philological work on medieval texts. He criticizes them, however, for insufficient knowledge of the medieval milieu (de Wulf 1900, vi). In not understanding the medieval period, Cousin and his followers failed to understand medieval thought.

The two writers that de Wulf singles out for having written the first works devoted solely to the history of medieval philosophy are Stöckl and Hauréau (de Wulf 1900, vi). He discusses Hauréau's *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique*, published in three volumes from 1872 to 1880, and not his shorter work from 1850. Hauréau's history, like that of Cousin, is said to depend on good textual work. Yet the value of Hauréau's history as a whole is belittled, when de Wulf argues that Hauréau failed to penetrate Scholastic terminology and to express the philosophical relations between the different doctrinal points of medieval philosophy.

For de Wulf, Stöckl understood medieval philosophy to a greater degree than Hauréau. This point is interesting since Stöckl worked from printed manuscripts and secondary sources while Hauréau appears to have studied more medieval manuscripts of a philo-

⁴ Brucker begins with the birth of Christ.

sophical nature than anyone else in his day. De Wulf is not criticizing Hauréau for being ignorant of medieval texts, rather for not having the proper understanding of the medieval Scholastics, an understanding that has little to do with philology but more with the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy. He praises Stöckl for having demonstrated a profound knowledge of the ideas of medieval philosophy (de Wulf 1900, vi). I take this to mean that what was understood by Stöckl, not by Hauréau, was the importance of epistemology, metaphysics, natural philosophy and ethics for the Middle Ages. All these are themes, as we shall see, that lie at the center of de Wulf's history. Furthermore, the reason why de Wulf can charge Hauréau with not penetrating the thought of the medievals is that Hauréau does not, like Stöckl, construct his history of Scholastic philosophy around medieval solutions to the problem of reason versus revelation.⁵

Noting the merit of Stöckl's work, de Wulf praises it for its great value in expounding philosophical positions. He does, however, have one critique, that it is dated. Already thirty-five years old at the time, Stöckl's history reflects neither the current knowledge of the medieval period nor contemporary methods of documentation. De Wulf hopes to supply both in an up-to-date history of medieval philosophy (de Wulf 1900, vi).

De Wulf does not mention Kleutgen in his discussion of the historiography of medieval philosophy, yet his influence is evident in the work. For example, when de Wulf discusses Aquinas's solution to the problem of knowledge, he praises Kleutgen as one of the better authors on Scholasticism (de Wulf 1900, 279). Furthermore, he cites Kleutgen's three principles of Aquinas's theory of knowledge, the same quoted by Stöckl. De Wulf must have considered these principles to be particularly apt, quoting them in preference to the work of Mercier, who had written and lectured widely on Aquinas's theory of knowledge. In fact, epistemology was one of Mercier's particular areas of specialization. For example, de Wulf would himself refer to Mercier in his *Introduction à la Philosophie Néo-scholastique*, published in 1904, as the creator of this department of Scholastic

⁵ De Wulf also discusses the general histories of philosophy by Erdmann and Überweg, praising Erdmann's summary of medieval texts and noting the Überweg volume, as reedited by Heinze, for its account of the principles of medieval philosophy (de Wulf 1900, vii).

philosophy.⁶ Furthermore, Mercier had taught de Wulf Scholastic philosophy at Louvain, given him his chair in the history of medieval philosophy, and published his work. Yet it is to Kleutgen that de Wulf turns in his account of Aquinas's theory of knowledge.

De Wulf provides a further indication of his high opinion of Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* in his *Introduction à la Philosophie Néo-scholastique*. In order to oppose the view that medieval philosophy should be discussed only in the Latin language, de Wulf praises Kleutgen's work. He states that Kleutgen's is superior to many of the works on Scholastic philosophy written in Latin, because of the excellent manner in which the author states the tenets of Scholastic philosophy, a judgment that de Wulf notes has been attested to by others (de Wulf 1904, 229). He cites the German, French and Italian editions of this text in order to claim that one language is as good as another for expressing human thought. His point is that the accuracy of these translations proves that Scholastic ideas can be discussed in modern languages with the same degree of precision and clarity. Furthermore, if an individual is able to express Scholastic philosophy in his or her native tongue, then he or she is in a better position to apply Scholastic principles to current problems than when translating from the Latin. Good living translations of Kleutgen's classic text prove that human knowledge is more than the particular inflections of a dead language. Since natural languages provide equal access to mental concepts, de Wulf concludes that Scholastic philosophy should be studied in one's natural language in order to obtain the good of contemporary society more effectively.

While de Wulf's discussion of the perspicuity of natural language might seem like an exercise in the philosophy of language, there was another issue at stake. Many seminaries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries taught Neo-Scholastic philosophy, and used textbooks written in Latin.⁷ For example, the German Jesuits

⁶ (de Wulf 1904, 299) Kleutgen had also attempted to ground a contemporary theory of knowledge on medieval philosophy in the first volume of his *Philosophie der Vorzeit*.

⁷ Even though Kleutgen had written his major works in the German language, he decided in the 1870s that he should have written in Latin in order to increase his readership. He notes that his works were little read by Germans and rarely reviewed. For example, Kleutgen was informed by his publisher in 1875 that a second edition of his *Philosophie der Vorzeit* was out of the question. Only twenty-four copies had been sold during each of the two previous years, and fifteen copies

published their Laach philosophical series in Latin. Mercier originally wanted to have the lectures at his institute delivered in French, but the Vatican Congregation of Studies altered the institute's statutes, during its second year, in order to require that all courses be taught in Latin, except for those in history and the natural sciences (Van Riet 1988, 236). If Mercier's institute was to prepare students to study at the universities in Rome, where lectures were given in Latin, they had to acquire the necessary skills. Furthermore, it was also held that since Aquinas had written in Latin, his works could best be studied and discussed in that language.

After instruction at Mercier's institute started to be given in Latin, the numbers of non-clerical students began to diminish. Mercier lobbied for a relaxation of the requirement that instruction be given in Latin. In 1898 the new head of the Roman Congregation of Studies, Cardinal Satolli, permitted individual professors to teach in the language of the people. When speaking to a group of Belgian pilgrims in 1900, Leo XIII determined the issue. He announced that henceforth all courses at Mercier's institute could be given in French, but students were to continue to read Aquinas in Latin (Van Riet 1988, 237). Therefore, when de Wulf praises the clarity of Kleutgen's philosophical work, he is not conducting a disinterested inquiry into the philosophical import of language. By arguing for an essentialist view of human knowledge that can be communicated in any natural language, de Wulf is defending the papal-granted right of Mercier's institute to teach in the vernacular.⁸ He is also defending his decision to write his history of medieval philosophy in French.

remained in stock. The projected sales would simply not cover the expense of a second edition. Kleutgen states that he wants nothing more to do with Germany and its overblown spirit. He exhibits jealousy towards the many favorable reviews that the German Neo-Scholastic Scheeben received for each installment (*Heft*) of his German language work on dogmatic theology, calling him "cocky" (*übermütigen*) in a letter to P. Steinhuber, the rector of the Roman College dated June 6, 1875 (Deufel 1976, 344-345). Kleutgen's major work after 1875 will be written in Latin, his *Institutiones theologiae in usum scholarum*, published in 1881.

⁸ In his autobiography, Anthony Kenny notes Frederick Copleston's efforts to circumvent the requirement to lecture in Latin at the Gregoriana in the 1950s. There was a clause that allowed professors to lecture in the language of the students when they all understood one language. Copleston would quote extensively from English texts in order to frustrate the non-English listeners and force them to drop his class. When his class consisted entirely of those who understood English, Copleston would begin lecturing in English (Kenny 1986, 49-50).

The Common Synthesis of Scholastic Philosophy

In the first edition of his history de Wulf argues that Scholastic philosophy, and especially the Latin philosophy of the thirteenth century, is essentially one in fundamental doctrine. According to this view, Aquinas did not present a new philosophy in the thirteenth century, but produced a synthesis of the philosophy of his day in which he made a number of innovations.⁹ De Wulf argues that Aquinas had written the most brilliant works of medieval Scholasticism in reference to the philosophical level of his synthesis of medieval thought (de Wulf 1900, 262). In his section on Scholastic philosophy and the philosophy of Aquinas: "Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la synthèse scolastique," de Wulf introduces his readers to Scholastic philosophy in general as well as to the philosophy of Aquinas (de Wulf 1900, 259-290). He offers a doctrinal summary of the common philosophical currency of the late Middle Ages with Aquinas's contributions set off in italics. No other treatment of the philosophy of Aquinas is given in this edition.

De Wulf explicates his view of the common Scholastic philosophy in his *Introduction à la Philosophie Néo-scholastique* with the claim that while the philosophies of Anselm, Alexander of Hales, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus, and Ockham differ on specific points, a "family resemblance" ("traits de famille") exists between each.¹⁰ This is a remarkable claim when contrasted with Kleutgen, who had discussed Aquinas as the leading representative of philosophical realism in the Middle Ages, the one who synthesized the work of the realists who came before him. But Kleutgen did not state that the realists, formalists, and nominalists fundamentally share a single philosophy. De Wulf makes a stronger claim than Kleutgen, or Leo XIII for that matter, when he asserts that a single philosophy is common to Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham.

Generally speaking, though, de Wulf writes his history within the framework of the Kleutgen-Stöckl model. Like Kleutgen and Stöckl, he argues that philosophy existed in the Middle Ages as a science that operated independently from theology. According to de Wulf, Brucker and Hegel were wrong when they said that philosophy was

⁹(de Wulf 1900, 147, 247, 262) For an account of de Wulf's debate with Pierre Mandonnet over the view that there was a common synthesis of philosophy in the thirteenth century, see Quinn 1973, 17-20.

¹⁰(de Wulf 1904, 66) On this point, see Quinn 1973, 20-21.

bound by religious dogma in this period. They failed to understand that the medievals made a clear distinction between reason and revelation and that for them the use of reason was not threatened by revelation. Furthermore, Hauréau was wrong to hold that the medievals used reason to free themselves from ecclesiastical dogma. In doing so, he failed to appreciate the specific medieval use of philosophy. The medievals did not subvert philosophical reason by placing it under the control of theology. They freely used reason in cooperation with theology. The problem of reason versus revelation was the central intellectual problem for which Augustine constructed one solution in the fourth century that would dominate western thought for nine hundred years and the Scholastics would come up with a yet more philosophical solution in the thirteenth century (Wulf 1900, 155-156). The Scholastics treated philosophy and theology as separate sciences, each with its own principles, method, and formal object. Philosophy had an influence on theology, yet was independent from theology. The reason why the Scholastics did not need to use philosophical reason to free themselves from theology was that theology had placed no restrictions on the use of reason.

Kleutgen and Stöckl had argued that for Aquinas reason cannot contradict revelation because God guarantees both revelation and human knowledge. In reference to the Scholastics, de Wulf makes this same point by distinguishing between the distinct methods, sets of principles, and objects of philosophy and theology. Since both reason and revelation yield truths according to their own methodologies, they yield truths that are separate and distinct (de Wulf 1900, 262-264). As each one is true, and since only what is false can contradict what is true, reason cannot contradict revelation.

De Wulf argues that Aquinas offers a more exacting account of human reason and a more comprehensive account of the relation between reason and revelation than his predecessors (Wulf 1900, 263-264). Like Kleutgen and Stöckl, he presents Aquinas as holding that revelation is not irrational. Human beings can know by reason what has been revealed. For example, human beings can know through the use of their natural reason that God exists, is simple, all-knowing, and all good. Since human beings can know by reason some propositions that have been revealed, there is nothing irrational about revelation. Revelation is not against reason, but a different form of truth from reason.

He continues to write within the Kleutgen-Stöckl model when he states that the theory of knowledge worked out by the Scholastics is philosophically important for the twentieth century. He argues that in accounting for the objectivity of knowledge, the Scholastics, and especially Aquinas, provide the definitive solution to the problem of knowledge (de Wulf 1900, 281). In his *Introduction à la Philosophie Néo-scholastique* de Wulf notes the central importance of this achievement to philosophy as a whole when he claims that the objectivity of knowledge is the critical problem of all philosophy (de Wulf 1904, 298). Therefore, when stating that Aquinas provided a definitive solution to the problem of knowledge, he implies that Aquinas has constructed a sound epistemology suitable for the modern world. In order to locate a first rate theory of human knowledge, we need only turn back to Aquinas.

As I have noted, de Wulf quotes Kleutgen's three principles of the Scholastic theory of knowledge in order to explain the general Scholastic view of epistemology. He argues that Aquinas's account is superior to the other medieval theories of knowledge because of the significant role it grants to the natural human powers. In claiming that human beings come to know universals through their natural powers, Aquinas offers a more philosophical view than one that has human knowledge arising from divine illumination (de Wulf 1900, 251, 282-283). He does not wave his hand over the problem of the origin of ideas by positing divine illumination or spiritual phantasms. Rather, he provides a natural account of the activities involved in human knowledge.

According to de Wulf, Aquinas's epistemology has repercussions for his ethical philosophy. Aquinas holds that when people act in favor of human nature, they do the moral good, whereas when they act against their nature, they do what is morally wrong (de Wulf 1900, 286). Since it is the nature of human beings to be rational, the human good is intimately connected with rational activity. The reason why people are able to act virtuously is that they know what is suitable for their nature. In understanding human nature, people can learn to distinguish what is good for their nature from what is not. Because they obtain objective knowledge of the natures of things, they can know whether or not an action supports human nature. In this way, Aquinas's theory of knowledge yields a measure of certitude for the moral life.

Duns Scotus is presented as constructing a philosophy that leads to pantheism. In accounting for only a formal distinction between individual things, he fails to offer an account of the real distinction between individuals. And for de Wulf, a philosophy that fails to make a real distinction between individuals leads logically to the view that everything is one. If everything is one, we have a type of pantheism, even if Scotus did not intend this conclusion (de Wulf 1900, 314, 320, 357). Without a philosophical distinction between individual beings, all is divine.

The entire Scholastic philosophical system is presented as being at stake on the issue of whether or not there are universals. For example, in noting that universals are not real things for Ockham, de Wulf indicates that he represents philosophical decline. Without an essentialist foundation for human knowledge, nominalist philosophy focuses on human subjectivity and leads to the destruction of objective science.¹¹ Furthermore, with no objective science, one can no longer attain with reason what has been revealed. Since there can no longer be propositions common to philosophy and theology, Ockham departs from the medieval reconciliation of reason and revelation (de Wulf 1900, 350).

On this reading, Ockham's philosophy leads to "dangerous consequences" that will result in the depletion of the forces of Scholastic philosophy (de Wulf 1900, 357-358). In order to characterize Ockham's philosophical achievement, de Wulf quotes what he refers to as Stöckl's "blunt" judgment, a judgment he does not contradict (de Wulf 1900, 343). This judgment is that Ockham has constructed a philosophy through the addition of distinction upon distinction that ends up "suffocating in its own grease" (*"étouffer dans sa propre graisse"*).¹² With no objective knowledge of the world or reconciliation of reason and revelation, De Wulf's readers have sufficient grounds to turn back to Aquinas in order to find a sound philosophical foundation.

In regard to Ockham's moral philosophy, de Wulf explains that since there are no universals, there are no natures that human beings can come to know. Without knowledge of the natures of

¹¹ (de Wulf 1900, 342-343, 352-355) De Wulf cites Stöckl when considering whether objective science is an illusion for Ockham (de Wulf 1900, 355, note 1).

¹² Noting that he is using an unparliamentary expression, Stöckl's judgment is " . . . dass die Scholastik in ihrem eigenen Fette zu ersticken drohte" (Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 971).

individual things, Aquinas's theory of the good life collapses (de Wulf 1900, 356). For Kleutgen, Stöckl, and de Wulf one of Aquinas's chief philosophical merits is his grounding of morality in the knowledge that human beings have of the natures of things. He offers a philosophical account of morality that allows for a level of certainty in distinguishing what is good from what is bad. Since Ockham does not ground human understanding in the intelligible natures of things, he presents a threat to this approach.

My aim here has been to show that the general picture given by de Wulf was constructed earlier in the nineteenth century. He continues the Kleutgen-Stöckl model in isolating medieval contributions to the relations between reason and revelation, epistemology, natural philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, morality, and politics.¹³ For example, he argues that Aquinas's philosophy is important on account of his solution to the problem of reason versus revelation, his theory of knowledge, and his moral theory. Aquinas is a great philosopher because he provides solutions to enduring philosophical problems, solutions that have more philosophical merit than those of his predecessors, and of many modern philosophers as well. He marks the high point of medieval thought, while Scotus and Ockham lead to philosophical decline. Scotus, and his followers, lead to pantheism, Ockham, and his followers, undermine the common Scholastic philosophical achievements.

De Wulf's history would prove so popular that it would appear in four ever-expanding editions by 1912, the last edition published before the First World War. By the beginning of this war, de Wulf, Mercier, and the other professors of the institute, had educated a large number of students. Peter Coffey, an Irish student, became a professor of philosophy at Maynooth College in Ireland. He would interpret de Wulf and Mercier to the English speaking world, translating the first edition of de Wulf's *Introduction à la Philosophie Néo-scholastique* into English in 1907 and the second edition of his *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* in 1909. During the First World War Coffey also wrote a preface to the translation of Mercier's manual edition of the six hefty Louvain volumes on Neo-Scholastic philosophy. This preface gives some indication of the sense of philosophical mis-

¹³ Note, for example, his discussion of the relations between the spheres: cosmology, metaphysics, logic, aesthetics, physics, psychology, and morality (de Wulf 1900, 6).

sion imparted by Louvain. With the closure of Louvain due to the war, Coffey stated that continuing this philosophical project was important, since the lack of true philosophy was what has led to the disasters of war:

. . . the tragic fate that befell the University of Louvain when the tide of the present ruthless war swept over the plains of Flanders. . . . The halls where courses of Philosophy were delivered are now the wards of a Red Cross Hospital. . . . The professors of the Institute of Philosophy are scattered, and some are in exile. . . . The illustrious founder of the Institute, and author of most of these pages, is the Prelate who now consoles his stricken people, while his name is held in benediction in every corner of Christendom. . . . Had the world but hearkened to the truths proclaimed by such as he and embodied in lives like his, had it but held fast to the Christian Philosophy of Life, well—the twentieth century might have dawned without such a baptism of blood. . . . (Mercier 1916-1917, 1: vii)

With Mercier's institute gone and Europe in disarray, the Louvain philosophical project continues in the English-speaking world. False philosophy leads to destruction, and true philosophy supports the common good. It is imperative, therefore, that people continue to search for philosophical truth if they are going to prepare for a better world. The First World War might have been avoided if Europe had only accepted the truth of Scholastic philosophy.

The Fifth Edition of de Wulf's History of Medieval Philosophy

The fifth edition of de Wulf's history of medieval philosophy, published in 1924 and 1925, was significant because it was the last edition in which he would argue so boldly for a single common synthesis of Scholastic philosophy.¹⁴ This is also an important edition for the English speaking world on account of the fact that it was the last edition to be translated in its entirety. Here, de Wulf takes into account the enormous amount of secondary material that had appeared since before the war. In contrast to his earlier editions, de Wulf omits coverage of ancient Greek and Eastern philosophy, and

¹⁴ Ordinarily references to the fifth edition will be made by the section numbers, which apply to both the French and the English editions. Since quotations are taken from the English edition, both English pagination and paragraph numbers are provided.

reduces his coverage of Byzantine, African, Jewish, and Islamic philosophy. The reason he gives for these changes is to devote more space to the philosophy of the Middle Ages (de Wulf 1924-1925, 1: preface). In the process, de Wulf's history has lost the feel of a Louvain textbook for undergraduates and has taken on the appearance of a scholarly work on the history of medieval philosophy.

De Wulf states two principles that have not changed from the first edition. He continues to argue for the formal distinction between philosophy and theology and for a common synthesis of Scholastic philosophy:

The two great principles in the light of which we have since 1900 sought a synthetic interpretation of philosophical facts, seem to us to be more necessary than ever, and they dominate the multitude of facts which erudition is unceasingly accumulating as high peaks do a massive mountain. The first of these principles, namely, that there were in the West in the Middle Ages systems of philosophy distinct from theology, is no longer questioned by anyone who has come into direct contact with mediaeval philosophy. The second, namely, that scholasticism is not the whole of mediaeval philosophy, but the best part of it, that it represents the collective inheritance of the majority of the thinkers of the West, and that it had to encounter fierce opposition throughout the centuries,—this second thesis, while gaining numerous adherents, is still disputed, and we do not intend in this place to undertake to justify it. (de Wulf 1926, 1: v-vi, preface)

De Wulf presents the philosophy of Aquinas and the common synthesis of Scholastic philosophy more clearly here than he did in the first edition. By including a section on the philosophy of Aquinas, he separates his treatment of Aquinas from that of the synthesis (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 269-289). In order to bring out the organic nature of the synthesis, he refers to it as a common patrimony.¹⁵ When de Wulf discusses this, he refers to Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* and laments that Kleutgen is no longer read on the topic of the common patrimony of Scholastic philosophy: "See for instance the excellent work of Kleutgen, too much neglected nowadays. *Die Philosophie der Vorzeit*."¹⁶ He also grants Kleutgen the first place in his bibliography for the common patrimony of Scholastic philoso-

¹⁵ For his discussion of the common patrimony of Scholastic philosophy, see de Wulf 1924-1925, 1: sec. 154-211. He had already come to use this language in 1911 (de Wulf 1911, 185-191). On this point, see Quinn 1973, 20-22.

¹⁶ de Wulf 1926, 1: 269, note 2, sec. 154.

phy (de Wulf 1924-1925, 1: sec. 211). Neither reference appeared in the first edition of his history.

Scholastic philosophers are presented as communitarians who stress the value of intellectual tradition, in contrast to modern philosophers who stress individual genius (de Wulf 1924-1925, 1: sec. 205). Individuals can work out a philosophy which is good for the moment, but it will last only until another new idea appears on the scene. Groups working within a common tradition can devote the decades and centuries necessary to discern the unchanging structures that lie at the base of appearances. On this reading, the Scholastics have continued to add to the philosophical achievements of Plato and Aristotle. Doing philosophy within a tradition has enabled philosophers to arrive at knowledge of unchanging essences and of God. De Wulf identifies Scholastic philosophy as an impersonal search for permanent truth carried out by members of succeeding generations. He draws an analogy between writing philosophy and the construction of medieval cathedrals in order to indicate the communal manner in which real philosophical progress has been achieved. Just as we do not know the names of the majority of the builders of the medieval cathedrals, a similar type of self-effacing effort led to the philosophical excellence of Scholasticism:

The impersonal character of scholasticism, and its progressive and collective constitution explains why the work alone counts, and why the thirteenth century troubled little about the name of the workman. Outside a small number of authorities known by all and quoted (*allegari*) in the schools, little importance was attached to persons, and contemporaries were designated by anonymous appellations (*unus dicit*). Even the style of the scholastics is impersonal, and only exceptionally does it manifest the emotions of the writer. (de Wulf 1926, 1: 318, sec. 205)

In contrast to the careful philosophical construction of the medievals, the individualistic methods of the philosophers of the modern period can only impede the long term goal of scientific objectivity.

Interestingly enough, when discussing human knowledge, de Wulf no longer cites Kleutgen's three principles of the Scholastic theory of knowledge. He does not mention Kleutgen in his account of the common Scholastic view of knowledge or in his treatment of Aquinas's view. When summing up Aquinas's view, he uses the term "intellectualism." The French Jesuit Pierre Rousselot had

brought this term into vogue through his characterization of Aquinas in his *L'intellectualisme de S. Thomas*, published in 1908. With reference to Rousselot, de Wulf uses this term to clarify the central role that reason plays in the thought of Aquinas (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 283).

Yet de Wulf does not refer to one of Rousselot's other major claims. Rousselot argued that there are subjective elements in Aquinas's account of knowledge (Rousselot 1924, 208-222). De Wulf avoids all talk of subjectivity. Placing stress on the impersonality of human knowledge, de Wulf remains solidly within the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 281). He continues to follow Kleutgen and Stöckl in arguing that Aquinas is a realist who preserves objectivity and does not draw attention to the individual human as subject.

De Wulf continues to claim that for Aquinas, the moral good depends on nature. And since the essences of the things that human beings can know are immutable, including human nature, human beings have an immutable guide to moral human action (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 285). One implication of this view is that Europeans in the 1920s can avoid war and revolutionary upheaval by turning back to the Middle Ages.

Aquinas's solution to the problem of reason and revelation is again presented as a major achievement of medieval philosophy, the reason why de Wulf can refer to Aquinas as the "prince of the speculative theologians of the thirteenth century" (de Wulf 1926, 2: 30, sec. 287). De Wulf believes Aquinas deserves this title because he was the first to write a text that clearly distinguishes between reason and revelation.¹⁷ De Wulf claims that Aquinas is original in his way of combining arguments based on reason with those based on revelation, thus representing the high watermark of medieval philosophy. The importance of this reconciliation is not only historical, de Wulf points out that Aquinas's solution has yet to be superseded (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 287). Aquinas is one of the great philosophers of every age because his account of the relation between reason and revelation has yet to be improved upon.

The account of Scotus's philosophy differs substantially from the presentation in the first edition. De Wulf no longer argues the Kleutgen-Stöckl line, namely that Scotus's philosophy leads away

¹⁷ Reference is made to the first question of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.

from realism and to pantheism. Instead of proposing that Scotus's formalism militates against having an account of real individuals, de Wulf now suggests the opposite. He claims that Scotus offers an account of individuation and grants actual individuals a central role in his philosophy (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 313). Like Aquinas, Scotus is a realist. No longer is it accurate to say that Scotus fails to distinguish between individuals and on these grounds leads logically to pantheism.

De Wulf names the writer who has brought about this revisionist reading of Scotus. He states that P. Parthenius Mingès (1861-1926), a member of the Franciscan order, prefect of the Collegio San Bonaventura at Quaracchi, and a key participant in the study and publication of the works of medieval Franciscans, has set in process the reevaluation of Scotus's work.¹⁸ For example, Mingès challenges the prevailing view of Scotus in his article "Scotismus und Pantheismus," published in 1918, refuting the "Neo-Thomist" charge that Scotus was a pantheist. He argues instead that Scotus does not imply that God and nature are one (Mingès 1918, 228-229). According to Mingès, Scotus philosophizes about a world inhabited by concrete individuals. The interpretations that Scotus fails to offer a philosophical account of individuals, and that his philosophy leads to pantheism, are wrong.¹⁹

While his treatment of Scotus was undergoing revision, de Wulf continued to view William of Ockham as the black sheep of medieval Scholasticism. He explains that since for Ockham people fabricate concepts that do not correspond to real objects, Ockham heralds the collapse of philosophical intelligibility (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 371). Ockham's criticism of the traditional Scholastic account of knowledge leads to a break between the knower and the known, which undermines the possibility of any objective science about a real physical world. This leads the way to a philosophical agnosticism in which the concepts of law, cause, and end are only mental constructions that do not inform one about the real world.

¹⁸ (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 313, sec. 320) The philosophical textbook written according to the mind of the Subtle Doctor by F. Cherubini indicates Scotus's renewed importance in the Franciscan order. Taking into account the canonical status attained by Aquinas and Bonaventure, Cherubini informs his readers that he will neither neglect them nor Alexander of Hales (Cherubini 1904-1905, 1: 5).

¹⁹ Mingès defends the philosophy of Scotus against the Thomists in the two articles he wrote for the *Catholic Encyclopedia* (Mingès 1909; 1912).

In failing to account for the human understanding of the nature of things, Ockham is unable to offer a philosophically intelligible account of moral action. He does not base his ethics on a view of human nature but on divine command (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 374). Furthermore in doubting longstanding philosophical truths, Ockham is thought to prepare the way for religious skepticism. He departs from Aquinas's reconciliation between reason and revelation and opens the door to the dissolution of medieval philosophy (de Wulf 1924-1925, 2: sec. 375).

In his fifth edition de Wulf continues to follow the Kleutgen-Stöckl model. In discussing the medieval contributions to the various spheres of philosophical inquiry, he interprets the medievals according to these standard areas. While he has changed his interpretation of Scotus, he continues to rank Aquinas as the significant medieval philosopher and Ockham as representing philosophical decline on a slippery slope that leads to the modern philosophical preoccupation with subjectivity.

The Sixth Edition of de Wulf's History of Medieval Philosophy

The formal structure of the sixth edition represents a change from the earlier editions. In his first edition de Wulf treated the common patrimony of Scholastic philosophy concurrent with his treatment of the philosophy of Aquinas. In the fifth he discusses the common patrimony before discussing the philosophy of individuals. The problem is that it is unclear how he arrives at his interpretation of the common patrimony. He adopts a more inductive approach in the sixth edition by first discussing the individual thinkers of a specific century, and then presenting the philosophical points they hold in common. For example, in regard to the philosophy of the thirteenth century, de Wulf discusses separately the philosophy of Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert, Thomas Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant, before considering the philosophical essence of Augustinianism, Latin Averroism, Thomism, Neoplatonism, and the common patrimony.²⁰ Only after offering an account of the philosophy of individual thinkers, does he characterize the philosophical doctrines common to the period. After studying the individuals,

²⁰ de Wulf 1934-1947, 2: 62-351, 352-382, respectively.

the reader is in a better position to evaluate their common philosophical features.

De Wulf remains true to the Kleutgen-Stöckl model. He interprets the medievals according to the standard branches of philosophy and the relation between reason and revelation. For example, Aquinas is praised for his view of knowledge, his view of the relation between reason and revelation, and his moral intelligibility.²¹ He remains the philosophical mean of the Middle Ages, the touchstone by which de Wulf judges other philosophical accomplishments. And Ockham continues to be the harbinger of philosophical decline in the areas of epistemology, morality, and the reconciliation of faith and reason.²²

While readers of the sixth edition continue to detect the Kleutgen-Stöckl model, they do not find the names of Kleutgen and Stöckl mentioned in the same light, or as often, as in the earlier editions. Kleutgen is mentioned once, Stöckl six times.²³ De Wulf refers to Kleutgen in a footnote when discussing Augustine's view of divine ideas, noting that Kleutgen provides a superior commentary on Augustine in his *Philosophie der Vorzeit*. He adds, ironically, that Kleutgen's work does not deserve the comparative oblivion into which it has fallen, an oblivion to which de Wulf himself contributes (de Wulf 1934-1947, 1: 92). For example, when he discusses the common patrimony of the philosophy of the thirteenth century, he

²¹ On de Wulf's praise of Aquinas as a realist in contrast to the Augustinian reliance on divine illumination, see de Wulf 1934-1947, 2: 167. For his view that Aquinas sets the limits of human knowledge, see de Wulf 1934-1947, 2: 169. For his presentation of Aquinas's view of human knowledge as the abstraction of universals from external realities, see de Wulf 1934-1947, 2: 169-170. Again de Wulf calls Aquinas the prince of the theologians of the thirteenth century for working out his account of the relation between philosophy and theology (de Wulf 1934-1947, 2: 177-178). And he praises Aquinas for working out a moral role for human beings in understanding the intelligible natural law (de Wulf 1934-1947, 2: 172-174).

²² De Wulf continues to argue that for Ockham we cannot know real things, but only universal terms themselves. On this reading, Ockham is agnostic about the scientific view of Aquinas that people can know real things (de Wulf 1934-1947, 3: 38). For de Wulf's assertion that Ockham separates philosophy from theology so sharply that there is no longer any harmony between reason and revelation, see de Wulf 1934-1947, 3: 45-46. For his interpretation of Ockham as basing morality on the autocratic decrees of God, and no longer on intelligible natures, see de Wulf 1934-1947, 3: 42. Furthermore, de Wulf states that Ockham is the first to shake the entire edifice of Scholastic thought and leads to the divorce between philosophy and theology attained in modern philosophy, i.e. the view that philosophers can ignore revelation (de Wulf 1934-1947, 3: 47-48).

²³ See de Wulf 1934-1947, 1: 12, 40, 167, 213, 227; 3: 45.

no longer refers to Kleutgen as he had in his fifth edition.²⁴ If Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* is undeserving of neglect, then de Wulf's omission here only adds to this neglect.²⁵

The influence that Stöckl had on de Wulf's interpretation of medieval philosophy is also less apparent from the sixth edition. While de Wulf continues to name Stöckl's history in his list of general histories of medieval philosophy, he includes so many other histories that no explicit clue is provided to the significance of Stöckl's influence in particular. He only notes that Stöckl's work "still has doctrinal value."²⁶ And while he continues to refer to Stöckl's history when discussing Ockham's view of the relation of theology to philosophy, he omits reference to Stöckl in the bibliography to this section (de Wulf 1934-1947, 3: 45, 49-51). Little overt evidence remains of the influence that Kleutgen and Stöckl had on de Wulf's writing of this history. By the 1930s and 40s, when de Wulf published his sixth edition, Kleutgen's work had fallen into oblivion, and Stöckl's history was not far behind.²⁷ Yet as we shall see, historians would continue to write histories according to their model.

Towards General Academic Acceptance

When Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit* was published in the early 1860s there was little, if any, response from non-Catholics. Hauréau was one of the few to note Kleutgen's work, and for him it represented a dangerous turn in the historiography of medieval philosophy. Stöckl also received little non-Catholic response. When

²⁴ When discussing the common patrimony of the thirteenth century, de Wulf refers to the works of Baeumker, Geyer, and Grabmann (de Wulf 1934-1947, 2: 383).

²⁵ This represents a shift from J. M. Heald's statement early in the century that Kleutgen provides the "fullest account" of the philosophy of Aquinas (Heald 1908, 1: 658).

²⁶ The quotation is taken from the Messenger translation of the sixth edition (de Wulf 1935-1938, 1: 32, sec. 20).

²⁷ I do not wish to imply that Stöckl is no longer read. He continues to be of interest in German circles as evidenced by the reprinting of his history by the Scientia Verlag in 1968 and the reference to this history in the bibliography to the article on scholasticism by Oswald Schwemmer in the *Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie* published in 1995. Stöckl's history is included there together with the classic histories of the twentieth century, with no mention of the histories of Brucker, Hegel, Ritter, and Hauréau.

Erdmann lists his history in the bibliography to medieval philosophy in the second edition of his history of philosophy, he repeats the charge by Huber that Stöckl depended a great deal on the work of Kaulich (Erdmann 1869-1870, 1: 237). Erdmann fails to note Stöckl's way of reading medieval philosophy. Yet, after the turn of the century, the Kleutgen-Stöckl model would come to play a significant role in the larger academic community.

Matthias Baumgartner was the first Neo-Scholastic invited to write the volume on medieval philosophy for the standard Überweg history of philosophy. He had written the article on John Scotus Erigena for Wetzer and Welt's *Kirchenlexikon*, published in 1897. By following Kleutgen and Stöckl in bluntly identifying Erigena as a pantheist, this article gives an indication of his philosophical direction (Baumgartner 1897, 2140). Labeling Erigena thus in a Neo-Scholastic reference work conveyed the message that readers should avoid this philosophy.²⁸

Baumgartner's major project in medieval scholarship was the tenth edition of the medieval volume of the Überweg history of philosophy, which he published in 1915.²⁹ On account of illness Baumgartner invited Bernhard Geyer, a fellow teacher at the university at Breslau, to edit the eleventh edition of the medieval volume of the Überweg in the summer of 1924 (Geyer 1928, vii). Geyer accepted and became the second Neo-Scholastic editor of a volume in the Überweg, which was published in 1928. This is an important edition because it was the last medieval volume of the Überweg to be published, and one that would be influential in the twentieth century.³⁰

An article Geyer published in the *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* in 1924, titled "Zur Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin über die Mitwirkung Gottes zur Tätigkeit der Geschöpfe," gives some idea of the Neo-Scholastic world in which he traveled (Geyer 1924). This article was published in a special issue dedicated to the editor C. Gutberlet upon his retirement alongside articles by the Neo-Scholastics Martin Grabmann and Joseph Koch, as well as a review of Max Scheler's

²⁸ In his history Erdmann takes issue with this interpretation (Erdmann 1896, 1: 272-273).

²⁹ Baumgartner 1915; Kluxen 1988, 372.

³⁰ For example, Josef Pieper would note in his *Scholasticism* that Geyer's work is indispensable and Julius Weinberg acknowledges his dependence on the work in his *A Short History of Medieval Philosophy* (Pieper 1960, 165; Weinberg 1964, vii).

Phänomenologie der Religion by Gutberlet himself. The two-page tribute that opens this issue summarizes the philosophical project in which these scholars had participated (Editors 1924, 309-310). The claim is made that the *Jahrbuch* had managed to combat the onslaught of modern science since its founding, a comment reminiscent of the aim set out in Gutberlet's original programmatic piece. Gutberlet's *Jahrbuch* is said to have achieved a harmony between Scholastic thought and modern science based on a foundation of Christian philosophy: science no longer needed to stand apart from God. Since each of the three articles in the tribute are devoted to Aquinas, it is clear that Aquinas played a special role in this project.

His theoretical concern is the relation between God and creatures in creaturely activity, and especially human activity, a central issue for the relation between science and theology. Geyer argues that according to Aquinas, God continuously generates all creatures. Therefore the properties and activities we study in physics, astronomy, and ethics are the properties and activities which God continues to hold in existence. At every moment God grants autonomy to individual created beings (Geyer 1924, 348, 358). Accordingly, Aquinas offers a view in which God's role in generating is balanced with the autonomous properties and natures of created beings. The properties of objects can be studied in science and human freedom can be considered in ethics. In each case the properties inherent in the nature of things are treated. But by reflecting on God's role in holding beings in existence, we may consider these same beings from the perspective of theology. Therefore, in his treatment of the relation between God and creaturely activity, Geyer continues the *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* project of reconciling modern science and theology.

Geyer and Baumgartner revised the Überweg history from the perspective of the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy. For example, the eleventh edition of the Überweg no longer continues Überweg's original view that Aquinas was an important medieval thinker on account of his ability to accommodate Aristotle to ecclesiastical doctrine. Geyer argues instead, as Stöckl had done, that Aquinas was formally the great system builder of the Middle Ages, and materially the one who best presents Aristotle to the Latins (Geyer 1928, 419-421). He says nothing

about accommodating the philosophy of Aristotle to religious orthodoxy.

Geyer agrees that medieval thinkers created a synthesis between philosophy and theology (Geyer 1928, 2). There is no talk here of philosophy being hampered by religion. He furthers Kleutgen and Stöckl's view that reason was granted a free rein by the medievals. Geyer argues that Aquinas has most clearly and precisely delineated the boundary between philosophy and theology (Geyer 1928, 430). No other medieval thinker before Aquinas offers a comparable view of this distinction. Aquinas, we are told, worked out this relation in such a way that there can be no contradiction between the two (Geyer 1928, 445). Geyer also informs his readers that this continues to be the ruling doctrine of the Catholic Church (Geyer 1928, 430). Catholic readers are given to understand that Aquinas is the significant philosopher of the medieval world.

Geyer continues to interpret medieval philosophy through the philosophical categories of the problem of reason and revelation, epistemology, metaphysics, natural theology, and ethics. For example, he notes that we must understand Aquinas's epistemology if we are to understand his metaphysics (Geyer 1928, 430). Like Kleutgen, Geyer gives philosophical priority to epistemology. And he explains Aquinas's theory of knowledge by stating what he takes to be the central principle, that cognition is in the cognizer through the mode of cognizing, one of the three principles Kleutgen had used in his summary of Aquinas's epistemology (Geyer 1928, 430). Geyer also argues that because Aquinas holds that human beings receive sensible form by way of their bodily senses and intelligible form through the activity of their intellects, he avoids the pitfalls of materialism and pantheism. He does so by asserting that intellectual knowledge involves more than material impressions — another of Kleutgen's principles — and that since human beings have individual bodies they are not God (Geyer 1928, 430-431).

Geyer claims that Aquinas offers an extraordinarily detailed and brilliant presentation of ethics. On this reading, the good life has to do with the human end, which involves the use of reason. Therefore, the good human life concerns the use of reason in deliberating over available goods (Geyer 1928, 444). Virtue occurs when people use reason to act in accordance with what is good for human nature, and vice when they do not.

When Geyer announces that Ockham lays the groundwork for the destruction of philosophical realism, the budding student of Aquinas can take heed (Geyer 1928, 573). Ockham undermines the Aristotelian epistemological and metaphysical realism of Aquinas (Geyer 1928, 576, 583). Furthermore, since Ockham does not think we can know anything general about the world, he is not able to base his account of the good life on human nature. Instead, he bases his ethics on the will of God. What is good morally, is good only because God has willed it as good (Geyer 1928, 582). In stating that for Ockham the human will is not supposed to submit to reason, Geyer flags a difference between Ockham's command-based ethics and Aquinas's nature-based account.

Ockham is presented as holding that people cannot know any of the articles of Christian belief with certainty but only through the authority of the Bible and ecclesiastical tradition. In this way, Ockham disengages philosophy from theology (Geyer 1928, 580-582). If we follow Ockham, we are no longer able to know by reason a number of propositions believed on faith. Geyer has already noted that the Catholic Church supports Aquinas's synthesis of philosophy and theology. In departing from this medieval synthesis, Ockham is therefore at odds with a solution currently in vogue within the Catholic Church. Furthermore, if philosophy rests on the use of reason, and theology on authority, then a philosophical tenet could contradict a point of theology. The result is the collapse of the medieval synthesis of philosophy and theology so clearly stated by Aquinas.

The Aquinas-centered nature of the history of medieval philosophy is much less evident in Geyer's work than in that of Stöckl and de Wulf, and the Überweg history is a far cry from the *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* of the Görres society. Yet, Geyer does manage to single out the problem of reason and revelation as of central importance in medieval philosophy. He praises Aquinas for having surpassed his predecessors in working out the distinction between philosophy and theology. And he presents Aquinas as providing a detailed theory of knowledge with ramifications for his reconciliation of reason and revelation, metaphysics, and ethics. While not singling out Ockham as representing the decline of medieval philosophy, Geyer implies as much when he shows Ockham undermining medieval realism, the medieval synthesis of reason and revelation, and ethical intelligibility based on human nature. Geyer implies, but does not state,

that Aquinas represents the high point of medieval philosophy and that Ockham marks philosophical decline.

Through Baumgartner and Geyer's reworking of the Überweg volume on the history of medieval philosophy, Kleutgen and Stöckl's model has found its way into a standard "non-Catholic" German history of philosophy. Henceforth, the Kleutgen-Stöckl model will dominate the authoritative histories of medieval philosophy in the twentieth century. The medievals will come to be viewed through the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry and through the relations between faith and reason. No longer will this interpretation remain confined to the Catholic schools.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ETIENNE GILSON AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

Etienne Gilson (1884-1978) was born in Paris and studied at the diocesan seminary of Notre-Dame-des-Champs and then at the Lycée Henri IV.¹ From 1904 to 1907 he studied while at the Sorbonne under Henri Bergson (philosophy), Léon Brunschvicg (general philosophy), Frédéric Rauth (ethics), Émile Durkheim (sociology), Marcel Mauss (French philosophy and sociology), and Victor Delbos (philosophy).² In addition, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, a historian of modern philosophy and sociologist, agreed to direct Gilson in the writing of his dissertation, as long as he took a positivistic approach. Gilson proposed a thesis on the Scholastic context of Descartes's philosophy, a sufficiently positivistic topic to win approval. His dissertation committee included Lévy-Bruhl, Delbos, Andre Lalande, an authority on methodology and lexicography, François Picavet (medieval philosophy), Henri Joachim Delacroix (theology), and Rebelliau, a specialist on Descartes (Shook 1984, 52). Gilson completed and published his dissertation in two parts as *Index scolastico-cartésien* from 1912 to 1913 and *La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie* in 1913.

After teaching at the five *lycées* of Bourg-en-Bress, Rochefort, Tours, Saint-Quentin at Orléans, and Angers, Gilson obtained his first university post at the University of Lille (Shook 1984, 26-59). In 1913, he offered a series of twenty-five public lectures at Lille on the philosophy of Aquinas. Nine of these were published in the *Revue des cours et conférences*, yet the others remained unpublished due perhaps to the outbreak of the First World War (Shook 1984, 62). During the war, Gilson served with the French army and was captured at Verdun in 1915. He spent three years in German prisoner-of-war camps, during which time he studied Bonaventure, Russian, and had an article published in France.³

¹ (Shook 1984, 6-11) My presentation of Gilson's life is drawn largely from Shook 1984.

² (Shook 1984, 17-19) Gilson heard Bergson give two series of lectures at the Collège de France.

³ Shook 1984, 82-85; Gilson 1917.

After the war in 1918, Gilson resumed his teaching at the University of Lille. He moved to the University of Strasbourg in 1919 and was appointed to a chair in the history of philosophy. There, Gilson was put in charge of a committee to elect the new dean of the university and was responsible for reestablishing the department of philosophy (Shook 1984, 90-93). Since the Germans had founded the University of Strasbourg as a German university in 1872, now in French hands, the philosophy department had to be adapted to different academic traditions. Gilson abolished the introductory philosophy classes, since that was an area covered in the high school curriculum, and searched for suitable professors with whom to staff the department.

Even though Gilson would leave Strasbourg in 1921, the discussions he had with the historians Lucien Fèbvre and Marc Bloch left a lasting impression on his view of the proper way to conduct research into medieval philosophy. Fèbvre and Bloch forsook the approach of writing history around kings, queens, and military escapades, and argued for the importance of an interdisciplinary approach (Shook 1984, 94-95). In Toronto, Gilson would later adopt this methodology at his Institute of Medieval Studies.

Gilson's major publications after the war indicate the direction his research would take over the next half century. He published his first volume on medieval philosophy in 1919, a revised version of his University of Lille lectures on Aquinas, *Le thomisme, Introduction au système de saint Thomas d'Aquin*. This work would go through six editions, the last one appearing in 1965 (Maurer 1988, 520, 543-545). He published his first narrative of the history of medieval philosophy, his *La Philosophie au moyen âge* in 1922 and an introduction to the philosophy of Bonaventure, his *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, in 1924. Here Gilson breaks with Leo XIII and de Wulf, arguing that Bonaventure and Aquinas offer distinct philosophies.⁴ He and Gabriel Théry founded the *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* in 1926, twelve volumes of which appeared before the Second World War. Gilson also published an introduction to the

⁴ Gilson argues that Bonaventure's philosophy differs from that of Aquinas: "... if these two philosophies are equally Christian, in that they equally satisfy the requirements of revealed doctrine, they remain none the less two philosophies" (Gilson 1924, 473; Trethowan and Sheed trans., 449). In arguing that Bonaventure and Aquinas offer distinct philosophies, Gilson departs from the interpretation that the Scholastics shared a common philosophy.

philosophy of Augustine of Hippo in celebration of the fifteenth centenary of his death in 1929, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*.

Gilson attended two congresses in 1926 that led to a career in North America as well as in Europe. The first was a congress on education in Montreal in April 1926. Standing in for the president of the University of Paris, Gilson read a conference paper on Aquinas's views on education. While in Montreal, he also gave a paper at a celebration of the seven-hundredth anniversary of the death of St. Francis. The second congress was the International Congress of Philosophy held at Harvard University in September 1926. Before attending this congress, Gilson taught in the summer session at the University of Virginia. After the congress, he taught at Harvard University for the fall semester. He returned to teach at Harvard in the fall semesters of 1927 and 1928 (Shook 1984, 133-168).

Late in 1927, Gilson lectured at a number of universities across the Eastern United States and Canada. The fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Leo XIII's "Aeterni patris" would occur in 1929. Both the Basilian Fathers of Toronto — a Roman Catholic order that directed St. Michael's College within the University of Toronto — and the Dominicans of Ottawa, wanted to respond to Leo's request that universities devote resources to the study of medieval philosophy by sponsoring an institute led by Gilson (Shook 1984, 193-194). While he was in Toronto on the lecture circuit, the Basilians invited Gilson to found and direct an institute of medieval studies. Gilson talked over the particulars with the governing body of the Basilian Fathers and before returning to France, accepted their offer (Shook 1984, 176, 180).

Gilson suggested that the Dominicans turn to their brothers in France, who had conducted extensive research into medieval thought. The French Dominican M.-D. Chenu went to Ottawa in 1930 to cooperate in the founding of the Institut Saint-Thomas d'Aquin (Shook 1984, 194). When the Dominicans obtained control of the philosophy department at the University of Montreal in 1942, they moved their institute to Montreal and renamed it the Institut d'Etudes Médiévales.

The creation of Toronto's Institute of Mediaeval Studies was announced in the *University of Toronto Monthly* in December of 1927. This institute opened two years later with Gilson as the director, a post he would hold until his death in 1978 (Shook 1984, 176, 192).

At Toronto the first graduate center devoted solely to the study of the Middle Ages was established. Gilson was able to get his own academic center, and the Basilian Fathers were able to obey the directive of Leo XIII to study Aquinas. Furthermore, the Basilian order supplied a few of its younger members for study at the new institute, including George Flahiff, who would later become the only Basilian cardinal.⁵

The Institute of Mediaeval Studies was recognized by Rome in 1936 as operating in compliance with the educational directives of the Vatican.⁶ Gilson and his faculty founded four different series of publications: a journal named *Mediaeval Studies*, editions of medieval texts, secondary works on the Middle Ages, and a series of translations. The journal was established as a house organ for the publication of articles written by professors at the institute (Owens 1988, xii-xiii). Gilson was named as director of *Mediaeval Studies*, and the first issue appeared in 1939, the same year that the institute received a Vatican charter and was renamed the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

While Gilson had read de Wulf's history, he was neither educated by Neo-Scholastics, nor one himself. He is reported to have obtained his first intimate contact with Neo-Scholasticism in Toronto. Laurence Shook, Gilson's biographer and a member of the Basilian Fathers, states that Gilson first learned about the ideas of the Neo-Scholastic movement from the Basilian Gerald Phelan (Shook 1984, 187-188). Since Phelan had been educated at Mercier's Institute, Gilson was thus introduced to the ideas and figures of Louvain Neo-Scholasticism.

During the 1930s Gilson annually divided his professional time between Paris and Toronto. He would spend one semester in France and one in Canada. These were the years when Gilson lectured widely, delivering the Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen in 1930 and 1931 (*The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*), the William James Lectures at Harvard in 1935 (*The Unity of Philosophical Experience*), the Richard Lectures at the University of Virginia in 1938 (*Reason and*

⁵ Other Basilians sent during the second year included Terence P. McLaughlin, Vincent L. Kennedy, and Alex J. Denomy (Shook 1984, 194, 210-211).

⁶ Gilson had first asked that Rome authorize a center for the study of medieval philosophy and theology. According to Laurence Shook, Ernesto Ruffini counseled him to ask for what he really wanted, a center for the study of the Middle Ages (Shook 1984, 215-216).

Revelation in the Middle Ages), and the Mahlon Powell Lectures at the University of Indiana in 1940 (*God and Philosophy*).⁷

Gilson spent the Second World War in Paris revising his earlier works for the Vrin press and lecturing at the Collège de France. After the war, he was appointed to the Canadian United Allied Relief Funds (CUARF) by the Canadian government. He chaired a committee for CUARF on how to provide aid to the students and professors of the French universities. The French government appointed Gilson to its delegation at several major conferences: the San Francisco Conference of 1945 that prepared for the establishment of the United Nations; the conference of 1946 in London that prepared for the establishment of UNESCO; and the Hague Congress of Europe in 1948.⁸ He was inducted into the Académie Française in 1947 and appointed by Georges Bidault's moderate Mouvement Républicain Populaire to the French senate for a term of two years.⁹

In 1951, after his term in the French senate, Gilson resigned his chair at the Collège de France in order to devote more time to his institute in Toronto. He published an English edition of the social encyclicals of Leo XIII in 1954, *The Church Speaks to the Modern World*, which gives an idea of his moral and political views at the time. Here, Gilson clarifies the political uses to which he thought medieval philosophy could be put in the middle of the twentieth century. In the introduction, he states that it was no mere coincidence that Leo promoted the study of medieval philosophy in his second encyclical, "Aeterni Patris." Gilson claims that a central aim of Leo's social project was the restoration of the philosophy of Aquinas:

There will probably be, in the minds of many readers, a tendency to consider this document ["Aeterni Patris"] as only indirectly related to the social and political teaching of Leo XIII. Nothing could be less true. Far from being an unpractical supplement to the doctrine, the teaching of the Christian philosophy of the Scholastics, especially that of St. Thomas Aquinas, is considered by the Pope a necessary pre-

⁷ (Shook 1984, 201-241) Gilson would also give the Mellon Lectures at the National Gallery in Washington in 1955 (*Painting and Reality*).

⁸ For Gilson's involvement with CUARF and his participation in these various conferences, see Shook 1984, 253-263, 285-287.

⁹ For Gilson's membership in the Académie Française, see Shook 1984, 267-272. On Gilson as a senator, see Shook 1984, 272-275.

requisite to any practical scheme in view of restoring the social order.
(Leo XIII 1954, 6-7)

Leo thought that only Aquinas could provide a suitable intellectual foundation for a sound social order. His point for the nineteenth century, which Gilson thinks ought to be reconsidered in the post-war period, is that if we return to the philosophy of Aquinas, we can reestablish a correct order for society. Since science continues to stand apart from Christian wisdom and modern states continue to stand apart from Christian principles, Leo's "Aeterni Patris" speaks to the world of the 1950s just as it did to the nineteenth century.

It is noteworthy that Gilson does not cite fascism as an example of what happens when a state departs from Christian philosophy. The Cold War colors his rhetoric. Like a faithful member of a Christian Democratic party, Gilson notes that in the contemporary age Marxism presents the most serious threat to a sound social order: "Were he with us still today, Pope Leo XIII would find little encouragement in the latest developments which have taken place since the seizure of power by Marxism in Central Europe and in Russia" (Leo XIII 1954, 333). Gilson argues that the "duty of Catholics is clear" and calls his readers, as Leo had done 75 years before, to rediscover the truth of the philosophy of Aquinas. We must return to Aquinas if we are to attain the philosophical foundation necessary for a social order that does not spurn religious activity.¹⁰

Central to Gilson's philosophical project is his view that Aquinas offers an account of knowledge that allows one to discuss the natures of things. This knowledge is important because it provides an intelligible foundation for the moral life. Gilson, like Kleutgen, Stöckl, de Wulf, and Geyer, highlights the implications that epistemological intelligibility has for determining moral and social issues. He states this view in the introduction to his *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, published in 1960:

Every society that disregards the fundamental laws of human nature and the order established by God brings about its own destruction.

¹⁰ Gilson notes that we need not interpret Leo XIII's talk about rulers and the ruled as implying that monarchy is the only legitimate form of government. He states that Leo was offering general principles that can be applied to monarchy or democracy (Leo XIII 1954, 11-13).

The teaching of Thomas Aquinas on this point was remarkably developed by Pope Leo XIII. Sorely disturbed at the sight of so many European revolutions, all of them causing untold destruction and losses in human lives and property, without resulting in any progress that could not have been obtained without resorting to violence, Leo XIII forcefully stressed the truth that even societies are facts of nature, to the extent, at least, that they consist of men; and human nature cannot be changed at will. Any society disregarding these facts is heading for its own ruin.¹¹

If we pay attention to human nature, we can avoid false moral and political views that lead to social disaster. One such view that Gilson discusses is that people are by nature equal. He defines "natural equality" as referring to an equality of economic status, physical strength, intelligence, or social and political power. His claim is that in the real world, actual human societies include people with different levels of each of these characteristics. Those who attempt to build a society on the view that all people are equal will not achieve success, because this type of equality does not exist. His argument is that if we are to construct a sound social philosophy we should speak of natural inequalities (Gilson 1960, 275). The actual natural order is of such importance that those societies failing to take natural inequality into account will bring about their own destruction.

In his *Elements*, Gilson explains that Leo XIII's social encyclical "Rerum Novarum" on the rights and duties of capital and labor is helpful in providing a philosophical approach to natural inequalities. This encyclical, published in 1891, opens with the claim that the increasing level of change in economics, science, and industry has led people to question their natural place in society:

That the spirit of revolutionary change, which has long been disturbing the nations of the world, should have passed beyond the sphere of politics and made its influence felt in the cognate sphere of practical economics is not surprising. The elements of the conflict now raging are unmistakable, in the vast expansion of industrial pursuits and the marvelous discoveries of science; in the changed relations between masters and workmen; in the enormous fortunes of some few individuals, and the utter poverty of the masses; in the

¹¹ (Gilson, 1960, 272) Gilson is noted on the title page of his *Elements* as belonging to the Pontifical Academy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the organization in which Kleutgen and Stöckl were enrolled as charter members.

increased self-reliance and closer mutual combination of the working classes; as also, finally, in the prevailing moral degeneracy. The momentous gravity of the state of things now obtaining fills every mind with painful apprehension; wise men are discussing it; practical men are proposing schemes; popular meetings, legislatures, and rulers of nations are all busied with it—actually there is no question which has taken a deeper hold on the public mind. (Leo XIII 1954, 205-206)

One of the revolutionary ideas that has led people to question their place in society is the idea that people are equal by nature. Arguing against the Socialists, Leo claims that people are not equal by nature:

It must be first of all recognized that the condition of things inherent in human affairs must be borne with, for it is impossible to reduce civil society to one dead level. Socialists may in that intent do their utmost, but all striving against nature is in vain. There naturally exist among mankind manifold differences of the most important kind; people differ in capacity, skill, health, strength; and unequal fortune is a necessary result of unequal condition. Such inequality [sic!] is far from being disadvantageous either to individuals or to the community. Social and public life can only be maintained by means of various kinds of capacity for business and the playing of many parts; and each man, as a rule, chooses the part which suits his own peculiar domestic condition. (Leo XIII 1954, 213-214)

In the middle of the twentieth century Gilson agrees with Leo on the natural character of inequality. In his *Elements* he quotes Aquinas's *Summa contra Gentiles* in order to make the point that the natural state of human beings is one of inequality: "For those among them who excel by their intellect naturally dominate the others; as to those who do not shine by their intellect, but whose body is robust, they seem to be destined by nature to servitude."¹² Gilson does not use this quote to conclude that servitude is the natural state for some, but rather to show that individuals are not equal.

Marxism and Socialism are therefore wrong, because they fail to take the existing natural inequalities into account, inequalities that exist as well in Marxist and Socialist countries. Gilson offers an essentialist view of morality as an alternative to Marxism and Socialism, arguing that the philosophy of Aquinas provides the metaphysical and epistemological foundation necessary for a moral

¹² Aquinas's *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3: 81, quoted by Gilson 1960, 275.

and social philosophy that respects the natural order (Gilson 1960, 261). Human beings should act according to their own nature, that is, people should use reason to determine their actions. In Aquinas we find the criterion that what is good for human nature is good for human beings, and what is bad for human nature is bad for human beings (Gilson 1960, 263-264).

Gilson tells us in his *Elements* that those who have no social or economic power are wrong when they act against society. While people may rightly use moral means to attain what they want, no one should resort to violence in order to attain power. The reason Gilson gives for this is that violence results in damage to individual human beings, which is morally wrong. He argues that if there are no moral avenues to power, then people should simply accept their economic lot as part of God's plan (Gilson 1960, 277-278). On this reading of Aquinas, the use of force appears to result in evil for the individual as well as for society:

The wisest thing to do is, for those who are at the top to live up to their moral obligations, and for those who find themselves at the bottom of the political and economic hierarchy not to make their situation even worse than it is by allowing envy, jealousy, and hatred to corrupt their souls. No man can add one inch to his stature. (Gilson 1960, 278)

Human beings should not allow themselves to become vice-ridden by advocating violence because some are poor and others are rich. Political and economic inequities are as natural as the various heights of individual human beings. Since people are naturally the way they are because God created the world this way, there is no legitimate reason to act in contrast to the natural order. By opposing the natural order one will oppose God, which for Gilson, is morally wrong. Economic slavery is no reason to choose Marxism or Socialism. Rather, economic slaves should use their own natural abilities to improve their lot.

Gilson wrote the history of medieval philosophy apart from his treatments of philosophical issues. But there is no clean separation between his history and his philosophy. Like Stöckl's, his philosophical texts provide a good background for reading his historical texts. Understanding his interest in the implications that epistemological and metaphysical realism have for moral and social philosophy is key to an appreciation of the central place he gives to Aquinas in his history of medieval philosophy.

Gilson's History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages

Gilson published his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* in 1955, based on the introductory lectures he gave to graduate students at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.¹³ This history represents an immense amount of learning on a large number of individuals and remains an important work on account of Gilson's scholarship. The 252 double-columned pages of notes remain a useful source for important primary and secondary material, material that would otherwise be difficult to find. Scholars continue to find this history useful. For example, John Marenbon recognizing the value of Gilson's history in his introduction to the history of medieval philosophy, published in 1987, states that no other history of medieval philosophy has replaced Gilson's in regard to its range and consistent clarity (Marenbon 1987, 204).

Gilson's well documented history is of interest for another reason, namely the specific interpretation that he presents of the history of medieval philosophy. If we are to continue to use Gilson's history, as I think we should, then we need to be clear about the fact that it follows the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy. Yet I have found no evidence to suggest that Kleutgen or Stöckl directly influenced Gilson's presentation of the history of medieval philosophy.¹⁴ While Gilson does state in his general bibliography that Stöckl's history is "remarkable for its clarity," this does not mean that Stöckl had a direct influence on him (Gilson 1955, 607), and while Gilson claims in 1966, that Kleutgen played an important role in the history of Thomism, he gives no indication of recognizing the German's part in constructing the dominant model of the history of medieval philosophy (Gilson 1962-1966, 4: 783-784). Gilson belongs to a generation of medievalists who no longer seriously read the works of either Kleutgen or Stöckl.

¹³ Since the Institute was affiliated with the University of St. Michael's College at the University of Toronto, it is appropriate that the Cardinal archbishop of Toronto, James C. McGuigan gave the imprimatur to Gilson's work on the feast of St. Michael the Archangel (9-29-1954). This imprimatur appears on the back of the title page.

¹⁴ The library of the Pontifical Institute, which includes Gilson's private library, had no copy of Stöckl's history of medieval philosophy when I checked in 1990. I assume that Gilson did not consider this work to be of any real use for the study of medieval philosophy, or he would have sought a copy. The Institute does own the French translation of Kleutgen's *Philosophie der Vorzeit*.

My claim is that even though Gilson does not rely directly on the works of Kleutgen and Stöckl, he remains within their model. He continues to base his interpretation on the relations between faith and reason and to read the medievals according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry. Gilson would have found this model in de Wulf's history, Leo XIII's "Aeterni Patris," or any number of works on the history of medieval philosophy. By the time he began to conduct research into the medieval background of Descartes, many individuals, texts, and institutions had propagated and established the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy.¹⁵

Gilson's history includes a one-hundred page account of the philosophy of the church fathers. He describes the use to which Christians first put Greek philosophy, the central concern of his history as a whole.¹⁶ The problem that Gilson presents as central to patristic and medieval philosophy is whether Greek philosophy corrupted or complemented Christian thought.¹⁷ The claim he makes is that Greek philosophy did not corrupt Christianity, but that Christianity provided a new perspective from which to do philosophy.

Augustine is important, Gilson notes, because of the degree to which he remained a Christian while reasoning within the Platonic tradition. He was not merely one more in a long line of Platonists. For example, on account of his Christianity, he was able to work out a new philosophical account of the human soul, one that respected what he believed as a Christian (Gilson 1955, 74-77, 80-81). Gilson points out that Augustine attained a high level of philosophical achievement because of the new way in which he used Platonic principles to think through philosophical problems.

¹⁵ Considering the state of the historiography of medieval philosophy during the first half of the twentieth century, it would have been more unusual for Gilson to come up with a different model of the history of medieval philosophy.

¹⁶ Stöckl does not include Augustine, or the church fathers in his history of medieval philosophy. He discusses Augustine in his history of patristic philosophy where he argues that Augustine constructed a coherent philosophical system that came to dominate the West (Stöckl 1891, 293-366, 364-366). De Wulf gives only a brief outline of the philosophy of the church fathers in the first edition of his history (de Wulf 1900, 131-145).

¹⁷ Adolf Harnack had argued that Christianity was weakened when it allied itself with Greek philosophy. He followed Luther in arguing that Greek philosophy had corrupted the attempt to live the Christian life based on the gospels (Harnack 1957, 1-2, 5-7, 30-36, 567). Gilson, as I indicate, disagrees that Greek philosophy had a negative influence on Christian thought (Gilson 1955, 5).

Because Augustine reinterpreted Christian thought from within this philosophical perspective, Gilson ranks him as a significant thinker.

In noting Augustine's philosophical achievement, Gilson prepares his readers to keep their eyes on what he will argue is the high point of medieval philosophy. He notes that after Augustine, Aquinas will construct the next philosophical reinterpretation of Christianity:

The truth is that, in interpreting his Christian view of the world by means of a modified Plotinian technique, the philosophical speculation of Augustine met some serious obstacles, almost all connected with his initial notion of the soul and of man. The next philosophical reinterpretation of Christian thought will be the work of Thomas Aquinas. (Gilson 1955, 80-81)

Augustine and Aquinas were great thinkers because they each constructed a new Christian philosophy. Both are philosophically important because of the novel character of their solutions to Christian intellectual problems. When, in his discussion of Augustine, Gilson points forward to Aquinas's philosophical achievement, he entices his reader to plow through eight hundred years of thought, and three hundred pages of text, in order to appreciate the philosophical summit of medieval philosophy.

A similar point is made in regard to Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century, who plays an important role in Gilson's history for his success in reconciling reason and revelation. Anselm, we are told, argues that human beings can use reason to support what they believe on faith (Gilson 1955, 129-130). For example, one can use reason to demonstrate the existence of God, the Trinity of divine persons, and the necessity of the incarnation of the Son of God. Anselm uses reason in order to understand what he already believes.

Gilson claims that if we consider that Anselm did not have a number of the texts of Aristotle, he attained a remarkable, but limited, philosophical achievement. His achievement was that he reconciled reason and revelation by demonstrating what he believed on faith. The limitation is that Anselm could not state the relation between reason and revelation with precision, because he did not yet have a sufficiently sophisticated philosophical vocabulary. Gilson notes that after Aristotle's works had been reintroduced to the West, Aquinas would rework what it meant to use reason in order to understand revelation: "St. Anselm therefore did, with the philo-

sophical technique then at hand, what Saint Thomas was to do over again in the thirteenth century after the discovery of the entire works of Aristotle" (Gilson 1955, 130). Readers are thus encouraged to expect philosophical ingenuity on the relation between reason and revelation.

By informing his readers that Aquinas would work out an innovative view of the relation between reason and revelation, Gilson prepares them for a question at the end of his short section on Islamic and Jewish philosophy. He asks whether Christians, like Arabs and Jews, would be able to assimilate Greek philosophy:

We now are approaching the time when Christian scholasticism is in turn to find itself confronted with those riches hitherto unknown to it. Will it have enough vitality to assimilate them, or will it, on the contrary, unable to dam their flood, allow itself to be swamped by them? Such is the significance of the truly dramatic movement and conflict of ideas which developed at the heart of Christian thought during the first half of the thirteenth century, whose historical importance is such that even today we continue to feel its repercussions. (Gilson 1955, 231)

The attentive reader already knows that Aquinas will be the one who philosophically assimilates Greek and Christian thought without corrupting either philosophy or religious belief; and, fourteen pages later Gilson explains that he does indeed have Aquinas in mind, that Aquinas will reconcile Aristotle and Christianity (Gilson 1955, 245).

Gilson refers to the second half of the thirteenth century as the "classical" age of medieval Scholasticism. According to him, this is the period when different thinkers offered precise explanations of the relation between reason and revelation. He singles out Aquinas and Bonaventure as representative of this classicism for establishing a harmony between reason and revelation:

The second half of the thirteenth century can be called the classical period in the development of mediaeval scholasticism. It corresponds to the moment when, fully conscious of the nature of the task that lay ahead of them and provided with the material required to perform it, some theologians succeeded in building up complete theological syntheses, for instance, Saint Bonaventure and Saint Thomas Aquinas. It was their privilege to achieve their work at a time when, although anybody could see that a crisis was brewing, it had not yet

taken place. There is, in the writings of these masters, and especially in their earlier ones, a sort of serenity born of the confidence felt by their authors that, if properly understood, philosophy was on the side of theology and reason in fundamental harmony with revelation. (Gilson 1955, 325)

In calling the second half of the thirteenth century the “classical period in the development of mediaeval scholasticism,” Gilson ranks it as the philosophical high point of the Middle Ages, the point at which Bonaventure and Aquinas successfully reconciled the Greek world of philosophy and the Christian world of theology. Yet, even though Gilson discusses both Bonaventure and Aquinas as representative of the classical period, it is Aquinas whom he praises more highly for his harmonization of reason and revelation: he alone brought the work of his predecessors on the reconciliation of reason and revelation to the point of perfection (Gilson 1955, 364). Aquinas represents the pinnacle of philosophical achievement in the Middle Ages on account of the precision with which he used Aristotle to harmonize reason and revelation.

In contrast to earlier historians writing within the Kleutgen-Stöckl tradition, Gilson chooses not to use the categories ‘epistemology,’ ‘metaphysics,’ or ‘morality’ as section headings in his history of medieval philosophy. For example, in his treatment of Aquinas he uses the general themes of the *Summa theologiae* as section headings: “Theology and Philosophy,” “God,” “Creation,” “Man,” and “The End of Man.” A quick look at the table of contents of Gilson’s history might imply that he has broken with the Kleutgen-Stöckl practice of interpreting medieval thought according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry. But a careful reading reveals that Gilson continues to discuss epistemology, metaphysics, and morality. For example, he discusses Aquinas’s metaphysical notion of being, his view of human knowledge, and his moral philosophy in the sections on “God,” “Man,” and “The End of Man,” respectively.¹⁸ Gilson’s history is a variation upon, not a break with, the Kleutgen-Stöckl tradition. He continues to interpret medieval thought according to the standard branches of philosophy but uses the arrangement of the medieval texts themselves in order to organize his history of medieval philosophy.

What we have in this history is a more integrated view of the medieval reconciliation between reason and revelation than appears

¹⁸ Gilson 1955, 368-369, 377-378, 379-381.

in Kleutgen, Stöckl, de Wulf, or Geyer.¹⁹ For example, Gilson argues that Aquinas has worked out a manner of doing philosophy within theology that results in greater rationality, a rationality that he claims is even greater than that attained by the ancient Greeks (Gilson 1955, 365). Aquinas has confronted the two disparate traditions of Greek philosophy and Christian theology and harmonized the two into a single theological account. He has completely integrated Greek philosophy into his theology.

By describing this integration, Gilson is responding to the question of how medieval theological works can attract philosophical interest (Gilson 1955, 365-366). The works of Aquinas do this because their author distinguishes so clearly between reason and revelation that he does philosophy within theology without violating the integrity of philosophy. This is the greater rationality to which Gilson alludes. Aquinas uses philosophy within theology with such a degree of rational precision that we can take his philosophy out of his theology, and discuss what we have extracted as philosophy. For example, Aquinas has used philosophy so precisely that Gilson can discuss his theological accounts of human understanding and the moral life as Christian philosophy.

According to Gilson, Aquinas's reconciliation of reason and revelation is more philosophically interesting than earlier medieval and patristic accounts. First it is more interesting as philosophy because he uses Aristotle as his guide. For example, in putting Aristotle's view of human knowledge to use, Aquinas chooses a philosophy that is superior to that of early medieval thinkers. His natural view of human knowledge is more philosophically adequate than Augustine's reliance on divine illumination (Gilson 1955, 362, 364). Secondly, because he uses a more accurate philosophy within his theology than his predecessors, Aquinas reconciles reason and revelation more precisely than they.

By extracting Aquinas's account of human knowledge from his theology, Gilson demonstrates the precision with which Aquinas uses philosophy within his theology. For instance, we can talk about Aquinas's treatment of perception, intellectual cognition, and the origin of human knowledge (Gilson 1955, 377-378). The senses are the origin of human knowledge, in that they passively receive an

¹⁹ Earlier historians writing in the Kleutgen-Stöckl tradition viewed Aquinas as writing philosophy apart from his theology.

imprint (particularized species) of physical objects. Species are impressions of physical objects, without the materiality of the object. But since the species are bound up with “traces” of materiality, we have not yet arrived at intelligibility itself (Gilson 1955, 378). The human intellect takes the traces of individuality away from the species, and arrives at intelligibility (a universal), which was only virtually present in the species of the individual object. And since the active intellect understands as universal what was only virtually present in the individual, there is a correspondence between the intelligible form of the universal and the structure of the thing known. The universal is virtually present in the actual forms of individual things. Gilson speaks of these forms as the “trace of the intelligible,” because the natural forms of actual things are grounded in the divine ideas which God used to create the world (Gilson 1955, 377). Human knowledge is grounded in the natural forms of natural beings, forms modeled on the ideas of God.

Gilson’s presentation of Aquinas’s account of human knowledge prepares the reader for Aquinas’s view of the moral life. Gilson explains that, for Aquinas, the moral good of every being is to act in such a manner that it can realize its form (Gilson 1955, 379-380). Therefore, what is morally good for human beings is what is good for the human form. Since the specific function of human beings is to reason, the moral good for human beings is to deliberate over and choose what they intellectually apprehend to be in the best interests of their nature. We have here a morality grounded in the very knowledge that human beings have of their own nature. And since Aquinas is an essentialist, who thinks that God has placed an essential order in the universe, he avoids the moral instability of a subject-based philosophy:

These rules, however, do not merely say what seems to be right or wrong according to our own preferences. They are laws, that is to say, commandments of reason prescribing what is required for the common good. The eternal law is the dictate of the divine providence, and therefore of the divine reason, governing the perfect community which we call the universe. Inasmuch as man is subject to this eternal law of divine providence, there is in him an imprint of it which is called natural law. Moreover, inasmuch as he is a rational creature, man is subject to the eternal law in a particularly excellent way. He does not simply undergo it, as all natural beings do, he also knows it and wills it. In man, therefore, “the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law.” (Gilson 1955, 380-381)

On this reading, natural law provides an intelligible guide to human moral action, which all human beings should respect. Natural law can provide such a guide because God has placed an intelligible order in the universe, an order human beings can come to understand. Therefore, the relation between Aquinas's view of human knowledge and his view of the good life is that since human beings understand the natures of things, they are prepared to understand and act in accordance with the intelligible order that God has placed in the world.

For Aquinas, the guide to human laws is the intelligible order in human beings, that is, the natural inclination to respect life, raise children properly, and use reason to recognize God and order one's actions. Gilson points out that this order in human beings is an unchanging law with its source in the divine:

As to human laws, they are so many prescriptions of human practical reason, promulgated by men vested in authority and in charge of insuring the common good of cities. Since they are human, these laws too, when they are just, are so many participations of the divine law. Every moral fault, or every sin, is before anything else a violation of the law of nature, and through it, a violation of the laws prescribed to nature by the divine reason. (Gilson 1955, 381)

The reader of this history is therefore able to appreciate in Aquinas a universal grounding of moral and political truth that stands in contrast to modern subjectivity and the Godless-Marxism which Gilson fears from the East.

Gilson continues to maintain the Kleutgen-Stöckl point that Aquinas harmonizes reason and revelation by offering rational demonstrations of points that have also been revealed. For example, Aquinas demonstrates rationally the existence of God, that God is the creator, and the immortality of the human soul, all of which have been revealed (Gilson 1955, 365, 369-372). Truths of reason converge with truths of revelation.

In saying that Aquinas has brought the work of his predecessors to the point of perfection, Gilson ranks Aquinas as an important thinker in relation to Augustine, who represents the high point of patristic philosophy, and to Anselm, who marks a high point of early medieval philosophy. Duns Scotus and William of Ockham are the only two thinkers after Aquinas whom Gilson discusses in comparable detail. But Gilson does not discuss the philosophy of

Scotus or Ockham in order to praise them. He characterizes both as representing a philosophical shift away from Aquinas's harmony between reason and revelation.

Gilson argues that when Scotus denies that we can demonstrate the immortality of the soul, he chips away at the array of rational demonstrations that are also given in revelation (Gilson 1955, 408-409). Yet it is Ockham who is the *bête noire* of this history of medieval philosophy; for it is he who brings about the collapse of Aquinas's view of scientific intelligibility when he argues against the claim that people can come to know universals:

In a doctrine where the form is a singular *qua* existing, the universality of concepts has no foundation in reality; abstraction, such as Thomas had understood it, then loses its object and the concept is almost fatally destined to become a natural "fiction." (Gilson 1955, 485)

If only singular things exist in the world, as Aquinas would permit, but there is no trace of intelligible form in material things, a view to which he would not subscribe, then there is no foundation for universal concepts in material things. If there is no foundation for universal concepts, then neither is there any foundation for essentialist-scientific knowledge. Human concepts are simply fictions and nothing more. Ockham opposes any essentialist understanding of philosophical intelligibility, the reason why Gilson can label him an "apprentice sorcerer:"

In philosophy itself, this apprentice sorcerer has, not at all created, but unleashed and encouraged forces which he himself could not possibly control after setting them free. In this sense, it can be said that the doctrine of Ockham marked a turning point in the history of philosophy as well as of theology. In theology his doctrine was paving the way to the "positive theology" of the moderns. In philosophy, it was paving the way to modern empiricism. In both cases it really was a *via moderna*: a modern way. (Gilson 1955, 498-499)

Ockham is skeptical in regard to general scientific knowledge and this skepticism leads to that of modern philosophy. If we accept his brand of empiricism, then we ultimately must deny the possibility of attaining general knowledge of the world.

Since, according to Gilson, Ockham does not offer an account of general knowledge that human beings can have of the world,

there is little, if any, convergence left between conclusions drawn from reason and those gained through revelation:

The dissolving influence exercised by his doctrine in the history of mediaeval scholasticism is due to the fact that, professing as he did a radical empiricism in philosophy, he had to reduce the understanding of faith to a bare minimum. An Ockhamist intellect is as badly equipped as possible for metaphysical cognition, and since where there is no metaphysical knowledge theology can expect little help from philosophy, the consequence of Ockhamism was to substitute for the positive collaboration of faith and reason which obtained in the golden age of scholasticism, a new and much looser regime in which the absolute and self-sufficient certitude of faith was only backed by mere philosophical probabilities. (Gilson 1955, 489)

Gilson thus diagnoses the difficulty with Ockham's view of the relation between reason and revelation as arising from an attempt to use a method based on empirical verification in order to solve metaphysical questions (Gilson 1955, 483, 495-496). Ockham's insistence on the singularity of signs, concepts, and things leads him to depart from the medieval project of working out the relations between reason and revelation:

Of the rational understanding of faith attempted by Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and their contemporaries, very little, if anything, was left after Ockham. This is the reason why we described Ockhamism as marking the end of the golden age of scholasticism. Faith was intact, but to follow Ockham was to give up any hope of achieving, in this life, a positive philosophical understanding of its intelligible meaning. (Gilson 1955, 498)

Ockham offers an epistemology that leaves no room for the intelligible natures of things. If we have no knowledge of universals that are grounded in material things and ultimately in the divine, then Aquinas's view of knowledge breaks down. If it does, then he was wrong to think morality could be based on human nature. And since Ockham does not think that human beings can know with reason what they believe on faith, Aquinas's careful harmonization of reason and revelation, which Gilson considers to be the chief philosophical achievement of the Middle Ages, becomes obsolete.

Gilson made statements before and after writing his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* that provide further clarification of his philosophical interest in writing this history. I have already

noted his concern to support an essentialist account of moral and political philosophy. He also clarifies his opposition to the epistemological views of Ockham. For example, he claims in his *Unity of Philosophical Experience*, published in 1937, that Ockham's view of knowledge presents a threat to objective knowledge:

Thus left without objective justification, human knowledge becomes a mere system of useful conventions, whose practical success remains a complete mystery to the minds of the very scientists who made it. Scientists themselves can afford such blunders; faith in science being what they live by, they have no need of reality. Yet, if even their intellectual life is a crippled life, what about those countless intelligences which have no science to live by, or faith left in an intrinsically intelligible world? They are all on the straight road to scepticism. Mediaeval thought entered it as soon as Ockham's philosophy took deep root in the European universities of the fourteenth century. (Gilson 1937, 90)

According to Gilson, Ockham's criticism of Aquinas's account of intellectual human knowledge led to the view that we can have no objective knowledge. He offers a thumbnail sketch of this development in order to expose the danger that Ockham's criticisms present to philosophy:

St. Thomas Aquinas restores philosophical knowledge, but Ockham cuts its very root, and ushers in the late mediaeval and Renaissance scepticism, itself redeemed by the moralism of the Humanists or by the pseudo-mysticism of Nicolaus Cusanus and of his successors. Then come Descartes and Locke, but their philosophies disintegrate into Berkeley and Hume, with the moralism of Rousseau and the visions of Swedenborg as natural reactions. Kant had read Swedenborg, Rousseau and Hume, but his own philosophical restoration ultimately degenerated into the various forms of contemporary agnosticism, with all sorts of moralisms and of would-be mysticisms as ready shelters against spiritual despair. The so-called death of philosophy being regularly attended by its revival, some new dogmatism should now be at hand. In short, the first law to be inferred from philosophical experience is: *Philosophy always buries its undertakers*. (Gilson 1937, 305-306)

Ockham is one of the chief undertakers of philosophy whom Gilson wants to bury philosophically on account of his criticisms of Aquinas's account of human knowledge.²⁰

²⁰ Kenneth L. Schmitz argued convincingly in a lecture given at the Pontifical

Gilson would continue to argue in his *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, published in 1960, that Aquinas offers a philosophically important view of human knowledge. He claims in this work that Aquinas offers an account of the structures of the knowing subject which serve as the conditions for human knowledge and language use. Aquinas is said to give an account of human nature that is superior to that worked out by Locke (Gilson 1960, 221-222). The implication is that if we want a sound theory of knowledge we should return to the philosophy of Aquinas. Therefore, when Gilson presents Aquinas's philosophy of human knowledge in his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, he discusses a theory that he thinks is superior to the modern philosophical account of Locke. When he points out the negative implications of Ockham's view of human knowledge, he discusses a view that led to modern skepticism.

In writing his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Gilson continues to follow the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy. Not only did he continue to clarify the epistemological, metaphysical, and moral philosophical views of the Middle Ages, but he continued to argue that the central intellectual issue in the Middle Ages was the reconciliation of reason and revelation. On account of the careful manner in which he argues that the medievals used philosophy within theology, Gilson locates medieval discussions of epistemology, natural philosophy, metaphysics, morality, and political philosophy within theological discussions. What makes a theologian philosophically important is whether his or her philosophy can be removed from his or her theology without harming the integrity of philosophy.

Gilson wrote within the grand tradition of the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy.²¹ And what places

Institute of Mediaeval Studies in 1987 that Gilson was not simply offering a philosophical defense of epistemological realism. As a Christian, theologically interested in the theme of incarnation, he had not just epistemological but theological reasons for grounding epistemology in concrete individual beings (Schmitz 1987, 10-12).

²¹The history written by Gilson's student and colleague, Armand Maurer, belongs as well to this tradition. One of the first members of the Basilian order to study and hold a chair in philosophy at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, he wrote his history, as he states, to bring his readers up to the point where they could read the history of Gilson (Maurer 1962, xvi). Maurer, like Gilson, views Aquinas as an important medieval thinker on account of his reconciliation of reason and revelation, theory of knowledge, and view of morality (Maurer 1962, 164-165, 182-185, 186-188). He continues to argue that Ockham leads to philosophical decline in the area of knowledge, morality, and the reconciliation of reason and

him squarely within this tradition is the fact that he constructed his history around the philosophy of Aquinas. He presents Aquinas as offering a harmony between reason and revelation that is superior to that of his predecessors. Aquinas is also said to offer an account of human knowledge that is philosophically superior to those of his medieval predecessors. For Gilson, Aquinas represents the high point of medieval philosophy, the yardstick against which he judges medieval thinkers who came before and after Aquinas. He praises Augustine and Anselm as forerunners of Aquinas and criticizes Ockham for paving the way to skepticism and bringing about the dissolution of the medieval harmony of reason and revelation. On this interpretation, since the harmonizing of reason and revelation was the central intellectual problem of the Middle Ages, Ockham represents the dissolution of medieval philosophy.

Other historians were beginning to challenge the view that Aquinas represents the high point of medieval philosophy. They were not attempting to take away from Aquinas's philosophical achievements but to recognize the philosophical importance of other medieval thinkers. In the previous chapter I noted that the Franciscan Minges was responsible for offering a revised account of the philosophy of Duns Scotus early in the twentieth century. Another Franciscan, by the name of Philotheus Boehner, would do the same for William of Ockham.

revelation. He explains Ockham's argument against the view that individual things have essences that human beings can know (Maurer 1962, 284-285). If there are no essences, Maurer argues, then we lose the type of intelligibility we need to ground morality (Maurer 1962, 285-286). Since there are no essences for Ockham, he reduces morality to a command-based system in which people should act as God commands. Aristotle and Aquinas's project of grounding morality in the essential structures of the world loses its foundation. Maurer also claims that Ockham separates reason and revelation, and in so doing dissolves the medieval reconciliation of reason and revelation (Maurer 1962, 266-275). The implication is that while Aquinas produced philosophy of the highest order, Ockham represents philosophical decline. Maurer's clear and readable *Medieval Philosophy* continues to serve as an important introductory text for English speakers. It remains in print and in classroom use at universities in 1997.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE EXPANSION OF THE PANTHEON OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHERS IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

During the first two decades of the twentieth century Parthenius Minges cleared Duns Scotus of the charge of pantheism and offered a revised account of Scotus's philosophy, securing him a place in the pantheon of great medieval philosophers. The time was right to produce a critical edition of the works of Scotus. Philotheus Boehner (1901-1955), another German Franciscan, would, in similar fashion, clear Ockham of the charge that he had brought about the destruction of medieval philosophy. In arguing that Ockham made significant contributions to the standard areas of philosophy, Boehner widened the Kleutgen-Stöckl pantheon of great medieval philosophers to include William of Ockham (Bohner 1958). With the philosophical reputation of Ockham cleared, Boehner would begin to prepare for the publication of a critical edition of his works.

Bohner entered the Franciscan order in 1920 and was ordained a priest in 1927. He was granted a Ph.D in botany from the university at Münster in 1933, writing his dissertation on the relation of temperature to the blooming of the tulip.¹ Bohner had at this time a serious interest in medieval philosophy and Gilson was his guide. He would state in the preface to his critical edition of the first question of the prologue to Ockham's *Ordinatio*, published in 1939, that he was both spiritually and materially indebted to Gilson, as to a friend and a father.² He also gives credit to Gilson for inspiring and encouraging his work on medieval philosophy, and in particular for his study of Scotus and Ockham:

He [Gilson] has awakened in me a great love of the Seraphic Doctor [Scotus], and of the Scholastics in general, and even of Ockham by exhorting me, in personal conversations, to undertake much-needed

¹ (Junghans 1968, 13) My presentation of Bohner's life is drawn largely from Junghans 1968, 13-18.

² Noted originally in 1939 and reiterated when disputing with Pegis in 1944 (Bohner 1939, preface; 1958, 316).

editions of Ockham. The translating of three of his books into German has recompensed me considerably more than the tedious work of translation could be expected to, by shaping my own intellectual development. (Boehner 1958, 316)

Boehner first learned how to write the history of medieval philosophy by translating works of Gilson. He translated Gilson's introduction to the philosophy of Bonaventure and had it published in 1929, Gilson's work on the philosophy of Augustine of Hippo in 1930, an article on Duns Scotus in 1935, and Gilson's volume on the mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux in 1936. Gilson also encouraged Boehner to prepare a critical edition of the works of Ockham, arranging for Boehner to use five Paris manuscripts of Ockham's *Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus*. And Gilson would co-author the three editions of a German language history of medieval philosophy with him, *Die Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie von ihren Anfängen bis Nikolaus von Cues*, first published in 1937.³

Boehner was appointed to work on the Quaracchi edition of the logical works of Duns Scotus in 1936, where he gained experience in preparing critical editions. The completion of this project in 1938 left him with no reason to remain at the Franciscan center of medieval studies at Quaracchi. At the invitation of Gilson, he moved to the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto in 1939. While there, he began to plan a critical edition of the works of Ockham (Junghans 1968, 15). When World War II began, Gilson chose to remain in France, and Boehner decided not to return to Germany. He accepted a professorship in philosophy at the Franciscan St. Bonaventure's College near Allegany in upstate New York.

Boehner built St. Bonaventure's into a Ph.D. granting research center for the study of medieval Franciscan thought. He began in 1941 to remodel the English language journal *Franciscan Studies* along the lines of the German *Franziskanische Studien*, publishing scholarly articles of the highest quality on medieval themes. The work he had done in Toronto on the critical edition of the works of Ockham was transferred to St. Bonaventure's in 1942. There he founded the Franciscan Institute Publications in 1946 and prepared

³ (Junghans 1968, 13-14) Junghans notes that the presentation of Ockham in each edition of the Boehner-Gilson history becomes progressively less Gilsonian.

the first two volumes of the works of Ockham, an edition of his *Summa totius logicae*, published in 1951 and 1954. The publication of Ockham's theological and philosophical works in a uniform binding would commence after Boehner's death in 1967. In less than two decades Boehner had transformed St. Bonaventure's from a small liberal arts college into a research institution that combined the expertise of Gilson's Institute and the philological skills of Quaracchi.⁴

Boehner and William of Ockham

Boehner read a paper in 1948 at the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy held in Amsterdam, in which he reevaluated the interpretation of Ockham that de Wulf had given in the sixth edition of his history of medieval philosophy published the previous year (Boehner 1958, 23-28). Boehner argues that de Wulf's interpretation of Ockham as representing the decline of medieval philosophy is simply wrong and out of date. He begins this argument by recognizing that historians of medieval philosophy no longer blame the decline of medieval philosophy on Scotus. The research of Minges and others led to a reevaluation of the philosophy of Scotus. Boehner remarks that the burden of having brought about the downfall of Scholastic philosophy thereafter fell solely on the shoulders of Ockham, noting that de Wulf, for example, continues to single out Ockham as the skeptic who brings about the decline of medieval philosophy. Boehner claims that Ockham is no skeptic and that de Wulf's history, still fresh from the press, stands in need of major revision.

Boehner argues that a careful reading of Ockham allows us to see him as other than an epistemological skeptic. Contrary to de Wulf's presentation, Ockham offers a philosophical account of human knowledge that grounds knowledge in concrete facts:

⁴ Other scholars would acquire reputations from working on Boehner's projects, including Eligius M. Buytaert, who would follow Boehner in preparing the critical edition of the works of Ockham (Junghans 1968, 107); Gedeon Gál, who would become the general editor of the works of Ockham in 1966; and Allan B. Wolter, who would publish widely on the philosophy of Duns Scotus (Franciscan Institute 1996-1997, 40-41; Duns Scotus 1987, xii).

Ockham lays the foundation and origin of true knowledge in intuitive cognition of singular facts; this guarantees the truth of evident judgments, about states of things. Intuitive cognition never leads into error, even if there is an intuitive cognition of something that does not exist. Ockham thus is the continuator of the Augustinian doctrine of the infallibility of judgments regarding immediately given facts. Hence Ockham's foundation for every cognition lies in experience. Ockham's abstract knowledge and all scientific knowledge is by means of universal concepts which, formed on immediate cognition, are only universalized by predication. Hence his theory is realistic, insofar as the concepts are representing reality, it is conceptualistic insofar as the universal concepts are entities in the mind whilst there is no universality whatsoever outside the mind, except by voluntary intuition. (Boehner 1958, 27)

Boehner calls Ockham a conceptualist and a realist, not a nominalist who thinks that words are only empty sounds.⁵ According to Ockham, people can check their concepts against the real world. Others can judge whether or not a person's concepts apply to the actual things that exist in the world. While Ockham holds that there are only particular things in the world, and no universals, he also grants that one can judge whether a person's concepts refer to things. Since he argues that people have concepts, and that they can judge whether or not their statements apply to the world, he is both a conceptualist and a realist, but not a skeptic.

In another article, Boehner criticizes Gilson for calling Ockham a skeptic in his *Unity of Philosophical Experience* (Boehner 1958, 292). Gilson's former student Anton Pegis wrote a defense of Gilson in which he claims that Boehner attempts to save Ockham by misconstruing the meaning of skepticism and leads to the "ruin of philosophy" (Pegis 1944, 468). True philosophy, according to Pegis, contains an account of general knowledge, and since Ockham is critical of the possibility of attaining any true universal knowledge, he must be a skeptic.⁶ In failing to point this out and suggesting that Gilson misunderstood Ockham, Boehner is accused of misconstruing both the philosopher and the historiographer.

⁵ On Ockham as a realist conceptualist, see Boehner's "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," in Boehner 1958, 156-174.

⁶ Gilson's former student Armand Maurer would continue to defend Gilson's approach in the 1970s by arguing that he is not accusing Ockham of being a strict nominalist because there were no nominalists in that sense in the Middle Ages (Maurer 1990, 410-411).

It is interesting that Gilson no longer labels Ockham a skeptic in his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* as he had done in his *Unity of Philosophical Experience*. But he does state that Ockham reduces concepts to fictions, the implication being that if Ockham is not a skeptic, then he is surely something close to it. Gilson, as we have seen, calls Ockham an "apprentice sorcerer" who has "unleashed" views that will pave the way to "modern empiricism" (Gilson 1955, 498-499). Since modern empiricism ends in the doubts about the real objects of Berkeley and Hume, Gilson continues to imply that Ockham starts out on the road to a strong version of philosophical skepticism.

In defense of Boehner, Pegis and Gilson appear to miss his point. If we look at Boehner's "The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-existents according to William Ockham," we can see that for him Aquinas stands closer to skepticism than Ockham. On this reading, Aquinas's view that human beings know universals places a third entity between the knower and the known. Since universals distance knowers from the known, we have no way to ascertain whether the universal we know represents something that exists in the world. The positing of universals between human beings and objects in the world is a reason to be skeptical about whether human knowledge does in fact correspond to anything in the world. In focusing on the immediate intuitive knowledge of physical things, Ockham removes this extra layer from his theory of knowledge. He offers a simplified account of human knowledge and thereby stands farther removed from skepticism than does Aquinas:

Hence we witness in Ockham two tendencies: 1. to base knowledge on the safe ground of reality in intuitive knowledge, and 2. to eliminate any element, as for instance a species, that could becloud the immediate vision of reality and which, preventing the mind from an immediate contact with things, could lead philosophy along the road of skepticism. For, if reality is not grasped immediately, how can we ever ascertain that we grasp reality at all? (Boehner 1958, 269)

Ockham offers a conceptual account of human knowledge that is grounded in human experience. While Ockham departs from Aquinas's essentialism, he continues to argue that concepts play a central role in human knowledge. As both a conceptualist and a realist, Ockham does not undermine the possibility of a philosophical account of human knowledge. To argue that he is a skeptic in

regard to human knowledge, or that he leads to skepticism, is therefore to misunderstand him.

Boehner brought about a change in the way that historians have come to view the philosophy of Ockham. For example, David Knowles states in the first volume of his *Religious Orders in England*, published in 1948, that Ockham is not a philosophical or a theological skeptic according to how we use those terms today. Referring to scholarship on the subject, he cites Boehner's "A recent presentation of Ockham's philosophy" (Knowles 1948 1: 238, note 1).

Knowles notes later in his *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* that the idea that Ockham is a destructive thinker is precisely the interpretation recent Franciscans have taken pains to expose:

More recently still, within the past two decades, members of his own order have endeavoured and still endeavour to destroy what they regard as the myth of Ockham's destructive genius, and to show him as the great logician, fundamentally traditional in thought and doctrine, who rejuvenated Aristotelian logic and who never intended that his daring hypotheses should do more than provide material for intellectual debate.⁷

Recent scholarship leads to the conclusion that Ockham is philosophically important on account of his contributions to logic. Knowles considers the origin of the false interpretation to lie in the revivals of the philosophy of Aquinas and Scotus:

Neglected in his turn for centuries, save as a bogey to scare young Thomists, he was re-discovered as an historical figure by the students of medieval thought who, followers as they were of Thomas or Duns, regarded him as Apollyon, the grand deceiver and destroyer who ruined the fabric of the golden age of medieval thought. (Knowles 1962, 318)

He draws an interesting comparison between the opponents of Ockham and the opponents of Karl Marx in order to note a psychological reason for depicting Ockham as representing philosophical decline:

⁷ (Knowles 1962, 319) Gordon Leff had recently pointed out in his history that Ockham worked out a position that was unequaled in "sheer destructive capacity" (Leff 1958, 279).

We are always relieved when we are able, or think we are able, to point to a single doctrine or, still better, to a single man as the cause of any specific evil we deplore, and those who prize the intellectual and religious achievements of thirteenth century scholasticism have often in the past found in Ockham and Nominalism what some have found to-day in Marx and Communism, the fount and source of all that is ill done. (Knowles 1962, 325)

Whether or not Kleutgen or Stöckl blamed the political, moral, and ecclesiastical problems of the modern world on Ockham, there certainly has been a pattern since the middle of the nineteenth century of viewing Ockham as leading to the decline of philosophy. Kleutgen, Stöckl, de Wulf, Geyer, and Gilson interpret Ockham as philosophically dangerous for undermining objective philosophical accounts of knowledge and morality. Even Knowles travels in this direction, when he notes that Ockham denies ordinary knowledge: "It remained for Ockham to deny anything common or universal in the essence of the individual, and thus to deny any intelligibility in the true sense of the word to the objects of our experience" (Knowles 1962, 317). Boehner's point had been that in denying reality to universals, Ockham does not deny intelligibility to the objects of experience:

It is to be noted that the existential judgement is an operation of the intellect alone, and that the intuitive cognition which is at the basis of it, even if it concerns an object of sense, is an *intellectual* intuitive cognition or a primary *intellectual* awareness of an object. The intellect could not have an intuitive cognition of a sensible object without the help of sensory cognition, at least in the natural order; but the intellectual awareness relates to the sense-object as immediately as the sensory cognition does. (Ockham 1957, xxiv-xxv, Boehner's emphasis)

While he is not an essentialist, Ockham does not deny the intelligibility of common experience. In arguing that he does, the historians who write within the Kleutgen-Stöckl tradition misrepresent the philosophy of Ockham.⁸ Boehner emends the Kleutgen-Stöckl

⁸ This continues to be an issue in the 1990s. For example, see Girard Etzkorn's review of H. Klocker's *William of Ockham and the Divine Freedom*, a book that was published in 1992. The review opens and closes with the same sentence: "Ockham viewed through Thomistic spectacles presents a distorted image" (Etzkorn 1992, 329, 333). Etzkorn is rightly critical of Klocker's presentation of Ockham's "scepticism," view of the absolute power of God, and denial of all reality to universals outside the mind.

model of the history of medieval philosophy through his reevaluation of Ockham's philosophical contributions to medieval thought. Yet, by continuing to interpret Ockham according to the standard branches of philosophy in order to raise Ockham to the philosophical level of Aquinas and Scotus, he remains within the general framework of this model.⁹

Weinberg's History of Medieval Philosophy

Julius Weinberg includes Boehner's interpretation of Ockham in his *A Short History of Medieval Philosophy*, published in 1964. The remarkable quality of this history, coming in at just under three hundred pages, is the clarity with which it presents the arguments of the medieval thinkers. In the preface Weinberg acknowledges his debt to the histories of Geyer and Gilson: "I could not have written this sketch of medieval philosophy without constant dependence on these [Geyer and Gilson] more extensive treatments" (Weinberg 1964, vii). His presentation does not differ substantially from the histories of Geyer and Gilson. As we shall see, like Boehner, he offers an up-to-date presentation of the philosophy of Ockham, yet remains within the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy.

Weinberg continues to praise Aquinas for his reconciliation of reason and revelation: "To this must certainly be added the most important fact that his main theological *Summae* are perhaps the most successful attempts made in the Middle Ages to produce an integrated system of Christian philosophical theology" (Weinberg 1964, 182). In praising Aquinas, he does not neglect either Scotus or Ockham. Weinberg devotes a chapter to each, the only medieval thinkers after Aquinas to receive such attention. He presents Scotus and Ockham as outstanding philosophers of the Middle Ages, without intimating that either represents philosophical decline. For example, when Weinberg notes that Ockham was a major influence on the conceptualism of the British empiricists, he implies that this

⁹I have discussed Böhner's understanding of Ockham's epistemology and metaphysics. For his treatment of Ockham's moral and political philosophy, see Ockham 1957, xlviii-li. Boehner also focuses attention on medieval logic, which earlier historians writing within the Kleutgen-Stöckl tradition had tended to neglect. See Boehner 1952.

is a positive philosophical achievement: "His conceptualism had a lasting influence into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the British Empirical philosophers from Hobbes to Hume owe their conceptualism to Ockham directly or indirectly" (Weinberg 1964, 265). Weinberg disparages neither modern British philosophy nor medieval Franciscan thought.

Nevertheless, Weinberg does remain within the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy. For instance, he considers the relation of faith and reason to be a central concern of medieval thought, offering a general discussion at the beginning of his history and by way of introduction to his treatments of the philosophy of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham.¹⁰ He also continues to view the medievals according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry. For example, he argues that Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham have different epistemological, metaphysical, and natural theological views and that their epistemologies have philosophical consequences for what human beings can know about God.¹¹ In considering the relations between the epistemological, metaphysical, and natural theological views of individual medieval philosophers, Weinberg continues to write within the tradition of Kleutgen and Stöckl.

As I have noted, Weinberg does not continue to brand Ockham as a philosophical skeptic. He offers Boehner's interpretation of Ockham as a conceptualist:

His positive view can best be called conceptualism, insofar as this term carries the implication that universals are concepts, and insofar as it is well understood that such concepts are properly applicable to singular things only insofar as these things resemble one another and insofar as the concept resembles each of them. (Weinberg 1964, 245)

Weinberg interprets Ockham as holding that people have concepts that naturally refer to individual things. And since Ockham accounts for ordinary talk about individual things he is a conceptualist and a realist. Yet, while Weinberg follows Boehner in viewing Ockham as a conceptualist, a realist, and not a skeptic, he still views him as leading to skepticism. He argues that Ockham unintention-

¹⁰ Weinberg 1964, 4-9, 32-33, 62-65, 182-184, 213-216, 236-240.

¹¹ Weinberg 1964, 210, 212, 216, 232, 262.

ally gives an impetus to skeptical philosophy by placing “strict limitations” on what can be known: “The strict limitations which Ockham imposed on knowledge properly so-called initiated a period of skeptical and critical philosophy which went far beyond Ockham’s intentions” (Weinberg 1964, 265). Therefore, Weinberg both views Ockham as a conceptualist and continues Kleutgen and Stöckl’s interpretation of Ockham as the stepping-stone to skepticism.

Weinberg follows Boehner on another point, when he notes that Ockham believes we can demonstrate the existence of God.¹² If Ockham demonstrates the existence of God, then the claim that he separates reason from revelation and thus endangers the medieval project of reconciling these two is off the mark. Earlier writers working within the Kleutgen-Stöckl model were wrong to state that Ockham does not use reason to understand revelation. For instance, Gilson claimed that Ockham grants no place for reason in understanding what he holds on faith. For example, he says that Ockham leaves us “very little, if anything” that we can know philosophically about God. Though this might imply that there is something we can know about God, Gilson states, in the next sentence, that “faith was intact but to follow Ockham was to give up any hope of achieving, in this life, a positive philosophical understanding of its intelligible meaning” (Gilson 1955, 498). To say that there is no hope of achieving a philosophical understanding of faith in the present life implies that one cannot know through reason any of the propositions revealed by God. Gilson implies that this is the case when he writes: “Ockham is perfectly safe in what he believes, only he does not *know* what he believes, nor does he need to know it” (Gilson 1955, 498). This is precisely the point that Weinberg and Boehner deny when they state that for Ockham we can demonstrate the existence of God.

Gilson admits that Ockham believes we can demonstrate the existence of God: “In applying to the being of things the kind of reasoning we have learned from experience, we can prove that this being has an efficient cause, which is God” (Gilson 1955, 497). Gilson’s statement that Ockham does not know what he believes seems to contradict his claim that Ockham believes he can demonstrate the existence of God. Certainly, when compared to Aquinas,

¹² Weinberg 1964, 263; Boehner 1958, 27.

Ockham limits what human beings can demonstrate about God. For instance, Weinberg notes that for Ockham human beings cannot use reason to conclude that there is a single God (Weinberg 1964, 263). But Ockham, as Gilson admits, argues that human beings can know at least one thing that they believe on faith, namely that God exists. Therefore, Gilson is wrong to imply that Ockham has separated reason from revelation.

Weinberg offers a revised account of Ockham as a conceptualist who does not separate faith from reason, and he uses the Kleutgen-Stöckl criterion for philosophical excellence, that is, sound epistemological and metaphysical ingenuity, in order to include Ockham in the philosophical ranks of Aquinas and Scotus. In discussing medieval philosophy according to the standard branches of philosophy, he continues to write within the Kleutgen-Stöckl tradition.

The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy

The *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, was published in 1982 as a sequel to A. H. Armstrong's *Cambridge History of Later Greek & Early Medieval Philosophy*, published in 1967. Armstrong's focus was the Platonic influence on medieval thought, treating the history of Platonism from Plato through the early Middle Ages. Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg begin with the twelfth century and the influence that Aristotle exercised on late medieval thought. These two histories present a departure from the earlier histories so far considered in that they consist of articles written by different authorities in the field. The literature on the history of medieval philosophy has become so large that no single individual can cover the entire period. One result is that the articles in these histories are authoritative in a way that single-author works are not. Each section carries the stamp of a specialist.

The *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* differs in another way from the histories I have thus far examined in that it is not organized according to individual thinkers. This history is problem-oriented, comprising forty-six analytical articles, each one focusing on a single philosophical problem. The writers are able to state different medieval positions with a clarity that is rare in a general

history. For example, instead of having to search for what Albert, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham have to say about natural law, readers can find a concise comparison of each in the article "Natural morality and natural law" by D. E. Luscombe (Luscombe 1982). This is the sort of treatment that one would expect only in a well-constructed journal article.

Yet, the Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg volume remains within the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy. As can be seen from the table of contents, this work is divided up according to issues in logic, epistemology, metaphysics, natural philosophy, philosophy of mind, action, ethics, and politics.¹³ At least two articles are devoted to each area of specialization, as in the case of metaphysics, and often four or more. From the time of Brucker, it had become customary to adopt a chronological order when writing the history of medieval philosophy. Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg break with this tradition. Like Kleutgen in his *Philosophie der Vorzeit*, they present the medievals according to the standard areas of philosophical specialization.¹⁴ Although it is more difficult to understand the views of any individual medieval thinker, or to consider a person's place in the long line of the history of medieval thought, a vast number of medieval intellectual problems are explained with precision and rigor.

While the *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* represents the most perfect application of the Kleutgen-Stöckl model, it is no longer built around the view that Aquinas is the great medieval thinker. Page after page is devoted to Albert, Scotus, Ockham, and a collection of medieval logicians neglected in the standard histories.¹⁵ Yet it does not play down the philosophical work of Aquinas. For example, in speaking about Aquinas's use of "intentio intellecta" in epistemological contexts, Christian Knudsen discusses one aspect of Aquinas's epistemology (Knudsen 1982, 481). John Boler discusses another in his treatment of Aquinas's account of the human intellect and the cognitive process (Boler 1982, 475-477). In

¹³ Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, v-viii.

¹⁴ Within each article, issues are normally treated according to a chronological order. But this history does not consist of a narrative that follows a single overarching chronological order.

¹⁵ In regard to Ockham, Marilyn Adams cites and follows Boehner when arguing that Ockham is a conceptualist in her article "Universals in the early fourteenth century." See Adams 1982, 434, note. 89.

fact, more space is given to Aquinas than any other medieval figure, yet with Ockham close behind.¹⁶

In comparison with earlier histories of medieval philosophy, the editors of the Cambridge history have devoted a disproportionate amount of space to the study of medieval logic. From the perspective of the historiography of medieval philosophy, there is something unusual about devoting three hundred and two pages, over a third of the entire text, to medieval logic.¹⁷ In his introduction, Norman Kretzmann defends this move by stating that logic is the most philosophically interesting part of medieval thought. He claims that one reason why medieval logic is of such interest is that it takes into account questions that would belong to metaphysics, philosophy of language, linguistics, natural philosophy, and the philosophy of science.¹⁸ In this way the study of medieval logic is important for understanding many other areas of medieval philosophy.

Kretzmann also rightly notes that the standard histories of medieval philosophy have neglected medieval logic. In order to fill this gap, medieval logicians are introduced into the pantheon of great medieval philosophers, including William of Sherwood, Walter Burley, Peter of Spain, and John Buridan. None of these thinkers played a significant role in the earlier histories of medieval philosophy.¹⁹ In discussing these medievals, Kretzmann is consciously attempting to provide a more complete history of medieval philosophy. Thus, an account is supplied, in a general history of medieval philosophy, of the only branch of medieval thought that Brucker and Hegel considered to be philosophically important.²⁰

¹⁶ The index provides a rough guide to determining the amount of space that is devoted to each medieval figure.

¹⁷ (Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, 99-381, 787-807) Three hundred and twenty-five pages if you classify Edith Sylla's article "The Oxford Calculators" under logic rather than natural philosophy (Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, 540-563).

¹⁸ Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, 4.

¹⁹ Yet too stark a picture should not be drawn of the earlier historians on this point. They had many intelligent things to say about medieval logic. Noting the length of discussions does not solve this issue, but Stöckl devoted three pages to Burley, Gilson devoted five to Spain, and both devoted six to Buridan (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1042-1044, 1023-1028; Gilson 1955, 319-323, 511-516).

²⁰ Carl Prantl's treatment of medieval logic in his four volume *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* published from 1855 to 1867 reflects much of what was known about logic in the Middle Ages in the latter nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. Due to the negative judgment cast on the logical efforts of Aquinas, who is said to have been unable to free logic from theology, it had little influence on the standard histories of medieval philosophy (Prantl 1855-67, 3: 107-108).

Kretzmann does note one area of medieval philosophy that could “possibly” rival logic in philosophical importance, namely that of rational theology.²¹ By rational theology I take him to refer to the use of natural reason to understand God, the sort of issues historians consider when treating the relations between faith and reason. In light of this comment, it is remarkable that no consideration is given to rational theology in this history of medieval philosophy. Such conscious neglect becomes more interesting when we recall Kenny’s autobiographical statement that his reflection on Aquinas’s arguments for the existence of God had changed the direction of his life (Kenny 1986, 147). Yet these arguments are not treated in this history. There are references to Aquinas’s five ways of demonstrating the existence of God, and to his view of the relations between philosophy and revelation in C. H. Lohr’s “The medieval interpretation of Aristotle,” but there is no sustained consideration of either (Lohr 1982, 92-93).

In omitting any sustained treatment of this area of medieval philosophy, Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg seemingly ignore what had become the central philosophical problem of medieval philosophy, the defining feature that marks medieval philosophy off from the philosophy of the ancient and of the modern world. Their history appears to alter significantly the general picture of medieval philosophy that Kleutgen and Stöckl constructed in the nineteenth century. Kretzmann can say that rational theology might be as philosophically important as medieval logic, but with their refusal to treat it, the editors offer a significantly different presentation of medieval philosophy: they do not simply add logic to the traditional disciplines of medieval philosophy, they remove what the leading historians of medieval philosophy had argued for over a century was the foundational philosophical issue of the Middle Ages.²²

Kretzmann reveals the philosophical interest behind this version of the history of medieval philosophy when he argues that it was intended to document those medieval philosophical concerns that had been neglected but had continued to be of interest to philoso-

²¹ Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, 4.

²² For those like myself who agree with Harry Wolfson’s thesis that medieval Jewish, Christian, and Islamic philosophy is a scripturally-religious philosophy, to neglect the cluster of intellectual issues that arise in association with revelation eviscerates medieval thought (Wolfson 1961, v).

phers. He notes that he does not want merely to duplicate the older histories of medieval philosophy:

... we have naturally had to emphasise some subjects at the expense of others that are equally important, but we tried to make those difficult decisions in such a way that our emphasis would fall on material that had been neglected in the established literature on medieval philosophy and on material regarding which recent research had been making most progress.²³

According to Kretzmann, it is time that the older works on medieval philosophy were supplemented by the fruits of recent research. Therefore logic is given significant attention that reflects contemporary scholarship.

Kretzmann's concern is that the older historians were not able to focus on issues that were similar to the philosophical concerns of the twentieth century because they were largely ignorant of, or unsympathetic with this philosophy. For this reason, the older medievalists were unable to discuss those topics that continue to hold philosophical interest:

By combining the highest standards of medieval scholarship with a respect for the insights and interests of contemporary philosophers, particularly those working in the analytic tradition, we hope to have presented medieval philosophy in a way that will help to end the era during which it has been studied in a philosophical ghetto, with many of the major students of medieval philosophy unfamiliar or unsympathetic with twentieth-century philosophical developments, and with most contemporary work in philosophy carried out in total ignorance of the achievements of the medievals on the same topics.²⁴

Kretzmann is frank when he admits that the Cambridge history is written according to the interests of a certain school of contemporary philosophers, interests not shared by older historians.²⁵ This

²³ Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, 2-3.

²⁴ Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, 3.

²⁵ When Kretzmann argues that medieval philosophy has been studied in "a philosophical ghetto" he overlooks Gilson's philosophical education and teaching at the Sorbonne, his work on Descartes, and the sections on modern and contemporary philosophy that Gilson wrote for the Random House *History of Philosophy* in the 1960s (Gilson 1962-1966, vols. 3, 4). Gilson's account of the philosophy of France and Italy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrates that he was not ignorant of recent philosophical developments, at least developments in contemporary continental philosophy (Gilson 1962-1966, 4: 171-408).

history was consciously constructed as a set of articles written to demonstrate that the medievals discussed questions that continue to hold philosophical interest:

And because the areas of concentration in contemporary philosophical scholarship on medieval thought naturally reflect the emphases in contemporary philosophy, our editorial strategy has led to a concentration on those parts of later medieval philosophy that are most readily recognizable as philosophical to a student of twentieth-century philosophy.²⁶

This is a different purpose from that of Stöckl, who stated that he was presenting the entire historical development of medieval philosophy based on the facts (Stöckl 1864-1866, 1: iii-iv). Unlike Stöckl, Kretzmann does not claim to offer a comprehensive account of the history of medieval philosophy. To criticize Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg for devoting too much space to logic, or too little attention to the problem of reason versus revelation, is to misunderstand their history. What they have produced is more akin to a collection of journal articles or set conference papers than to the standard chronological account of a philosophical period.

The Cambridge history marks an appropriation of medieval philosophy by academics who were trained for the most part and teach outside of the institutions created in response to Leo XIII's call for a return to the principles of medieval philosophy. While the Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg volume does include articles by Joseph Owens and James Weisheipl, both of the Pontifical Institute in Toronto, and John Wippel of Catholic University, the majority of the authors, and all the editors, are/were employed at institutions other than those guided by Leo XIII. The Cambridge history represents the revival of interest in medieval philosophy that has

Kretzmann's judgment also overlooks Armand Maurer's sympathetic treatment of Anglo-American philosophy in the same Random-House history (Gilson 1962-1966, 4: 485-549, 623-663). Maurer wrote this as well as the volume on medieval philosophy in the same series (Maurer 1962). He does not dismiss, or play down, the philosophical achievements of Moore, Russell, Ayer, Wittgenstein, Ryle, or Austin. While he has not quite caught up with the philosophy of Quine, it is inaccurate to accuse him of being either ignorant of, or unsympathetic with, twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy. In fact, one characteristic that Maurer shares with analytic philosophy is his interest in clearly stating the arguments that he discusses.

²⁶ Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, 3.

occurred outside the older institutions created for the study of medieval philosophy. The analytical method is the norm, with all the benefits of tightly focused essays that permit rigorous discussion.

Nevertheless, because Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg continue to present medieval philosophy according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry, their history remains within the Kleutgen-Stöckl model. And, as the Cambridge history was planned as a supplement to the older histories of medieval philosophy, it differs from, yet remains within, this tradition. The editors have consciously constructed a history according to what they have judged to be of continued philosophical interest. In excluding treatments of the problem of reason versus revelation, and the discipline of natural theology, Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg decided there was no need to cover what had been the central philosophical problem of medieval philosophy.²⁷ Yet even this exclusion does not mark such a dramatic break with the older histories as we might first think. Since historians in the past have had much to say about the philosophical-theology of the Middle Ages, and recent work has occurred in other areas of medieval philosophy, most notably in logic, Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg have simply chosen to devote space to those areas in which progress has been made. They have chosen to supplement, and not to challenge, the Kleutgen-Stöckl model.

In discussing the Middle Ages as a period when philosophy was practiced freely, the Cambridge history depends on the work of Kleutgen and Stöckl. Earlier historians like Brucker and Hegel thought that there was no philosophy in the Middle Ages. Even Hauréau, who argued that philosophy existed during the medieval period, identified philosophy with the liberation of reason from theology. Until Kleutgen and Stöckl constructed the history of medieval philosophy around the reconciliation of faith and reason, theology was thought by historians to present a threat to the free exercise of reason. Once the medievals were thought to have harmonized faith and reason, historians began to interpret the Middle Ages as a time when individuals freely engaged in philosophical issues. Even though the relation of faith and reason is not

²⁷ In the 1990s, Norman Kretzmann would devote considerable attention to these issues (Kretzmann 1997, vii). They had once again become of philosophical interest.

specifically addressed in the *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, the practice of interpreting the medievals as having reflected on philosophical issues without theological restraint, presupposes the view that philosophy was not in opposition to theology in the Middle Ages. Jan Pinborg makes this point in passing, in the article "Medieval Philosophical Literature:"

Students of theology were more mature and better educated than the Arts students, and they had more leisure and better opportunities, . . . That is why so much of the study of medieval philosophy is concerned with theological texts. But this historical connection does not entail that philosophy and theology could not be studied separately, or that theological goals determined philosophy and made it unfree and unphilosophical.²⁸

That philosophy was free in the Middle Ages was a central principle of the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy. In continuing to follow this principle, the Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg volume therefore remains faithful to the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy.

Conclusion to Part One

I have clarified the origins of the dominant twentieth-century model of the history of medieval philosophy, a paradigm that I call the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy. Knowledge of the philosophical and political origins of this model helps toward a better appreciation of many of the secondary texts written on medieval philosophy. Thousands of works on medieval philosophy, including a number of critical editions, have been written within and annotated according to this model, texts that continue to be important. For example, as noted above, John Marenbon wrote in 1987 that there is still no general history of medieval philosophy that rivals Gilson's 1955 *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* in respect to its range of thinkers and issues (Marenbon 1987, 204). Gilson's history remains useful and important. Another example is Martin Grabmann's *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* published from 1909 to 1911 while its author

²⁸ Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, 15.

was teaching at Eichstätt. This work remains the most detailed history of medieval methodology extant. Even when we disagree with Grabmann, we often rely on his research. For example, while Anthony Kenny states in a footnote in the *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* that Grabmann failed to “notice” the distinction between disputation in Aristotle’s *Topics* and in Aquinas, nevertheless he relies on this text in his next footnote.²⁹ Grabmann’s history of Scholastic method remains a standard work on the history of medieval philosophy and it was written according to the Kleutgen-Stöckl tradition.³⁰ Therefore, clarity concerning the Kleutgen-Stöckl model is indispensable to the critical use of the resources we have on the history of medieval philosophy.

Kleutgen, Stöckl, de Wulf, Geyer, and Gilson present Aquinas as a great philosopher on account of his contributions to the relations between faith and reason and to the spheres of philosophical inquiry. They view other medieval figures according to whether they lead towards or away from Aquinas. Minges, Boehner, Knowles, and Weinberg use the same criteria to raise Scotus and Ockham to the philosophical level of Aquinas. They argue that Scotus and Ockham wrote philosophically important accounts on the standard areas of philosophy. Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg follow suit with the addition of logic, adding significant medieval logicians to the pantheon of great medieval philosophers. But what if Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham did not write philosophical treatments of the standard areas of philosophy? What if they did not write philosophical accounts of epistemology, metaphysics, natural philosophy, and morality? The dominant model of the history of

²⁹ Why Kenny says that Grabmann has not noticed this I do not know (Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 1982, 25). Within a chapter on Abelard Grabmann quotes John of Salisbury’s statement that Aristotle’s *Topics* have been necessary for the art of disputing (Grabmann 1909-1911, 2: 218). Although he supports the claim that Aristotle’s *Topics* influenced medieval disputation, Grabmann makes no mention of Aquinas at this point in his history. He was to treat Aquinas in the next volume of his history, a volume that was never published.

³⁰ Grabmann notes in the foreword to the first volume of his history of Scholastic method that he has collected printed and manuscript material to discuss the late Scholastics, and above all, St. Thomas. He adds that his history of Scholastic method will terminate in the age of Aquinas (Grabmann 1909-1911, 1: vii-viii). Grabmann is therefore essentially writing a history of Scholastic method in order to clarify the development of disputation and argumentation that led to Aquinas. The reason why this point is difficult to grasp from the text itself is that Grabmann never published the projected third volume of this work, on the methodology of Aquinas.

medieval philosophy would be fundamentally flawed. In the next chapter, I will take a step toward making this claim. I will argue that Aquinas does not have an epistemology and that this has implications for understanding Scotus and Ockham. Having clarified the philosophical and political interests behind the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy we are prepared to reconsider the accuracy of this model.

PART TWO

TOWARD A NEW HISTORIOGRAPHY OF
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER NINE

THE KLEUTGEN-STÖCKL MODEL RECONSIDERED: THE CASE FOR MEDIEVAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Over the last one hundred and forty years it has become customary to interpret the history of medieval philosophy according to the spheres of philosophical inquiry. Previous historians like Jacob Brucker and G. W. F. Hegel had judged that the medievals did not write philosophy, that for them philosophy was a slave to theology. Joseph Kleutgen and Albert Stöckl proposed that, in fact, the medievals had effected a reconciliation between faith and reason that allowed for religious faith and the unhampered exercise of reason. On this reading, faith and theology did not interfere with the autonomy of philosophy. Kleutgen and Stöckl concluded that, based on this reconciliation, the Latin medievals made substantial contributions to philosophy in the areas of epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of nature, psychology, morals and politics. As has been shown in the first part of this book, this reading was to become the dominant model of the history of medieval philosophy in the twentieth century.

Over the last eleven years, however, medievalists have begun to question specific tenets of this model.¹ These criticisms are important because they suggest that the common approach to the history of medieval philosophy is fundamentally flawed. Indeed, the historiography of medieval philosophy is entering a state of crisis not seen since the middle of the nineteenth century. No longer are medievalists concerned merely with extracting medieval philosophies. They are beginning to reconsider whether we should continue to view the medievals through the standard branches of philosophy. In asking whether the medievals offer philosophical accounts of the philosophical areas of specialization, historians are beginning to reevaluate the general approach to the study of medieval philosophy. In the present chapter, I will continue this discussion by challenging the view that Aquinas has an epistemology and indicate that

¹Jordan, 1986, 118-119; Marenbon, 1987, 1-3; Marenbon, 1988, vii-xii; Kenny 1993, 18-19; French and Cunningham 1996, 178-200.

this has implications for our interpretation of Scotus and Ockham. If we recognize the theological and moral reasons that the medievals had for discussing human understanding, we can begin to construct a more accurate model of the history of medieval philosophy.

Christian Knudsen offers the standard interpretation of Aquinas when he discusses Aquinas's use of the term "intentio intellecta" in his article "Intentions and impositions" that appears in the *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* under the heading of "Metaphysics and epistemology." Knudsen states that he is interested in Aquinas's use of this term in "epistemological contexts" and treats, as an example of an epistemological context, Aquinas's definition of "intentio intellecta" from chapter eleven of the fourth book of his *Summa contra Gentiles* (Knudsen 1982, 481). Both Kleutgen and Stöckl had cited this same chapter in support of the first principle of Aquinas's epistemology.² And the text that Knudsen cites might sound like an inquiry into epistemology:

Now, I mean by the "intention understood" what the intellect conceives in itself of the thing understood. To be sure, in us this is neither the thing which is understood nor is it the very substance of the intellect. But it is a certain likeness of the thing understood conceived in the intellect, and which the exterior words signify. So, the intention itself is named the "interior word" which is signified by the exterior word. (SCG 4.11; 1975, 4: 81)

But what does it mean in this case to speak of an epistemological context? The topic under discussion in this chapter by Aquinas is a point gained through revelation, and not through reason, namely, the generation of the Son of God. The question Aquinas poses is how generation occurs in God (SCG 4.11). He argues that the higher the nature possessed by a thing, the more internal is the life that a being is able to generate. For example, he notes that rocks and stones have the lowest nature, beings so low that they have no generative power. Plants, of a higher nature, are able to generate. For example, a plant can bear a fruit, which can fall to the ground, grow, and produce another plant. Yet generation for plants is external, they have no internal life. As Aquinas moves up his scale of being, generation and life become progressively more internal.

² Kleutgen 1860-1863, 1: 26; Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 462.

More internality is involved in the emanation of sensitive souls. This emanation occurs within the interior of these souls. Aquinas uses Aristotle's discussion of the power of sensitive souls to describe the interior activity of sensitive souls. To say that they have an interiority is to refer to the fact that the form of external sensibles affects the exterior senses and proceeds to the imagination and memory. The imagination and memory are the interior of the sensible soul, that which distinguishes it from minerals and plants. And in generating other sensitive souls, beings are produced with the same degree of interiority.

The supreme and perfect grade of life according to Aquinas is the intellectual life. Beings with intellects are able to reflect upon themselves and in doing so demonstrate an interior life that is more perfect than the interior life of mere sensitive souls. Here Aquinas uses Aristotle's discussion of the intellectual soul in order to explain the interiority involved in the generation of human beings. He states that human beings have intellects, but since human intellects depend on an external element they have the lowest level of interiority among intellectual beings. Human intellects must first understand external objects, which are outside themselves, in order to arrive at self-understanding. Therefore, they do not possess interiority in the fullest sense. The implication is that perfect interiority cannot arise from human generation.

Angels represent a higher type of intellectual being. They do not proceed to cognition from what is external to themselves. The angelic intellect is able to understand itself immediately. Therefore angels have more interiority than human beings. Yet, according to Aquinas, even angels do not have perfect interiority. There is an even more intimate and interior nature. While angelic intention is completely internal, depending on no external element, there is a distinction between angelic understanding and angelic substance. Because of this, Aquinas claims that angelic understanding is not perfectly interior to angelic being. A being that is one with its understanding would possess a higher level of interiority. Since God's understanding is identical with his being, God possesses this highest level of interiority.

Having arrived at the being with the highest level of interiority, Aquinas discusses intellectual activity in order to clarify the divine generation of God. He comments on "*intentio intellecta*" in order to inquire into the interior generation of the Word of God, and with

reference to the interiority of self-understanding and generation, he seeks to understand that interior generation. The indirect manner in which human beings understand themselves is discussed in order to point to the greater degree of intimacy present in the self-understanding of God. Aquinas's claim is that for God, everything understood, and that includes God, is in the divine intellect. He defines intention in a discussion of the degrees of interiority within a treatment of Christology.

To read chapter 11 of the fourth book of Aquinas's *Contra Gentiles* as an epistemological context is to read Aquinas atomically, without taking the textual content into account. Unless we reduce epistemology to the use of so-called "epistemological" terms apart from context, classifying this text as epistemological is to misunderstand Aquinas. Reading sentences and texts apart from the context, as I argue in this chapter, can lead to inaccurate interpretations. In the present case, Aquinas does use the terms "intellect" and "intention" and even speaks of the sensible beginnings of human self understanding, but he uses these terms to construct an analogical account of divine generation. His goal is to understand the generation of the Word of God, a point held on faith.

Referring to what the medievals have to say about human understanding in theological texts, without offering consideration of the theological context, misrepresents medieval thought. Such practice shows no regard for the differences between medieval and modern discussions of human cognition. If these differences are important, as I maintain, we need to discuss the context of philosophically significant texts in order to understand the medievals. For example, in order to decide whether Aquinas, Scotus, or Ockham have epistemologies requires that we interpret what they have to say about human understanding from within the textual context and not assume that the reference is epistemological as Knudsen and others do.³

Since Kleutgen and Stöckl, it has become customary in histories of medieval philosophy to interpret Aquinas as presenting an epis-

³ Scott MacDonald continues to "extract" an epistemology from Aquinas's theological works in his chapter on Aquinas's theory of knowledge in the *Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*. "To examine what we can recognize as a distinct and systematic theory of knowledge, then, we need to extract his strictly epistemological claims from the metaphysical and psychological discussions in which they are embedded" (MacDonald, 1993, 160). What needs to be considered is whether such an extraction works against understanding the text.

temology in questions 84 through 86 of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*. For example, Julius Weinberg argues in his *Short History of Medieval Philosophy* that Aquinas offers a foundational account of human knowledge: "The direct knowledge of material things is, then, to St. Thomas's satisfaction, vindicated. And with this foundation, the propositions of natural philosophy are secured" (Weinberg 1964, 210). Weinberg refers to these questions in Aquinas's *Summa* when presenting his epistemology (Weinberg 1964, 205-210). But if we take the context of these texts into account we can see that Aquinas's purpose belies such a characterization.

Anthony Kenny has argued that Aquinas discusses human understanding as part of an inquiry into philosophical psychology, not as an investigation into the nature of human knowledge (Kenny 1993, 8, 18-19). He claims that Descartes's consideration of the human mind within epistemological issues has led to a misreading of Aquinas. Kenny is correct, I think, in his claim that Aquinas inquires into the activity of the human mind, but for more or less the same reasons that Augustine was interested in it. Augustine had considered human understanding for the purpose of explicating the divine Trinity in his *De Trinitate*, a discussion that Peter the Lombard summarized in his *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*. Aquinas's discussion of human understanding in his commentary on this text, his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, in his tenth disputed question *De veritate*, and in *Summa theologiae* allows us to see that he did not fundamentally disagree with Augustine on the purpose of analyzing human understanding.⁴ He developed a framework for discussing human understanding in his *Scriptum* and used it to construct his tenth disputed question *De veritate*, two works that help to recover the order of investigation and purpose of the *Summa*. In each case, Aquinas examines the activity of the human mind in order to clarify the human imitation of God and gain some understanding of the Trinity. Too little attention has been paid to the *moral* and *theological* thrust of Aquinas's discussion of human cognition in his *Summa theologiae*. Rather than a speculative treatment of understanding for its own sake, there is a moral and theological dimension to this discussion that should affect our understanding of his analysis. My

⁴ Aquinas has much to say in these three texts on human understanding in reference to both the imitation of God and the Trinity. For historically-sensitive presentations of his arguments, see Beaurecueil 1952-1955 and Merriell 1990.

claim is that Aquinas's consideration of human understanding is inseparable from its moral and theological context and that it is a misinterpretation to discuss his account apart from this context.

Scriptum super libros Sententiarum

Aquinas first discusses human understanding in the third distinction of the first book of his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (In Sent).⁵ From a modern perspective, what is striking about these comments is the manner in which they are embedded in theological considerations.⁶ Aquinas discusses human understanding as part of his concern with the divine Trinity. He follows the order of Peter the Lombard in commenting on human understanding within a discussion of the human imitation of God. Like Augustine in *De Trinitate*, Aquinas's purpose is to present an analogical picture of the activity of the triune God. He uses notions from Greek philosophy in order to solve theological puzzles.⁷ For example, Aristotle's concept of the agent intellect is employed in order to comment on the duration of the human imitation of God (In Sent I.3.4.5). Granted that human beings have intellects that are active only when they understand, the question arises as to whether human beings continue to imitate God when they do not understand. Aquinas responds to this difficulty by claiming that human understanding occurs through the light of the agent intellect. His point is that since agent intellects are always active, human beings imitate God whether or not they are currently engaged in understanding. He thus uses Aristotle's notion of the active intellect in order to defend the continuity of the human imitation of God.

Aquinas also looks to Aristotle in order to describe this imitation. His claim is that human beings can understand God through coming to understand human-ensouled activity. Reflecting on Genesis

⁵ The essay by Romanus Cessario on the methodological background to Aquinas's *Scriptum* provides some of the context for the structure of Aquinas's text (Cessario 1995).

⁶ Battista Mondin argues that Aquinas presents his view of human beings within an account of the imitation of God in his *Scriptum*, but changed his position in his *Summa theologiae* (Mondin 1975, 58). I will argue that Aquinas continues to discuss human beings in his *Summa* within the framework of the *imitatio Dei*.

⁷ Philipp Rosemann presents a detailed picture of the emanational framework of Aquinas's theological metaphysics, one that helps to contextualize many of Aquinas's more focused discussions (Rosemann 1996, 221-352).

1: 27, he proceeds to clarify the human imitation of God. In doing so he defines “image” as a representation of an object according to its parts, which yields a representation of the interior of an object (In Sent I.3.3.1). If X represents the activity of Y, then X is an image of Y. Based on this representational understanding of image, he argues that human beings imitate God when human activity represents the activity of God.

Aquinas claims that an imitation occurs when something represents the “interior” of an object (In Sent I.3.3.1). “Interior” here refers to the intellectual and appetitive activities of the divine in contrast to physical characteristics. Aquinas’s point is that we can explicate the intellectual and appetitive activity of God through a description of the intellectual and appetitive activities of the human soul. He inquires into human activity in order to locate a representation of God for the purpose of clarifying the activity of the divine Trinity. Human self-understanding thus leads to the understanding of God.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas discusses the activity of the human mind through a consideration of the objects of human understanding and love. Aristotle suggested in his *De anima* that we reflect on the objects of our ensouled activity in order to discuss the specific activities of the human soul.⁸ Aquinas takes the same approach when he argues that the objects of human understanding and love determine the degree to which human beings represent and imitate God (In Sent I.3.4.4). He assumes that if an object represents God then the human understanding and love of that object imitates God. In this brief section, he divides the objects of human understanding and love into three classes for the purpose of isolating those acts that imitate the understanding and love of God.⁹

The first type of object is physical things, which do not express the Trinity (In Sent I.3.4.4). If physical objects do not express the Trinity, then the human understanding and love of physical objects does not imitate the triune God.

⁸ (415a 15-22) For Aquinas’s comments on this discussion, see his commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima* II.6.304-308, Pirota ed. and III.9.724-725.

⁹ Three types of understanding and love are discussed along with the equality of the memory, intellect, and will. Since the three divine persons are equal, Aquinas follows Augustine in making a similar point about the human faculties. This equality allows these faculties to imitate the Trinity. In his *De veritate* and *Summa theologiae* Aquinas will discuss the three types of human understanding apart from the equality of the faculties. See Merriell 1990, 66-69.

The second type is human-ensouled activity. When human beings understand and love their own acts of understanding and love, their self-understanding and self-love imitate those of God.¹⁰ The intellectual and appetitive powers of the human soul imitate the Trinity, because the soul is an image that “expressly leads” to God (In Sent I.3.4.4). In noting that this activity of the soul leads to God, Aquinas indicates a moral interest he will develop in his *De veritate* and *Summa theologiae*.

The third object of human understanding and love is God. Aquinas notes that the imitation is most true in respect to this object, since the human understanding and love of God provide an actual imitation of the Trinity (In Sent I.3.4.4).

Aquinas inquires into types of human understanding for both moral and theological purposes. He continues Augustine’s project of reflecting on the Trinity by developing an order of investigation into mental activity after the fashion of Aristotle. This order is important because it will serve as the framework for treating human cognition in the *De veritate* and *Summa theologiae*.

De veritate

Aquinas develops a more detailed account of the activity of the human soul in question ten of his *De veritate* (QDV), the full title of which informs the reader of his purpose: “On the mind, in which is an image of the Trinity.”¹¹ The same purpose can also be seen in the architectonic structure of the thirteen articles that make up this question.¹² Through a discussion of the human understanding and love of material things, souls, and God, Aquinas follows the order of his treatment in *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*. He does not argue that human beings imitate God, but instead assumes that this

¹⁰ Aquinas does not at this point explain how these human intellectual and appetitive activities map onto the activity of the triune God, however, he will do so in his *De veritate* and *Summa*.

¹¹ “De mente, in qua est imago Trinitatis.”

¹² Students as well as bachelors and masters of theology either studied or had studied Peter’s *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*. To people familiar with this work, the tenth question of Aquinas’s disputed questions *De veritate* would appear as an exercise in Trinitarian theology. The issues he discusses are those of the third distinction of the first book of Peter’s *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*. On the institutional context of the *De veritate*, see Kenny and Pinborg 1982, 19-22.

is the case. Given that human beings are created in God's image, Aquinas's task is to clarify *how* human beings imitate God.

The key to his explanation of the human imitation of God occurs in article 7 where he argues that an image of God differs from a mere likeness in being a most-expressed likeness. He states that a most-expressed likeness represents something according to its species (QDV 10.7). This gives him reason to distinguish in detail those mental acts that imitate God from those that do not.¹³ The question posed in article 7 is whether human beings can imitate God while understanding material things or only when understanding immaterial objects. He has already discussed the understanding of material objects, which do not imitate God, in articles 4 through 6. After article 7 he examines those acts that do imitate God, namely, the understanding of human understanding and the understanding of God in articles 8 through 10 and articles 11 through 13, respectively.

In regard to the representational quality of temporal things, Aquinas notes that physical objects cannot represent God. Here, he offers more detail than he did in his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*. He states that the shape of temporal things can only represent species according to shape (QDV 10.7). Temporal things cannot represent that which is without shape. Therefore, since God has no shape, temporal things cannot represent the species of God. On this interpretation, shape and God stand so far apart that the human understanding of material objects does not constitute an imitation of God. In understanding material objects, human beings can represent only that which has shape, and since God has no shape, the human understanding of physical objects cannot imitate God.

Aquinas argues further that the understanding and love of human understanding and love imitate God. On account of the great degree of similarity between human self-understanding and divine self-understanding, the human understanding of human understanding imitates the self-understanding of God. In order to clarify this point he explains that the eternal generation of the Word of God is God's own self-understanding. In understanding human understanding, human beings imitate the reflexive intellectual activ-

¹³ Merriell argues convincingly that, after a careful reading of Augustine's *De Trinitate*, Aquinas came in his *De veritate* and *Summa* to locate the imitation of God in the activity of the human soul (Merriell 1990, 132-147, 239-240).

ity exercised by the Word of God (QDV 10.7). The same holds true for human love. Granted that God loves the Word, and the Word loves God, the love that human beings have for their own rational activities imitates the love of God.

Aquinas distinguishes more precisely in his *De veritate* between levels of the human imitation of God than he did in his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*. As far as self-regarding understanding and love are concerned, he notes that they are analogous to God's self-understanding and -love (QDV 10.7). Human reflexive intellectual and appetitive activity is like the reflexive intellectual and appetitive activity of God. For this reason, Aquinas calls human self-understanding and -love an *analogous* imitation of God.¹⁴

Aquinas explains that since the object of the human understanding and love of God stands closer to the self-understanding and -love of God than does the object of human reflexive intellectual and appetitive activity, the human understanding and love of God constitute a fuller imitation than human self-understanding and -love (QDV 10.7). He claims that the object of the human understanding and love of God possesses the same form as the object of God's self-understanding and -love. In both cases the object of the intellectual and appetitive powers is God. For this reason, Aquinas calls the human understanding and love of God a *conforming* imitation of God.¹⁵ The goal is to become like God.

This discussion therefore has a moral purpose. One can come to imitate God through understanding and love. Aquinas indicates this purpose when he states that the perfecting of the *imitatio Dei* occurs through the acquisition of virtue (QDV 10.7.ad 8). Furthermore, in coming to understand how one can imitate God, one comes to a greater understanding of what is imitated, that is, the Trinity itself.

Significantly for the account he presents in his *Summa*, Aquinas indicates limits placed on human understanding in the final article of question 10. He argues that human beings cannot directly understand the Trinity in the present life (QDV 10.13). If human beings cannot yet directly understand the Trinity, they cannot yet provide a full imitation of the triune God. His reasoning is that human beings must be able to understand the properties of the three divine

¹⁴ On this analogy, see Squire 1951, 174-176.

¹⁵ Bonaventure had already discussed the imitation of God in terms of conformation in his *Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum* (Sen), composed from 1250 to 1252 (Sen I.3.2.1.2). See Merriell 1990, 141-142.

persons if they are to imitate God in this way. Since human beings cannot understand these at present, they cannot yet fully imitate God. If they are to do this, it can occur only in some other life.

I have argued above that Aquinas has moral and theological reasons for discussing the activity of human understanding and love in his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* and in the tenth disputed question of *De veritate*. In both cases he comments on human understanding and love as part of an inquiry into the human imitation of God. In the next section this thesis is extended to his *Summa theologiae*.

Summa theologiae

1

My first point is a textual one: the famous discussion of human understanding in questions 84 through 86 of the *Summa theologiae* is bracketed by two explicit indications of its moral-theological purpose.¹⁶ The first is the programmatic point made in question 78 at the beginning of the discussion of the appetitive and intellectual powers of the human soul. At this stage Aquinas has already begun to treat those things that God has created. He is about to discuss the intellectual powers of the human soul, the texts often quoted in defense of his “epistemology.” He now introduces his consideration of the human intellectual and appetitive powers with the statement that as a *theologian* he will treat *only* the intellectual and appetitive powers in which the virtues are to be found.¹⁷ If we are to believe Aquinas, and I see no reason why we should not, we must admit that there is a theological and moral context to his discussion of the specific powers of the human soul. The claim I wish to make on

¹⁶ For a helpful discussion of Aquinas’s interest in both the practical and the speculative life, see Jordan 1995, 97-101.

¹⁷ Ad considerationem autem Theologi pertinet inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis intellectivis et appetitivis, in quibus virtutes inveniuntur (ST Ia.78). Within a discussion of Aquinas’s earlier programmatic point that the theologian is to consider the body only as it relates to the soul (ST Ia.75), James Weisheipl distinguishes between Aquinas’s theological order of investigation and Aristotle’s philosophical order. He argues that we misunderstand Aquinas concerning the powers of the human soul in his *Summa*, when we follow the interpreters of the nineteenth century in viewing these texts as adhering to a philosophical order (Weisheipl 1974, 232-233).

Aquinas's behalf is that "epistemology" conceived as a study of human knowledge for its own sake is not the purpose of his *Summa* investigation into the intellectual powers. Furthermore, he is effectively informing his readers that he is not writing a general treatise on the human soul comparable to Aristotle's *De anima*. Far from composing a taxonomy of the human soul, without concern for the final human end, Aquinas is focusing rather on a moral and theological purpose.¹⁸

The second indication occurs in question 93 at the end of the discussion on human understanding where the imitation of God is treated within the context of the first human beings. Considering the *imitatio* along with a cluster of issues having to do with Adam and Eve is not without precedent. Peter the Lombard's second treatment occurs in this context, the first, as we have seen, was in the context of the Trinity (Sent II.16). Aquinas followed the Lombard in discussing the *imitatio* in both places in his commentary.¹⁹ Yet, in the *Summa theologiae* he no longer discusses the *imitatio* within his account of the Trinity.

By placing his treatment of the *imitatio* in question 93, he positions it after his discussion of both the appetitive and the intellectual powers.²⁰ Therefore, he locates his treatment of the *imitatio* after his consideration of the specific appetitive and intellectual powers of the human soul in order to emphasize that these together imitate God.²¹ According to Aquinas, the human imitation of God occurs in both human love and understanding. By locating a single treatment of the imitation of God after his consideration of

¹⁸ In arguing for the moral nature of Aquinas's consideration of the appetitive and intellectual powers, I seek to amend the traditional view that his interest was theoretical and speculative. For a presentation of this view, see Pegis 1963a, 8: "For quite apart from the philosophical differences between Plato and Aristotle, the transition to Aristotelian psychology in the thirteenth century involved a further transition from the religious psychology of the early Middle Ages, dominated by a moral and spiritual interest in the study of man, to a psychology that must be properly called theoretical and speculative, dominated by the metaphysical framework and principles of Aristotle."

¹⁹ In treating the *imitatio* within the context of the first human beings, both Peter the Lombard and Aquinas focus on God's goodness in creating human nature in the likeness of God (In Sent II.16).

²⁰ He treats the production of the two first human beings in questions 90 through 92.

²¹ On the imitation of God as the end of the production of human beings, see Geiger 1974, 514-517.

the intellectual and appetitive powers of the human soul, Aquinas simplifies the over-arching logic of his presentation.²²

Aquinas argues in article 8 that different objects of human understanding and love call forth different species of understanding and love. For example, he notes that the species of a stone differs from the species of a horse and thus evokes a different type of understanding and love (ST Ia.93.8). He uses the view in order to distinguish those types of human understanding and love that provide an imitation of God from those that do not. Quoting Augustine, he continues to claim that there is no imitation of God in the human understanding and love of temporal things (ST Ia.93.8.ad 2). The imitation is found in the human understanding and love of God and of self. He grants a primacy to the divine species as object when he claims that the human understanding and love of God provide a direct representation of the self-understanding and -love of God (ST Ia.93.8). Due to the direct quality of this representation, the human understanding and love of God present the fullest human imitation of God that occurs in the present life.

The human understanding and love of human understanding and love is said to provide an indirect imitation of God (ST Ia.93.8). This is because the human understanding and love of human-ensouled activity are not exercised in a direct relation to God. Aquinas no longer argues that human self-reflexive activities imitate God because they are analogous to the activity of God. He claims instead that human self-reflexive activity imitates God on account of the fact that human beings can use such activity in reference to God. Therefore, when human beings understand and love their own understanding and love, they imitate God through exercising powers they could use in order to understand and love God. Stress is placed on the role that human activity can play in leading one to God.

Aquinas's purpose in discussing human understanding becomes yet more clear in the last article of question 93. He makes a distinction between "image" and "likeness" which, on the one hand, is used to effect a transition between the first two parts of the *Summa* — between his treatment of the imitation of God and his discussion of the life of virtue — and, on the other, allows him to deepen the

²² As becomes clear in question 93, Aquinas continues in his *Summa* to be interested in the *imitatio* in order to come to an understanding of the Trinity (ST Ia.93.5).

moral character of the imitation.²³ He states that while an “image” *represents* something, a “likeness” can be considered as the perfection of an image (ST Ia.93.9). Therefore, the imitation of God differs from the likeness to God as representation differs from perfection. While human understanding and love imitate God through representation, human beings can come to bear a likeness to God through the attainment of virtue.

Aquinas quotes John of Damascus as saying that human beings can bear an image of and likeness to God (ST Ia.93.9). He will shortly quote this text again in the prologue to the second part of his *Summa*, reminding the reader that he has already considered the human imitation of God and is about to discuss the perfection of this image (ST IaIIae. prol.). The imitation of God was considered in the discussion of the appetitive and intellectual powers of the human soul as well as in question 93, and the perfection of this image will be dealt with in the treatment of the life of virtue.²⁴ Therefore, the transition from the first part to the second, between the discussion of the powers of the human soul and that of virtue is a progression towards a level of greater perfection.

Aquinas’s consideration of the powers of the human soul in the first part of his *Summa* prepares his reader for the account of the life of virtue offered in the second. For example, having read Aquinas’s account of human understanding and will as an imitation of God, the reader is better able to grasp the role of reason in human choice, to understand how reason presents to the appetites objects from which human beings can choose (ST IaIIae.9.1, 13.1). Aquinas also argues that every virtuous action is an imitation of God involving reason and will. For example, he discusses the virtue of perseverance as an habitual way of continuing to pursue a project when encountering difficulties. In treating perseverance, he highlights a specific use of understanding and will in the face of adversity (ST IaIIae.137.1). Aquinas’s account of human understanding and will as an imitation of God thus constitutes a kind of prelude to his account of moral virtue as the perfection of the human imitation of God.

²³ In his study of the structure of the *Summa theologiae*, Ghislain Lafont presents the notion of image as the central organizing concept (Lafont 1961, 265-298).

²⁴ Deborah Black explains this journey as a participation in the divine (Black 1985, 41-52).

On the other hand, the relation between Aquinas's discussion of the powers of the human soul and his treatment of the life of virtue is reciprocal.²⁵ When he explains in the first part of his *Summa* how human understanding provides an imitation of God, he presupposes the account of virtue offered in the second part.²⁶ If person X is to imitate God in any full sense through coming to know and love God, he or she must already live a life of virtue and grace.²⁷ According to this account, any serious human understanding and love of God may come about only through a life of moral and theological virtue.

Aquinas's reflections on human understanding, considered within the context of the *Summa theologiae*, suggest that he treats the intellectual and appetitive powers of the human soul along with the moral and theological virtues in order to offer a precise account of the human imitation of God. He discusses the appetitive and intellectual powers of the human soul in the context of an account of human beings as wayfarers on a moral journey to God. This is a

²⁵ On the tensions between Aquinas's different principles of organization in his *Summa*, see Chenu 1964, 310-318. In his *Summa*, Aquinas follows a temporal order when he moves from God, to God's creation, and back to God. Yet he departs from this chronological order at different points in his text. For example, he reflects early in the first part on God's existence before he inquires into the properties of the divine. When he demonstrates God's existence before considering God's simplicity and oneness, he departs from a temporal order (ST Ia.2, 3, 11). God did not acquire existence before obtaining the divine attributes.

Puzzles arise when Aquinas departs from the over-arching chronological order of the work. For example, when discussing the final end of human beings at the beginning of the second part, he considers the end of human action not at the conclusion as chronology might dictate but at the beginning of an examination of human virtue. He begins his discussion of the good life with a consideration of what will occur only at the end, in order to inform his readers of the ultimate purpose of each and every human choice. And to make this point, Aquinas notes that even though something can occur at the end of a series, it can play a causal role throughout the series as a whole (ST IaIIae.1.1.ad 1).

²⁶ Furthermore, making sense of Aquinas's account of virtue becomes problematic when read apart from the third part of his *Summa*. In the third part, Aquinas explains that the incarnate Son of God is the paradigm and principle of human virtue (IIae.8.1-2). He clarifies the paradigm and source of virtue *after* his discussion of virtue. But in order to follow his discussion of virtue, readers need to be familiar with the author's view of the paradigm and source of virtue. My point is that we need to read the third part of the *Summa* in order to understand the account of virtue in the second, and the second in order to follow his account of human understanding in the first.

²⁷ Grace plays a necessary role in the attainment of the understanding of God, which is required for the perfect imitation of God (ST Ia.93.8.ad 3; IaIIae.65.2). For an account of this role, see Sorondo 1979, 140-157.

fundamentally richer treatment of the human imitation of God, and therefore of God himself, than is found in the *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* or in the tenth disputed question of *De veritate*.

Framed between the introductory comments in question 78 and the account of the imitation in question 93, Aquinas has moral reasons for considering human understanding. He discusses the specific appetitive powers of the human soul in questions 80 through 83 and the specific intellectual powers in questions 84 through 89. As in the *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* and in the tenth disputed question of *De veritate*, he treats three types of human cognition: that of material objects in questions 84 through 86, that of human understanding in 87, and that of God in 88. This enables him to distinguish the two types that imitate God from the one that does not. However, since these types do not imitate the Trinity in the present life, as he argued in *De veritate*, he adds a fourth type in question 89, namely, the cognition of the life to come. Here Aquinas considers the type of human understanding that presents the fullest general human imitation of God. Within a hierarchical order of different types of understanding, he moves from considering the type that does not imitate God to the type that provides the highest level of imitation.

2

My second point in regard to the *Summa theologiae* is that Aquinas models his discussion of the human understanding of material objects in questions 84 through 86 on his account of divine understanding. In considering human understanding according to what he has established about God's understanding in question 14, Aquinas follows Augustine in establishing similarities and dissimilarities between human and divine understanding — the kind of differences one expects within the *imitatio Dei*. My claim is that this emphasis determines the shape of the discussion to such an extent that one searches in vain for the kinds of things one would expect in a philosophical account.

For example, Aquinas argues for both a material and an immaterial component to human understanding throughout questions 84 through 86. In clarifying these components, he draws a contrast between the understanding of human beings and the understanding of God, a contrast that becomes important for his moral and theo-

logical view on the imitation of God. Consideration of this contrast begins in the first article of question 84 where he criticizes Plato's view that human understanding has nothing to do with human bodies or material objects. In contrast to Plato's stress on the immaterial, Aquinas claims that since human understanding extends to what is physically external to the one who understands, human beings understand material objects (ST Ia.84.1). His argument is that if human beings understand material objects then there must be a material aspect to human understanding.

Having insisted upon a material component in human understanding, Aquinas disputes in the second article the view that human understanding involves only matter. He attacks the Greek materialists for claiming that human understanding is a purely material activity (ST Ia.84.2). If this is so, then every material thing should have cognition, which, as he states, is patently false. The conclusion drawn is that human understanding does not involve only matter.

In claiming that an inverse relationship exists between the matter possessed by a being and its cognitive power, Aquinas proposes a relationship between immateriality and understanding, thus situating human beings on the scale of beings that understand (ST Ia.84.2). Therefore, the higher the level of immateriality that a being possesses, the higher the level of cognitive power. As plants and merely sensible souls do not abstract form from the individuating conditions of matter, these beings do not possess higher levels of cognitive power. In receiving form abstracted from the individuating conditions of matter, human beings rank on the scale of understanding above these beings. Yet, on account of the role that materiality plays in human understanding, human beings do not represent the highest level of intellectual power. Human understanding is limited when compared with the understanding of angels and God.

Since angels and God are completely immaterial beings that understand without any need for matter, they represent the highest level of cognitive power (ST Ia.84.2). Aquinas uses the notion of understanding through one's essence to distinguish the two, a view he has already explained in question 14. Angels do not understand through their own essence, but God's understanding is his essence (ST Ia.14.4). Because God's understanding is his own essence, there is no multiplicity in divine understanding. Unlike human and angel-

ic understanding, the understanding of God is farthest removed from multiplicity and represents the highest level of intellectual understanding.²⁸

In question 85 Aquinas continues to consider understanding in terms of a hierarchy. In the first article, cognitive beings are distinguished according to whether they are material, immaterial, or composite (ST Ia.85.1). He notes again that since human understanding has material and immaterial elements, it stands between the more enmattered cognition of the lower animals and the completely immaterial understanding of the angels and God. The concepts “phantasm” and “abstraction” are used to indicate a middle position that human beings inhabit.

Human beings occupy this middle position because they understand form both as it *is* and as it is *not* in the material individual (ST Ia.85.1). While human beings understand the form of natural things, they do not simply receive it from material objects. Human beings actively abstract immaterial form from the phantasms they have of physical objects. Therefore, for human beings, form *is* in the material individual to the degree that it is in the phantasm derived from physical objects, and it is *not* to the degree that it is arrived at through intellectual abstraction. The degree to which form is *not* in the material individual is the reason why human understanding ranks above the sense cognition of the lower animals. The degree to which form *is* in the material individual is the reason why human understanding ranks below the purely immaterial understanding of the angels and God.

In his second and third articles, Aquinas maps out a set of priorities between the material and immaterial aspects of human

²⁸ In articles three through eight Aquinas further treats the material and immaterial elements of human understanding that distinguish it from the understanding of God. For example, in article three, he opposes an objection to the material component of human understanding when he argues that Plato was wrong to think that human beings understand through the use of innate species. If human beings comprehend through innate species, then they would not forget what they already know. But since human beings do forget what they have learned, they do not understand through innate species. Then, in articles four and five, Aquinas maintains that human beings understand neither through forms separate from matter nor through eternal ideas. He argues instead for a material component to human understanding. In articles six through eight, he provides further clarification of the material and immaterial character of human understanding when he distinguishes the corporeal impression involved in human understanding from the intelligible species.

understanding that distinguish human cognition from the divine. He claims that human beings first understand the individual of which the intelligible species is the likeness (ST Ia.85.2). For example, human beings understand individual tables and chairs before they understand “tableness” or “chairness.” Therefore, understanding material objects is prior to understanding immaterial species. The second priority is that there is something more universal in human understanding that precedes what is less universal (ST Ia.85.3). For example, in order to define human beings as rational animals, human beings must first understand the more universal concept of animal. The more universal concept is required in order to define what it means to be human. Accordingly, what is more universal in human understanding is prior to what is less universal.

The priorities that Aquinas discusses in human understanding are not shared by God. All priority is foreign to the understanding of God. Aquinas argued in article seven of question 14 that God understands all things at once. There is therefore no reason to speak of priority in the understanding of God. Human beings, on the other hand, unlike God, do not understand many things at once (ST Ia.85.4). The human intellect generates the likenesses of things successively because human intellects move from potentiality to act. Since Aquinas has already stated that God understands all things at once, he offers a contrast between human and divine understanding when he argues that human beings do not understand many things at once. The successive understanding of human beings differs from the simultaneous understanding of God. Furthermore, in the fifth article Aquinas argues that human beings understand by combining and dividing properties, accidents, and relations (ST Ia.85.5). He notes that God does not combine or divide in order to understand. Therefore, in combining and dividing, human understanding again differs from the simultaneous understanding of God.

In article 6, Aquinas discusses intellectual error. He notes that human beings can err in understanding (ST Ia.85.6). The attentive reader knows that Aquinas has already argued that God cannot err (ST Ia.16.5). Since human beings can err but God cannot, we have another contrast between human and divine understanding. Likewise in article 7, where Aquinas discusses the variable degrees to which human beings understand (ST Ia.85.7), having already argued that understanding is invariable for God (ST Ia.14.15). Finally, in article 8, Aquinas claims that since they can understand

only bodily objects in the present life, and since complete indivisibility stands in contrast to bodily objects, human beings, unlike God, cannot directly understand what is completely indivisible (ST Ia.85.8). God, however, understands all things that are, including that which is indivisible (ST Ia.14.9).

The contrast between human and divine understanding is developed in question 86. In the first article Aquinas asks whether human beings can understand singular things (ST Ia.86.1). He argues that since human beings need universals in order to understand material objects, they understand universals directly but singulars only indirectly. Having already argued that God understands singulars directly in question 14, he furnishes another contrast between human and divine understanding (ST Ia.14.11). And after concluding earlier that God understands what is infinite (ST Ia.14.12), he argues in the second article that the human intellect, unlike the divine, cannot directly understand what is infinite (ST Ia.86.2).²⁹ In articles three and four, Aquinas contrasts human and divine understanding in regard to understanding contingents (ST Ia.86.3-4). He already argued in question 14 that God understands contingents directly in the present, past, and future (ST Ia.14.13). He now claims that human beings, by contrast, do not have such an understanding of contingents.

In questions 84 through 86 Aquinas uses terms like intellect, species, abstraction, and phantasm in order to contrast human understanding with the understanding of God. Having already discussed specific characteristics of divine understanding, he now considers human understanding in reference to many of the same. But since human understanding falls short of the perfection of divine understanding, this is an inquiry into the specific limitations of human understanding. Human beings err, possess variable degrees of understanding, and cannot understand what is indivisible. They are dependent on material things, cannot directly understand singulars, what is infinite, or what is contingent. Aquinas's readers know that God alone can understand all these things, that he alone possesses understanding in the highest degree.

²⁹ Aquinas's reply to the first objection of the second article of question 86 ultimately explains why he argues that human beings cannot understand infinity (ST Ia.86.2.ad 1). He notes that he has already stated that God is infinite (ST Ia.7). Therefore, in arguing that human beings cannot directly understand what is infinite, he denies that human beings can directly understand God.

This treatment of the limited character of human understanding becomes important for the presentation of the human imitation of God. For example, when Aquinas explains why human beings cannot imitate God perfectly, he notes that a perfect image lacks nothing that is also in the original (ST Ia.93.1). If human beings are to present the perfect imitation of God, they must possess all that is of God. Yet, since human activity is limited in comparison with the activity of God, human beings cannot present the perfect imitation of God. Only a being that has a nature identical to that of God can present a perfect imitation (ST Ia.93.1.ad 2). Since the Son of God shares the same nature as God, he presents the perfect imitation of God.

While Aquinas argues in question 93 that human beings can present at best an imperfect imitation of God, he does not explain the limited character of human understanding because to do so would be to repeat what he has said earlier. Instead, Aquinas assumes that the reader will have absorbed his account of divine understanding in questions 14 through 16 of the first part of his *Summa* as well as his consideration of the human understanding of material things in questions 84 through 86. Each limitation on human understanding provides one more reason why human beings can offer only an imperfect imitation of God.

In describing the limits of human understanding, Aquinas remains faithful to the conclusion of Augustine's *De Trinitate* (T), which is that one can only arrive at an inadequate picture of the Trinity in the present life due to the inadequacies of the human *imitatio Dei*. In the final book of this work, Augustine offers a sketch of these limits when explaining the following about human thought: it moves in succession from thought to thought (T 15.7.13); depends on bodily senses (T 15.12.22); comes in degrees and can be lost (T 15.13.22); is not the same as one's being (T 15.15.24); and cannot comprehend what is indivisible (T 15.23.44). In each case a contrast is drawn between human and divine cognition in order to underline the conclusion that human beings cannot at present have any full knowledge of God — each of these points are, in turn, developed at greater length and precision by Aquinas in his *Summa theologiae*.

What is missing from Aquinas's discussion are the kinds of topics one would expect to find in a philosophical account of human understanding. For example, in the second and third books of his

De anima Aristotle clarifies the operations of the human soul through consideration of sensation, the five senses, common sense, and the passive and active aspects of understanding.³⁰ Yet, while Aquinas discusses the exterior senses in order to determine their number (ST Ia.78.3), common sense in order to claim that the interior senses are fittingly distinguished (ST Ia.78.4), and the active and possible intellects in order to oppose the view that the understanding of material things does not involve abstraction (ST Ia.85.1.ad 3, ad 4), he offers no speculative treatments.³¹ In stating that as a theologian he treats only the intellectual and appetitive powers in which the virtues are to be found, he indicates that he is not concerned with human understanding for its own sake.³² He has not written a treatise on the powers of the human soul, but rather discussed the intellectual and appetitive powers for the purpose of explicating the human imitation of God.³³ Careful to distinguish human understanding from the divine, he describes the various limits of this imitation. Because moral and theological goals guide his discussion, caution is needed when interpreting it in light of issues raised in modern philosophy.

There cannot be a moral or a theological motive for an epistemology, because such motives preclude the autonomy of this area of philosophy.³⁴ Aquinas has mined Aristotle's account of human understanding for a moral purpose rather than for theory or speculation. He borrows specific concepts and accounts in order to explain the moral-theological return of human beings to God but gives no account of human understanding independent of a moral

³⁰ 416b32-418a26, 418a26-424a15, 426b8-427a16, 429a10-430a25, respectively.

³¹ Even though Aquinas does discuss the active and possible intellects in question 79, he is concerned here to distinguish the powers of the human soul. His focus is not epistemological.

³² (ST Ia.78) Aquinas's statements in the first question of the *Summa* that sacred teaching considers creatures only in relation to God helps to explain why he treats human understanding for a theological purpose. His project is one of sacred teaching (ST Ia.1.3.ad 1, ad 7).

³³ Both De Beaurecueil and Merriell argue that the *imitatio* is central to Aquinas's consideration of human beings, yet they differ as to whether he continues to treat it within the context of the Trinity. De Beaurecueil views him as offering an anthropological account of the imitation while Merriell concludes that the Trinity is central to his account of human activity. I agree with the latter. See De Beaurecueil 1952, 50, 81-82; 1955, 50-51; Merriell 1990, 157-158.

³⁴ On the autonomy of philosophy in the thirteenth century, see Marenbon 1990.

interest in creation as flowing from, and returning to, God. In this sense he does not respect the autonomy of epistemology. As is evident in his discussion of the human understanding of material objects, self, God, and in the life to come in questions 84 through 89, this consideration is itself moral, shaped by an interest in clarifying the highest good.³⁵ Since moral knowledge is not speculation, a category mistake occurs when one reads Aquinas's moral-theological discussion of understanding as a speculative treatise on intellectual power.

Questions 84 through 86 of the first part of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, viewed within the context of his earlier works and of the *Summa* as a whole, suggest that he inquires into human cognition for moral and theological purposes, a common practice at a time when intellectual questions remained largely within the boundaries of the *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* of Peter the Lombard.³⁶ Aquinas does not break with the Augustinian tradition of discussing the activity of the human mind in a consideration of the human imitation of God.³⁷ He continues to find signs of God in the activity of the human soul. This is not surprising if we recall that the regular teaching of a master in theology at this time consisted in lecturing on the books of the Bible.³⁸ In discussing the imitation of God in the first part of the *Summa*, Aquinas is preparing Dominican students to follow scriptural discussions of this imitation.³⁹ For example, he helps them to follow his lectures on the first book of Corinthians, his *Super I ad Corinthios* (In I Cor), where he explains St. Paul's consideration of the "image and glory of God."⁴⁰ What

³⁵ Daniel Frank argues a similar point with reference to Maimonides (Frank 1995, 73).

³⁶ Odon Lottin explains how the Lombard would lead masters of theology in the thirteenth century to consider the faculties of the human soul in relation to the Trinity (Lottin 1957, 1: 483-502).

³⁷ The use of reason to explain an imitation held on faith illustrates the Neoplatonic unity of Aquinas's project. Wayne Hanke argues that Aquinas depends on Pseudo-Dionysius in using both reason and faith within a single project. See Hanke 1979, 105-108.

³⁸ For a discussion of this point, see Principe 1980, ch. 5, p. 22. On the importance of using Aquinas's commentaries on Scripture for explicating his use of Aristotle, see Stump 1993, 252-268.

³⁹ On the audience of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, see Boyle 1982, 8-18. Jean-Pierre Torrell draws on recent research to offer a clear, if brief, presentation of the Dominican context of the *Summa theologiae* in the first volume of his biography of Aquinas (Torrell 1996, 142-159).

⁴⁰ In this text, Aquinas contrasts the imperfect human imitation of God with the perfect imitation by the Son of God (In I Cor 11.2.603-604).

might sound to a modern reader like an inquiry into the nature of human understanding is, in fact, a preparation for the study of Scripture.

If Aquinas's consideration of the human understanding of material things in questions 84 through 86 of the first part of his *Summa theologiae* forms part of an inquiry into the image and likeness of God, then we need to trade our epistemological cap for a moral and theological one. I am suggesting that Aquinas comments on concepts like abstraction and species only as part of a moral and theological account of human beings as images of God. If my thesis is true, then we should read Aquinas's extensive comments on human understanding, including his discussions of phantasms and passive intellects, as a moral account that leads to a consideration of the divine. Using concepts like phantasm and passive intellect in an account of the human imitation of God is to write a wholly different type of text from the *De anima* of Aristotle. Aquinas does not simply insert Greek philosophy into his theology, that we may then, as Gilson claims, extract (Gilson 1955, 366). He uses philosophical concepts as components within a different type of project. He discusses human understanding within a theological treatment of the moral imitation of God, an account that is informed by his religious belief that human beings imitate a God that is three and one. Since he assumes, and never establishes, that human beings are made in the image of God, Aquinas writes an account of a tenet held on faith. This does not mean that he is irrational or that philosophers have nothing to gain from the study of Aquinas.⁴¹ On the contrary, he has many interesting things to say concerning human understanding, but within a moral-theological account of the human journey to God.

Aquinas was not alone in discussing human understanding in order to explicate the divine. This had become the accepted institutional practice by the middle of the thirteenth century. The theological character of these texts has implications for their use in the presentation of an individual's "epistemology." For example, question four of Duns Scotus's commentary on the third distinction of

⁴¹ I do not wish to imply that we should no longer compare what Aquinas and various philosophers have to say about human understanding. For example, we might want to consider Aquinas and Kant on the limits of human understanding. But failing to bring out the very different reasons each has for discussing human understanding patently leads to misrepresentation.

the first book of Peter the Lombard's *Sentences* (Ord) is a classic text for presenting his "epistemology" (Ord I.3.4). Allan Wolter, the historian of Franciscan medieval philosophy, prints this entire question under the heading "Concerning Human Knowledge" in his translation of Scotus, *Philosophical Writings* (Duns Scotus 1987, 96-132). And the question that Scotus poses does sound as if he has epistemological concerns: whether human beings are able to understand any truths with certainty without the intimate enlightenment of the uncreated light. Yet, reading this question in the context of his commentary on the third distinction as a whole suggests that Scotus has concerns that are more theological in nature. For example, in the next question he considers whether there is a vestige of the Trinity in all creatures (Ord I.3.5). Scotus moves from discussing vestiges to considering, in questions six through ten, the activity of the human mind, and in doing so follows Augustine's belief that mere vestiges cannot be imitations of God. Scotus thus discusses the human mind in order to clarify the human imitation of God, which he treats in question eleven, the last question of distinction three (Ord I.3.11). To treat his discussion of human understanding apart from this context is to misrepresent Scotus.

Historians also cite Ockham's commentary on the third distinction of the first book of the *Sentences* (O) when presenting his epistemology. For example, both Julius Weinberg, in his *Short History of Medieval Philosophy*, and John Boler, in his "Intuitive and abstractive cognition" printed in the *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, cite this distinction in their accounts.⁴² Boler cites questions five through eight of the commentary on distinction three when explaining Ockham's view that human knowledge is either of concepts or of individuals. But to cite these questions without discussing the theological direction of the text misrepresents Ockham. This text is not an inquiry into the nature of human knowledge. For example, in the next question, Ockham considers whether there is a vestige of the Trinity in creatures. And in question ten, the last question on the third distinction, Ockham considers whether there is an image of the Trinity in rational creatures (O 3.9-10). His distinction between understanding concepts and individuals is key to clarifying how human beings imitate God.

⁴² (Weinberg 1964, 257; and Boler 1982, 466) Both also rely on the first question of the prologue to the first book, another striking theological context.

Reading Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham contextually suggests that they have moral and theological reasons for discussing human understanding. If medieval thinkers discussed human understanding for moral and theological purposes, then we need to reevaluate our philosophical presentations of these discussions. We need to rethink whether they conducted inquiries into the nature of human knowledge that can be legitimately classified under the sphere of philosophy known as epistemology.

The discussions of human understanding considered in this chapter are technical explanations of how the activity of the human soul imitates God. This has ramifications for the historiography of medieval philosophy. For since these discussions are clarifications of a point held on faith, it is inaccurate to label them as philosophy. In explicating medieval discussions of human understanding we bump our heads against the relation between philosophy and theology, the very problem earlier historians thought they had settled. Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham do not seem so much to have reconciled faith and reason in their accounts of human understanding, as to have co-opted reason within accounts of faith. Brucker and Hegel appear to have had a point when claiming that the Latin medievals wrote theology and not philosophy.

CHAPTER TEN

THE FALSE DICHOTOMY OF REASON AND REVELATION

Writers of general histories of philosophy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries argued that faith placed limits on the free exercise of philosophy in the Middle Ages. After Kleutgen and Stöckl had interpreted the history of medieval philosophy according to the problem of reason and revelation, it became common to hold that the medievals had engaged freely in philosophical issues, that is, that they, and especially Aquinas, had reconciled reason and revelation in such a way that they were able to discuss philosophical questions free from the encroachment of ecclesiastical dogma. Those today who interpret the medievals according to the standard branches of philosophy presuppose this reconciliation and remain faithful to the Kleutgen-Stöckl model.

But did Aquinas, and other Latin medievals, contribute to the standard branches of philosophy? A reevaluation is in order as to whether we should speak about “the epistemology” or “the philosophy” of Aquinas, Scotus, or Ockham. If philosophy is either an inquiry into the natural world for its own sake, or into the conditions that must be presupposed for human experience, then as Brucker argued, many Latin medieval writers did not write philosophy. While, in this chapter, I will devote my remarks largely to Aquinas, I do not intend that what I say should apply only to him. My suggestion is that by keeping in mind why the history of medieval philosophy has been written as it has, and reconsidering what it means to talk about the Latin medieval use of philosophy, we can begin to construct a more accurate model of the history of medieval thought.

If Aquinas discusses human understanding for a moral and theological purpose, what does this imply about interpreting him according to the branches of philosophy? Did he conceive himself as doing philosophy, and if not, then in what sense did he reconcile reason and revelation? Gilson’s characterization of Aquinas’s use of philosophy in his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* offers an appropriate point of departure. Gilson characterizes

Aquinas as writing theology in such a way that his philosophy can be “extracted” from his theology without doing an injustice to his philosophy:

... in the particular case of Thomas Aquinas, we are meeting a theologian so careful to distinguish between faith and reason that the philosophical elements included in his theology can be extracted from it and considered apart without undergoing any modification in nature or content. (Gilson 1955, 366)

For the Gilson of 1955 Aquinas is, as he was for Kleutgen and Stöckl, a great medieval thinker, on account of the autonomy that he grants to reason within his theology. Yet because philosophy no longer plays such a role in theology, it is hard for us moderns to understand this use: “We are living in times so different from those of Thomas Aquinas that it is difficult for us to understand how philosophy can become theology and yet gain in rationality” (Gilson 1955, 365). While Gilson recognizes that Aquinas borrows much from Augustine’s “Magnificent elaboration of Christian dogma,” he contrasts the “objective” nature of Aquinas’s brand of theology with the personalism of the medieval Augustinian tradition (Gilson 1955, 364). He argues that philosophy holds an autonomous position in the theology of Aquinas, which it did not have for the Augustinians.¹

Augustine had argued in his *De civitate Dei* (CD) that the life of philosophy is not for the Christian. He did not grant autonomy to philosophy within theology. For example, in relation to virtue, Augustine indicates a distaste for philosophy apart from the grace of God when he claims that those who speak of virtue without speaking of grace only speak of vice:

For what kind of mistress of the body and the vices can that mind be which is ignorant of the true God, and which, instead of being subject to His authority, is prostituted to the corrupting influences of the most vicious demons? It is for this reason that the virtues which it seems to itself to possess, and by which it restrains the body and the vices that it may obtain and keep what it desires, are rather vices than virtues so long as there is no reference to God in the matter. For although some suppose that virtues which have a reference only

¹ Gilson notes that a formal distinction exists for Aquinas between natural knowledge and supernatural knowledge (Gilson 1955, 367).

to themselves, and are desired only on their own account, are yet true and genuine virtues, the fact is that even then they are inflated with pride, and are therefore to be reckoned vices rather than virtues. (CD 19.25; 707, Dods trans.)

Those who speak of virtue apart from the "true" God are the Greek and Roman philosophers. Augustine argues that this philosophy is limited because the philosophers do not act with God's authority (CD 2.7). The days of viewing the world apart from the Christian God are numbered. Philosophy conceived as the use of natural wisdom apart from the Christian God is vice.

In his history Gilson presents Bonaventure as continuing to view the world only in relation to God. He explains that when Bonaventure discusses nature he speaks as if he sees the face of God in creatures:

The confident ease and deep emotion with which Brother Bonaventure discovers in things that very visage of God, closely resemble the sentiments of Francis, reading like an illuminated manuscript the beautiful book of nature. And no doubt, sentiments are not doctrines, but it happens that they engender doctrines. To that permanent emotion of a heart that feels itself near to God we owe the refusal to follow up to its very final consequences the philosophy of Aristotle, and the persistent maintenance of an intimate contact between creatures and their creator. (Gilson 1955, 340)

Gilson's point is that Bonaventure is Augustinian in the manner in which he speaks about creatures. He and Aquinas do not speak about creatures in the same way. While Bonaventure speaks about creatures in order to speak about God, Aquinas makes full use of the philosophy of Aristotle to speak about creatures qua creatures. Bonaventure's account of the divine creation of the world in his *Collationes in Hexaemeron* (CH) clarifies the point. Here he argues that since the philosophers did not take faith into account, philosophy cannot lead one out of darkness:

Faith, therefore, heals, rectifies and orders; in this way the soul is able to be moderated, made right, and ordered. The philosophers were unacquainted with this. Therefore, only faith separates light from darkness. (CH 7.13)

Philosophy is not a suitable enterprise for the Christian. Bonaventure speaks of faith in the present tense, and of philoso-

phers in the past tense.² No longer are the days of philosophy numbered as they were for Augustine. For Bonaventure, the days of philosophy as an independent enterprise are over.

I wish to argue against Gilson's distinction between Bonaventure and Aquinas and maintain that the latter is more Augustinian than the French Thomist claimed in 1955. For example, Aquinas continues to view philosophy as a relic from a past age when he remarks, like Augustine, that in order for human beings to attain their proper end, God must infuse human beings with the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity:

It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply; since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine on the words, All that is not of faith is sin (Rom. xiv. 23), says: He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good. (ST IaIIae.65.2; 1: 863, Dominican trans.)

The acquired virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice become perfect only to the degree that they help people to their ultimate end (ST IaIIae.63.3). The ancient philosophers provide an insufficient account of ethics because they espouse an imperfect life, a life of sin according to St. Paul.

For Augustine, as well as for Aquinas, the life of philosophy is inadequate for human perfection. Human happiness on earth is of no value if people fail to obtain their true happiness in heaven. When Aquinas states that he will discuss human action as the imitation of God in the prologue to the first part of the second part of his *Summa*, he points towards the final end of the human virtuous life which is union with God. Philosophy alone will not lead to this end because philosophy is oriented only to nature. While Aquinas holds that human beings naturally tend and intend to unite with

² In speaking about philosophers in this late text, Bonaventure is not referring only to the ancients, but also to certain masters of arts and masters of theology at the University of Paris who were thought to hold the view that philosophy alone was sufficient for the good life (CH 1. 9; Bougerol 1964, 131-132; Ratzinger 1971, 148-160; Hayes 1994, 44).

God, he states that they can attain this goal only if they receive the theological virtues through divine infusion (ST IaIIae.62.1). And a life of grace-infused virtue is not the life of a philosopher.

I do not mean to imply that Aquinas was opposed to the study of philosophy. For example, when discussing the vice of curiosity, he considers the usefulness of philosophy for a Christian. He states that philosophy can be used both rightly and wrongly (ST IIaIIae.167.1.ad 1, ad 3). His argument for its usefulness is that philosophers have been able to obtain truth, and since God is the source of all truth, God is the source of contemporary sacred truth as well as of ancient philosophical truth. Because philosophers have attained some measure of truth, Christians may study philosophy. Yet while he holds that Christians can put the study of philosophy to good use, he does not suggest that they should live the life of philosophy.

In the middle of the thirteenth century members of the Dominican order were forbidden to study the arts, including logic, at the universities. The master of the order, Raymond of Peñafort, reiterated this rule in the edition of the Dominican constitutions that he completed in 1241.³ It was not, however, understood to mean that Dominicans had to forego the study of Aristotle. The Peñafort constitutions clearly permitted the study of ancient philosophy by those who obtained a dispensation from their superior in the order.⁴ The formal study of the works of Aristotle was carried out at Dominican houses of study, such as that at Cologne where Aquinas studied under Albert the Great.⁵

Within this context Aquinas defends the reading of philosophy by members of religious orders devoted to preaching and study. Yet he qualifies the use to which they are to put philosophy. When arguing that religious orders should indeed be established for preaching and study, he notes that while philosophers studied literature for the secular teaching, members of these religious orders are to direct themselves principally to the sacred teaching that they find in such texts.⁶ Since members of religious orders devote their entire lives to the service of God, they have no use for what is not help-

³ (Tugwell 1982, 455) Aquinas entered the order between 1242 and 1244 (Weisheipl 1974, 27; Tugwell 1988, 204; Torrell 1996, 8-10).

⁴ Denifle and Ehrle 1885-1900, 5: 562.

⁵ Weisheipl 1974, 36-38; Tugwell 1988, 207-210; Torrell 1996, 24-27.

⁶ (ST IIaIIae.188.5.ad 3) On this point, see Gilson 1955, 365.

ful for the study of the divine. Aquinas promotes the study of secular teaching by members of religious orders for the sole purpose of sacred teaching (“nisi inquantum ordinantur ad sacram doctrinam”), one implication being, that a member of the Dominican order ought to study Greek philosophy only for this purpose.

One problem about reflecting on the proper use of philosophy within sacred teaching concerns the way in which the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology’ have come to be applied in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is the difficulty to which Gilson alludes that we can no longer understand the medieval use of philosophy within theology (Gilson 1955, 365). Albert Stöckl is representative of the identification of philosophy with the rational study of natural things for their own sake when he defines “philosophy” in his *Lehrbuch der Philosophie* as the natural knowledge of the highest and final causes of those things that can be known (Stöckl 1887, 1: 4-5). Philosophy is natural wisdom. Yet, this does not appear to be Aquinas’s project.⁷ For example, he does not conduct an inquiry into human understanding or virtue apart from a moral interest in the human imitation of God.

But if Aquinas is not doing philosophy conceived as the study of natural things for their own sake, should we say he is doing theology? Again, Stöckl is representative of the identification of theology with revelation and the supernatural when he defines it as that which has been revealed supernaturally by God and which lies beyond what we can know with reason (Stöckl 1887, 1: 4-5). But when Aquinas discusses human beings as bearing the image of God, he does not limit his treatment to what lies beyond human reason. He talks about “species” and “abstraction” as part of his inquiry into the imitation of God. If theology consists only in reflection on the supernatural, Aquinas does not do theology. While it has been common to speak Stöckl-wise of philosophy as dealing rationally with the natural world for its own sake, and theology as dealing with revelation, neither category does justice to Aquinas. To ask whether Aquinas is a philosopher or a theologian according to these definitions is to propose a false dichotomy.

⁷ The anonymous author of the *Chronicle’s* 1867 review of the third volume of Stöckl’s history is right in stating that: “It is only half the truth to say that the schoolmen received the philosophy of Aristotle and turned it so far as they knew how, unaltered, to the service of the Church. They altered it by the mere application to subject-matter so different” (Scholasticism 1867, 923).

Aquinas does not separate the natural from the supernatural in the way that he has been understood by Kleutgen and Stöckl. Friedrich Michelis was right to criticize Kleutgen for presenting Aquinas as distinguishing too sharply between the two (Michelis 1861, 72-73). While Aquinas does consider natural capacities, and even things above nature, in his discussion of human understanding he does not separate the natural world from the supernatural.⁸ If this is right, then the effort on behalf of the Counter-Reformation to extract Aquinas's philosophy from his theology has given us an inaccurate picture of his thought.⁹

A clarification of Aquinas's concept of sacred teaching (*sacra doctrina*) provides a key to how he uses philosophical language within theology without separating the natural world from the sacred. In discussing sacred teaching in the second question of his unfinished *Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate* (BDT), a question on the human understanding of God, Aquinas asks whether it is permissible to use philosophy in sacred teaching. He explains that it is, for three different purposes: to demonstrate the preambles of faith, for example that God exists or that God is one; to clarify faith through analogy, as he does when discussing human remembering, understanding, and willing as an imaging of the Trinity; and to resist what is contrary to faith, by demonstrating what is false (BDT 2.3). Aquinas does, however, place an important qualification on the use of philosophy within sacred teaching. He states that we should be

⁸ For the classic discussion of this point, see Lubac 1967, 25-65.

⁹ For example, the Jesuit Cosmus Alemannus (1559-1634), was one of the first to write an account of the philosophy of Aquinas: *Summa Philosophiae: ex variis libris D. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici in ordinem Cursus Philosophici*, published from 1618 to 1623. In his title Alemannus announces the general methodology of his project. He has gathered Aquinas's philosophical positions from his various primary works and arranged them according to the order required in the study of philosophy. He reconfigures the thought of Aquinas because he has a purpose Aquinas did not have, namely, to construct a philosophy. In his title, Alemannus acknowledges the labor he has expended in extracting Aquinas's accounts of logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics. Once it became customary to discuss medieval philosophy apart from theology, writers would no longer need to expend this effort. There would be a ready model in which to discuss medieval philosophy.

As Alemannus's *Summa* represents the first stage in the transition from Aquinas's text to the textbook tradition, he remains very close to Aquinas, including thousands of citations to the primary texts. Rarely would writers of Thomistic manuals in later periods introduce points directly from the texts of Aquinas. For this reason Franz Ehrle would publish a new edition of this work in the late nineteenth century and Robert Schmidt would call the volume on logic, "the best manual from the point of view of exegesis" (Schmidt 1966, vii).

on our guard against viewing sacred teaching from within the limits (“*sub metis*”) of philosophy, as if what has been obtained through philosophy is all that is true. Rather, philosophy needs to be kept within the limits of faith. There is nothing wrong with borrowing concepts and arguments from philosophy in order to explain and defend what is held on faith, but one is thereby doing sacred teaching, and not philosophy.

The classic text from Isaiah 1: 22, about not mixing water and wine, serves Aquinas in his suggesting a transformation of philosophy. The objection, which he argues against, is that since according to Scripture we are not to mix water and wine, and since water often stands for philosophy and wine for sacred teaching, we are not to mix philosophy and sacred teaching (BDT 2.3.ob 5). The implication of this objection is that Christians should not use philosophy within sacred teaching. Aquinas responds by explaining the legitimate use to which the works of the philosophers can be put in the service of the faith. While philosophic texts are not permitted within sacred teaching as a mixing of water with wine, they may be changed into wine (BDT 2.3.ad 5). His point is that just as Christ changed water into wine at the wedding at Cana, philosophy can be legitimately used within sacred teaching by a similar transformation.¹⁰ While the substance of water does not remain after it has been changed into the substance of wine, philosophy does not remain after it has been changed into the substance of sacred teaching. No mixing of philosophy and sacred teaching occurs, but a transformation of philosophy is effected.

Aquinas gives a further indication of the use of philosophy within sacred teaching when he considers whether God is the subject of sacred teaching in the first question of the *Summa*. He argues that since He is, when we do sacred teaching, we ought to discuss things only in relation to God. We are to consider either God himself or things *as they are ordered to God* as to their source or end.¹¹ Since

¹⁰ There is also a sense in which Aquinas follows Aristotle in considering theology to be the principal science served by the particular philosophical sciences. When philosophy serves the principal science, the science of the end, it serves theology. On this point, see Crouse 1975, 182-183. Yet Crouse argues that Aristotle's notion of metaphysics is sufficient to account for his concept of theology. While this may be true in Aquinas's prologue to his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, it does not account for his discussion of sacred teaching. It is the notion of sacred teaching that he develops at some length and not that of theology.

¹¹ (ST Ia.1.3.ad 1) Also see ST Ia.1.7.

sacred teaching concerns God and the relation of creatures to God, it does not include the study of created things for their own sake.

Understanding Aquinas's notion of sacred teaching helps to clarify how he can use philosophy to talk about the relation of God to his creatures without separating the natural world from the supernatural, in effect, how he can change philosophy into sacred teaching.¹² For example, he draws an analogy between the role of the human will in a charitable act, and the use of natural reason in sacred teaching (ST Ia.8.ad 2). With reference to the Scholastic maxim that grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, he argues that just as charity causes the natural inclination of the will to give way in human action, so can natural reason in sacred teaching. The human will yields to charity as a result of the infusion of God's grace. Grace does not oppose the human will, it moves the will, and perfects human action. The analogy is that reason is not opposed to sacred teaching but is taken up and used for the purpose of explicating the faith. And just as when charity moves the will, it is no longer a natural use of the will; so, when faith makes use of reason, it is no longer a natural use of reason.¹³ The inference one draws here is that while philosophical arguments are used within sacred teaching, they are no longer philosophy.

As was noted in the last chapter, Aquinas adopts an order of inquiry from Aristotle's *De anima* when discussing the imitation of God. Aristotle explains that the objects of sensation and the intellect are to be discussed in order to consider the sensible and the intellectual powers (415a 15-22). Specifying the objects helps to specify the power. Aquinas notes this point in his *Sententia liber De anima* (DA) where he insists upon discussing the object of understanding in order to discuss the act of human understanding.¹⁴ He

¹² J. H. Walgrave classifies this use of philosophy in the service of theology as one of remote similitude (Walgrave 1976, 190-193). David Burrell speaks about the role that theological tradition plays in guiding intellectual inquiry (Burrell 1994, 25-27). A. Patfoort understands Aquinas's project as a rational defense of theological truth in the face of error (Patfoort 1977, 484-488).

¹³ Reading these texts under the influence of the Enlightenment, we want Aquinas to delineate more clearly than he does between effort and grace. This need on our part says more about our *Weltanschauung* than it does about Aquinas.

¹⁴ (DA II.6.304-308) Aquinas wrote his commentary on the *De anima*, his *Sententia libri De anima* either while composing, or after finishing, the first part of his *Summa theologiae* (Weisheipl 1974, 215-216, 361, 378; Torrell 1996, 171-174, 341). Even though he might have written this commentary after his *Summa*, and certainly after his *Scriptum*, the comments he offers suggest the origin of his approach to the human imitation of God.

explains that, for Aristotle, the human intellect—unlike the divine—cannot gaze upon itself. Human beings must proceed from the objects of cognition in order to grasp the intellectual activity of the human soul. In grasping these acts, one can understand his or her own cognitive power, that is, the activity of one's own soul (DA II.6.308; III.9.724-725). This is the order of inquiry adopted in the accounts of the imitation of God in his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, in the tenth disputed question of *De veritate*, and in the *Summa theologiae*.

Once again, what sounds to a modern reader like an account of knowledge for its own sake is in fact a moral-theological excursus.¹⁵ Aquinas has changed Aristotle's philosophical discussion of the rational powers of the human soul into sacred teaching. He offers an account of the moral imitation of God, an intellectual account informed by his belief that human beings imitate a God that is three and one.¹⁶ To abstract his comments on human understanding and present them as an account of knowledge for its own sake is to change sacred teaching back into philosophy.

Gilson himself makes a similar point in his *The Philosopher and Theology*, published in 1962, where he announces that he has changed his mind on what has been for him the central philosophical question since his youth, the relation of reason to revelation (Gilson 1962, 5). He admits that he had hitherto failed to appreciate the full extent of the theological character of medieval thought. He now claims that the Scholastics did not have philosophical problems or use philosophical methods: "The scholastic theologies of the Middle Ages were true theologies; none of them was a philosophy. Neither their ultimate problems, nor their methods, nor the light in which they resolved these problems were the same as in philosophy" (Gilson 1962, 102). Arguing that medieval theology would become philosophy in the seventeenth century, Gilson implies that

¹⁵ Another example is the theological context that Mark F. Johnson provides for Aquinas's five arguments for the existence of God. He argues that read carefully, Aquinas's arguments for the necessity of revelation, the existence of God, and the theological virtues are a demonstration of the existence of sacred teaching (Johnson 1991, 93-97).

¹⁶ When considering Aquinas's synthesis of eschatology and the natural desire to know, Jan Aertsen explains it as an interweavement of faith and philosophy (Aertsen 1988, 218). My claim is that when discussing human understanding, terms like synthesis and interweavement do not do justice to his project. I hope to have demonstrated that Aquinas treats human understanding for a moral-theological purpose.

in order to be precise, one should not read the Latin medievals as having a philosophy.¹⁷

In light of the theological character of Latin medieval thought, should we continue to interpret it according to the standard areas of philosophy? Often faith appears to guide the use of reason to such an extent that to claim that we can remove the reasoning and present it as philosophy is surely unjustified.¹⁸ This is the crux of the problem in the historiography of medieval philosophy which challenges the Kleutgen-Stöckl model. For if reason was put to a thoroughgoing theological use in the Middle Ages, that is, if each stretch of argumentation was shaped by theological concerns, then why should we continue to speak about philosophy? Do the Latins follow a theological logic, reworking each term and account they borrow from the ancients, before putting what they find to a theological use? If reference accrues through theological use, then what does this imply for speaking of medieval philosophy?

In order to clarify the medieval use of philosophy, a reevaluation is needed of the classic medieval passages cited in support of the different branches of philosophy. For example, on human understanding, Aquinas clarifies the material and immaterial aspects in order to distinguish both human and divine cognition. Contrasting the limitations of human understanding with the perfect understanding of God allows him to explicate the limited manner according to which human beings imitate God. As was suggested at the end of the last chapter, Aquinas is not alone in putting Aristotle to a theological use. Both Scotus and Ockham discuss human under-

¹⁷ A careful historical study of Gilson's use of the word 'philosophy' in reference to the Middle Ages would serve to explicate his change of mind on this important issue in the historiography of medieval philosophy.

¹⁸ Not all medieval writers opt for theology in contrast to philosophy. For example, Averroes offers a different view in his consideration of whether the Koran commands or prohibits the study of philosophy in his *Kitab fasl al-maqal* (FM). In noting that the law of the Koran commands the study of philosophy, he identifies the aim and purpose of philosophy with those of religion (FM ch. 1; Hourani trans. p. 48). Philosophy has the same goal as the Koran. Yet since philosophy lies outside the reach of most people, the Koran was written to instruct all people, not only the intelligent and the virtuous (FM 3; p. 64). My point is that there were medievals who identified their projects with philosophy. For this reason it does not seem inaccurate to write the history of certain medieval traditions of philosophy according to the ancient spheres of philosophy. For example, see the Routledge *History of Islamic Philosophy*, edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (Nasr and Leaman 1996, 2: 783-998). Yet Latin writers like Augustine, Bonaventure, and Aquinas did not belong to these traditions. See Taylor 1991, 227-230.

standing within accounts of the human imitation of God. One is bound to inquire whether the extraction of these discussions from the theological context does a disservice to Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham?

A reevaluation is also needed of what it means to talk about medieval issues in metaphysics. For example, when discussing Aquinas's metaphysical view of existence, Armand Maurer quotes the statement that existence is "‘that which is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally present within all things’" (Maurer 1962, 177). Again, though, this statement is made by Aquinas in a discussion of the relations of creatures to God (ST Ia.8.1). He is considering whether God is in all things. Fidelity to the writer would demand that we discuss the context of his "philosophical" statements.

Another perennial metaphysical concern is the problem of universals. Yet, when discussing universals, historians often fail to discuss the author's theological purposes. For example, one of Ockham's key discussions of universals appears in the second distinction of his *Ordinatio* (O) where he considers whether universals are something inside or outside the human soul (O I.2.4-8). Historians have cited these texts in order to explain how Ockham differs from both Aquinas and Scotus on the problem of universals.¹⁹ Yet, Ockham notes at the beginning of question four that his purpose is to distinguish God from creatures. For this purpose he considers whether anything common can be predicated of both God and creatures, which he resolves in question nine. In other works, he did not write an account of universals for their own sake.

In the area of morality, Peter the Lombard argues for a connection between the virtues. He quotes Augustine to claim that the virtue of charity plays a central role in each of the moral virtues (Sent. III.36.1). Aquinas, as already indicated, takes up this discussion in his *Summa*, noting that while many pagans acquired moral virtue, they did not acquire the theological virtue of charity (ST IaIIae.65.2). This is a critical point: Aquinas believes that there is no true moral virtue without the theological virtue of charity. The Greeks did not discuss virtue in this sense, because they did not consider the theological virtues. Aquinas has a single ideal for the moral

¹⁹ Stöckl 1864-1866, 2: 1004-1005; Weinberg 1964, 248-253; Adams 1982, 411, 419-421.

life, an ideal of the good life infused with the divine gift of charity. This allows him to construct a theological account of the moral and infused virtues, and to prompt Mark Jordan's argument that we need to reconsider whether Aquinas has a moral philosophy at all (Jordan 1993, 236-241). With no real virtue that stands apart from the theological, Aquinas's project differs from a philosophical account of human virtue.

Scotus agrees that the only real virtue is theological virtue. For example when discussing the connections between the virtues, he argues that the moral virtues can be perfect in their species without the theological virtues (Ord III.36.3). Yet, even though there is such perfection, Scotus has no praise for the moral virtues apart from the theological. He distinguishes perfect moral virtue from moral perfection in order to claim that human beings cannot obtain moral perfection through moral virtue alone (Ord III.36.4). That is, a person might obtain perfect moral virtue, but not reach moral perfection.

Ockham also holds that philosophers have been able to be virtuous without the theological virtue of charity. Yet he explains that this virtue is ultimately of no value because meritorious acts cannot be performed without charity.²⁰ Since such acts are required for true perfection, there is no real human perfection apart from the infused gift of charity. And if there is no true moral virtue apart from charity for Aquinas, Scotus, or Ockham, the life of philosophy clearly does not appear to have been their project. Once again, in order to appreciate their use of moral philosophy, we need to recover the theological contexts.

Historians of medieval philosophy have considered Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham to be three of the most philosophically important intellectuals of the Middle Ages. Yet we need to reconsider the practice of interpreting them according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry. They appear to have studied Greek philosophy, even to the point of writing commentaries on the works of Aristotle, for specifically theological projects. Aquinas's claim that members of a religious order devoted to preaching and study should occupy themselves with ancient thought only in order to clarify God and His relations to creation appears to be shared by all three. They use terms and accounts from philosophy within webs of the-

²⁰ Report III.11.responsio ad dubia 1.

ological beliefs, a common practice during an age when intellectual problems remained largely within the general framework constructed by Peter the Lombard. By extracting Latin medieval philosophies, we are in danger of disemboweling medieval thought. The Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy stands in need of revision, which we can begin by recovering the theological context of the medieval use of philosophy.

Conclusion

While significant medieval Latin thinkers transformed philosophy into theology, philosophers in the modern period would transform medieval theology back into philosophy. Working within this tradition, Kleutgen and Stöckl read the medievals, and Aquinas in particular, against a backdrop of contemporary philosophical problems. They used specific medieval texts to construct a theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and ethics that allowed them to oppose what they took to be the subjectivism of Descartes, Kant, and the German Idealists, as well as the materialism of ancient Greece and the modern world. Arriving at a theory of knowledge and metaphysics that rested on real individual objects as the foundation of universal knowledge, they balanced the healthy respect for observation central to empiricism with the stress on universality central to the rationalists. With this view as their base, they sought to avoid the subjectivity of modern philosophy that leads to revolution and effect a reconciliation between reason and revelation that would preserve the traditional institutions of church and state.

Many prominent medievalists followed this reading late into the twentieth century. De Wulf, Geyer, and Gilson built their histories around Aquinas's contributions to the standard branches of philosophy and reconciliation of faith and reason. Boehner, Weinberg, and the contributors to the Kretzmann, Kenny and Pinborg volume continued to present the history of medieval philosophy according to the same branches. More recently, Peter Dronke remains faithful to this model when stating the parameters of the *History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, published in 1988:

Detailed treatment, however (not only in the section on individual authors but throughout the volume), has been limited to those writ-

ings in which reasoned argument, bearing on a traditional sphere of philosophical enquiry (such as logic, epistemology, or metaphysics), plays an important role (Dronke 1988, 6).

If, as I have argued, we need to reevaluate whether Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham offer an epistemology, a metaphysics, or a philosophical account of morality, then such a rule might exclude these, and many other medieval writers, from the history of medieval philosophy.

The separation of medieval philosophy from theology during the Counter-Reformation period, along with the political, ecclesiastical, and philosophical interests of the nineteenth century, appears to have brought about a misrepresentation in many of the standard histories of this subject. For example, Jordan states in his *Ordering Wisdom*, published in 1986, that to read Aquinas as having an epistemology is to read him through the lens of modern philosophy (Jordan 1986a, 118-119). Keeping in mind why it was important to locate an autonomous philosophy among the Latins indicates motivations for this interpretation. While historians might not have the same motives today, the institutionalization of the discipline of philosophy provides grounds for continuing to follow this model.²¹ Therefore, in order to determine its accuracy, we need to bracket our interest in viewing philosophy in the Middle Ages as an autonomous discipline and distance ourselves from interpreting the medievals according to the standard spheres of philosophical inquiry. Through a reconsideration of the categories that frame our interpretation of medieval thought, we position ourselves to rethink the model through which historians have come to read the medievals. Further research into medieval thought might disabuse us of talking so freely of the "traditional sphere of philosophical enquiry" (Dronke 1988, 6, quoted above).

John Marenbon takes a step in the right direction in the preface to the second edition of his *Early Medieval Philosophy*, written after his decision that the methodology of his first edition was inaccurate. Now in favor of a methodology developed in writing his *Later Medieval Philosophy*, published in 1987, he argues that in order to understand the views of medieval thinkers, we need to understand

²¹ Mark Jordan argues that new motives have not yet arisen for the writing of the history of medieval philosophy (Jordan 1994, 159).

the medievals historically and forsake what passes for the traditional categories of the philosophical disciplines:

When I reflected more about philosophy and its history, I began — gradually but firmly — to consider that my earlier approach was misleading. *Later Medieval Philosophy* rejects the principles which I had previously followed. In it (see especially pp. 1-2, 83-90, 189-91) I suggest that there is no single, identifiable subject — ‘philosophy’ — which has been studied by thinkers from Plato’s time to the present day. Although some of the problems discussed by thinkers in the past are similar to those discussed by philosophers today, each belongs to a context shaped by the disciplines recognized at the time. The historian who isolates ‘philosophical’ arguments from the past from their contexts, studying them without reference to the presuppositions and aims of their proponents, will not understand them.²²

Yet, in the second half of his *Later Medieval Philosophy*, devoted to late medieval accounts of human cognition, Marenbon does not present the medieval texts he cites within their context. While he does state that the medievals reflect on human cognition within discussions of the Trinity, disembodied souls, angels, and God, he does not explain the textual contexts of the individual passages he cites (Marenbon 1987, 94). For example, while noting the theological context of Aquinas’s treatment of cognition in general terms, he does not discuss the contexts of the specific Aquinian texts to which he refers (Marenbon 1987, 124-131). I hope to have supplied some of that context in the present work.

I agree with Marenbon that we should be cautious about applying modern philosophical categories to medieval texts. But in using intellectual knowledge as the major theme in an account of later medieval philosophy, he continues to construct the history of medieval philosophy around a modern interest in epistemology. Of course philosophers will rightly be interested in comments on human understanding, but unless readers are introduced to the con-

²² (Marenbon 1988, vii-viii) More recently, Norman Kretzmann defends the traditional view by arguing that Aquinas has a natural theology in his *Summa contra gentiles*. Like Kleutgen, he picks this work on account of the rational character of the first three books (Kretzmann 1997, 28-30, 39-42). Yet what is at question here is the application of words like ‘apologetics,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘metaphysics’ within different historical contexts. See Hibbs 1995, Jordan 1986b, French and Cunningham 1996, Marenbon 1998, 1-9.

text of these medieval discussions, the same sort of misunderstanding against which Marenbon rails will continue.²³

In the reevaluation of our model of the history of medieval philosophy, another, more basic question arises. Paul Vignaux asks in his *Philosophie au moyen âge* "what place should be made in the history of philosophy for a typically theological age" (Vignaux 1958, 10). If it turns out that the Latins did not generally do philosophy in the Middle Ages, should we not omit the study of medieval thought from the history of philosophy?²⁴ From the perspective of the history of philosophy, we should by all means continue to study medieval thought in order to follow the history of the intellectual vocabulary of the West, from the ancient world to the modern period. Terms like 'substance,' 'form,' 'intellect,' 'species,' 'passion,' 'being,' and 'certainty' have ancient and medieval pedigrees. If we are to understand the later history of ancient thought, and the intellectual background to the early modern period, we need to understand the medievals.

And in order to understand the projects of medieval writers, we need to clarify the reasoning of the medievals themselves. Latin medieval masters of sacred teaching offer literally thousands of intriguing arguments, which while they may not be exactly philos-

²³ The debate over whether to read the medievals according to the branches of modern philosophy or within textual context finds expression more recently in the *Cambridge Companion to Aquinas* edited by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, published in 1993. With chapters devoted to metaphysics, philosophy of mind, theory of knowledge, ethics, and law and politics, this work might appear to be written according to the model of Kleutgen and Stöckl. However, signs of a growing tension are apparent in McNerny's and Jordan's discussions of ethics. McNerny presents Aquinas as in agreement with Aristotle for holding that human beings become good through rational activity. He argues that since virtue is defined as that which makes a person's actions good, moral virtue includes those activities that lead one to act rationally (McNerny 1993, 202-203). Jordan challenges this by demonstrating that if an action is truly virtuous for Aquinas, then it must be infused from on high (Jordan 1993, 236-241). Rational activity is not enough for true moral virtue and Aquinas is therefore not in agreement with Aristotle. Such divergent approaches to medieval texts can serve as a catalyst for reevaluating our model of the history of medieval philosophy.

²⁴ Some Islamic medieval discussions are a different story, as I indicated in my comments above on Averroes's identification of philosophy and religion. Averroes equates philosophy and Scripture in a way that the Latin tradition does not. In regard to Jewish thought, Leo Strauss argues persuasively that Maimonides offers a discussion of biblical teaching in the *Guide for the Perplexed* and not a philosophy (Strauss 1941, 37-45). Howard Kreisel makes a similar point about Maimonides, but adds that this reflects one of two longstanding interpretative traditions. The other tradition places Maimonides closer to Averroes (Kreisel 1997, 249-252).

ophy, nevertheless demonstrate the use of human reason to make sense of the human condition, something like symphonic variations on Plato's cave. Erigena, Anselm, Abelard, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Robert Kilwardby, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, to name a few, reason carefully in offering sacred accounts of God and his creation. For example, Aquinas offers lucid argument after lucid argument in the 2652 articles of his *Summa theologiae*, including more than 10,000 responses to objections (Werner 1889, 1: 876). They do not offer proof texts for church dogma as Brucker claimed, but argue for a sacred version of the good life that ends with a return trip to the divine. These arguments themselves are the most important reason for philosophers to continue to study medieval thought. Medieval writers attained such a high degree of intellectual rigor, that their works continue to be intellectually challenging and philosophically important.

With the Kleutgen-Stöckl model of the history of medieval philosophy in mind, we ought to read the medievals anew. Through a reconsideration of the degree to which the medievals wrote accounts of logic, epistemology, natural philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, morals, political philosophy, natural theology, and the relations between faith and reason we can begin to reevaluate the dominant model.²⁵ By reading the medievals in context, we can rethink the basic categories through which they have been presented.²⁶ In the process, we can reexamine our criteria for ranking philosophical significance. If Aquinas, and other Latin medieval thinkers, are not

²⁵ Even medieval discussions of logic are not immune to contextualization. For example, Mikko Yrjönsuuri argues that practical reasons, and not theoretical ones, motivated Ockham to write specific sections of his *Summa logicae* (Knuuttila and Yrjönsuuri 1988; Yrjönsuuri 1993; 1994).

²⁶ Consideration of the medieval historical and institutional context can also help in writing this history. In this regard, the chapters on the social and cultural context in the Routledge *History of Jewish Philosophy*, edited by Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, are of interest. For example, Steven Wasserstrom's treatment of the Islamic context of Jewish thought gives one reason to doubt certain commonly-held views (Wasserstrom 1997, 93-114). In presenting clear accounts of the arguments together with issues concerning the historical context, the first part of this history represents a new direction in the historiography of medieval philosophy. While not providing the same degree of detail on the historical and institutional context, the Routledge history of medieval philosophy includes chapters that successfully reconstruct stretches of reasoning within the textual context. For example, see Brian Davies on Aquinas and Stephen Dumont on Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus (Marenbon 1998, 241-268, 291-328, respectively).

philosophically significant on account of having worked out interesting philosophies, we need to read their texts afresh in order to find out what they did in fact accomplish.

The contemporary crisis in the historiography of medieval philosophy provides an opportunity to reconceive the medieval use of ancient Greek philosophy, specific medieval types of inquiry, and the influence that medieval thought had on modern philosophy. And if we read medieval thinkers contextually, and avoid the modern philosophical blinders that appear to have obscured so much of what passes for the history of medieval philosophy, we can begin to write the history of medieval thought through discussion of the projects upon which the medievals actually labored. By reading them contextually, and reconstructing their arguments, we can obtain a better idea of which problems and positions might continue to hold philosophical interest; we can distinguish treatments of creation in relation to God from modern preoccupations with things for their own sake. Ultimately the challenge is a dialectical one, for in order to read medieval writers contextually we will need to clarify our own assumptions about what constitutes philosophy.

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